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Stanford International Policy Review
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Affairs
Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

Email: stanfordipr@stanford.edu
Website: <https://fsi.stanford.edu/sipr>

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Editors' Note

Welcome to the Fall 2020 edition of the *Stanford International Policy Review* (Volume 5, Issue 2). This issue features work addressing the theme of Inflection Points, offering insightful policy analysis of our turbulent and changing geopolitical landscape. The theme was inspired by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Black Lives Matter movement and other global justice movements, and declining trust in political institutions. During the editorial cycle, the United States weathered a historic presidential election and an unprecedented attack on the U.S. Capitol. These events, alongside a host of international developments, further underscore the urgent need for policymakers to begin identifying and reflecting on the challenges and opportunities of shaping the way forward.

Against this backdrop, SIPR's authors present an array of policy suggestions and reflections, among them analyses on the unmet promises for transitional justice in Mexico during the Andrés Manuel López Obrador administration and the impacts of the end of "One Country, Two Systems" on Hong Kong's property law and the autonomy of its people. SIPR continues to balance academic and practitioner perspectives, serving as a bridge between the two communities. In particular, we are thrilled to feature commentary from William Perry Research Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation and former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer on prospects for the U.S.-Ukraine relationship under the new Biden administration. Finally, to reach a broader range of audiences, the SIPR editorial board is also pleased to announce the launch of the SIPR Forum, the digital companion to the *Stanford International Policy Review*, which publishes cutting-edge analyses of timely and relevant issues in international affairs in the form of short articles and opinion pieces.

The editorial board hopes you will enjoy the contributions and critically engage with the policy questions they grapple with. In closing, we would like to thank our advisory board, the Master's in International Policy program, and the Office of the Vice Provost for Graduate Education for their continued support.

Kelsi Caywood and Adriana Stephan
Editors-in-Chief, SIPR
Stanford University, California, USA

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Changes for the Post-COVID World: Reforming the World Health Organization

By Min Byung Chae

The global response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been subpar. As some national leaders downplayed the danger of the virus, the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths mounted. Amidst this global confusion, the World Health Organization (WHO), as the “directing and coordinating authority on international health work,” has undertaken some crucial tasks to counter the threat of the virus.¹ This included convening experts in February to “establish priorities and timelines for COVID-19 research,” disseminating research on COVID-19, and urging national governments to enhance testing.²

Yet the World Health Organization has been criticized for what is perceived as a delay in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably, the WHO delayed declaring COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) until late January and did not classify it as a pandemic until mid-March. In July, U.S. President Donald Trump responded by withdrawing the United States from the WHO, accusing the organization of failing to implement long-due reforms in its priorities and structure.³ We cannot outright reject such an accusation given the WHO’s past shortcomings. For instance, the WHO failed to accurately report the severity of the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak and effectively coordinate vaccine distribution.⁴ Furthermore, during the 2014 Ebola outbreak, the WHO withdrew its team prematurely from the disease epicenter in Sierra Leone, was slow to disclose the severity of the outbreak to the international community, and failed to quickly marshal international support,⁵ leading Professor Ashish Jha, the director of Harvard Global Health Institute, to describe WHO’s response as an “egregious failure.”⁶

In light of these events, it is crucial to reform the WHO now. This is necessary not only to prevent future health emergencies, but also to secure the survival of the WHO as an organization. As the world faces new health challenges like COVID-19 and existing ones like influenza, it needs a transparent leader in setting global benchmarks and respond-

ing to crises in global health.⁷ But the WHO remains poorly financed and overstrained as new institutions have challenged the WHO's leading role in global health.⁸ Organizational inefficiency, unclear priorities, and subpar financing have left the WHO as an agency with many responsibilities but diminished power.⁹ The WHO must, therefore, conduct a rigorous self-examination of what it can and cannot perform.¹⁰ Organizational reform will not only better prepare the WHO for future health emergencies, it will help the WHO to regain the public's trust as facilitator of global public health and provider of scientific expertise. The following are recommendations for possible reforms.

1. Prioritize Collaboration and Coordination in Global Health

The WHO has too much on its plate. Its constitution lists twenty-two functions towards its objective of “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.”¹¹ However, many of these functions overlap with other organizations' activities, such as UNICEF's function of promoting maternal and child health and welfare, a mandate which overlaps with the WHO's function (L) in Article 2 of the WHO Constitution.¹² The WHO should instead focus on the activities that it has comparative advantage over other bodies, such as establishing global health standards and providing advice to national governments on public health measures.¹³ The WHO has historically had success in what are called ‘normative functions’—technical guidance, information collection and dissemination, alerting the international community to an epidemic's threat, and facilitating national governments' implementation of its advice, such as in the global drive towards eradication of smallpox in the mid-20th century.¹⁴

To ensure that the WHO does not remain overstretched, the WHO should better coordinate with other agencies in global public health. In deciding which functions to collaborate on, the WHO's leadership must consider whether it effectively fulfills such functions and whether others can achieve them more readily.¹⁵ For instance, the growing call to establish a WHO medical corps could be satisfied by existing organizations like Doctors Without Borders (MSF).¹⁶ Outsourcing functions such as medical personnel deployment would improve overall efficiency by utilizing other agencies' comparative advantage.¹⁷ In return, these agencies could be compensated or be recognized as the global leader in those functions. In coordinating with other agencies, the WHO should clearly delineate its responsibility from those of other organizations and eliminate redundancies. As Laurie Garrett, a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations suggested in 2015, the WHO and the World Bank might better coordinate their respective roles as advisors and financiers when handling outbreaks of infectious disease.¹⁸ Overall, this approach would be more efficient than the WHO having overlapping roles

with other agencies.¹⁹

2. Engage Non-State Actors

The exclusion of non-state actors from the WHO's work hinders its ability to carry out its primary functions of directing and coordinating international health work. The leadership of the WHO must recognize that national governments are no longer the only important actors in addressing global health challenges.²⁰ Unlike fifty years ago, the field of global health now has a variety of contributors, such as the Global Fund and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.²¹ This has created what Professor of Public Health Kelley Lee calls a "market-driven global health environment," in which different initiatives compete for donors' funding to achieve the same goal, wasting valuable resources.²² The contributions from non-state actors cannot be ignored in performing the WHO's functions.

The WHO should thus advocate for including NGOs, private donors, and civil society groups in its governing body, the World Health Assembly (WHA). A potential model to emulate is the tripartite structure of the International Labor Organization (ILO) that involves representatives from states, labor force, and businesses, thereby integrating both "non-state actors and state actors within its decision-making body."²³ WHO might consider allocating more votes per state representatives to persuade member states that are reluctant to cede influence to non-state actors. Achieving a more integrative leadership structure can be accomplished by amending the WHO Constitution to enlarge the composition of the WHA, which requires a supermajority vote in the WHA.

3. Rejuvenate the Funding Structure

The WHO's budget is another concern. For one, it is too small for the WHO's responsibilities. The WHO's budget is only one-third the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's budget yet had a similar number of responsibilities in the 2015 fiscal year.²⁴ The composition of WHO's budget poses an additional challenge, as funding is often distributed regardless of programmatic need. For instance, in the 2014-15 budget cycle, funding for noncommunicable diseases increased by 21 percent while funding for outbreak response dropped by 51.4 percent.²⁵ The drop in outbreak response funding led to budget cuts in the WHO's emergency response units and left the organization with only one technical expert on Ebola.²⁶ The poor Ebola response is indicative of larger problems stemming from the WHO's ineffective financing structure. As member states have resisted increases to their mandatory membership dues for many years,²⁷ the WHO

has relied on voluntary contributions from member states and private donors, which now make up more than 80 percent of its overall budget.²⁸ Dependence on voluntary contributions has left the WHO vulnerable to the whims of private organizations,²⁹ since donors usually earmark their contributions to be used for specific purposes, which may or may not be aligned with the WHO's global health priorities.

To decrease dependency on private donors, the WHO should consolidate its financing structure. The WHO leadership should discourage private donors from earmarking their voluntary contributions for specific purposes through continued campaigning. The WHO should also consider expanding the Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE), a separate fund for rapid responses to pandemics established after the 2014 Ebola outbreak. An expanded CFE could help the WHO in quickly distributing information and resources during pandemics. In addition, the WHO leadership should continue to make use of the WHO Foundation, an independent grant-making agency established in May 2020 to finance the WHO. Consolidating the WHO financing structure will help the WHO mitigate its perennial funding problem and give the organization more leeway to direct funds where needed the most.

4. Strengthen the International Health Regulations Framework

In addition, the WHO, the WHA, and the constituent member states should reform the dysfunctional IHR regime, a legal instrument that defines the rights and responsibilities of WHO member states during epidemics. The IHR framework “asks member states to prepare for public health threats according to standards set by the WHO and to report any outbreaks.”³⁰ It also requires them to “develop public health capacities to detect and respond” to Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC),³¹ a designation that the WHO can declare over member states’ objection.³² Once the WHO declares an outbreak to be a PHEIC, IHR calls for “the least intrusive measures possible and strong protection for freedom of movement and other human rights.”³³ However, the WHO cannot enforce the IHR. Without member states’ consent, the WHO cannot deploy international assistance inside a state’s borders,³⁴ force states to act on its advice,³⁵ or compel governments to share information.³⁶ In fact, in the past, triggering PHEIC led member states to defy WHO’s advice. For instance, during the Ebola outbreak, national governments instituted travel bans, which deterred valuable information transfers and hindered crucial medical supply lines.³⁷

To reform the IHR, the WHO could allow the IHR secretariat to control its own budget and possess an internal information-gathering unit, using its network of national health

ministries and regional offices. IHR reforms would ensure that the IHR does not solely rely on information from member states and is protected from political considerations that can interfere with science-based decisions.³⁸ Moreover, the WHO could consider collaborating with the UN Security Council to give the IHR more gravitas on the international stage. For instance, the Security Council could issue resolutions in support of the WHO when the WHO declares PHEIC in the future, “which would bolster the WHO by giving greater ... force to its actions.”³⁹ The Security Council can issue resolutions by interpreting its mandate more broadly to “encompass human security.”⁴⁰ Such an interpretation would be less controversial than vesting the WHO with new regulatory powers that could encroach on national sovereignty. Furthermore, such a measure has precedent. During the Ebola epidemic, the Security Council called for further engagement from the international community, which raised Ebola’s profile and ushered in more assistance.⁴¹

Conclusion

The World Health Organization must adapt to the changing realities of the world, as the handling of the COVID-19 pandemic underscores. Outsourcing duplicate functions and including the leadership of non-state actors would improve the organizational efficiency of the WHO. Revitalizing the funding structure and enlarging the existing Contingency Fund for Emergencies would help the WHO to financially prepare for outbreaks. Finally, strengthening the IHR framework would support the WHO in advising member states more effectively on sound public health measures. These reforms will ensure that the WHO remains a global coordinator of public health for years to come.

Min Byung Chae is a Research Professional at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. He graduated cum laude from Yale University in May 2020, majoring in Global Affairs with distinction. His interests include development economics, poverty alleviation, and the role of international organizations.

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From Great Powers to Great Victims

By Natasha Lock

Great Powers have altered the way they express their greatness. There has been a shift from promoting one's internal greatness in the face of an externally weak system, to capitalizing on victimhood and weakness in the face of rising foreign competitors. In the 1960s, the height of the Cold War, a strong self-identification on the world stage was paramount. Leaders showing any signs of internal weakness was unthinkable; it could have led to the crumbling of the Iron Curtain or skepticism in universal capitalist democracy. The image the United States and the Soviet Union propagandized to their citizens was one of ultimate domestic strength against adversaries. In the early stages of the Cold War, this conviction of domestic strength helped to establish a pervasive sense of political superiority within each of the nations.

In 2020, a different world stage emerged. The bipolar international structure has a new player—China—that has not only supplanted the Soviet Union, but eclipsed any actual competition the former power presented to the United States. Yet the way the world's current Great Powers—the United States and China—self-identify has metamorphosed from victors leading the global system, to victims *of* said system. This has been seen in Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" 2016 campaign and Xi Jinping's focus on "National Rejuvenation" that is rooted in remembering past humiliation. What have been some of the structural changes that have led to the manifestation of this inflection point?

In the 1960s, Mao's top-down narratives portrayed the United States as weak, corrupt, and futile; nothing but "dogs to be swept into the dustbin of history."¹ The CCP propagandized Beijing's greatness in the face of rightists and the capitalist "running dogs," scribing down superior ideology within the vade mecum Little Red Books.² As my Chinese teacher once told me, when greeted with another year of meager food supplies during the 60s, herself and a generation of malnourished children in China

were reminded to “think of all the poor American children who have nothing for dinner tonight.” During his visit to the United States in 1979, Deng Xiaoping witnessed firsthand how incompatible with reality that narrative had been.³

America throughout the 1960s was a melting pot of ideas, an explosion of modernity and exercised the push for global democracy. Under the inherited notions stemming from Manifest Destiny, it was the supposed civic duty of the post-WWII United States to promote ideals of liberalism and democracy as the newly born “Leader of the Free World.” Advocacy of these ideals had reached the shores of post-war Japan, which had subscribed to political democracy. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s subscription to the Domino Theory and the revival of liberalism for the Vietnamese people was the supposed motive for sending U.S. advisors to Saigon. The United States’ lead in the space-race enshrined American predominance in the Cold War system. To the Western eye, what made America so great was its confidence in the power of its own greatness.

Fast-forward to 2020, where two powerful leaders compete at who can play the biggest victim. Xi Jinping has emphasized the humiliation China suffered under foreign powers during the “Century of Humiliation,” and the threats some of these same nations—the United Kingdom and Japan, for example—continue to pose to a growing and changing China. Meanwhile, Donald Trump has sought to convince the American people that they are victims of job loss and overseas manufacturing competition, and that immigrants are undermining domestic socio-economic security. Narrating facets of victimhood at the hands of outside actors has served as the glue to hold China’s nationalism together and congregate Trump supporters in America.

Ultimately, exacerbating “them” versus “us” mentalities works to the favor of legitimizing Xi’s and Trump’s power. Henri Tajfel, a preeminent scholar of social psychology, notes “there can be no intergroup behavior without the relevant aspects of the social environment having been categorized.”⁴ Whilst divided societies are a natural part of human existence, the categorization of the social environment is produced through artificial means. Often this is maneuvered by the politically savvy, who foster internal tensions to protect and expand their overarching power. Instead of internally dividing populations, the form of divide employed by Xi and Trump is focused on exacerbating nation-against-nation, culture-against-culture, and ultimately them-versus-us. Indeed, the more Xi and Trump can fabricate their weakness against the threat of a dominant out-group, the more loyalty they will receive from the in-group who fears their survival.

China has adopted a self-serving narrative of the past, using history as a politically

expedient tool. Zheng Wang, a professor at Seton Hall studying historical memory, is cognizant of how Chinese officials interpret history differently depending on exigencies of the current era.⁵ Beijing has sought to strengthen nationalist sentiment by evoking collective historical memory. The CCP's selected era to re-engage the Chinese people is the "Century of Humiliation." This marks a period of history, beginning with the First Opium War, upheld through unfair treaties, prolonged by Japanese aggression, and only lifted following the Communist Party's arrival to power in 1949. Beijing sought this collective memory to reinvigorate patriotic fervor and serve as the new national glue to hold the country together as domestic ideology itself began to dissolve in the post-Reform and Opening era, where Maoist ideology did not comport with the realities of new found explosive economic growth.⁶ Indeed, it was only in 1991, following the Tiananmen incident and the fall of the Soviet Union, that China's leadership revised historical narratives to portray China as a victim of the international system.

With near-absolute control over education, the media, and the internet, the CCP can immediately modify the historical narrative presented to its people. Patriotic education (*aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu*) has played a significant role in the school educational syllabus for Chinese students. From 1947 to 1990, not a single book was published about national humiliation in China; today it forms part of a nation-wide core syllabus taught to China's 260 million students.⁷

The very narrative of victimhood has proven convenient in developing China's fraternal relationships with countries (who have experienced their own victimhood under Western colonialism) along the Belt and Road Initiative. Maximilian Mayer explicitly acknowledges that national histories often conflate the unity of a shared past.⁸ Mayer uses the term "historical statecraft" to describe the selective interpretation of history to serve national interests. He marshals evidence that the CCP is uniquely creating a shared *regional* history across BRI countries that a selection of the international community can participate in. The tactic has drawn de facto success: after Xi Jinping publicized his affinity for Greece on a shared past of "art looting" by the British and announced support for the repatriation of the Elgin Marbles, Greece was one of the first member states of the EU to sign a memorandum of understanding on the BRI with China.⁹

Meanwhile, in 2016, Trump won a presidential election on a campaign promising to "Make America Great Again." This slogan suggested to the world and to the American people that the United States had lost its greatness. For Americans aggrieved by multiculturalism and the legacy of the 2008 economic crash, Trump's racist rhetoric has convinced them that they are being victimized by outsiders—by immigrants, overseas

manufacturing, and a “foreign” disease. In *Scientific America*, Michele Gelfand *et. al.* argue that Trump has monopolized on fearful voters, pitting them against other culture groups through ruthless use of threatening language.¹⁰ Immigrants, for example, are no longer viewed as the victims of an unequal international system, but rather as an overpowering threat to American cultural identity. In a warped dispersal of blame, the Davids are being considered as Goliaths, by the Goliaths themselves.

Xi and Trump have orchestrated dominant narratives that are attractive to their citizens. For the Chinese teenager scrolling through news outlets and popular media, the barrage of foreign criticism against Beijing is nothing more than the Western powers’ continued attempts to humiliate China. For the unemployed Missouri worker, the lack of job opportunities can be blamed on immigrants taking jobs and China’s dominance in manufacturing. To channel the blame onto external actors and frame oneself as a victim is a productive mechanism to distract citizens from domestic problems. International calls to address human rights abuses in Xinjiang have been labelled by the Chinese state as “malicious baseless lies within the US... used to humiliate China.”¹¹ Amidst Washington’s inability to control the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, Trump has consistently described America as a victim of a Chinese-borne disease. Both of these narratives draw their success from painting themselves as the victim of external factors.

One can hardly imagine a boxer entering the ring telling their audience of previous downfalls. Nowadays, from San Francisco to Shanghai, we are seeing the adoption of a “victim” affinity. Yet the incongruities of these major nation’s self-identification are puzzling, as the narratives do not comport with the realities of the power and wealth shared by the United States and China in the contemporary world. This leaves oneself wondering, can a nation be a “successful” Great Power and a victim at the same time?

Natasha Lock holds a degree in History, International Relations and Mandarin Chinese from the University of Exeter. She is a Yenching Scholar at Peking University, where her work examines top-down state narratives and modern Chinese nationalism. Natasha currently resides in Taipei, where she is conducting field research alongside teaching roles and freelance writing.

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The Biden Presidency and Ukraine

By Steven Pifer

In a December 2020 New York Times interview, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed Joe Biden’s election as U.S. president. Zelensky observed that Biden “knows Ukraine better than the previous president” and “will really help strengthen relations, help settle the war in Donbas, and end the occupation of our territory.”¹

While Zelensky’s comments may prove overly optimistic, there is little reason to doubt that the Biden presidency will be good for Ukraine. The incoming president knows the country, and he understands both the value of a stable and successful Ukraine for U.S. interests in Europe and the challenges posed to Ukraine and the West by Russia. That might—might, not will, but might—help break the logjam on the stalemated Donbas conflict, which Zelensky of course would welcome. Perhaps less welcome to the Ukrainian president may be Biden’s readiness to play hardball to press Kyiv to take needed but politically difficult reform and anti-corruption steps. Ukraine’s success as a liberal democracy depends not just on ending its conflict with Russia but also on combating corruption and advancing still necessary economic reforms.

U.S.-Ukraine Relations under Trump

In one sense, U.S. policy toward Ukraine during the Trump administration had its strengths. It continued political and military support for Kyiv, including the provision of lethal military assistance that the Obama administration had been unwilling to provide. It maintained and strengthened Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia. And it took further steps to bolster the U.S. and NATO military presence in central European states on Ukraine’s western border.

However, Donald Trump never seemed committed to his administration’s policy. His primary engagement on Ukraine was his bid to extort Kyiv into manufacturing derogatory

information on his Democratic opponent, a bid that led to his impeachment.² Beyond that, Trump showed no interest in the country and consistently refused to criticize Vladimir Putin, who has inflicted more than six years of low-intensity war on Ukraine.

The Biden presidency will end this dichotomy in Washington's approach to Kyiv. The president and his administration will align on policy. That new predictability will mean that Ukrainian officials no longer have to worry about late night presidential tweets or the subjugation of U.S. policy interests to the president's personal political vendettas.

Two Challenges Confronting Ukraine

As Biden takes office, two principal challenges confront Ukraine. The conflict with Russia poses the first.³ In March 2014, in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution, Russian military forces seized Crimea. Weeks later, Russian security forces instigated a conflict in Donbas, masked poorly as a "separatist" uprising. The Kremlin provided leadership, funding, heavy weapons, ammunition, other supplies and, when necessary, regular units of the Russian army. Now in its seventh year, that conflict has claimed the lives of some 13,000 people.

While Moscow illegally annexed Crimea, it has not moved to annex Donbas. It appears instead to want to use a simmering conflict in that eastern Ukrainian region as a means to put pressure on, destabilize and disorient the government in Kyiv, with the goal of making it harder for the government to build a successful Ukrainian state and draw closer to Europe. (Moscow has interfered elsewhere in the post-Soviet space to try to maintain a Russian sphere of influence.)

Without the Kremlin's cooperation, Kyiv on its own cannot resolve the conflict in Donbas, and Crimea poses an even harder question. However, meeting the second of the challenges facing Ukraine—implementation of reforms and anti-corruption measures needed to build a fair, robust and growing economy—lies largely within Kyiv's purview. Unfortunately, after a good start by Zelensky and his first government, reforms have stagnated, oligarchs retain undue political and economic influence (including within Zelensky's Servant of the People party), and the judicial branch remains wholly unreconstructed.⁴ Among other things, this depresses much-needed investment in the country.

Progress Toward a Resolution in Donbas?

The Biden presidency might well play a more active role in the moribund negotiating process regarding Donbas. As co-chairs of the “Normandy process,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron have had little success of late in implementation of the 2015 Minsk agreement, which laid out a path to a settlement and restoration of full Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas.⁵ Unfortunately, it appears that the Kremlin calculates that the benefits of keeping Kyiv distracted currently outweigh the costs, including of Western sanctions.

Zelensky believes that a more active U.S. role could change that calculation and inject momentum into the process. At a minimum, the Biden presidency should appoint a special envoy to coordinate with the Germans and French, and, more broadly, with the European Union, Britain, Canada and others on Western support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. That position has gone unfilled since September 2019.

Whether Biden, who will face many demands on his time, will choose to engage personally is a different question. He knows Ukraine, having traveled there six times when he served as vice president. And, unlike Trump, who sought quick victories, Biden understands that solving a question like Donbas would require an investment of his time over a sustained period. It would make sense if it became clear that his engagement would shake up things in a way that would increase the prospects of a settlement and return of Donbas to Ukrainian sovereignty.

At first glance, the Kremlin might not welcome that kind of U.S. involvement, but there are good arguments for it. First of all, the United States is Ukraine’s strongest Western supporter, and Washington’s voice carries considerable weight in Kyiv. Second, Russia’s current conflict against Ukraine is not just about Donbas; it is also about Ukraine’s place in Europe, that is, where the country fits between Russia and institutions such as the European Union and NATO.⁶ Addressing that question will require diplomatic finesse. Given the trans-Atlantic relationship, which will be revived under Biden, it is difficult to see such a geopolitical discussion taking place without American participation.

As for Crimea, Ukraine cannot at present muster the political, diplomatic, economic and military leverage to effect the peninsula’s return. Still, the U.S. government knows how to do non-recognition policy.⁷ It did so for five decades with regard to the Baltic states’ incorporation into the Soviet Union. The Biden presidency will remain supportive of Kyiv’s claim to Crimea and not recognize its annexation by Russia—and the White House will express this view.

Domestic Reform

After an encouraging start on reform, Zelensky wavered in 2020. He has to do more, and Biden can be helpful, though in a manner the Ukrainian president may not appreciate. A big part of the problem is that Zelensky himself seems to have lost his way. Ruslan Ryaboshapka, his reformist first prosecutor general, observed that “Instead of fighting oligarchs, [Zelensky] chose to peacefully coexist with them.”⁸ Biden could well prove the kind of friend that Ukraine needs now: supportive but direct with Zelensky on what must be done, and ready to push him to take politically hard measures that he might prefer to avoid.

Biden has already shown that he can do this. As vice president in the Obama administration, he had the lead on U.S. engagement with Ukraine. When necessary, he applied “tough love,” famously withholding a one-billion-dollar loan guarantee until then-President Petro Poroshenko fired a prosecutor general who was viewed widely, inside and outside of Ukraine, as corrupt.⁹

A dose of such tough love now seems necessary with Kyiv. One question concerns access to low interest credits under Ukraine’s stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund.¹⁰ The IMF conditions disbursements of those credits on how Ukraine implements reform commitments that it made to secure the agreement. The Biden administration should, and almost certainly will, back the IMF in insisting that Ukraine needs to deliver on its commitments in order to secure additional disbursements.

Likewise, the Biden administration should make more bilateral U.S. assistance conditional on Ukraine tackling particular reforms. In doing so, it should consult and coordinate closely with the European Union, which has greater assistance resources available. Introducing a higher degree of conditionality to Western assistance programs could usefully ratchet up the pressure on the leadership in Kyiv to take reform steps that are in the country’s broader interest but opposed by key oligarchs or political groups who stand to lose from such reforms.

Priority should go to encouraging reform of the judicial branch, including the Constitutional Court, which has a core of judges who appear beholden to special interests. The high court reversed earlier laws requiring members of parliament and government officials to disclose their assets and could threaten other reforms.¹¹

At home, the Biden administration can assist Ukraine by implementing a ban on

anonymous shell companies by requiring disclosure of who actually forms companies in the United States as contained in the Corporate Transparency Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act.¹² This will make it more difficult for corrupt Ukrainians to shelter ill-gotten gains in U.S. assets.

The Biden presidency is good news for Ukraine and those who wish to see it develop into a modern European state. It will mean more high-level but hard-nosed U.S. support. That could lead to greater progress on reform within the country. And, with some imaginative diplomacy and luck, it might even help break the logjam with Russia over resolving the fate of Donbas.

Steven Pifer is a William Perry Research Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.

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Relief and Rescue

Financial Regulatory Suspensions in the United Kingdom

By Iris H-Y Chiu, Andreas Kokkinis, and Andrea Miglionico

I. Introduction

This introduction provides an overview of the context in which financial regulators in the United Kingdom responded to extraordinary financial needs from the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. We provide a brief introduction to policies of “relief” and “rescue” supported by financial regulatory suspensions and a roadmap to the rest of the article.

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted economic activity as governments imposed lockdowns in many countries.¹ In the UK, fears of widespread contagion and risk to public health caused the government to announce a lockdown of society and the economy.² Business activity has been adversely affected in many sectors³ and in April 2020, economic output fell by at least 20 percent compared to the same period in the previous year.⁴

The financial implications of the economic lockdown were immediate as the corporate sector is heavily financialized.⁵ The freezing of business activity in many sectors has implications for corporations’ cash flow, servicing of debt, potential insolvency and, hence, their market valuation and credit rating assessments. Besides public finance packages for emergency help, such as furloughing,⁶ policymakers have turned to private sector finance to alleviate the financial stresses and hardships caused to households and corporations. In other words, private sector finance is being relied on, to a significant extent, but not exclusively, to meet the policy goals of “relief and rescue” for households and corporations. “Relief” refers to the policy goal of giving corporations and households temporary release from the pressures of debt which are exacerbated in

the weak economic conditions during the pandemic. “Rescue” refers to facilitating the access of corporations to finance to keep them afloat in relation to expenses, losses, and shoring up for the future.

These policies are similar to those undertaken by many countries.⁷ In the UK, which is the focus of the article, the policy goals of “relief and rescue” were carried out by the enactment of emergency legislation,⁸ as well as by regulatory actions under the leadership of financial regulators, i.e., the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA)⁹ and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).¹⁰ The PRA and FCA suspended the application of certain regulatory laws and private contractual obligations applicable to their regulated entities. Regulatory suspensions may, at first blush, be regarded as temporary, and we may expect regulatory resumption once the crisis of the pandemic fades. However, we argue that more permanent institutional change may occur, based on the theoretical positioning of regulatory suspensions within the legal theory of finance.¹¹

Regulatory suspension can be seen as one of the ways the “elasticity” of law is realized in order to cater to wider political, social and economic needs.¹² Legal elasticity is posited in Pistor’s legal theory of finance,¹³ showing when suspensions of laws and regulations may occur under extraordinary circumstances such as financial crises. We situate the regulatory suspensions introduced by UK financial regulators during the COVID-19 crisis within the theorization of legal elasticity. Reis and Vasconcelos¹⁴ argue that such elasticity is institutionally supported based on the expected macro-economic behaviour of agents in markets, and empirical evidence also offers support for the *ex post* efficiency and welfare effects of certain suspensions, in private law agreements such as debt moratoria.¹⁵ Carruthers¹⁶ characterizes contractual suspensions as “financial decommodification” that is necessary when markets are temporarily dysfunctional.

In Pistor’s legal theory of finance, law is central for constructing finance; hence, legal elasticity is resorted to when existing law is no longer able to meet overarching policy goals such as financial stability.¹⁷ This theorization, drawn largely from observations during the global financial crisis of 2007-09,¹⁸ depicts law in an instrumental sense and bound up with power structures that influence legal change, but also treats law in a structural sense.¹⁹ Hence, legal elasticity may not avoid structural effects, such as institutional dissonance and change. In this manner, regulatory suspensions in the UK should be perceived as going beyond merely being instrumental. It is imperative to explore the nature of regulatory suspensions within the framework of legal elasticity as a fully theorized account so regulators can perceive more fully the implications of their deployment. This will help mitigate the unintended and adverse consequences

that regulatory suspensions may entail, which could ultimately undermine the public policy goals of relief and rescue. Further, the impression that regulatory suspensions in financial law and regulation are only short-lived is difficult to sustain, with extensions having already been made to them.²⁰ Our study, although focused on the UK, offers lessons and insights for developed financial jurisdictions that embarked on financial regulatory suspensions.²¹

Section II explores the concept of legal elasticity as theorized in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. We argue that this concept can be extended to encompass regulatory suspensions introduced in the COVID-19 crisis. However, as Sections III and IV illustrate, the application of legal elasticity to credit laws and regulation, and capital markets regulation respectively, has resulted in a number of unanswered questions and unintended consequences, including hazards to regulators, banks, markets, and the intended beneficiaries themselves, i.e., households and corporations. We call for a fully theorized understanding of legal elasticity and caution that financial regulators' deployment of regulatory suspensions risks bringing about hazards resulting from the failure to situate such suspensions within the fully theorized framework for legal elasticity.

In Section V, we argue that regulators' deployment of legal elasticity can be better supported by decision-making frameworks that are based on a fully theorized understanding of legal elasticity. We make proposals for the key aspects of these frameworks. This contribution assists in framing legal elasticity not only as a crisis management regulatory tool but also as a general regulatory tool pursuant to a modern and broad understanding of regulatory responsiveness.²²

This article does not argue that by more optimally deploying legal elasticity, substantive policy agendas such as relief and rescue would also be optimal. What we argue is that whatever the substantive policies in place, where financial regulatory suspensions are regarded as part of the policy mosaic, the use of legal elasticity should be a fully apprised one and should not add to existing substantive challenges. This is important as for a second time, financial regulators in many jurisdictions have looked to legal elasticity at a significant scale for crisis management, even if this is not a financial sector originated crisis. However, we confine our proposals on the optimal use of legal elasticity in finance, as Section II explains how legal elasticity is anchored in the legal theory of finance. Other regulatory areas may not be susceptible to as much legal construction as in finance, and legal elasticity in those areas may have to be theorized in a different manner. We do not discount the possibility that other regulatory "enterprises"²³ can

benefit from this study, but we do not claim direct applicability within the confines of this article. Section VI concludes.

II. Legal Elasticity in Financial Regulation

Legal elasticity is argued to be a function of the legal theory of finance posited by Pistor.²⁴ The legal theory of finance frames finance in legal terms, as financial transactions and obligations are constructed as legal structures in order to work as intended. In particular, the theory constructs finance as being underpinned by the crucial qualities of certainty and enforceability that law supplies. However, in the global financial crisis, it was observed that the very qualities of certainty and strict enforceability of financial obligations and transactions in various markets would collectively lead to systemic risk, such as collective fire sales of financial assets.²⁵ As such, the solution is also found in law, i.e., to resort to legal elasticity in order to suspend and mitigate the adverse impacts driven by law, to meet the needs of crisis management.

In this theoretical framework, it can be argued that legal elasticity served an unwinding purpose, i.e., to unwind the adverse effects caused by its very own legal nature in the first place, when the broader policy goals sought to be achieved are shifted. Elasticity also redeems financial law or regulation as such, even when it appears that the application of an existing law or regulatory instrument has run its course, as legal elasticity entails institutional change and paves the way for law reform.

The above conceptualization of legal elasticity in finance portends of impending institutional change from the previous law. Indeed, it can be argued that the post-crisis reforms to the banking and financial sector reflected this conceptualization of legal elasticity. Where banks had been unable to absorb their losses during the global financial crisis, legal elasticity was applied so that regulatory discipline was not meted out to them for being inadequately capitalized. Instead, many jurisdictions bailed out their banks by injecting state capital²⁶ and then proceeded to reform capital rules to tie banks to higher and more robust levels of capitalization for loss absorption.²⁷ In the UK, government intervention prevented the full force of insolvency law from applying to banks in crisis,²⁸ leading to subsequent development of a bespoke bank crisis management and resolution regime in many jurisdictions.²⁹

The application of legal elasticity by UK policymakers and regulators to credit and capital markets during the COVID-19 crisis seemed arguably not in the same vein, as regulatory suspensions were articulated to be temporary. This near-term perception of regulatory

suspensions can be attributed to the sophisticated development of financial regulation after the crisis, which includes inherently flexible regulations.³⁰ Regulators constructed an increasingly prescriptive regime for prudence³¹ and conduct³² by banks and financial institutions—and therefore also specifically carved out particular measures of inherent flexibility that can be adjusted.³³ This juristic development suggests that legal elasticity in finance may have been theoretically enriched by the provision of *ex ante* discretion and flexibility, and not just *ex post* discretion argued in Pistor’s legal theory of finance.

However, we observe in Sections III and IV that during the COVID-19 crisis, regulators exhausted inherently flexible measures and moved to relax unexpected regulatory rules in order to achieve legal elasticity to advance the policy demands of relief and rescue. These are framed to be bundled with the inherently flexible rules, arguably showing hesitation and ambivalence in deploying legal elasticity.³⁴ In the post-crisis regulatory regime which appears comprehensive, *ex post* exercises of legal elasticity continue to be necessary, such as in relation to crisis management. This *ex post* exercise of legal elasticity raises a new question: can legal elasticity take place within institutional stability? The post-crisis conceptualization of legal elasticity is structural in nature, and a pathway to institutional change. Is legal elasticity capable of taking effect in different degrees along a spectrum of institutional stability and disturbance, or would legal elasticity necessarily entail more structural considerations of institutional dissonance and change?

We suggest that, just as the application of legal elasticity during the global financial crisis paved the way for structural changes in financial regulation, the application of legal elasticity by UK financial regulators during the COVID-19 pandemic may also bring about the same trajectory. Further, the structural effects of legal elasticity may be along a spectrum of intensity of institutional impact. Such a spectrum can be dependent on *legal* factors such as how far legal effects are suspended, and for how long, and *other* factors such as the nature of policy rhetoric in which regulatory suspensions are framed. These are issues that can be further explored empirically in future work.

It is fully understandable that the financial regulators in the UK wish to secure institutional consistency despite the application of legal elasticity. The *post*-crisis financial regulatory reforms have taken more than a decade,³⁵ and regulators have no appetite for major institutional changes. Further, the COVID-19 crisis can be regarded as a crisis exogenous to the financial sector, and crisis management is therefore not perceived as entailing existential consequences for either the substance of laws/regulations or regulators. Many jurisdictions are also keen to emphasize that lockdowns

adversely affecting economic activities are temporary,³⁶ although no one has a sense of certainty as to how temporary these are.

We argue that our call to fuller theorization and appraisal of legal elasticity is not intended to “create more work” for regulators during this stressful time. This exercise is fundamental to effective financial regulatory policy in supporting the broader relief and rescue agenda, and would do much to spare regulators from unexpected and longer-term challenges down the road. At a broader level, a fully theorized understanding of legal elasticity allows this regulatory tool to be used more optimally in crisis management and by regulators more generally. More general application of legal elasticity as a regulatory tool can be theoretically anchored in responsive regulation.³⁷ Although Ayres’ and Braithwaite’s work on “responsive regulation” was most famous for its enforcement pyramid and the creative options regulators have for engaging regulated entities in securing compliance, it more broadly redefined the nature and directions for modern regulation.³⁸ It provides a vision of regulatory dynamism not only for substantive purposes³⁹ but also for purposes relating to regulatory participation,⁴⁰ processes,⁴¹ and implementation,⁴² breathing new theoretical life into procedural aspects of regulatory genesis and outworking. Legal elasticity, if regarded as an extension of the responsive regulatory paradigm, can provide a fuller and richer basis for regulators to engage with dynamic regulatory goals, tools, and processes. We argue in Section V that the theoretically informed understanding of legal elasticity in terms of its structural nature can help regulators make decisions in regulatory suspensions in a more robust manner.

III. Regulatory Suspensions in Credit Laws And Regulation: Advancing “Relief And Rescue” in the UK

During the COVID-19 crisis in the UK, a key policy concern has been how credit arrangements would affect households and corporations that are in debt and/or need financing by debt in order to meet financial needs during the challenging period. Regulatory suspensions were made by the PRA and FCA,⁴³ and specific legislation for business debt was passed.⁴⁴

First, regulatory suspensions are made to allow borrowers, both households and corporations battered by lockdowns, to enjoy temporary relief from the pressures of debt while regrouping themselves during the crisis. Second, the suspensions facilitate access to finance and credit to business borrowers during a period where banks may be risk-averse to lend more. This would help businesses avoid inflicting knock-on effects upon their suppliers and needing to introduce massive redundancies.⁴⁵ As the FCA has a

consumer protection mandate,⁴⁶ measures on personal finance were rapidly introduced from the early stages of the pandemic.

In order to achieve the two effects above, certain suspensions from financial regulation had to be implemented. These are discussed in Parts A and B in this section. We first consider how regulators looked first to financial regulatory measures that are inherently flexible. This provided a starting point for regulatory suspensions.

The macro-prudential regulator in the UK, the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee (FPC), has oversight for the systemic health of the financial system,⁴⁷ and to this end is able to exercise an inherently flexible power to adjust a prudential regulatory measure known as the countercyclical buffer (CCyb). The exercise of this power is supported by the PRA which oversees banks' prudential compliance with all capital requirements, including the CCyb. The CCyb was introduced in the wake of the global financial crisis as a measure to allow the macroprudential regulator to impose capital cost on banks to dampen pro-cyclical creation of debt.⁴⁸ If the macroprudential regulator, who is responsible for surveying financial market trends,⁴⁹ takes the view that asset prices are rising excessively and markets may be overconfident about leverage and asset prices, the introduction of the CCyb would make it more costly for banks to extend credit. This measure plays a part in moderating financial institutions' behaviour and markets' tendencies towards a cycle of Minskian instability.⁵⁰ Prior to the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the CCyb was set at 1% for UK banks to be elevated to 2% by December 2020 as economic activity looked strong, and there was a risk that banks could be overly optimistic and engage in excessively liberal lending. This was abruptly adjusted to 0% during the COVID-19 crisis,⁸ freeing up for banks an estimated capital cost of £190bn.⁵¹

The regulatory elasticity in the CCyb reflects inherent flexibility in the prudential regulation of banks to adjust banks' incentives according to regulatory capital cost. Masur and Posner (2017)⁵² argue that such regulation is designed to address the need for financial regulators to shape the incentives of financial actors that are inherently biased towards procyclicality, in order to moderate potential market excesses that are not self-correcting. In downturns, as has been caused by the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, the relaxation of prudential regulation that is inherently adjustable is merely countercyclical regulation that counteracts sub-optimal market behaviour. This downward adjustment is aimed at incentivizing banks to engage in more lending since capital cost for credit is significantly reduced with the removal of the CCyb's constraint.

Freeing up the cost of capital originally imposed by the CCyb does not, however,

automatically result in more lending either. During the COVID-19 crisis, borrowers' creditworthiness would be difficult to discern due to the uncertainties of their circumstances, such as future income and employment of individuals, or volatility of business revenues for corporations, as affected by wider economic conditions. Banks may be behaviourally inclined to refrain from lending more. Behavioural tendencies such as risk aversion and impediments to efficient markets such as acute information asymmetry may result in capital hoarding instead.

Hence the PRA and FCA introduced a raft of measures in addition to the inherently flexible measure of the CCyb to steer more precise actions on the part of banks. This means suspending other regulations not inherently thought to be flexible to send stronger incentive-based messages to banks. We examine the bundling of inherently flexible and unexpected legal elasticity, targeted at the immediate needs of loan forbearance as well as borrowing. We argue that such legal elasticity inevitably gives rise to more fundamental issues and institutional dissonance, and it would be difficult to merely regard such elasticity as temporary and that reversion to "normal" would take place in due course. We argue that the deployment of legal elasticity necessarily entails considerations of what could become the "new normal" on the part of policymakers. This is not to discourage policymakers from deploying legal elasticity, but they should be prepared to address consequential effects of regulatory suspensions in a manner that would result in broader institutional robustness and social justice⁵³ in due course.

A. Regulatory Package Aimed at Relief for Borrowers

First, regulatory suspension is made in relation to consumer credit taken out by household borrowers. The FCA introduced periods of deferred payment, known as loan payment holidays, for consumer credit products it regulates. As the FCA does not have regulatory perimeter over business lending, an Act of Parliament was passed to give temporary relief for business borrowers.⁵⁴

For households, the FCA has introduced rights for mortgage, credit card, motor finance consumers, and unsecured personal borrowers to defer their payment obligations by making a request to their respective lenders. Lenders are not to conduct diligence investigations into the affordability of such requests and should grant them as a matter of course.⁵⁵ This measure does not affect the accrual of interest on the loan and firms are not required to investigate the individual circumstances of each customer who makes a request for such a payment holiday or extension. The balance achieved in this measure is that customers are not imposed with burdens to prove that they can

afford a payment holiday, given that their personal economic circumstances may be in flux anyway. At the same time, banks are not asked to forego their expected earnings on these assets in due course. In cases where a customer is already in default at the commencement of the guidance, the guidance prevents firms from commencing or continuing repossession proceedings and any possession order already made must not be enforced. Higher risk short-term credit borrowers have also been granted deferred payment.⁵⁶ However, with the second lockdown, the FCA has extended the timeframe for customers who have yet to make deferral requests to do so, but limiting the number of periods for deferred payments for those who have already made such requests.⁵⁷ Overall, no customer would be able to defer debt payments for more than two periods of deferral, which is six months in total.

As business lending is not regulated by the FCA, a fast-tracked piece of legislation has been passed to allow companies with debt obligations to apply for a moratorium. Directors can make such an application if they are of the view that the company is unable to pay its debts. They however need to appoint an insolvency practitioner as “monitor” to verify that rescue for the company is possible.⁵⁸ A successful application for moratorium allows the company to enjoy relief from its debt obligations, except specified obligations such as rent and employees’ wages, for an initial 20 days with a possible extension for another 20 days.⁵⁹ During the period of the moratorium, no insolvency proceedings can commence against the company. It is envisaged that this period will be used for the company to seek arrangements with its creditors or explore avenues of raising finance.

Temporary relief from debt has immediate implications for creditors such as banks. Should banks treat the outstanding obligations as being in default or as prospects for increased default risk at least? This has knock-on effects on banks’ balance sheet strength, and they would need to conserve capital, or worse, raise capital themselves, to shore up against credit risks. In this manner, payment holidays would be contrary to banks’ ability to lend or help their borrowers. A suite of bank regulation suspensions has therefore been introduced by the PRA, working in tandem with the FCA.

The PRA clarifies⁶⁰ that banks should not treat deferred payments as being in default. Even if deferred payments are not able to resume promptly, whether they should be treated as impaired assets or not should not be mechanistic, but subject to the understanding of individual financial situations. This clarification meets two purposes. One is to protect borrowers from relentless enforcement. The other is to protect banks from the sudden blow to their balance sheets, and the need to ensure that they have

sufficient capital to absorb losses. To achieve the latter, the PRA allows ambiguity in whether deferred borrowers are in default, and this ambiguity extends to ambivalence in treating deferred borrowers who have not yet defaulted as poor credit risks.

After the global financial crisis of 2007-09, it was thought important to inculcate prudential behaviour in banks by subjecting them to conservative measurements of their borrowers' creditworthiness in order to have sufficient loss-absorbing capital in place. The accounting standard IFRS 9 requires banks to account for debt instruments at fair value.⁶¹ Changes in fair value have to be reported in the profit and loss account, e.g., a reduction in fair value is registered as a loss. Banks are thus required to make loan loss provisions and ensure that they have sufficient capital to absorb these potential losses. This is an example of a forward-looking approach for prudential treatment and supervisory reporting adopted in the aftermath of the global financial crisis⁶² aimed at correcting the behaviour of delayed loss recognition by banks before the crisis.

Payment holidays exacerbate information asymmetry for banks in relation to borrowers' creditworthiness, and banks may indeed make increased loan loss provisions against outstanding debt,⁶³ paddling back against the capital liberation that has been offered. The application of IFRS 9 during the pandemic crisis would inevitably lead to a significant increase in expected credit loss provisions and hence a contraction of the ability of banks to grow their balance sheet by lending. Hence, the PRA had to moderate banks' above tendencies by clarifying⁶⁴ that deferred payments under the COVID-19-induced payment holidays should not necessarily be treated as expected credit losses that warrant capital provision against them. Banks should use reasonable and balanced information and assumptions to assess their borrowers. Borrowers for example may be assessed on the basis of whether loans may be past due for 90 days instead of the narrower test of 30 days.⁶⁵ Although the PRA does not wish to undermine the prudent regulatory regime that has been reformed since the global financial crisis, its strict application would certainly cause banks to hoard capital rather than lend to borrowers in such an extraordinary time.

Nevertheless, even as the PRA recognizes the balancing difficulties between the rigor of prudential regulatory standards and the liberation policies aimed at banks due to demands in the COVID-19 crisis, the PRA has in effect "delegated" to banks the implementation of such a balance at the micro level of evaluating their borrowers. Such "delegated" implementation does not put banks in an easy position as they need to deal with the dissonance of changing regulatory objectives and are yet not certain to what extent the boundaries of the existing regulatory regime can be pushed.⁶⁶

The PRA is not in a unique position, as the European Banking Authority faces the same policy challenge of encouraging banks to support the real economy's needs⁶⁷ while upholding the prudential regulatory frameworks that have only just been completed in the decade after the global financial crisis of 2007-08.⁶⁸ The European Central Bank which has direct microprudential supervisory authority over key euro area banks⁶⁹ also allows banks to take a longer-term view of loan adversity so that banks may refrain from excessive loan-loss provisioning.⁷⁰ Although the elasticity parameters are relatively clarified by banking regulators, the need to maintain overall institutional coherence has caused bank regulators to be unwilling to articulate excessively on possible impairments to credit risk and bank balance sheets. This is understandable as bank regulators do not wish to become stumbling blocks to the policy purposes of relief and rescue. However, regulated entities are ultimately left with the balancing act of achieving the goals of legal elasticity while maintaining institutional coherence.

Unintended Adverse Consequences for Markets, Institutional Stability, and Social and Distributive Justice

Although legal elasticity in suspending financial regulations supports the relief packages for borrowers and appears to meet social welfare needs in the near term, the longer-term implications of such elasticity are not articulated by regulators and arguably internalized by banks. Banks remain uncertain about how impaired their balance sheets may be, and when the full strictness of prudential regulation would resume. Yet asking banks to internalize the balance poses a difficult challenge—should banks take the opportunity to treat borrowers generously, especially favoured clients? How should banks manage the resumption of regulatory expectations in due course? Banks are arguably faced with contradictory regulatory expectations: on the one hand to apply maximum flexibility to accommodate the immediate financial needs and limitations of their customers while on the other to maintain prudential standards and safeguard the quality of their assets. Hence, it is likely that banks' behaviour in enforcement and borrower treatment could be socially adverse when banks are able to resume efficient market-based behaviour.

In credit arrangements, contractual terms regarding default, which operate as efficient market mechanisms to protect lenders, are forcibly suspended for the wider public interest objective of alleviating household suffering. If left to efficient market mechanisms, the operation of private law could lead to the systemically destabilizing effect of mass household defaults and even bankruptcies during this period. The FCA's

power to suspend contractual operation is based on its general conduct of business principles, especially on Principle 6 that requires firms to pay due regard to the interests of their customers and treat them fairly, while contractual operation for business debt is suspended under the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 discussed above.

However, payment holidays are not the same as permanent debt relief. Borrowers benefiting from this may postpone their troubles, but may be storing up an amount of arrears and debt that may become even more unmanageable in the future.⁷¹ Banks and other lenders may try to pre-emptively discourage retail customers from taking advantage of payment holidays too. The FCA has not provided clear enough guidance to lenders on how to deal with requests for payment holidays, leaving to borrowers the burden of negotiating the exact terms of their debt for the period after the suspension of repayments. The conduct of debt enforcement down the road is also a matter of concern, especially from the point of view of social justice,⁷² as lenders would be anxious to mitigate the impairments to their balance sheets. Further, the FCA's Chairman⁷³ and commentators have warned that regulators' ambiguous positions risk pushing customers into unsustainable levels of debt. As household debt in the UK is already at very high levels, the implementation of regulatory suspensions to facilitate financial relief and rescue may exacerbate the problem of high household leverage and the fragility of household finances in the long-term.⁷⁴ Huertas⁷⁵ speaks of both relief during the pandemic and the need for normalization so that predictability and efficiency can work in markets after the pandemic is over. The question at stake is: how will the return of efficiency and contractual discipline affect consumers, and are they factoring these into account in their choices under stress during the pandemic? Would and should there be a difference between the treatment of retail and business borrowers in due course, bearing in mind that business borrowers may be responsible for stakeholders and job creation?

Next, efficiency disruptions introduced by regulatory suspension affect market mechanism chains that may in turn adversely affect consumers. This is experienced in the US mortgage markets where securitization is the norm for supporting mortgage underwriting. Underwriters of mortgages seek to bundle up mortgages into securitized assets usually after three months of such mortgages being written. Payment holidays affect the information quality of such mortgages as no reliable stream of income can be reported for securitized assets sales, and this can in turn freeze up mortgage markets, adversely affecting households that need mortgages or refinancing.⁷⁶

Regulators also need to consider the distributive effects of the measures above. There

may be a temporary distributive effect from lenders to borrowers entailing from relief granted during the crisis. This is privately borne by banks and their shareholders. This type of redistribution via interfering with private contracts may be blunt as the optimality of this redistributive effect depends on bank fragility and whether there is an increased chance of use of public funds to recapitalize them.⁷⁷ The years of microprudential regulatory reform have made banks more resilient,⁷⁸ and such a redistributive effect may well be within banks' current capacities.⁷⁹ However, it remains uncertain how far banks can push their newly-built resilience and at what point they may be jeopardized.⁸⁰ Such concerns would shape banks' behaviour in their pursuit of unviable borrowers when relief ceases. Yet the private enforcement paradigm against borrowers would likely be socially scrutinized, and long-term implications emerge in terms of how much permanent redistribution would or should take place as a result of writing off bad debts. These dilemmas and challenges arise as longer-term consequences due to the deployment of legal elasticity, and there are no easy answers in the short-term.

Finally, regulatory suspensions also bring about immediate effects of institutional dissonance if their application leaves gaps and creates differences between markets. Regulatory suspensions in relation to payment holidays for consumers and business borrowers do not apply to peer-to-peer lending arrangements. This is because "peer" lenders are not regulated entities and only the platform that facilitates peer-to-peer lending is regulated⁸¹ with respect to their duties in conduct of business vis-à-vis their customers on both sides of the market, i.e., the supply side for credit (who are treated as investors in loans) and demand side (the borrowers). This may be regarded as a hazard in "regulatory commons" articulated by Buzbee⁸² who cautions against regulatory gaps that may be ideologically anomalous but that are caused by the drawing of regulatory boundaries.⁸³ The treatment of borrowers has been completely left to the self-regulation of peer-to-peer lending platforms, some of whom allow payment holidays and "pass the pain" to their lender/investors by freezing withdrawals or slashing returns.⁸⁴

B. Regulatory Package Aimed at Increasing Credit Availability to Businesses

The PRA has clearly instructed UK banks that all elements of liquidity and capital buffers "exist to be used as necessary to support the economy."⁸⁵ This relates to the second element of the UK's rescue and relief policy goals for households and corporations—access to credit during the COVID-19 crisis. Arguably, this general pronouncement reflects the introduction of objectives in microprudential regulation that are different from the objectives in post-crisis regulatory reforms from 2010. The diagnosis of

excessive lending and risk-taking⁸⁶ by banks in the wake of the global financial crisis 2007-08 led to microprudential regulatory regimes that incentivized deleveraging in the UK and EU.⁸⁷ A call to expansion in credit provision is likely to cause banks some sense of dissonance in terms of assessing what their behavior ought to be. The expansion of credit is a policy not unique to the UK, as fiscal support for corporate borrowing, trade credit, and commercial paper is also enacted in the United States,⁸⁸ although it is left to state and federal prudential regulators to work out the prudential regulatory adjustments that are needed to cohere with such measures.

Legal elasticity in microprudential regulation has been deployed in the UK to shape lenders' incentives to lend. Besides the downward adjustment of the inherently flexible CCyb discussed above, several other unexpected prudential measures have been relaxed. The PRA guidance clarifies that banks can draw down all their capital buffers starting with any discretionary capital buffer. Regulatory capital buffers such as the capital conservation, systemic risk, PRA buffer and buffers applying to systemically important banks are required to be maintained as risk-constraining measures since the post-crisis reforms.⁸⁹ Banks may also build up a discretionary additional buffer on top of regulatory buffers in order to be prudent. They are now encouraged to draw down such discretionary buffer⁹⁰ to maximise their capacity to lend. After exhausting any discretionary buffer, banks are able to draw down their regulatory buffers as well, starting from the PRA buffer which is individual to each bank and not publicly disclosed, followed by any remaining CCyb, the capital conservation buffer and the systemic risk buffers that only applies to banks with more than £25bn in deposits.⁹¹ The PRA and FPC have nevertheless maintained the notional levels of mandatory regulatory buffers (except CCyb), such as firms' systemic risk buffer rates so as to maintain confidence in banks' resilience.⁹²

Further, a suite of microprudential regulatory measures in liquidity and leverage thresholds have been relaxed, many of these not thought to be inherently flexible as they relate to the risk moderation objective in shaping banks' lending behaviour. Banks are encouraged to allow businesses with credit lines and undrawn credit to draw upon such lines, even if this means banks' liquidity ratios may fall below the mandatory 100 percent they are supposed to maintain.⁹³ The liquidity coverage ratio is intended to be maintained at all times at 100 percent which effectively means that a firm can meet its cash outflows for a period of thirty days so as to prevent a liquidity-driven systemic crisis.⁹⁴ This relaxation is an example of unexpected elasticity which raises concerns about the balancing of short-term crisis management objectives against prudential regulatory objectives. It is unclear to what extent banks can draw down their liquidity

ratio, as this can cause liquidity hazards for them. However, the Bank of England has provided a new Coronavirus Corporate Financing Facility⁹⁵ which is designed to help businesses tide over liquidity squeezes through their bank. This could help prevent banks from being dragged into liquidity hazards by corporate customers.

Next, at the EU level, there is a new legislative initiative to allow banks not to count certain loans as subject to the prudential measure of the leverage ratio, in order to augment banks' capacities to lend in a less constrained manner by existing regulation. The leverage ratio limits all leverage created by banks to be supported by at least 3 percent of CET1 capital.⁹⁶ This is a measure that backstops bank lending and complements other microprudential regulatory measures. The new EU Regulation,⁹⁷ called the "CRR Quick Fix" package, introduced temporary flexibility in calculating institutions' total exposure measure in order to reduce the risk of amplifying leverage in a time of economic contraction and constrained business.⁹⁸ In particular, certain exposures such as guaranteed loans by national governments can be excluded from banks' balance sheets. This is justified by the need to maintain the level of lending to households and businesses.⁹⁹ This measure applies to the UK in view of the transitional status of the UK before exiting the EU at the end of 2020.¹⁰⁰

In order to precisely steer banks' behaviour towards increased support for the real economy instead of perverse incentives such as rewarding shareholders, the PRA has also provided strongly phrased guidance to UK banks to suspend any capital distributions to shareholders including the payment of dividends and share buy-backs as well as the payment of any cash bonus to certain material categories of staff.¹⁰¹ This can be regarded as a different type of "suspension" as it is a form of intervention that disrupts market participants' expectations, such as on the part of institutional shareholders. Regulators' power over dividend restrictions is warranted under existing regulation¹⁰² in order to promote the resilience of banks and financial stability. This use of discretionary power, outside of the original rationale, may however raise long-term problems relating to banks' cost of capital and ability to attract and retain talented staff.

Finally, the relaxation of microprudential requirements to incentivize lending, and hence turn banks' potentially risk-averse preferences to supporting the real economy, is complemented by the suspension of externally administered stress testing. Stress tests are a useful exercise for supervisors to understand whether banks have enough capital to continue to intermediate and lend in disrupted scenarios.¹⁰³ The Bank of England (BoE) normally runs the following stress tests: an annual cyclical scenario and a biennial exploratory scenario. The tests are forward looking and facilitate cross-bank

comparisons, as well as monitoring for signs of systemic risk. The BoE has postponed the 2020 stress test.¹⁰⁴ This decision is intended to keep credit flowing to households and businesses and reduce pressure on banks induced by the stress test.¹⁰⁵

Although the suspension is based on an inherently elastic structure as the PRA has full discretion on the timing and frequency of regulatory stress testing, the drawback of such suspension is that information opacity may be exacerbated in relation to banks' strength at times of crisis. Further, the uncertainty over the timeframe for the next stress test exercise makes it hard for banks to plan in advance and develop their lending and broader asset quality strategies in line with regulatory expectations. Such uncertainty can neutralize the intended effects of the regulatory package to increase credit availability to business if banks act in a cautious manner in anticipation of imminent stress testing. Regulatory suspensions of stress testing do not help address the unknowns that exacerbate fragility in the post-COVID period. At the same time, delayed stress tests also mean delayed supervisory guidance on banks' capital and resilience positions. Suspending stress testing exacerbates instability and increases information gaps¹⁰⁶ in the banking sector, particularly in times of stress where market participants need more information to plan for crisis management processes.¹⁰⁷ Regulators may be responding only to the near-term needs to release bank lending, and although they remain keen to protect the prudential regulatory framework, there is inevitably some extent of undercutting and compromise, the effects of which can be longer-term and create uncertainties for both regulators' objectives and regulated entities' behaviour.¹⁰⁸

The regulatory suspensions discussed above may incentivize banks to expand their lending, but the pressure to lend in a less discriminate manner may increase. This could lead to longer-term adverse consequences such as the accumulation of non-performing exposures on banks' balance sheets.¹⁰⁹ This consequence is neither beneficial for banks nor borrowers as banks' regulatory compliance may be jeopardised and their future capacities to support the real economy could be diminished. Further, balance sheet pressures can also entail necessary enforcement against borrowers, leading to more social frictions between finance and society in due course.

In order that the legal elasticity discussed above achieves real effects, the UK has further introduced fiscal support to boost lending. On the one hand, this overcomes banks' incentives not to respond to the legal elasticity introduced. However, such measures positively distort banks' incentives in the near term, and may produce results of a short-term focus with longer term adverse impact on both bank resilience and social justice.

The UK government has announced fiscal support for two loan schemes, so that fiscal underwriting can incentivize bank lending. UK businesses with turnover of less than £45 million can benefit from the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme, which is administered by the government-owned British Business Bank and enables accredited lenders to provide loans and overdraft facilities of up to £5 million, guaranteed at 80 percent by the government, to be repaid over up to six years.¹¹⁰ UK small and medium-sized businesses will also benefit from the Bounce Back Loan Scheme that provides loan facilities of up to £50000, guaranteed at 100 percent by the government to be repaid over up to six years with no payments in the first twelve months.¹¹¹ Lenders are expected to assess whether businesses should access such government-guaranteed finance, the principle being that loans should only be available to otherwise healthy businesses that need to trade through the short to medium-term revenue loss caused by the lockdown. To support the lending programme, the PRA has announced that loans made under the Bounce Back Scheme, which is 100 percent guaranteed, would not be counted in the leverage ratio.¹¹²

Unintended Adverse Consequences for Bank Resilience, Regulatory Objectives, and Social Justice

Credit, or leverage, is often a double-edged sword. It may allow present problems to be solved, but often at the price of deferred constrictions and augmentation of financial risk for the future.¹¹³

In the UK, and arguably in the United States, banks' credit risks are likely exacerbated by underlying fiscal support for government-backed loans. Fiscal guarantees are likely to fuel moral hazard as the urgent demand for such loans makes underwriting a pressed process exacerbated by information asymmetry.¹¹⁴ The government guarantee is likely to incentivize minimal underwriting diligence standards as banks do not have the incentive to price conservatively. It is uncertain if the UK government's policy choice to greatly expand commercial channels of financial support for businesses, such as through banks, is necessarily optimal, as the public interest needs underlying policy choice greatly interferes with the delicate relationship between microprudential regulation and commercial decision-making.¹¹⁵ This creates 'legalized' moral hazard as banks are incentivized to ignore resilience implications of the increased loan underwriting by relying on the eventuality of fiscal bailout. Commentators already expect at least 40 percent of Bounce Back loans to default in due course.¹¹⁶

The level of loans made in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis that can be expected to be

non-performing would likely increase.¹¹⁷ This could have adverse consequences for bank resilience¹¹⁸ even if regulators have taken the view that banks' capital positions are now relatively strong. Regulators are already concerned¹¹⁹ about increased debt levels during the pandemic. There is no indication yet of any major shift in financial regulation in the long term at the end of regulatory suspensions. The PRA, for example, seems to assume that the regulatory framework would simply resume after a likely twelve-month period of the suspension of the CCyB, and maintains that other unadjusted capital requirements remain the same.¹²⁰ However, would legal elasticity result in more permanent issues for banks to deal with, and would the existing regulatory framework be sufficient? How far can the expected challenges to bank resilience be met by the fiscal backstop for government guaranteed loans?¹²¹ Further, would a fiscal backstop not create a vicious circle problem for banks, as banks are also funders for sovereigns? If banks suffer from impaired balance sheets from excessive credit creation during the COVID-19 crisis, to what extent would governments' own fiscal backstops be credible, since governments rely on private sector funding (including banks) themselves?

Further, it is uncertain that the temporary boost of lending to businesses would not become a snare for borrowers in the future. The Bounce Back Scheme relieves businesses of payments for the first twelve months, but it is uncertain if the period would be sufficient for a business to recover. The government guarantee can also introduce perverse incentives for banks to accelerate treating recovering Bounce Back borrowers as in default so as to call upon the guarantee and to remove these borrowers from banks' balance sheets, exacerbating the pressure placed on the fiscal backstop. Huertas¹²² rightly argues that current loan support measures must be coupled with regulatory thinking about conduct in treating borrowers in due course, as careful discernment of unviable borrowers and their fair treatment remains a paramount concern even as the crisis recedes.

It may be argued that the hazards of compelling banks to support expanded credit in such emergency times may be overstated as companies have the option of raising equity which is a more stable form of finance to tide over the crisis. Equity-raising also benefits from regulatory suspension which is discussed below. However, investors in the markets are rightly risk averse during the COVID-19 crisis, and can be highly selective or make equity financing costly, favoring those companies that are already financially strong, punishing those that have signals of weakness.¹²³ Indeed, empirical research finds that companies are turning more to debt than equity issuances,¹²⁴ and companies' stock market prices are highly penalized by risk-averse investors' perceptions such as whether they are affected by trade with China or have healthy leverage and cash

levels.¹²⁵

Legal elasticity in facilitating banks' incentives to lend is arguably an important policy in relief and rescue aims. But such elasticity creates a number of unintended and adverse consequences that policymakers should consider on an *ex ante* basis rather than wait for problems to be manifest *ex post*. As Dorn¹²⁶ argued, "elasticity in application of finance laws opens up such law to a process of deterioration, undermining legal certainty, loosening market discipline and inviting crisis." Although the measures of keeping open access to credit and creating a fiscal backstop for business loans could be necessary in principle, regulators could engage in more holistic policy thinking, especially supported by a fully-theorized understanding of the structural nature of legal elasticity. Possible options for policy thinking include the following:

- (a) There is room to consider how banks and regulators can be more engaged in the dynamic landscape of asset quality and banks' resilience and the impact of these upon banks' conduct of borrowers and customers.¹²⁷ The supervision of prudential and conduct of business aspects can benefit from integrated conversations between relevant regulators. In the UK, the FCA and PRA have a history of coordination,¹²⁸ but this may be more challenging in jurisdictions with disparate regulators, such as the United States.
- (b) Regulators may need to consider safe harbors from capital or liquidity breaches by banks in due course for periods of time as banks take stock of their balance sheets and as suspended regulatory requirements resume. There should be some transitional provision for regulatory forbearance while working in supervisory engagement with banks.
- (c) Regulators also have to engage with how to strike a balance between economic welfare/justice and bank resilience, such as considering writing-off for non-performing loans that neither penalize banks nor borrowers in circumstances caused by the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. There are policy option mixes involving public and private sector support,¹²⁹ debt versus equity,¹³⁰ for regrouping corporations as economic engines, in order to achieve the balance between rescue of the real economy, bank resilience,¹³¹ and fiscal implications.

IV. Regulatory Elasticity in Capital Markets Regulation: Advancing Corporate Fundraising and Economic Recovery

As freezes in economic activity during the COVID-19 lockdown threaten corporate revenues, business operational continuity and even survival,¹³² it is important to address

equity fundraising by companies on an emergency basis. The channel of equity fundraising is important as equity provides a stable and long-term pool of capital for companies,¹³³ and can reinforce a company's financial resilience. Debt, on the other hand, may be more accessible but can exacerbate financial fragility.¹³⁴

The FCA, regulator for publicly traded companies and the Listing Authority in the UK, introduced a slew of emergency measures, suspending and adjusting listing and securities offering regulations that would have applied in normal times, in order to facilitate less cumbersome fundraising by corporations. Such fundraising could be preemptive in nature as businesses try to safeguard against the depletion of their cash reserves during the lockdown. The building up of companies' capital positions would strengthen their ability to retain employees and maintain investment post-crisis. However, companies seeking to raise funds could also be in a precarious state, especially if they have inflexible contractually committed outflows such as debt servicing and rent, making their securities particularly risky for investors.

The FCA issued a Statement of Policy on April 8, 2020¹³⁵ to facilitate corporate fundraising exceptionally, intended to last only for the duration of the pandemic. This policy introduces regulatory suspensions and adjustments to three key aspects of fundraising: the treatment of preemption rights, the general meeting procedures ordinarily needed for shareholder approval of significant transactions in the Listing Rules, and the mandatory disclosure document required for the fundraising.

In relation to the treatment of preemption rights, shareholders in the UK have a right of first refusal to the company's new offer of shares in proportion to their existing holdings¹³⁶ unless preemption is exempt.¹³⁷ The right of preemption seeks to mitigate managerial agency problems as managers may seek to offer new shares cheaply and easily to third parties if left to their own incentives. Shareholders would be adversely impacted in terms of value dilution and the reduction in voting power.¹³⁸ Although this position was harmonized with the EU's Second Company Law Directive, reflecting the European stance for protecting shareholders against managerial exploitation, it is also regarded in the UK as a "core" right of shareholders.¹³⁹ Preemption rights may be regarded as a mandatory corporate law rule that is placed along the more "rigid" end of corporate law,¹⁴⁰ reducing the flexibility of managers to raise funds easily in a perhaps changing and dynamic environment. In the United States, preemption rights are the exception and not the rule, particularly for publicly traded companies, as existing shareholders have a choice to purchase shares in the open market if they wish to maintain the level of their shareholdings. In other words, market mechanisms in the United States are seen

as sufficient to provide shareholder protection so that corporate governance rules such as preemption rights need not be legalized. Although there is an increased burden for shareholders to determine if they would use such market mechanisms, the corresponding flexibility for managers reduces cost to the company. The UK, despite similarity with the United States in terms of deep and liquid capital markets, has however opted for a different balance of flexibility-control in relation to safeguarding the rights of shareholders,¹⁴¹ particularly in publicly-traded companies, not just leaving them to market mechanisms or ex-post remedies.¹⁴² There is, however, the possibility that the articles of association can provide for a waiver of preemption rights in advance, for a period of up to five years, so that directors can be pre-authorized to an agreed degree of flexibility.¹⁴³ The general meeting can also provide ad hoc waivers by special resolution up to certain limits. The limit is usually set at 5% of the issued share capital for any given year and not more than 7.5% of the share capital over a 3-year period. This best practice is recommended by the Preemption Group (PEG) which comprises a range of influential institutional investors.

The PEG made an extraordinary recommendation to investors that preemption rights could normally be waived for issuances up to 20 percent of issued share capital during the pandemic. This recommendation is explicitly endorsed by other trade bodies such as the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) and by the FCA. The FCA is not the direct authority to adjust company law provisions. However, this is not an adjustment to company law as such but rather an adjustment to the ordinary market practice of institutional investors within the framework of the exercise of their voting power as determined by company law. Although the PEG has shown flexibility during this challenging time for companies, fundraising still takes time to complete. Commentators have raised the prospect of shortening offer periods as lessons from the emergency fundraising exercise by banks in the 2007-08 global financial crisis point to disadvantages of a long offer period. Ferran¹⁴⁴ argued that the twenty-one day offer period that applied during that time, which has since been reduced to fourteen days under the Listing Rules, was too long and allowed short sellers to depress the share price of the issuer, adversely impacting uptake of the shares. The FCA also endorsed the PEG's stance on soft preemption offers, which allows companies to make private placements, therefore not attracting the compliance burden required in relation to public offers. Companies are urged to work with investment banks responsible for the placings to engage with existing institutional shareholders, in order to respect the ethos underlying the preemption regime despite the newly introduced flexibility.

Next, company law requires directors who wish to allot new shares in the company to

seek authorization in the general meeting¹⁴⁵ unless pre-authorization is obtained either in the articles or by a resolution in an earlier general meeting.¹⁴⁶ The PEG has recommended that such pre-authorization could normally be for up to one-third of a company's issued share capital. Pre-authorizations must be revisited every five years, hence an in-built mechanism for shareholder monitoring is provided in law to countervail adverse effects of managerial flexibility.¹⁴⁷ The relatively high level of pre-authorization recommended by the PEG reflects the inherent flexibility in company law to enable shareholders and boards to implement their preferred bargains instead of being tied to mandatory standards. This is likely to meet many companies' fundraising needs during the pandemic.

However, although inherent flexibility in company law can pave the way for less cumbersome rights issues made by companies, such companies still have to contend with mandatory disclosure obligations under securities regulation, which has been regarded as a fundamental pillar of investor protection,¹⁴⁸ unless issuers only conduct private placements up to 20 percent of the company's issued share capital and are thus exempt from mandatory disclosure obligations. However, even in the latter situation, institutional investors in private placements would still likely require companies to make adequate disclosure of their needs and prospects.

In this manner, the cost of preparing disclosure documents for investors¹⁴⁹ and how disclosure may affect investors' behavioural biases in times of great uncertainty and challenge may prove to be twin obstacles for corporate fundraising. In such times, investors may greatly discount a company's share price as they are susceptible to risk aversion and other cognitive biases. The FCA, with the PEG's support, urged companies to utilize the exemption from the 2017 EU Prospectus Regulation with regard to issuances of securities up to 20 percent of total traded securities. This means that such issuances would not need to be accompanied by a prospectus, saving companies time and cost in preparing one. Where the exemptions¹⁵⁰ under the Prospectus Regulation 2017 do not apply, issuers are urged to utilize simpler disclosure requirements based on shelf registration of a base prospectus for seasoned offerings.¹⁵¹

Further, as mandatory disclosure includes a requirement for issuers to disclose on an audited basis that they have working capital for the next twelve months as a solvent entity, the FCA considers it impracticable for the requirement to apply as companies are facing the uncertainties wrought by the COVID-19 crisis. The FCA has exceptionally decided to tweak the application of this requirement by allowing companies to provide an unqualified "clean" working capital declaration as if the company had not been af-

ected by the crisis, and to append disclosure about effects of the crisis in a separate document that does not require formal audit, but only a comfort letter from an auditor in support. This only applies if a company's adverse financial position has been caused by the pandemic crisis and has not entailed from other weaknesses. The FCA requires the additional "Coronavirus Working Capital Statement" to contain models and assumptions relating to the impact of the pandemic on the company, including taking into account the uncertainty in length and duration of the crisis and impact on revenue. This tweak is arguably a form of framing that achieves a balance between investors' information rights and issuers' fundraising interests, which we analyse below.

Next, the FCA Policy¹⁵² also allows companies to financially reorganize themselves in a less cumbersome manner, by engaging in certain substantial transactions specified in the Listing Rules,¹⁵³ relating to significant disposals of assets. Such disposals may be a way of restructuring companies during difficult times as liabilities and expenses can be shed. It may be imperative for companies to be able to finalize their deals quickly, and such efficacy can be affected by the need for companies to seek general meeting approval for these under Listing Rules. Companies can now apply for a dispensation for general meetings, avoiding the cumbersome procedures and time required for conducting general meetings. The dispensation of general meetings is granted on a case-by-case basis, and issuers would have to provide evidence that shareholders would have voted in favour of such a resolution if a general meeting had taken place. Such dispensation is arguably sensible as social distancing during the COVID-19 crisis would make it difficult for general meetings to be physically convened. However, companies could virtually convene such meetings. The FCA's policy in favour of allowing dispensations possibly caters more for timeliness needs on companies' part.

Companies applying for dispensation can provide evidence that they have secured written undertakings from sufficient shareholders to indicate their support for the resolution either ahead of the issuer publishing a circular for the market generally, or after such a circular has been published. The FCA emphasized the temporary and extraordinary nature of such dispensation. Further, the need to apply to the FCA for dispensation means that regulatory discretion can be perceived by investors as a form of gatekeeping at a time where investor protection based on normally expected procedures is suspended.

In parallel, the FCA¹⁵⁴ has also provided temporary relief for listed companies in relation to normal compliance obligations to maintain efficient capital markets, to publish their audited annual financial reports. The FCA package of measures includes: (1) delaying

the filing of accounts by companies; (2) postponing auditor tenders and audit partner rotation; (3) reducing Financial Reporting Council (FRC) demands on companies and audit firms; and (4) extending reporting deadlines for public sector bodies.¹⁵⁵ Although these measures disrupt expectations in capital markets for timely and accurate information, companies may not be in a position to offer such reporting in highly uncertain times, and short-termist information may be distortive in itself. Policymakers emphasize that the quality of transparency should continue to be robust,¹⁵⁶ but it is uncertain how such quality can be readily assessed in extraordinary and highly dynamic times. Companies are caught in a difficult position, as taking advantage of reliefs and regulatory suspensions may give rise to disfavor with investors. Delayed general meetings¹⁵⁷ and uncertain quality in annual reports can adversely affect the fundraising hopes of companies too.

We provide critical reflections below on the achievements as well as the unintended and adverse consequences that may entail from the capital markets regulatory suspensions discussed. We argue that, just as regulatory suspensions that apply to banks in effect result in delegated implementation to banks, so too regulatory suspensions in capital markets regulations allow the market to price and select companies. The out-working of market forces is not necessarily consonant with social appetite for “saving” companies or jobs. Further, just as deeper regulatory engagement with longer-term and broader effects of regulatory suspensions seems missing in the regulatory suspensions applicable to the regulation of credit, we suggest that more radical regulatory engagement and policy thinking may be needed if injection of equity into companies is viewed as socially desirable.

A. Analysis on Treatment of Preemption Rights

The extended suspension of preemption rights up to 20 percent of issued share capital is not exactly a regulatory suspension, as it is recommended market practice by the PEG to investors on a case-by-case basis. Its status is more like soft law, with the FCA’s endorsement not exactly a form of legalization but rather a reinforcing signal of legitimacy and a nudge directed to investors.¹⁵⁸

Although preemption rights are regarded as an aspect of mandatory “shareholder protection” in UK company law, their exact implementation is subject to tailoring between companies and their shareholders in relation to pre-authorizations, disapplications, and constitutional provisions. This is often referred to as the “enabling” aspect of company law that is ideologically supported for its efficiency effects regarding the alloca-

tion of governance rights between voluntarily bargaining parties.¹⁵⁹ It may be argued that in the United States, the enabling effects of company law are realized in terms of the non-mandatory nature of the doctrine of preemption rights. The United Kingdom's preemption rights regime is mandatory and not enabling law. However, there are different shades of enabling law, in terms of the extent of discretion given for private agreements between companies and their shareholders.¹⁶⁰ As the United Kingdom allows negotiated exclusion or disapplication of preemption rights between shareholders and their companies,¹⁶¹ preemption rights may be regarded as a default rule but one that can be characterized as 'strong default' given that deviating from the rule requires special procedures and is subject to a time limitation of five years, which discourages too much flexibility.¹⁶²

Inherent flexibility in enabling corporate law is empowering in nature, as it allows for company innovations to be offered and shareholders' preferences to be voiced, without being subsumed under a one-size-fits-all mandatory prescription. However, in a crisis situation, it is uncertain if shareholders are able to agree on coherent actions, and negotiation costs can be high in the face of uncertainty and different private preferences amongst investors. In this manner, the role of soft law such as best practices recommended by the PEG is highly valuable and provides a benchmark for convergence and efficiency in private decision-making.¹⁶³ The need for harmonized optimal terms in company law, despite shareholders' theoretical freedoms to bargain with companies, has been theorized by Easterbrook and Fischel.¹⁶⁴

The FCA's package of regulatory suspensions, which includes unexpected suspensions of capital markets regulations, is arguably bundled with the inherent flexibility expressed in company law. Such bundling can allow the FCA to benefit from the aura of inherent flexibility and create a reduced impression of dissonance for investors. The FCA's role in endorsing the PEG's recommendation can potentially achieve the effect of reinforcing legitimacy in the face of perhaps divergent investor preferences, nudging towards convergence in accepting the soft law standard. However, is the bundling of regulatory suspensions in capital markets regulation with inherently flexible company law aspects inappropriate? The latter is "enabling" in nature and can be adjusted, but the former is mandatory in nature due to the public interest of investor protection, and can be seen as being compromised by being bundled in regulatory suspensions encompassing inherently flexible company law. What boundaries are there, if any, between the ideological or jurisdictional separation¹⁶⁵ of corporate law from securities regulation?¹⁶⁶

On the one hand, the bundling exercise may make porous the boundaries of enabling

corporate law and mandatory securities regulation and allow regulators greater freedom to foray into the former.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, the bundling exercise may also result in the shareholder-centric ideology underpinning enabling aspects of corporate law being extended to the whole package of legal elasticity, therefore thinning out notions of public interest.¹⁶⁸ Further, it is uncertain to what extent the FCA has engaged with the PEG and AFME ahead of their announcement, and whether the soft law recommendations reflect the multifaceted mix of private and public interest in the exercise of inherent flexibility. Moreover, any coordination between the FCA and investor trade bodies, although useful in a crisis, can also create opaque networks that may become impenetrable to other interested stakeholders.

We turn to consider the unexpected regulatory suspensions that are juxtaposed with the inherently flexible measure. The strategic bundling of inherent flexibility with unexpected suspensions mitigates the dissonance effect of the latter. However, such bundling also results in a strong marketization character for the *other* regulatory suspensions, thinning out its public interest aspects. Part C in particular discusses this.

B. Analysis on Dispensation of General Meetings

The procedural law of general meetings ensures that all shareholders receive the same information at the same time and are able to participate collectively in decision-making processes. In reality, such procedural fairness under company law has been somewhat undermined as institutional shareholders have begun to be more engaged with their investee companies informally, as part of “stewardship” (since the Stewardship Code of 2010, amended 2020,¹⁶⁹ and the advent of similar provisions in the European Shareholders’ Rights Directive 2017).¹⁷⁰ Policymakers’ nudge to institutional investors to become more engaged is due to concerns that passive institutional shareholders who vote with management are not effectively performing their monitoring roles.¹⁷¹ Moreover, with the rise of American-style hedge fund shareholder activism,¹⁷² the level of voice and vociferousness observed in the institutional shareholder community has risen because institutions have worked with hedge funds in joint campaigns¹⁷³ and because the corporate sector has attracted negative attention for the last decade or so, since the global financial crisis and a number of home-grown scandals.¹⁷⁴

The discretionary dispensation of general meeting procedures for substantial transactions may not be regarded as too prejudicial to shareholders. First, its “bundling” with the relatively more enabling regime company law discussed above allows shareholders to see the regulatory suspension in a more integrated and less unfavourable light. Sec-

ond, it may be argued that the condition for discretionary dispensation is that the company must show evidence of sufficient shareholder consent; hence, companies are still compelled to engage with shareholders, much in the “stewardship” ethos of informal engagement “outside of general meetings.” Such engagement can also ameliorate the risks taken by investors in allowing the waivers of preemption rights discussed above. Finally, regulatory discretion in dispensation may be regarded as a gatekeeping device, although it is uncertain what level of evidence the regulator is looking for in relation to shareholder consent. For instance, it could be queried if shareholder consent with conditions or with qualifications may be regarded as sufficient.

Nevertheless, to allow dispensation of general meetings conditioned upon companies securing sufficient written consent of shareholders would mean that companies are likely to engage in selective engagement, with perhaps “friendly” but significant shareholders in order to reach the needed majority. In this manner, the underlying principle of fairness amongst treatment of shareholders in the collective decision-making of general meetings is compromised. Further, retail investors are likely to be marginalized.¹⁷⁵ Although it may be argued that stewardship practices already entail differences in the quality of company-investor relationships amongst different investors, allowing companies to selectively “court” shareholders for decision-making seems to go a step further and exacerbate the already uneven playing field. Furthermore, even if companies accurately estimate the level of majority support for these measures, such estimates are not equivalent to a general meeting where the percentage of shareholders dissenting is recorded. A relatively high level of dissent is important for signalling the controversy of company proposals.

In this light, the FCA should consider the incentives on the part of affected constituents as a result of regulatory suspension, and the trade-offs made amongst different interest groups affected by the suspensions. These should be considered not only on a temporary basis but also in terms of how such trade-offs may exacerbate a longer-running issue, such as the relative marginalisation of the retail investor, in the stewardship landscape that emphasizes the role of institutional ones. Should shareholder engagement be regarded as part of the enabling character of company law, that facilitates shareholders to tailor-make their monitoring arrangements with companies and or as part of mandatory law that standardizes common expectations of protection and reflects collective values?¹⁷⁶ The longer term impact on the nature of shareholder relations and corporate governance should not be ignored even if there appears to be pressure for quick policy adjustments,¹⁷⁷ and should give rise to longer-term thinking even after a crisis settles.

C. Analysis on Working Capital Disclosure

Where a prospectus or simplified prospectus is required for corporate fundraising, the FCA¹⁷⁸ has not suspended mandatory disclosure obligations. Ferran,¹⁷⁹ drawing on lessons from the last emergency fundraising by banks during the global financial crisis, recommended that suspension of mandatory disclosure could be warranted if issuers are not new to the market and if the suspension would save issuers time and cost. However, mandatory disclosure is a cherished tenet in investor protection¹⁸⁰ and suspending it may be counterproductive if companies' cost of capital increases due to investor risk aversion.¹⁸¹ Hence, the FCA has not chosen to be more radical but rather to adjust mandatory disclosure in a manner that arguably puts issuers in the most favourable light possible.

By allowing issuers without underlying financial problems to issue a separate coronavirus statement which does not affect the otherwise "clean" working capital declaration, the FCA arguably engages in a form of framing of information while not undercutting the long-held institutional expectations of comprehensive and full disclosure. Investors would still be receiving the COVID-19 impact-related financial information, but in a disaggregated manner. Kahnemann and Tversky's prospect theory¹⁸² shows how the framing of information affects choice, and in particular, O'Clock and Devine¹⁸³ demonstrate how negatively-framed information by companies affects auditors' opinions. The disaggregation of the "clean" working capital declaration would help to avoid auditors' biases against negatively-framed information¹⁸⁴ and would likely be viewed positively by investors. The confinement of coronavirus-related impact to its own separate statement frames such information as being more contingent, and highlights the exogenous nature of the impact. This may encourage such information to be assessed in a more forgiving light and not to preponderantly "infect" the positive framing within a "clean" working capital declaration.

A crucial question is whether the framing approach disrupts the balance of institutional values in securities regulation, i.e., the promotion of rational investor market discipline for issuers (as far as possible, given behavioural insights showing lapses in rationality¹⁸⁵). The rational investor brings about efficient pricing in capital markets¹⁸⁶ so capital is ultimately allocated to the most efficient companies, resulting in long-term wealth creation for all participants in the corporate economy. It may, however, be argued that such framing could serve as a behavioural antidote to counter investors' sub-optimal behavioural biases, such as excessive risk aversion.

Nevertheless, a more important question is what the FCA seeks to achieve with the regulatory suspensions introduced. The regulatory suspensions to facilitate easier equity fundraising by companies do not change how investors select and price their investments in companies. These investment decisions would still be made for rational purposes and not necessarily for pro-social purposes in relation to saving companies or jobs. When a crisis exposes the fragilities in the corporate economy, it may be argued that it is rationally optimal for a destructive wave to sift out all but the most robust companies, albeit bringing about a transitional period of instability. Left to market forces, commentators¹⁸⁷ have found that investors gravitate towards funding companies with less financial fragility during the COVID-19 crisis,¹⁸⁸ such as companies with lower levels of debt and higher cash buffers, which make them financially flexible. This may defeat the broader policy goals of saving companies and jobs, as capital markets can be excessively unforgiving towards companies with some weaknesses. There is a deeper question of whether market discipline should be the optimal channel for selecting corporate survivors as many jobs and near-term economic pain for many households are at stake.

The FCA's intervention in framing reflects a hint of public interest in relation to preventing massive destabilization of the corporate economy and capital markets.¹⁸⁹ The FCA has an interest in preserving the robustness of London's capital markets¹⁹⁰ throughout the crisis. However, the FCA has refrained from articulating pro-sociality, such as in relation to preservation of jobs by corporations, or more pronounced interventionist stances, such as stock market closures proposed by Andhov¹⁹¹ in order to prevent short-termist value destruction by shareholders or short-sellers who may profit from anticipation of bad news. Schammo¹⁹² queries if regulatory choices should be more pronounced to be in the overall public interest, such as being more "precautionary."

Although we are sceptical that precautionary tools such as stock market closures are necessarily optimal in achieving a balance between pro-social goals in saving the real economy and investor protection in capital markets, there is a need for the FCA to consider the substantive effects of regulatory suspensions, and whether more radical options are needed if supporting a robust corporate economy is a matter of public interest.¹⁹³ These include:

- (a) using government or public sector vehicles or public-private partnerships to support capital injection into private sector companies alongside private sector fundraising,¹⁹⁴ in a manner that does not breach state aid rules;¹⁹⁵
- (b) tying down investments made in support of companies during the COVID-19 crisis to duties, measures or restrictions in support of long-termism on the part of investors to help strengthen or rebuild companies, so that subsequent short-termist

mist pressures do not become counter-productive or destructive. A form of fiduciary duties to be imposed for the benefit of the company may be warranted, such as discussed in relation to hedge fund activists¹⁹⁶ or controlling shareholders;¹⁹⁷ providing for adequate investor protection in return for their long-termist support, companies should make particular and adequate disclosures and continuing transparency regarding the use of funds,¹⁹⁸ and in particular investors may have an interest to ensure that companies pursue sustainable behaviour going forward.¹⁹⁹ instituting a form of prudential regulation²⁰⁰ for the non-financial corporate sector too to improve their long-term resilience, entailing more mandatory standards in capital structures.

We have explored critically the dilemmas, challenges, unintended consequences, and possible adverse effects arising from regulatory suspensions in credit and capital markets regulations designed overall to achieve relief and rescue of households and the corporate economy. Although the suspensions themselves embed controversial policies that inevitably attract discussions of potential weaknesses, and the policies may not be perfect, we caution that these suspensions may have been carried out with near-sighted assumptions, with insufficient consideration being given to longer-term effects that may entail from the structural nature of legal elasticity. Even if regulators do not need to bring permanent adjustments about proactively or prematurely, they should engage with deeper and broader considerations in the deployment of legal elasticity, so that the demand for fundamental shifts, if they occur, do not take regulators by surprise and cause even more disruption and dissonance in due course. The deployment of legal elasticity can also be regarded as part and parcel of the need for regulators to engage in a broad notion of “responsiveness,”²⁰¹ so that dynamism can be brought to substantive policy solutions as well as regulatory processes, designs and implementation.

V. Deploying Legal Elasticity by Financial Regulators—the Way Forward

Sections III and IV have teased out the dilemmas, unintended and longer-term consequences of the regulatory suspensions introduced to achieve the relief and rescue agenda in the UK. We show that even where legal elasticity is used against a context of relative institutional stability, i.e., there is no apparent appetite for major regulatory reform, it introduces more than transient challenges in relation to institutional dissonance. Questions regarding regulatory objective trade-offs²⁰² arise, as well as critical scrutiny of outcomes achieved and unintended or adverse effects. We argue that regulators deploying legal elasticity should be mindful of its structural nature and be pre-

pared to engage with managing its deployment.

We propose three aspects of a management process for legal elasticity, choosing to offer these as empowering measures for regulators rather than to prescribe what substantive solutions may be preferred for combatting the COVID-19 crisis. Different substantive solutions may work to different extents in different jurisdictions, but where legal elasticity is deployed for the purposes of achieving substantive outcomes, regulators may face similar challenges. The three aspects of regulatory management of legal elasticity deal with:

- (a) recognizing the potential for institutional dissonance and responsively managing these effects against a context of policy goals;
- (b) actively engaging in multipart frameworks for crisis management, including with regulated entities who may be tasked with delegated implementation of the balance of regulatory suspensions and existing regulatory objectives;
- (c) pre-crisis preparedness on the part of regulators in order to mobilize crisis management tools including legal elasticity in a robust manner.

A. Managing Institutional Dissonance

Where households and corporations engage in more debt to meet their financial needs in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, the long-term macroprudential regulatory objective of debt reduction is affected,²⁰³ not to mention the microprudential regulatory objective of prudent lending. We have earlier argued that lending behaviour is bound to be affected by policy nudges towards the expansion of bank balance sheets and the existence of government guarantees. In relation to capital markets regulation, although the facilitation of easier approvals for share issues and dispensation with general meeting procedures for substantial transactions may appear as pragmatic solutions to immediate problems, there are forces that may make the temporality of such measures questionable. The advent of technology and corporate pressures can both exert influences towards shaping the nature of shareholder engagement and the exercise of rights in subtle ways.²⁰⁴ Further, institutional dissonance brings about more than just policy implications. Legal elasticity may also affect market-based structures in unintended ways as discussed in Section III regarding the market for securitized home mortgages in the US.²⁰⁵

The reluctance of financial regulators to manage institutional dissonance more explicitly may stem from fears of proactively bringing about institutional instability. However, the cosmetic approach of bundling regulatory suspensions that are inherently flexible with those that are mandatory does not of itself reinforce institutional stability, being

merely a rhetorical device. Fundamental questions regarding how institutional tenets and values “encoded” in law or regulation have been rendered imbalanced would still arise, in relation to moral hazard,²⁰⁶ or financial institution resilience.²⁰⁷ Questions abound as to whether longer-term or permanent effects may entail from institutional dissonance and pave the way for policy change in due course.²⁰⁸ In this way, institutional dissonance, initially perceived to be temporary, may affect social contract bargains underlying the institutionalization of norms or tenets.

Regulators should be mindful of the structural nature of legal elasticity and its potential to introduce disruptions that would portend questions of a more fundamental nature, and ultimately affect regulatory stability.²⁰⁹ As Baldwin et al. argue, regulatory stability is not itself a tenet that should be necessarily maintained, but it is important to understand how it should be disturbed.²¹⁰

Pistor’s legal theory of finance provides a theoretical basis for conceiving of legal elasticity as structural in nature and inextricably connected with institutional disruption, even if that is a matter of degree. However, one may take a more limited reading of the theory. According to the theory, finance is a hierarchical structure with sovereigns at its heart, to the extent that they control their own currency (and borrow mostly in their currency) and can therefore act as true lenders of last resort. Private parties fit into this hierarchical structure depending on their size and economic power from large systemic banks down to retail investors and borrowers. Pistor posits that elasticity tends to be more accentuated at the top of the system to the benefit of sovereigns and large banks, while those at the bottom are left to face the full rigour of the law. This conceptualization resonates very closely with the events of the global financial crisis during which most distressed large financial institutions were rescued with the use of public money while individual investors and borrowers were left to face the dire financial consequences of the crisis.

As the COVID-19-induced economic crisis is exogenous to the financial system in the sense that financial firms are not responsible for its occurrence and could have done nothing to prevent it, the key financial institutions and the sovereign at the heart of the financial system would not be incentivized to support any fundamental institutional change to financial law and regulation. Hence, elasticity is likely to be seen only as a set of temporary measures that need to circumvent the rigidities of institutional stability during an economic shock. In this manner, legal elasticity and its impact can be contained by the framing and decisions taken by powerful structures in finance, allowing legal elasticity to exist as minimally disruptive. Further, as much of the elasticity em-

ployed during the pandemic has been used to the benefit of actors in the periphery of the financial system, such as mortgaged households or small businesses, it can be argued that such elasticity is of a different and less radical quality than that affecting the heart of the financial system during the global financial crisis. Pistor's key thesis is that the core of the financial system must always be protected. In the current circumstances, despite the severity of the pandemic and the ensuing economic recession, financial institutions are not (yet) in distress. This permits governments and regulators to take measures to alleviate the consequences of the crisis for households and businesses on the grounds of social welfare but also as a means to implement a macro-economic policy of supporting the economy during what is hoped to be a V-shaped recession. But, if the core of the financial system becomes threatened, then it is likely that elasticity will again be used primarily to the benefit of core actors such as systemically important financial institutions.

Based on the power structures perspective of legal elasticity, institutional change would likely be resisted although legal elasticity has been deployed during the COVID-19 crisis. This narrower reading of the theory also means that legal elasticity and institutional change are only connected if power structures at the core of the financial system elect to do so. However, the objective effects observed are that elasticity does bring to fore questions regarding regulatory objective trade-offs, and normative questions regarding what finance's role is and should be. Is it *right* at the end of the COVID-19 crisis for banks simply to return to an "enforcement" mode in relation to the borrowers who have been on payment holidays? Is this issue only a matter of conduct of business?²¹¹ Would consumer protection require more radical distributive treatment such as some extent of debt forgiveness? With prolonged economic uncertainty, these questions will not be answered satisfactorily with a simple resumption of regulatory regimes and the termination of suspensions. We posit that power structures alone are not likely to sustain institutional stability, as bottom-up social appetite and demands can exert new pressures in the future due to the longer-term effects of institutional dissonance. One of the authors has argued that social movements have contributed to a gradual institutional change in corporate regulation for example.²¹² Lothian²¹³ and Arup²¹⁴ have also, in the wake of the global financial crisis, called for greater socialization of the objectives of financial regulation. Such a radical reorientation is not yet seen in the UK, being dominated by an economic paradigm²¹⁵ in financial regulation. Post-crisis reforms have only edged closer to macro-level economic perspectives such as financial stability.²¹⁶ However, there is a consistent social cry for financial regulation reform such as in consumer welfare.²¹⁷ The undercurrents of dissatisfaction with the myopic paradigms of financial regulation may again be raised in the opportunities provided by institutional dissonance. We simply do

not think regulators can avoid thinking about radical and fundamental issues regarding institutional objectives, norms, and tenets, although it is beyond the scope of this work to prescribe that particular regulatory policy changes be made.

Hence, we argue that financial regulators should deploy legal elasticity with an understanding of its structural nature in accordance with the fully theorized account of Pistor's theory. This allows financial regulators to engage in dynamic evaluations of outcomes and effects of regulatory suspensions. Financial regulators should not start with the assumption that legal elasticity applied to the exogenous nature of the COVID-19 crisis is necessarily temporary and that resumption of institutional stability will automatically take place. Rather, we propose that when regulators deploy regulatory elasticity, it should be recognized that some extent of institutional dissonance *will* result, and should give consideration to monitoring the levels of and managing such dissonance, including engaging in regulatory discourse and institutional review. Keeping such an open mind allows regulators more fully to appreciate the risks and opportunities in deploying legal elasticity and allow regulators to operate more fully in the intersection between financial regulation as a system and wider public policy goals.

Proposal One: Financial regulators should expect institutional dissonance and focus on how to monitor and manage it in terms of public discourse. Regulators should adopt an open-minded stance to the longer-term effects of legal elasticity, factoring such effects into their decision-making matrix.

The practical implication for financial regulators is that monitoring and managing institutional dissonance is not a foregone assumption but an active approach, one that should be dynamic and sensitive to the overall pressures and drivers for change, without necessarily bringing about premature actions. In relation to this, we suggest that financial regulators can benefit from an approach of rational but holistic regulatory decision-making proposed by Sunstein.²¹⁸ Indeed, such a rational approach can be even more justified in the midst of crisis management where behavioural biases, such as risk aversion and short-termism, may dominate perception.

Sunstein's approach in regulatory decision-making is grounded in cost-benefit analysis in its broadest terms.²¹⁹ This approach allows regulators to anticipate and constantly assess the outcomes and effects of legal elasticity. This approach goes beyond merely calculating the monetary values of benefits and drawbacks in the marketized sense, and seeks to encompass "hard to value," controversial and subjective evaluations. The aim is to arrive at a more holistic evaluative compass. The evaluative compass is anchored

upon the human perspective, including the difficulties in putting a value on social values and preferences.²²⁰ Sunstein²²¹ sets out in detail and acknowledges the difficulties in such evaluations, clarifying that the aim is not to arrive at narrowly agreed monetized values in order to justify regulatory policies. Rather, this approach should tease out the factors that make variables hard to value, allowing ranges of tentative values to be assigned not to demean the variables but to map them out relative to other priorities and values, so that regulators can see the range of issues before them more clearly. The broad pursuit of such cost-benefit analysis is challenging, as it requires regulators to have a broad scope of information before them²²² and to make responsive judgments.

Commentators have criticized regulatory implementation of cost-benefit approaches in regular times as being flawed. Cost-benefit analyses have become narrowly defined, in order to avoid hard questions,²²³ and highly proceduralized in order to show that formalities are completed for advancing a particular law reform.²²⁴ Treatment of variables that are difficult to value could also be vague and weak.²²⁵ However, as Wiener²²⁶ argues, evaluative approaches like cost-benefit analysis need not be practised in narrow, formalistic and meaningless terms.

To apply this approach to financial regulators' management of legal elasticity and institutional dissonance, we encourage regulators to consider broadly near and longer-term effects and implications, in an ongoing manner. The deployment of legal elasticity raises institutional dissonance risks but also provides a unique opportunity to grapple with forward-looking thinking. Opportunities for law reform should not be ruled out. For example, where regulatory suspensions have mobilized a suite of laws and regulations not inherently thought to be flexible, this can provide an opportunity for regulators to consider if more flexibility needs to be built into regulatory systems.²²⁷ The evaluative approach also provides a more robust basis for regulatory accountability in the management of legal elasticity and crisis management.²²⁸

This leads us to the second proposal which is intricately linked to Proposal One. We observe that financial regulators have communicated at great lengths to their regulated entities to carry out regulatory suspensions as well as to adhere to much of the institutional framework, especially in micro-prudential regulation and corporate transparency in capital markets regulation. Such communications give the impression that, because financial regulators firmly believe in their assumption of institutional stability, the management of institutional dissonance is merely an implementation matter for the regulated entities. In this manner, institutional dissonance can become externalized or "delegated" to their regulated entities. We argue that this leads to hazards in terms

of unexpected behaviour by regulated entities and social justice consequences. There can be a better balance between regulatory management of legal elasticity and delegation to the regulated sector. Hence, besides the necessity of regulatory leadership under Proposal One that relates to regulators' monitoring and management of legal elasticity and institutional dissonance, regulatory leadership is necessary for managing delegated implementation in uncertain times resulting from institutional dissonance.

B. Delegated Implementation by Regulated Entities to Manage the Balance of Institutional Dissonance

The PRA emphasized at length that existing regulations continue to be implemented in a 'consistent, robust and well-balanced manner' although clarification is made towards lenient treatment of deferred debt payments benefiting from payment holidays.²²⁹ This balance is not easy to maintain as regulated entities are mindful of the part they play in the broader agenda for relief and rescue while perceiving their needs for compliance with regulatory standards. The latter is arguably challenging as regulated entities are used to a relatively prescribed numerical governance regime in microprudential regulation. How should banks exercise the discretion to be able to draw down capital and liquidity buffers, not being certain where the bottom line is, or to make less loan loss provisions in light of the PRA's encouragement to refrain from treating deferred debt as being in default, not being certain how much to provision for? The exercise of discretion by banks can become a burden and not a freedom.

At a broader level, this is also an archetypical problem of modern regulatory approaches such as meta-regulation²³⁰ where regulators' broad principles and open-ended frameworks are by necessity realized through detailed implementation by firms. Firms cannot be overly prescribed as regulators cannot micro-manage regulatory compliance. However, the breadth of discretion in implementation can often lead to firms' discretion being exercised in favour of cosmetic compliance,²³¹ if firms are not committed to the underlying policy. Firms can also be left to a form of self-regulation if regulators fail to supervise meaningfully.²³² We observe that in both the deployment of legal elasticity in credit and capital markets regulation, policymakers and regulators have tended towards a *greater degree* of autonomy for regulated entities and markets to implement legal elasticity. This discretion can be particularly difficult if regulated entities need to manage institutional dissonance while managing legal elasticity.

We argue that the more regulators assume that institutional stability is not affected by temporary legal elasticity and fail to engage with the implications of institutional dissonance, the more likely a 'delegated' approach will ensue, in the meta-regulato-

ry outworking of legal elasticity. Regulated entities are in effect asked to implement new measures that challenge their sense of certainty, while being required to comply with existing rules and principles. This can give rise to different types of behavioural responses.

One is that the regulated entities can become excessively risk averse, mindful of the possible boomerang effect of compliance once temporary elasticity recedes. This can explain why the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme discussed in Section III did not result in much underwriting by banks, as they were mindful of the existing prudential expectations on regulators' part. Second, delegated implementation by the regulated sector of legal elasticity can give rise to market participants' incentives to exploit opportunities.²³³ This perverse behaviour can result from the perceived "freedom" in discretionary implementation of legal elasticity. Private-equity owned companies that were already laden with debt sought to increase debt by turning to government-backed loans. This caused public outcry as private equity backers are seen as exploitative and unwilling to capitalize companies in a manner that may help them become more resilient in the future. Debt can increase future fragility for corporations.²³⁴ These companies would also be competing with others for such loan finance, and could unduly deprive other companies from accessing such finance.

Third, delegated implementation can also entail behavioural sub-optimality on the part of regulators. For example, regulators can engage in "blame games"²³⁵ if social sentiment is unfavourable to their actions, and their narrative framing of crisis management can take on a form of defensiveness based on the delegation of implementation to the regulated sector.²³⁶ We raise these possibilities because there may be outcomes that can be controversial, despite the overall policy agenda of relief and rescue. In this context, if regulators were to take enforcement actions against regulated entities for failure of regulatory compliance in the ambiguous context of managing institutional dissonance, this would also likely be regarded as unjust.²³⁷

Legal elasticity often results in reallocations of burden and benefit, and these may be perceived as justified on the basis of who can better bear risk or loss, and who may be in relatively greater need of welfare redistribution. The dangers of delegated implementation of legal elasticity to regulated entities, although likely inevitable in a meta-regulatory framework, are that: (a) welfare outcomes may be attributed to regulated entities' actions, putting them in a difficult position in balancing their private decision-making, the needs for regulatory compliance, and the part they play in the public policy of relief and rescue; and (b) the roles of regulators and policymakers may become ambiguous

or uncertain even though welfare outcomes that result are essentially matters of public interest.

Who should make judgments about welfare redistributive consequences²³⁸ especially since these judgments are unlikely to be uncontroversial given a landscape of competing needs for individuals, corporations and systems in general?²³⁹ Such distributive judgments implicate private capacities²⁴⁰ as well as public institutional structures, such as in relation to the nature of the Lockean social contract in politics. The rise of the risk society²⁴¹ and welfare state in Western developed countries²⁴² poses the question of whether consumers should be favoured in terms of protection, relief, and welfare, and under what circumstances should the operation of market forces be regarded as optimal.²⁴³ Even in an institutional context, there can be redistributive consequences. For example, the adjustments to mandatory disclosure for securities offerings in emergency fundraising by corporations discussed in Section IV have redistributive consequences in terms of reducing cost for companies, but potentially increasing opacity for investors.

In this manner, we propose that financial regulators ought to engage continuously with the regulated sector that is carrying out the delegated implementation of legal elasticity. Financial regulators would benefit from being apprised on an ongoing basis of information and problems “on the ground.” Further, supervisory steering is needed in light of behavioral developments that may be unexpected. Policy steering would be needed for broader implications of welfare outcomes that are mixed matters of private and public interest. In this manner, we reinforce the argument made in Proposal One that legal elasticity has to be managed, this time *relationally*, with those tasked to implement it, as well as those likely to be affected by or interested in the outcomes of implementing legal elasticity.

Proposal Two: Consistent with a proactive approach to monitoring and managing institutional dissonance entailing from legal elasticity, regulators should engage in relational frameworks for managing legal elasticity. They should engage proactively with their regulated entities, possibly also extending to other agencies and stakeholders.

We propose that the relational management aspect of legal elasticity would include the following dimensions for practical application:

- (a) The relational dimension amongst financial regulators and relevant policymakers. Crisis management by the public sector is often not assumed to be unitary

due to the delineations between government bodies, independent agencies, and how government and bureaucracy is structured.²⁴⁴

- (b) The relational dimension between regulated entities and their relevant regulators. This relationship is often fraught with depictions of capture,²⁴⁵ polarisation, and excessive delegation (resulting in self-regulation).²⁴⁶ Although the regulated-regulator relationship remains a work in progress in regulation theory studies, this article suggests that constructive engagement is inevitable although relational dynamics may not be perfect.
- (c) The relational dimension between regulators, policymakers, and stakeholders or society more broadly, as crisis management benefits from multi-stakeholder participation and drawing together of resources,²⁴⁷ social mobilization, and solidarity.

One of the lessons from the global financial crisis for financial regulators was the need to coordinate amongst each other and with relevant government agencies and Treasury departments. After the global financial crisis, it is explicitly provided in UK legislation that crisis management should be coordinated between the Treasury, Bank of England, and PRA with respect to financial stability and public interest needs.²⁴⁸ As the reform was inspired by the immediate needs of the crisis that related to financial sector instability, the FCA was not included. The exclusion of the FCA can be attributed to a lack of the perception of business conduct as being contributory to these objectives.²⁴⁹ However, the financial stability crisis of 2007-08 was quickly followed by business conduct scandals in the banking industry.²⁵⁰ As such, in this dynamic environment, there should be room to consider a wider and more permanent crisis management group including the FCA. Indeed, the management of the COVID-19 crisis also required the PRA and FCA to work in a coordinated manner so that the FCA's regulatory suspensions in consumer credit could be coordinated with the PRA's approach to microprudential regulation.

Although the regulated-regulator relationship has been depicted in relation to lobbying, informal "capture or sympathy,"²⁵¹ or excessive trust (especially before the global financial crisis),²⁵² it remains imperative that regulators maintain informational and supervisory proximity to the regulated. Omarova²⁵³ argued, in the wake of the global financial crisis, that a system of tripartite financial regulation should be introduced where "bankers" and "bureaucrats" would enroll "guardians" who are stakeholders representing public interest to co-govern in the realm of financial regulation. This would allow public interest issues to be brought to bear in financial regulation, and weaknesses in the relational paradigm between the regulator and regulated to be moderated. Such a multipartite form of networked governance is consistent with and has always been

envisaged in regulatory theory.²⁵⁴ Perhaps there may be fear that diverse demands from multiple stakeholders may confuse the policy agenda. However, excluding voices or dialogue at a time of crisis management does not necessarily lead to more efficient or effective policy decisions. In Section IV, we discuss the dialogue between the FCA and the PEG which paved the way for the FCA's endorsement of the waiver of preemption rights and other regulatory suspensions included in the same communication. The support of relevant non-public sector actors and stakeholders can be important, especially if they play a catalyzing part in the introduction of legal elasticity or if their support may mitigate dissent and resistance. However, there may be an issue regarding how stakeholders are selectively engaged by regulators for the purposes of crisis management. An example of a more open multistakeholder dialogue during the COVID-19 crisis is the UK Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee (BEIS) of the Parliament's channel for feedback²⁵⁵ from the business sector in relation to impact and needs. Such a channel is open to the public although the Committee may engage in further dialogue with select respondents.

C. Preparation for Crisis Management and the Role of Legal Elasticity

Finally, we suggest that if legal elasticity is to become a staple part of crisis management tools for financial regulators, or broadly as part of responsive regulation, regulators need to engage with it in an ex ante and sustained manner rather than in an ad hoc manner.

We propose that regulators should have a pre-crisis framework for thinking about the scope of and possibilities relating to legal elasticity, as preparedness is a quality that can be usefully honed and would be beneficial even if the actual crisis that materializes and needs to be managed is different from the one imagined.

Proposal Three: Financial regulators should put in place a pre-crisis framework for preparing for crisis management, including deploying legal elasticity. Pre-crisis preparedness goes some way towards the ex post management of institutional dissonance, discussed in Proposals One and Two.

It is useful for regulators to have a dedicated outfit for pre-crisis preparation, and wisdom may be borrowed from scenario planning literature in business management. Oliver and Parrett argue that the more dynamic and unpredictable a business environment may be, the more a business needs to engage in scenario planning. Scenario planning allows business leaders to take stock of information and perceptions in a more holistic manner, and to take stock of the existing suite of tools available to the business in im-

aging responses. This allows business leaders to develop alternative strategic options for possible responses, as they observe how the environment changes around them.

In a similar vein, pre-crisis preparation on the part of regulators can incorporate useful elements from scenario planning practice. In terms of gathering information, regulators' access to information, particularly from the financial sector, has increased dramatically after the global financial crisis. This is because of regulators' acknowledgement of their shortfalls in trusting markets and not having comprehensive and even granular information to map out the trends and risks in financial markets domestically and internationally. Hence, micro-prudential, conduct, and macro-prudential regulators in the UK and EU have vastly increased reporting and information return requirements. The current information environment for regulators is not anaemic by any means and provides a good starting point for developing greater preparedness for crisis management. However, such information should be regularly shared amongst regulators and policymakers in relational paradigms discussed in Proposal Two.

Next, regulators should map out the scope of their inherently flexible regulatory tools as these are designed with responsiveness in mind, as well as the likely effects entailing from their deployment. Maymin argues that regulators need to be aware that the timing and duration of interventions can promote regularization of dysfunctional markets but can also distort markets, and much depends on regulators' choice in timing and duration of interventions. Regulators can enhance their preparedness in considering scenarios in which flexible regulatory tools may be used and to what extent. This can contribute to more skillful judgment at the point of deployment. Crawford argues that although regulators cannot prepare for the exact types and extent of crises that occur, training to develop those judgments is beneficial. Indeed, he proposes a 'wargaming' approach in which the regulators design worst-case scenarios in different ranges of probability, in order to test the limits of inherently flexible regulatory tools that can be deployed. This may even be similar to stress-testing that regulators carry out for systemically important banks and financial institutions and would not be unfamiliar as a methodology to regulators.

Regulators' "wargaming" or "stress-testing" of inherently flexible tools may reveal their limits and the need for other flexibilities in other laws or regulations not hitherto explicitly flexible. This provides regulators with the opportunity to consider more holistically the needs for legal elasticity and possible effects in institutional dissonance. Although ex ante mapping is unlikely to be complete or exactly match a crisis, regulatory preparedness can be more optimally honed for the management of legal elasticity and the demands depicted in Proposals One and Two.

VI. Conclusion

The COVID-19 crisis has severely impacted economic activities globally, generating wide-ranging policy responses. A crucial piece of the mosaic of policy responses comes from financial regulation, as financial regulators have adjusted regulatory rules in order to allow the financial sector to meet the policy goals of rescue and relief. We argue that although the twin policy goals of relief and rescue meet the immediate needs of many households and corporations caused by unexpected stressful conditions, the regulatory suspensions introduced by financial regulators obscure hazards to regulators, regulated financial entities, households, and corporations, and may fall short of the policy goals desired. This is because such regulatory suspensions may not be as temporary as they seem and their impact on institutional stability should not be assumed to be minimal. The article situates the deployment of regulatory suspensions within the theoretical framework for legal elasticity developed in Pistor's legal theory of finance. We argue that legal elasticity brings about longer-term and structural effects, and gives rise to questions regarding institutional change. Regulators and policymakers' reluctance to engage with the structural nature of legal elasticity is pursuant to their perspective that regulatory suspensions during the COVID-19 crisis are only temporary. However, we critically caution that such reluctance to engage in institutional questions raised by deploying legal elasticity risks greater hazards to legal certainty, institutional stability, and ultimately policy outcomes in due course.

We make a series of recommendations to improve financial regulators' decision-making processes relating to regulatory suspensions. These recommendations are built upon our overarching argument that regulatory suspensions need to be understood in the fullness of the theoretical framework for legal elasticity. We not only draw upon but also extend Pistor's legal theory of finance to that end. First, we propose that regulators should anticipate that institutional dissonance follows from deploying regulatory suspensions and should proactively seek to evaluate all relevant aspects and considerations pertaining equally to institutional stability and change. Second, regulators should engage constructively in relational paradigms with relevant public sector agencies, regulated entities, and broader stakeholders in order to monitor and supervise the outworking of legal elasticity. Third, regulators should put in place *ex ante* frameworks for preparing for crisis management and the potential use of legal elasticity to be better prepared for engagement with this complex regulatory tool. These approaches facilitate more richly considered and holistic decision-making on the part of regulators and policymakers, even if it is not perfectly clear what substantive policies may work optimally in an economic crisis such as that induced by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Iris H-Y Chiu is Professor of Corporate Law and Financial Regulation at the University of College London and a Research Fellow at the European Corporate Governance Institute. Andreas Kokkinis is Senior Lecturer of Law at the University of Birmingham. Andrea Miglionico is Lecturer of Law at the University of Reading. The authors are grateful to Pierre Schammo and Luca Enriques for comments on an earlier draft which is now an ECGI Working Paper.

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July 1, 2047: Doomsday for Hong Kong Property Law?

By Saraphin Dhanani

I. Introduction

On the morning of June 9, 2019, Hong Kongers flooded the streets to protest the pernicious erosion of their fundamental rights and freedoms by the People's Republic of China (PRC), including the right to a democratic form of government; the right to speak freely and to protest openly; and perhaps most importantly, the right to due process in a territory historically governed by the rule of law.¹ These rights, though typical of Western democracies, were not unfamiliar to the people of Hong Kong. They were stitched into the very fabric of the territory and codified in the Sino-British Joint Declaration²—the 1997 treaty signed by the United Kingdom and the PRC to mark the official end of the UK's 99-year leasehold of Hong Kong and its handover to the PRC.³

The Sino-British Joint Declaration set up a new framework of governance between Hong Kong and China, known as One Country, Two Systems. This framework allowed Hong Kong to continue to enjoy its distinct political and economic rights for fifty years until July 1, 2047 when the PRC would have full authority to integrate Hong Kong into the Mainland.⁴ The details of this framework were codified in a document written by the PRC known as the Basic Law which became Hong Kong's de facto constitution. Under the Basic Law, the rights to press, speech, and assembly were explicit as well.⁵

But early last year, pro-democracy Hong Kongers who had so fervently taken to the streets to protest the erosion of their freedoms for nearly nine months were forced to retreat back into their homes. The rapid spread of COVID-19 quashed any public demonstrations for several months. Chinese leader Xi Jinping took advantage of a lull in the protests and introduced a national security bill, the "Law of the People's Republic

of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” to the National People’s Congress (NPC), the Mainland’s legislative body. The bill was a nebulous amalgamation of China’s national security interests in Hong Kong, which included a ban on secession, subversion of state power, terrorism, and foreign intervention, and it also gave the Mainland authority to deploy its security agencies in the island region.⁶ In effect, the bill prematurely marked the end of the One Country, Two Systems governance framework between the PRC and Hong Kong. On May 28, 2020, the proposal was approved by the NPC near-unanimously and passed into law on June 30. The United States did not skip a beat, declaring that the end of Hong Kong’s autonomy had come.⁷

Although the people of Hong Kong have once again taken to the streets to protest the PRC’s heavy-handed tactics and to reclaim the rights promised to them under both the Sino-British Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law, one right that has received relatively little attention is the right to one’s own property. Hong Kong is, by many measures, one of the most important property markets in the world. The average cost per square foot of an apartment in Hong Kong was roughly \$2,000 in 2018, making it the most expensive real estate market in the world.⁸ Hong Kong is also a global financial center. Nearly 4,000 multinational companies base their Asia operations in the territory.⁹ As a result, the future of Hong Kong’s system of property rights—especially after 2047 when One Country, Two Systems nominally ends—will affect not only Hong Kongers and Hong Kong-owned businesses. International companies and the global residential and commercial property markets will also feel the effects of any changes to Hong Kong’s long-standing property regime.

To better understand the future of Hong Kong property law after 2047, Part II of this paper will first analyze the rights conferred onto Hong Kong property owners through a “bundle of sticks” analysis and compare their rights against the property rights conferred onto landowners in the United States and onto land-use owners in the PRC. Part III will then present a legal analysis of the Basic Law, as well as a discussion on the economic incentives that the PRC faces to preserve the One Country, Two Systems framework even after 2047, to determine the future of Hong Kong property law. Part IV will present a geopolitical analysis of the realities in Hong Kong and discuss the pessimistic view of its future before concluding with final thoughts on why the future of Hong Kong property law could change in a moment’s time.

II. “Bundle of Sticks:” A Comparative Analysis Between American and Hong Kong Property Rights

Hong Kong's system of property rights differs from the Western, and especially American, system of property rights in important ways. In the United States, property rights are likened to a bundle of sticks, each stick conferring a specific right on the owner, including the right to possess property, the right to transfer property, the right to use property, the right to enjoy the fruits or profits from one's property, the right to destroy property, and perhaps most importantly, the right to exclude others from one's own property.¹⁰ This right to exclude is likely the most valued property right in the United States in large part because it is intimately and inextricably tied with people's notions of autonomy.¹¹ Most rights in the bundle of sticks, such as the right to use property and the right to destroy property, are also derived from the right to exclude others from one's own property. Americans' notion of the right to exclude is so fundamental that it is integrated into the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.¹²

In Hong Kong, however, property law is derived from Chinese national law where the right to exclude is neither explicitly guaranteed nor generally understood to be foundational.¹³ Instead, private ownership of land in Mainland China is prohibited. Individuals can, however, obtain land-use rights from the state for a set term limit.¹⁴ By doing so, the bundle of rights conferred onto land-use owners is "usufructuary," whereby land-use rights holders can "legally possess, use, and benefit from property owned by another," or the PRC in this case.¹⁵ Chinese scholars argue that although these rights do not map onto those typical in the United States, they are bundles of sticks unique to Chinese culture and property norms.¹⁶

In parallel, virtually all land in Hong Kong is nominally owned by the Chinese government and managed and leased by the Government of Hong Kong for set term limits of fifty, seventy-five, or ninety-nine years.¹⁷ As in Mainland China, the right to exclude is not conferred onto private parties, but instead rests with the government. Exclusion, therefore, is not foundational in the same way among Hong Kongers as it is among Americans. Instead, under Article 105 of the Basic Law, the people of Hong Kong have "the right ... to the acquisition, use, disposal and inheritance of property and ... to compensation for lawful deprivation of their property."¹⁸ Hong Kong legal scholar Danny Gittings contends that the property right most valued among Hong Kongers and the Mainland Chinese alike is their right to *acquire* property, noting half-jokingly that in modern-day Chinese culture, "a man is not worthy of marriage if he does not have his own flat."¹⁹ And although Hong Kong and Chinese property laws do differ in their respective land renewal policies—the PRC's renewal of land-use rights being less certain than Hong Kong's renewal of land-leases²⁰—over the last thirty years, the PRC's land-use system and Hong Kong's land-lease system have come to approximate

one another.²¹ So notwithstanding similarities in their capitalist systems and way of life, Hong Kong property law and U.S. property law differ in significant ways.²²

Even so, Hong Kong has historically been an attractive spot for foreign investment. As opposed to the PRC's system of one-party rule, Hong Kong's approximation to a Western democratic nation means that property rights operate within a government system that upholds the rule of law and governs under a transparent justice system. Foreign investors seeking to grow their businesses by tapping into the Asian market are more likely to set up their companies in a community that protects their freedoms and values their rights.²³ But as the PRC continues to curb a number of rights guaranteed under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law, a second order consequence of its actions likely will include a depleted demand for land leases in Hong Kong by both foreign corporations and individuals. As 2047 looms on the horizon, it is worth exploring whether the leases issued by the Hong Kong government after the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed will be upheld after 2047.

III. Legal Analysis of the Basic Law and the Optimistic Views on the Future of Hong Kong Property Law After 2047

To forecast what Hong Kong's property laws will look like after 2047, one must analyze the text of the Basic Law. The primary source of Hong Kong property law is Article 7, which states:

The land and natural resources within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be State property. The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be responsible for their management, use and development and for their lease or grant to individuals, legal persons or organizations for use or development. The revenues derived therefrom shall be exclusively at the disposal of the government of the Region.

As a general matter, Article 7 reinforces the notion that land within Hong Kong's jurisdiction belongs to the PRC and catalogs the authority of the Hong Kong government to manage, develop, and lease this land to individuals. It does not, however, shed any light on property rights post-2047 when One Country, Two Systems ends. This is of notable issue today for two reasons. First, most fifty-year land leases issued after the 1997 Handover are set to expire in 2047 and are void of a renewable clause.²⁴ It is unclear, therefore, whether Hong Kongers will be able to lease their property, either from the Hong Kong government or the PRC, after 2047. Second, for the land leases that have

expired since the Handover, the Hong Kong Lands Department has used its own discretion to extend leases for a term of fifty years, citing Article 7 as authority to exercise its power to “manage ... lease or grant [property].”²⁵ But by doing so, the public is lulled into a false sense of security of owning their property forever, even though Article 7 does not make clear if these leases will be upheld by the PRC after 2047.²⁶

Without clear guidelines in Article 7, Hong Kong politicians and academics alike note that the Basic Law ought to be read as a whole to make sense of the fate of Hong Kong property law post-2047.²⁷ The oft-cited dispositive authority on this matter is Article 123 of the Basic Law, which states:

Where leases of land without a right of renewal expire after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, they shall be dealt with in accordance with laws and policies formulated by the Region on its own.

Like Article 7, Article 123 makes no mention of Hong Kong property rights after 2047. This omission, however, is noteworthy because the neighboring article, Article 121, states explicitly that land leases that were granted by British authorities *before* the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1997 will expire on June 30, 2047.²⁸ If the drafters intended Hong Kong property rights conferred *after* the Handover to expire on a certain date, they would have specified it like they did in Article 121. No less, Article 123 also reinforces the Hong Kong government’s discretion in renewing land “in accordance with [its own] laws and policies.”²⁹ Taken together, scholars argue that the Hong Kong government has authority to renew leases beyond 2047, both because there is no explicit limitation in their authority to do so, and also because this discretion is in accordance with the laws and policies designed by the Hong Kong Lands Department.³⁰

But former Hong Kong legislative council member and pro-democratic figure, Margaret Ng, is unconvinced. Many like her point to Article 5 of the Basic Law to add yet another layer of complexity, noting that Hong Kong’s economic and political structure are time bound by fifty years with an end date of June 30, 2047.³¹ The full text of Article 5 is as follows:

The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.

If Hong Kong’s “capitalist system and way of life” has a fifty-year time limit, it might be thought that the same limitation would apply to the lifespan of the Hong Kong government as well. Any leases granted by this government for a term expiring after June 30,

2047 would, in effect, be ineffective. But scholars are skeptical of this outcome and offer two compelling reasons why Ng's analysis is overstated.

First, Danny Gittings offers a textual analysis. He posits that the comma separating the two clauses in Article 5 confines the time period of fifty years to the second clause—"the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged."³² The first clause guaranteeing that "the socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region," is not limited by such time constraints.³³ Taken together, Gittings argues that Article 5 was never intended to put an end to One Country, Two Systems; the fifty-year time-frame specified only the minimum, not the maximum, amount of time that Hong Kong could retain its unique capitalist system and way of life without the Mainland making any changes.³⁴ Indeed, even Deng Xiaoping, China's leader at the time the Joint Declaration was signed and the Basic Law was drafted, noted that, "50 years is only a vivid way of putting it. Even after 50 years our policy will not change either."³⁵ Under this analysis, one could expect that land-leases set to expire after 2047 will likely retain their legally binding force.

Mainland Chinese investors' demand for commercial real estate in Hong Kong seems to correspond with this analysis as well. In August alone, Mainland Chinese investors "snapped up" \$516 million worth of commercial real estate in Hong Kong after prices plummeted nearly thirty percent since anti-government protests broke out in 2019.³⁶ If their investment activity is any indication of the future of the Hong Kong property market and the One Country, Two Systems framework more broadly, then there is an argument to be made that investors expect their leases to be upheld even after 2047.³⁷ Moreover, investments in commercial real estate by Mainland investors also serve to highlight their confidence in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong economy, and perhaps most importantly, the One Country, Two Systems framework over the longer term as well.

Second, on prudential grounds, it may not be in China's economic interest to dissolve the One Country, Two Systems framework—and therefore Hong Kong's "capitalist system and way of life"—even after 2047. A year following the Handover, Hong Kong legal scholar Alice Lee speculated that the first half of the twenty-first century would be marked by "tremendous economic growth" for China, and that maintaining Hong Kong's capitalist system well beyond 2047 would be necessary to sustain this growth.³⁸ Indeed, from 1997 to 2017, China's gross domestic product (GDP) as measured in current U.S. dollars has grown over 1,000 percent.³⁹

In the earliest years of this growth, Hong Kong made up about twenty percent of Chi-

na's total GDP; today, its share of Chinese GDP has dwindled to about two percent.⁴⁰ Still, Hong Kong remains important to the PRC for a number of reasons. Its status as a tariff-free port has allowed China to capitalize off of Hong Kong's centrality in global trade.⁴¹ Moreover, strict currency controls in Mainland China have curbed the ability of Mainland Chinese companies to raise money from investors inside their own borders.⁴² However, Hong Kong's longstanding status as a global trade hub, its strict regulatory filing requirements, and its tradition of enforcing contracts has drawn a large number of foreign investors to its shores and has allowed Mainland Chinese companies to readily access international capital from their backyard.⁴³

In sum, Hong Kong's exemption from the Mainland's strict economic regulations has allowed Hong Kong, and by extension China, to prosper. In moments where China has undercut Hong Kong's autonomy and unique status, foreign investors have shifted their banking and financial business away from Hong Kong and towards Hong Kong's long-standing financial hub rival in the region, Singapore.⁴⁴ As just one point of evidence, following last year's anti-government protests in Hong Kong, investors moved nearly \$4 billion of their Hong Kong deposits to Singapore.⁴⁵ And in the property market space, transaction volumes for industrial, office, and retail properties plummeted nearly fifty percent in 2019, Hong Kong's lowest level since at least 1996.⁴⁶ Peter Churchose of Hong Kong's Portwood Capital contends that as China continues to "creep" into Hong Kong and erodes Hong Kong's autonomy, foreign investors will be forced to continue relocating their regional headquarters from Hong Kong to other parts of Asia.⁴⁷ Put another way, dismantling the One Country, Two Systems framework will hurt the Chinese economy in more ways than one.⁴⁸

IV. The Discouraging Reality of the Future of Hong Kong Property Law After 2047

Even though it might be in China's best economic interest to preserve the One Country, Two Systems regime, and even though Danny Gittings assures us through his textual analysis that there is little reason to believe that there is a legal foundation for the system to be changed, it is important to underline that these are just speculations. Alice Lee's conclusion from over twenty years ago should not be lost: "If the intention had been that Hong Kong would be allowed to maintain its capitalist system indefinitely or for a period longer than fifty years, a provision to the same effect could easily have been inserted into the Basic Law for the sake of clarity."⁴⁹ But no such clarification exists. The future of One Country, Two Systems—and by extension, Hong Kong property law—is

at best uncertain. This uncertainty is perhaps most starkly reflected in housing prices, which are dependent on the “continuity of land ownership in the far future.”⁵⁰ Notably, land leases set to expire on June 30, 2047 suffer from a fourteen percent discount rate relative to those leases that are also set to expire on June 30, 2047 but that are protected by a fifty-year extension period.⁵¹ The data underscores that the largest asset class on households’ balance sheet is losing its value as residents feel more uncertain about Hong Kong’s future.

But efforts to remedy this uncertainty can still be made. Perhaps the most obvious solution would be for Beijing to insert clarity in the legal text itself, either by following the procedures laid out in Article 158 or Article 159 of the Basic Law. Of these two options, however, the latter is the sounder strategy for the people of Hong Kong.

Article 158 vests the NPC’s Standing Committee with the power to interpret the Basic Law. The Standing Committee, for its part, delegates this power to Hong Kong courts on matters related to adjudication. However, when the law concerns affairs that are the responsibility of the PRC—such as the future of Hong Kong property law in 2047 when One Country, Two Systems nominally comes to a close—Hong Kong courts must seek the NPC Standing Committee’s interpretation of the relevant provision through the Court of Final Appeal.⁵²

Article 158 is the path of least resistance for Beijing to clarify the future of Hong Kong property rights by interpreting the relevant text of the Basic Law. But this option will not entirely alleviate the uncertainty that exists because the NPC Standing Committee has read Article 158 as conferring it with plenary power “to issue an interpretation any time, with or without reference from Hong Kong institutions, and on any provision of the Basic Law.”⁵³ With such plenary power, the NPC Standing Committee could conceivably change its interpretation in the future, leaving Hong Kongers without the legally binding assuredness that their property rights will be upheld after 2047.

Instead, the more secure of the two options for the people of Hong Kong would be for Beijing to codify its clarification of the Basic Law through an amendment, as stipulated under Article 159 of the Basic Law. Under Article 159, the ultimate power to pass amendments to the Basic Law rests with the NPC. But the NPC Standing Committee, the PRC’s chief administrative authority known as the State Council, or the Hong Kong government⁵⁴ can separately propose bills for amendments to the Basic Law as well. The principal caveat is that no amendment can “contravene the established basic policies of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong.”⁵⁵ Put another way, amend-

ments “must foster Hong Kong’s development[,] ... conform to the principles of ‘One China, Two Systems[,]’ and favor the territory’s prosperity and stability.”⁵⁶ In the case of property rights, adding clarifying language to the Basic Law would strengthen the Hong Kong government’s power to continue leasing land and provide a sense of security to lessors that leases will be upheld after 2047. Perhaps more importantly though, amending the Basic Law to clarify whether One Country, Two Systems will exist after 2047 will further alleviate the guessing game among Hong Kongers and investors beyond its shores as to whether Hong Kong’s capitalist system and unique way of life will continue to exist.

If the national security bill that was passed by the NPC in June 2020 and codified in Annex III of the Basic Law is any indication of the significance of Article 159, however, then the Article arguably holds little authority today. Indeed, although the bill facially targets separatism, subversion, terrorism, and collusion with foreign forces, the provisions are so broad that Beijing retains sweeping powers to limit dissent and erode the civil liberties of the people of Hong Kong⁵⁷—liberties that were promised to them under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and codified in the Basic Law, including freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of the press, and an independent judiciary. Ostensibly, the bill has prematurely ended the One Country, Two Systems framework by “contravene[ing] the established basic policies of the People’s Republic of China regarding Hong Kong.”⁵⁸

V. Conclusion

So what becomes of Hong Kong property law? Even in the most extreme case where One Country, Two Systems would cease to exist and the Hong Kong government would dissolve, legal scholars have speculated that the “responsibility for any unexpired portion of ... land leases would simply pass to the body that authorized the Hong Kong ... [g]overnment to issue the leases, namely the Chinese central government.”⁵⁹ But leaving these land leases in the hands of what has proven to be a mercurial Mainland central government that has already passed legislation to subvert the civil liberties of Hong Kongers does not guarantee the protection of Hong Kong property rights.

Without clarity and certainty in the legal text itself, and without confidence that amendments to the Basic Law will be bound by the rules codified in Article 159, perhaps the only way to discern the future of Hong Kong property law post-2047 is to wait and see what comes of it on July 1, 2047, even if this wait-and-see approach undercuts the very essence of what Hong Kong was supposed to be when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed: a rule-based society.

Saraphin Dhanani is a second year J.D. Candidate at Stanford Law School. She is the Senior Articles Editor of the Stanford Law Review, Co-President of the Stanford National Security and the Law Society, and she serves on the Madeleine Korbel Albright Institute for Global Affairs Ambassadors Council. Prior to law school, Saraphin worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the Markets Group. The author extends her deepest gratitude to Gregory Ablavsky, Erik Jensen, and Dinsha Mistree for encouraging this research. To Danny Gittings and Alice Lee for their helpful insights on the topic. To her dear friend, Laura Wong, and her family for opening their lives—and by extension, Hong Kong—to her. And importantly, to Romen Mookerjee for inspiring her over the years to be a more intentional writer.

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that when the term for the right to use land for residential purposes expires, the term will be automatically renewed, but the law does not make clear if the state charges another granting fee or how the fee is determined), with Angela Choi, “Land Tenure System in Hong Kong,” *Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region*, December 8, 2016, <https://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/english/essentials-1617ise07-land-tenure-system-in-hong-kong.htm> (noting that Hong Kong’s Government Leases Ordinance that states all renewable land leases in Hong Kong are required to pay a re-assessed annual rent equivalent to 3% of ratable value of the land, and that non-renewable leases may be extended for an additional 50 years without payment of an additional premium).

21. Telephone Interview with Danny Gittings, Professor of Law, April 23, 2020.

22. John Ruwitch, “What to Know About Hong Kong’s Special Status and what Happens if the U.S. Removes It,” *NPR*, May 18, 2020, <https://www.npr.org/2020/05/28/864321056/what-to-know-about-hong-kongs-special-status-and-what-happens-if-the-u-s-removes> (noting that Hong Kong’s rule of law and civil liberties are what draws American business to the region, principles shared by the Americans as well).

23. Indeed, following the 2019 protests and economic downturn in Hong Kong, corporate leaders were concerned “about the long-term impact to Hong Kong’s reputation as a stable hub for multinationals in greater China, especially if a crackdown leads to serious bloodshed or Beijing tries to interfere with the city’s hallowed independent court system.” Andrew Jacobs, “With No End to Unrest in Sight, Hong Kong’s Economic Pain Deepens,” *New York Times*, October 13, 2019, <https://nyti.ms/35zKTVc>. See also “The End of One Country, Two Systems in Hong Kong,” *Financial Times*, July 1, 2020, <https://www.ft.com/content/5d3d7d2e-bba8-11ea-a05d-efc604854c3f> (“On business grounds alone, all foreign multinationals will have to be wary of a city where freedom of expression and the rule of law can no longer be guaranteed.”).

24. “Home Ownership after 2047? It’s Risky,” *South China Morning Post*, January 6, 2012, <https://www.scmp.com/article/989427/home-ownership-after-2047-its-risky>.

25. Choi, “Land Tenure System in Hong Kong.”

26. “Home Ownership after 2047? It’s Risky.”

27. Telephone Interview with Danny Gittings, Professor of Law, April 23, 2020.

28. Xianggang Jiben Fa chpt. V, art. 121 (H.K.).

29. *Ibid.*, chpt. V, art. 123.

30. Choi, “Land Tenure System in Hong Kong.”

31. Margaret Ng, “Fudging the Law of the Land,” *South China Morning Post*, April 30, 2007, www.scmp.com/article/591126/fudging-law-land.

32. Danny Gittings, “What Will Happen to Hong Kong After 2047?,” *California Western International Law Journal* 42 (2011): 37, 48, <https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1040&context=cwilj>.

33. *Ibid.*, 48.

34. *Ibid.*, 48-49.

35. *Ibid.*, 49 (citing Deng Xiaoping, *On the Question of Hong Kong* (1993), 47, 61).

36. Clare Jim, “Chinese Investors Snap Up Hong Kong Property as New Security Law Deters Foreigners,” *Reuters*, August 30, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-property-investors/chinese-investors-snap-up-hong-kong-property-as-new-security-law-deters-foreigners-idUSKBN25Q0XD>.

37. One could also argue that Mainland investors have more experience with the PRC’s system of land-use rights, and so what might appear to be a loss of land rights to foreign companies, might not appear that way to Mainland investors.

38. Alice Lee, “Leases Beyond 2047?,” *Hong Kong Law Journal* (1998): 183, <https://hkjo.lib.hku.hk/archive/files/ae359d725b2d420637ba60657df10873.pdf>.

39. “China Data,” *World Bank*, <https://data.worldbank.org/country/china>.

40. Ben Bland & Jane Pong, “Hong Kong Since the Handover in Charts,” *Financial Times*, June 28, 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/7e2422b8-5bb1-11e7-9bc8-8055f264aa8b>.

41. *Ibid.*

42. Noah Sin, “Explainer: How Important is Hong Kong to the Rest of China,” *Reuters*, September 4, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-markets-explainer/explainer-how-important-is-hong-kong-to-the-rest-of-china-idUSKCN1VP35H>.

43. *Ibid.*

44. See Abigail Ng, “Firms May Consider Moving out of Hong Kong Amid Protests and Political Uncertainty, Experts Say,” *CNBC*, June 18, 2019, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/19/businesses-may-consider-moving-from-hong-kong-to-singapore.html> (“[I]ncreasing numbers’ of companies are also relocating their

regional headquarters from Hong Kong to other parts of Asia, ‘most particularly’ to Singapore”).

45. Noah Sin, “About \$4 billion Hong Kong Deposits May Have Left for Singapore in June-August: Goldman,” *Reuters*, October 3, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protest-markets/about-4-billion-hong-kong-deposits-may-have-left-for-singapore-as-protests-rage-goldman-idUSKBN1WI0CR>.

46. Sandy Li, “Average Home Prices Fell by a Quarter Last Year in the World’s Most Expensive City as Protests, Trade War Sapped Demand,” *South China Morning Post*, January 9, 2020, <https://www.scmp.com/business/article/3045245/average-price-new-home-hong-kong-dropped-25-cent-or-us478000-last-year>.

47. Ng, “Firms May Consider Moving out of Hong Kong Amid Protests and Political Uncertainty, Experts Say.”

48. In October 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a public address on promoting the economic vitality of the Bay Area region. Known as the “Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area,” Xi encouraged the alignment of economic rules and institutions of Hong Kong, Macao, and nine cities along Guangdong. To achieve these ends, Xi noted that Shenzhen, a major city on the coast of Guangdong, would be tasked with “enriching the *new* practice of one country, two systems,” (emphasis added) without elaborating on what this “new” practice of One Country, Two Systems would be. Professor and Director of the Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Macau Regional Development Institute, Zhang Guangnam, shed light on Xi’s vision, contending that integration of the Bay Area would create “one country, two systems, and three customs zones,” whereby each region’s unique advantages would be synergized to form a massive economic hub. Xi’s emphasis on One Country, Two Systems in the context of economic statecraft seems to suggest that the framework continues to be important to the PRC’s economic future and that dismantling it would negatively impact the economy. See Claire Huang, “Call for Young People From HK, Macau to Move to Greater Bay Area,” *The Straits Times*, October 15, 2020, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/call-for-young-people-from-hk-macau-to-move-to-greater-bay-area>; Zhang Guangnam, “The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area: A More Open and Global City Cluster,” *Macau Business: Opinion*, October 31, 2020, <https://www.macaubusiness.com/opinion-the-guangdong-hong-kong-macau-greater-bay-area-a-more-open-and-global-city-cluster/>.

49. Lee, “Leases Beyond 2047?,” 184.

50. Zhiguo He, Maggie Rong Hu, Zhenping Wang & Vincent Yao, “Valuation of Long-Term Property Rights Under Political Uncertainty,” (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27655, 2020), 39-40, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w27665>.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Xianggang Jiben Fa chpt. VII, art. 158.

53. “The Legal Limits on Beijing’s Power to Interpret Hong Kong’s Basic Law,” *Hong Kong Free Press*, November 5, 2016, <https://hongkongfp.com/2016/11/05/legal-limits-beijings-powers-interpret-hong-kongs-basic-law/> (citing *Lau Kong Yung v. Director of Immigration*, [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R 300).

54. But the process for the Hong Kong government to propose an amendment is onerous. See Xianggang Jiben Fa chpt. VII, art. 159 (“Amendment bills from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be submitted to the National People’s Congress by the delegation of the Region to the National People’s Congress after obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the deputies of the Region to the National People’s Congress, two-thirds of all the members of the Legislative Council of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the Region.”).

55. *Ibid.*

56. Rao Geping, “Two Views of Hong Kong’s Basic Law: From Beijing, ‘One Country’ Must Dominate the Two Systems...,” *Hong Kong Journal* (Spring 2006): 5, https://carnegieendowment.org/hkjournal/PDF/2006_spring/rao.pdf.

57. See Austin Ramzy & Tiffany May, “Joshua Wong and Agnes Chow are Sentenced to Prison Over Hong Kong Protest,” *New York Times*, December 8, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/world/asia/joshua-wong-agnes-chow-hong-kong.html> (explaining Beijing’s aggressive crackdown of political opposition in Hong Kong pursuant to the newly enacted national security bill and the imprisonment of prominent pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong as a result); Vivian Wang & Chris Buckley, “Jimmy Lai, Media Mogul, is Charged Under Hong Kong’s Security Law,” *New York Times*, December 11, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/11/world/asia/china-hong-kong-jimmy-lai.html> (arguing that the recent imprisonment of Hong Kong’s media mogul and critic of the PRC highlights Beijing’s crackdown of free speech after the passage of the national security bill).

58. Xianggang Jiben Fa chpt. VII, art. 159.

59. Gittings, “What Will Happen to Hong Kong After 2047,” 45.



No More Air Hugs

Realizing a Strategy for Transitional Justice in López Obrador's Mexico

By Samuel P. LeRoy

In early 2016, Mexican Marines tracked the elusive Joaquín Guzmán, drug lord of the Sinaloa Cartel, to a coastal compound.¹ The raid handed President Enrique Peña Nieto a major victory. With an American official describing the arrest as “a Mexican op, planned and executed by Mexico,” Nieto impressed critics at home and abroad who questioned his government’s sincerity and effectiveness in combating the nation’s drug epidemic.²

Mexico soon extradited Guzmán, better known as El Chapo, to the United States, removing him from his syndicate of smugglers and government insiders. Officials in both countries felt confident they could secure his imprisonment through the American judicial system, where prosecutors had already indicted El Chapo on drug, weapons, and racketeering charges.³ The trial was a dramatic affair marked by confessions of love from the stand, cartel threats against jurors, and bribery implications against Peña Nieto himself.⁴ The proceedings detailed the violent business of a cartel which cost 100,000 people their lives and damned countless more to addiction and financial ruin.⁵

In February 2019, the American jury found El Chapo guilty on all counts. While many in the United States celebrated, his life sentence in a foreign prison received a decidedly mixed reception back home. Mexico’s new president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, denounced the punishment as “inhumane.”⁶ In Sinaloa, El Chapo’s home state, residents lamented the loss of a community figure viewed not as a criminal pariah, but as a local benefactor. As one resident explained, “The truth is this [conviction] hurts...We know that he’s helped a lot of people, building roads, schools, churches. People here will suffer now due to lack of support.”⁷

El Chapo's case illustrates the challenges Mexico faces in defeating the cartels and repairing the damage. Organized crime divides Mexican society, law enforcement, and government. Some factions pledge loyalty to the drug lords who offer contingent security and prosperity to neglected segments of the population. Others fiercely resist the cartels, desperate to protect their loved ones and find closure for the ones they have already lost. Amid profound suffering and tenuous alliances, there is no consensus on what will bring Mexico peace, justice, and prosperity. But all agree: a single conviction in New York will not suffice.

The War is Over. Now What?

While Mexico's narcotics epidemic traces back to the 1960s, its war on drugs began in earnest in 2006 with President Felipe Calderón's cartel crackdown, and it continues to wreak havoc to this day. Fearing that criminal organizations had infiltrated local police, Calderón deployed federal troops to apprehend dozens of kingpins. His successor, Peña Nieto, similarly relied on the military to combat violence. The United States invested substantially in these efforts. Calderón and U.S. President George W. Bush launched the Merida Initiative in 2007 which provided billions in aid to disrupt trafficking networks, secure the U.S.-Mexico border, protect the rule of law and human rights, and stimulate economic development.⁸ Despite these efforts, the national homicide rate tripled from 2006 to 2018, with experts attributing between one-third to one-half of cases to drug activity. In Calderón's six-year term alone, up to 60,000 people died at the cartels' hands.⁹ Tens of thousands more remain missing.¹⁰

In January 2019, shortly after assuming the presidency as a left-wing populist, López Obrador declared the end to his country's war on drugs. "There is officially no more war. We want peace, and we are going to achieve peace." His critics, seizing on López Obrador's military-centric security strategy, questioned whether he genuinely intended to break with establishment policies.¹¹ Security doves feared López Obrador's new National Guard—nominally charged with fighting the cartels but in reality patrolling the border to appease U.S. President Donald Trump—would detract from crime prevention and enshrine military supremacy at the expense of rebuilding Mexico's civilian law enforcement capacity.¹²

Nevertheless, López Obrador campaigned on national reconciliation and development, a radical departure from previous presidencies. He signaled openness to détente with slogans such as "hugs, not bullets," "scholars yes, killers no," and "you can't fight fire with fire." Even his secretary of security and civilian protection reframed the military

and law enforcement as a “last resort.” The López Obrador administration pledged to treat the epidemic’s root causes through social programs, education funding, and employment opportunities. His platform further promised to pardon nonviolent drug offenders, provide reparations to victims, and professionalize police services with better pay and training.¹³

López Obrador’s aspirational peace plan requires a justice system with robust capacity, integrity, and credibility, attributes which existing Mexican law enforcement institutions lack. Reflecting public mistrust of the system, 94 percent of crimes in Mexico go unreported. With only four percent of reported crimes resulting in punishment, many citizens consider calling the police a waste of time.¹⁴ Overall dissatisfaction with local police exceeds 70 percent on average across the country, with negative perceptions reaching 84 percent in Acapulco.¹⁵ Shortages of police officers and prosecutors certainly contribute to these failures, but so do more nefarious factors. Corruption pervades law enforcement, with cartels easily out-bidding government wages to win favor.¹⁶ Police engage in nepotism, criminal collusion, and outright bribery with alarming ubiquity. Research suggests that bribe solicitation, which occurs in Mexico more than in any other Latin American country, explains citizen distrust more than high crime and other poor security outcomes. Stated differently, citizen complaints appear to stem primarily from police duplicity, not incompetence. Accordingly, recent policies to expand and cosmetically rebrand police agencies without instilling rigorous accountability controls will likely fail to earn law enforcement much credibility.¹⁷

Mexico’s federal judiciary remains tarnished by political patronage. The Constitution of 1917 empowered the Supreme Court to appoint and monitor all lower court judges. While the high court’s members were originally accountable to the legislature by impeachment, an amendment in 1944 established life tenure for justices, subject to removal only through presidential prerogative. The absence of checks and balances combined with pressures to rapidly expand the judiciary insulated the courts from oversight. A political hierarchy solidified whereby the Supreme Court appointed and promoted allies to the single-party government and its cartel associates. In 1976, evidence linked several judges to a drug trafficking network, yet the Supreme Court sought only to transfer them, not remove or prosecute them.¹⁸

Efforts to reform the courts have yielded mixed results. The Mexican Judicial Council, established in 1994, reduced the Supreme Court’s influence over judgeships. Council members, selected by lottery from all levels of the judiciary, instituted public examinations for admission to the bench and regulated performance evaluations for

promotion.¹⁹ In an effort to separate powers between law enforcement and the judiciary, federal law enacted in 2008 required all Mexican states to adopt an accusatorial rather than inquisitorial criminal procedure system. While helpful in restraining the courts' prosecutorial influence, early findings suggest these changes have not substantially improved public confidence in criminal justice institutions.²⁰ Public servants still sense systemic vulnerabilities too. While they report a decrease in corruption due to the judiciary's professionalization and improved civil service career tracks, improprieties persist in the absence of adequate training, deterrence, and whistleblower protections.²¹

Complicating matters further, even an effective, credible justice system would struggle to resolve decades of violence and grievances when the lines between victims and perpetrators blur. As the hometown affection for El Chapo's philanthropy demonstrates, the drug trade has created unexpected beneficiaries out of bystanders, not just victims. Ironically, low-level cartel members were often themselves victimized by society. Many drug runners describe themselves as social outcasts who view their trade as the logical if not exclusive economic path out of poverty. They describe committing violence as necessary to survive amid poverty and retaliate against perceived government aggression.²² These nuances suggest the conflict's blame lies not just with the cartels but also with decades of failed policy, a conclusion which complicates who deserves redress, who deserves punishment, and who deserves amnesty. Answering these questions nationally requires policymaking structures and resources beyond the current criminal justice system's capabilities. Where a traditional justice system has failed, a transitional justice system might succeed.

Competing Visions for Transitional Justice

Transitional justice "embodies an attempt to build a sustainable peace" through a "set of practices, mechanisms, and concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and humanitarian law."²³ Specific transitional justice structures vary, but most share the ability to enshrine historical records and personal experiences into official state memory, try high profile leaders accused of wrongdoing, and restore victims' rights.²⁴ Mexico, qualifying for such intervention on scale and substance, would benefit from transitional justice's remedies. No matter what any president claims about the drug war being "over," its associated violence remains one of the world's greatest humanitarian crises. As recently as 2016, it was the second deadliest conflict behind the Syrian civil war.²⁵ Qualitatively, Mexico shares important characteristics with other countries which incorporated transitional justice into their

own peacebuilding efforts: countless unsolved crimes, impunity for perpetrators, resentment against the government's inattentiveness and ineffectiveness, emerging democratic institutions, and a judicial system of questionable independence.

Scholars and practitioners disagree about what transitional justice should accomplish. After all, someone must decide “what the state is ‘transitioning’ to.”²⁶ On this crucial point, transitional justice has received widespread criticism for narrowly privileging the pursuit of legal justice and political liberalization over addressing socioeconomic inequities and other, non-political forms of violence.²⁷ Harsher scrutiny comes from experts who allege transitional justice—championed by an increasingly hegemonic class of international bureaucrats and donors—denies recovering communities their self-determination.²⁸

Each contention merits serious consideration. Should transitional justice marginalize socioeconomic issues, such campaigns might fail to remedy the first order societal problems which internally conflicted nations confront. Legal justice rings hollow without stable access to water, education, healthcare, or other daily necessities. Likewise, transitional justice scripted to generic international norms might fail to broker peace. A society which prizes communal accountability would gain little value, for example, from a process which prosecutes a select few individuals in distant capital cities or in international courts. Without attention to local conceptions of justice, peacebuilders could clumsily inflame tensions.

A spectrum emerges from this scholarship, presenting difficult tradeoffs for peacebuilders. On the incremental side, paradigmatic transitional justice seeks redress simply for political violence and civil rights abuse through state and multinational institutions. Revolutionary transitional justice, by contrast, strives for social justice, redistribution, and democratization through whole-of-society interventions.²⁹ Some general principles help manage this balance in crafting a transitional justice strategy.

First, transitional justice should complement other peacebuilding policies to relieve it from the pressure of correcting all socioeconomic wrongs. While many would normatively prefer the social transformation vision of transitional justice, ambition must negotiate with reality. Unmet expectations risk disenchanting participants from the peace process altogether. Case studies presented in this article's review of truth and reconciliation commissions will demonstrate the pitfalls associated with asking too much from nascent institutions with limited financial resources and political capital. A more deliberate strategy restraining transitional justice to human and political rights

will not bring holistic change overnight, but it will create a shared acknowledgement of social needs, build popular momentum to address those issues, and prevent political spoilers from blocking progress. Transitional justice can therefore presage a diversified second generation of peacebuilding policies spanning electoral participation, security reform, development, and redistribution. Collectively, this piecemeal approach stands a better chance at success than pressing all bets on one legal intervention.³⁰

Second, while transitional justice should avoid dismissing local norms of justice, outside expertise and international institutions acting in good faith can help. In a conflict's tense aftermath, raw emotions and resource shortages often hinder local parties from resolving disputes by themselves.³¹ Social change might stall without the neutrality and capacity external support offers, if provided with the host nation's consent. Securing cooperation, especially in a policy field where normative aspirations differ sharply, depends on transparency and appeals to shared values.³² This tension will naturally moderate the polarization between revolution and incrementalism.

To withstand criticism and earn support, an effective transitional justice campaign must define, justify, and adapt its goals. While the affected parties themselves must ultimately reach these determinations, this piece now proposes a transparent strategy for transitional justice—a vision for what Mexico might transition to—first by establishing outcomes the Mexican government should desire and then by suggesting a structure informed by historical and comparative analyses to achieve those hopes.

A Transitional Justice Strategy for Mexico

Mexico's transitional justice system must first document the comprehensive truth about the drug war's atrocities, a conventional claim requiring renewed defense. Many experts in the field challenge the assumption that publicizing the truth advances peacebuilding. Some argue that, because of people's psychological response to tragedy, "selective forgetting is even more important" than remembering.³³ Learning the truth might counterproductively impede reconciliation as people digest new facts which reinforce animosity.³⁴ By encouraging people to come forward to share their narrative, transitional justice discounts the role silence plays in revealing injustice.³⁵ Nevertheless, evidence from Chile's transitional justice process demonstrates that even victims themselves believe truth-telling performs a valuable, if incomplete, role in societal reckoning.³⁶ Although it is difficult to generalize across conflicts, these findings underscore an important understanding about the truth: it is insufficient by itself, yet still necessary to create an evidentiary basis for systemic accountability and institutional

sector reform. Preserving a historical record with an honest, equitable accounting of victims and responsible parties therefore fulfills a vital public interest.

Second, this effort must provide an appropriate level of amnesty which balances political inclusion and social harm reduction against justified punitive consequences. As an industry, Mexico's cartels employ an estimated half-million people. Many thousands more, working for the government, inflicted state-sponsored violence in response.³⁷ No law enforcement system could prosecute every drug war participant; even if one could, it would likely harm social welfare given the detrimental outcomes associated with lengthy pre-trial detention and mass incarceration.³⁸ Amnesty policies avoid these consequences and benefit the peacebuilding process by emphasizing accountability for high-level perpetrators. Legal pardons incentivize those who might otherwise spoil transitional justice to participate in truth-telling and testify against their leaders, allocutions which would satisfy the need for broader acceptance of responsibility and social shaming. Especially when linked with trials, amnesty ultimately provides stability and advances human rights by breaking up corrupt centers of power.³⁹ Although amnesties appear to bear little direct effect on diminishing electoral manipulation, the policy contributes to democratic consolidation by including potential spoilers in the state's political rebuilding.⁴⁰ Well-designed amnesties can thus advance peacebuilding processes, contrary to objections that they reinforce impunity, treat offenders inequitably, and deny victims justice.⁴¹

Third, once the transitional justice process has produced a comprehensive state narrative aided by confessions tendered under amnesty, the effort must leverage those findings to end impunity. Since the height of democratic sentiment at the turn of the 21st century, coinciding with the end of Mexico's single party rule, the public has become largely dissatisfied with democracy. Although elections have grown competitive with alternating parties in power, people have yet to discern meaningful improvements in their lives. Many citizens regard their representatives as corrupt and self-interested, a perception based on considerable evidence.⁴² Without discounting the importance of trying cartel leaders and crony business executives, any government carries a special responsibility to punish public corruption. Fulfilling this obligation would reap great rewards. Aggressive prosecution of corrupt officials not only promotes faith in democratic institutions but also leads to improvements in the rule of law and human rights.⁴³

Document the truth, apportion amnesty, and prosecute corruption. By current academic standards, this strategy advances an admittedly limited vision of transitional justice.

It need not, however, foreclose subsequent socioeconomic and institutional reform. In fact, well-structured transitional justice mechanisms following this strategy would inform precisely those societal transformations. But even independently, this plan would provide closure for countless victims, restore faith in democracy, protect rights, and accelerate reconstruction by removing spoilers from power.

Among many possible policy mixes for fulfilling this strategy, Mexico should establish a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) and a hybrid prosecutor's office (HPO). Unstained by cartel influence and legacies of party domination, a TRC would collect official histories and offer amnesty in collaboration with the HPO which would pursue high-profile prosecutions. To chart a course towards structural reform, the TRC would offer legislative policy recommendations while the HPO would build state capacity to professional standards. The remainder of this piece champions the merits of both interventions as suitable vehicles to implement this strategy. The analysis draws best practices from comparative contexts, explores Mexico's own history with each institution, and assesses political feasibility to develop specific structural recommendations.

Truth Heals Some Wounds

TRCs collect individual narratives from victims and perpetrators to document a state-sanctioned history of genocide, apartheid, political terror, or other societal violence. By empowering the persecuted to share their stories, TRCs help to bring closure to the previously voiceless by elevating their grievances into collective memory. TRCs further help victims heal by revealing new evidence which may assist them in seeking reparations, legal damages, or answers about their loved ones. By demanding testimony from oppressors, TRCs acknowledge wrongdoing, expose power structures, and assign warranted blame to help the public understand state failures. These forces “pull the whole country together” and create a legacy of remembrance to help society move forward without repeating mistakes.⁴⁴

Established as temporary official bodies, governments around the world—in developed and developing countries, at national and sub-national levels—have organized TRCs to resolve conflict. They operate differently, each growing from particular social pressures and policy choices. Some TRCs emerge directly from peace accords while others receive their charge from executive mandate, legislative action, or judicial order. Generally led by commissioner boards which can include international participants, TRCs receive funding from a mixture of their home governments, aid foundations, private investment, and the international community. Most consequentially, TRCs diverge

in their powers and purposes. Some TRCs simply summarize findings from voluntary testimonies. Others bear compelling investigatory powers to fulfill quasi-judicial and legislative functions, such as granting amnesty, referring individuals for prosecution, and proposing policy reforms to their government.⁴⁵

TRCs' unlimited permutations could disorient peacebuilders in adapting this mechanism to the Mexican drug war. A critical review of TRCs across comparative contexts and within Mexico's own history clarifies how best to structure one compatible with this piece's proposed transitional justice strategy and the country's political realities.

Following apartheid's collapse, the Republic of South Africa commissioned the world's most famous TRC. Established by law under the Government of National Unity, parliament charged the TRC with painting "as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes, and extent of gross violations of human rights."⁴⁶ A memorable exchange in 1996 between Bishop Desmond Tutu and Lucas Baba Sikwepere, an African National Congress activist, attests to TRCs' personal healing potential. Sikwepere was abducted and tortured by white police officers during apartheid, ostensibly for harboring illegal arms. His injuries permanently blinded him soon after his imprisonment. In describing how authorities robbed him of his vision, Sikwepere felt momentarily whole again: "I feel what has been making me sick all the time is the fact that I couldn't tell my story. But now it feels like I got my sight back by coming here and telling you the story."⁴⁷

South Africa's TRC wielded broad powers and public influence. Parliament granted the commission authority to conduct searches and seizures, issue court-enforced subpoenas, propose policy recommendations to preserve human rights, and offer individual amnesty. To accomplish these goals, the government invested the commission with unprecedented financial and human resources.⁴⁸ Proceedings commanded massive media attention, with daily radio broadcasts and weekly television summaries airing revelations around the world. Still, not everyone shared Sikwepere's cathartic relief. Many balked at the TRC's amnesty offers and questioned the perceived prioritization of reconciliation over accountability. One contemporary public opinion poll even suggested two-thirds of South Africans expected race relations to deteriorate further from anger over the exposed atrocities.⁴⁹

Fortunately, South Africa avoided a reversion to apartheid-level racial violence. Beyond that, however, whether the TRC materially advanced national unity remains ambiguous. Studies on interracial reconciliation often reach contradictory conclusions. One study, surveying nearly 4,000 respondents, suggested that exposing apartheid abuses

softened white South Africans' racial attitudes. Another paper, however, indicates that the 1,000 amnesties granted by the TRC instilled more resentment among black South Africans. Assessing the TRC's effectiveness, it appears, depends on to whom and how you ask the question.⁵⁰ Measurement challenges in assessing such nebulous feelings as reconciliation explain some of the difficulty in reaching firm conclusions on the TRC's effect on racial progress. In this case, as with surveys of post-conflict reconstruction broadly, revealed attitudes often differ from stated attitudes. While some early analyses suggest a positive correlation between the TRC's restorative mechanisms and interracial reconciliation, a more recent neurological study reveals pervasive strands of implicit prejudice among white South Africans.⁵¹

Perhaps more of the uncertainty arises from a scholarly tendency to overgeneralize. South Africa's TRC, dated 1996-2000, was neither a wholesale failure nor triumph. The TRC clearly succeeded in diminishing white denial of apartheid's atrocities. The commission's highly public proceedings, which included testimony from not only individuals but also respected media, legal, medical, and commercial institutions, inspired ubiquitous civic engagement and public acceptance of findings.⁵² These attitude changes mattered, contributing to an "independent influence" on democratization.⁵³ In other respects, the TRC overpromised and underdelivered. Along with committees studying human rights violations and amnesty, the commission supervised a board dedicated to reparations and rehabilitation. This structure failed, however, to deliver timely, adequate remedy to victims, partially because the TRC's narrow focus on human rights obscured the truth about ordinary daily suffering. As a result, the TRC failed to facilitate the promised redistribution to overcome South Africa's socioeconomic disparities, which persist and continue to impede racial reconciliation to this day.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, on balance South Africa's TRC proved worthwhile, even if not completely satisfactory.

Other TRCs fared worse, blunted by weak mandates and marginalized by defiant governments. Following decades of state repression and militia violence, Guatemala created the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) in 1994 to comply with a United Nations peace agreement. Unlike its South African counterpart, the CEH lacked authority to name responsible actors, refer individuals for judicial action, issue subpoenas, or even hold public hearings.⁵⁵ The CEH documented systemic human rights violations and advised the government to pursue reparations and high-level prosecutions, but most of their recommendations were ignored by disinterested elected officials across multiple administrations.⁵⁶ Ten months after the report's public unveiling in 1999, Guatemala's fragile post-war government lost in an electoral blowout to a coalition linked with the former military dictatorship responsible for many of the conflict's worst atrocities. The

result doomed the CEH's progress to irrelevance.⁵⁷

Mexico itself bears a history with truth commissions, one which tracks closer to the Guatemalan than the South African experience. When Vicente Fox won the presidency in 2000, breaking the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (PRI) 71-year primacy, he pledged to establish a truth commission to investigate the former regime's human rights abuses. He signed an agreement with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, but his commitment met swift resistance from the PRI's opposition in the federal legislature and state governments. His own administration's appointed reform czars, a group which fatefully included a PRI-affiliated military prosecutor accused of human rights violations, also hindered Fox's agenda.⁵⁸ Fox could not discard his campaign promises entirely, personally authorizing a truth commission to support the new National Security and Investigation Center (CISEN). Old-guard sympathizers wrestled CISEN's control away from Fox, however, and blocked the truth commission's report from publication.⁵⁹ At best, Mexico's truth-telling attempts contributed little to national reconciliation and democratization. At worst, they legitimized new elites who maintained the country's culture of political violence and military domination through conciliatory yet empty rhetoric.⁶⁰

Although collectively these case studies paint a dispiriting picture of TRCs, lessons from their shortcomings offer insights on how Mexico could design a better iteration. From South Africa's example, the Mexican government should appreciate the importance of managing expectations. A more compartmentalized vision of a TRC within transitional justice stands a better chance of fulfilling promises, and therefore of earning public legitimacy. Limiting the commission's role to truth telling and amnesty would avoid repeating South Africa's error in charging its TRC with economic redistribution without requisite resources or scope.⁶¹ With the TRC's boundaries better defined, the Mexican government must next appeal to cultural norms of forgiveness to justify the commission's finite role in peacebuilding.⁶² That national conversation must begin with a candid explanation, as offered in this paper's strategy, of the importance of documenting truth, apportioning amnesty, and referring leaders for prosecution as valuable ends themselves and indispensable means towards more fundamental social reform.

Guatemala's failed truth commission informs how Mexico should empower its own TRC to achieve stated objectives. Unlike the CEH, a Mexican TRC must wield autonomous authority to operate publicly, subpoena evidence, identify perpetrators, pardon deserving offenders, and refer others for prosecution. Without these powers, a TRC would

struggle to solicit candid testimony and transparently answer the public's questions. The TRC should not receive law-making powers, however. South Africa's case suggests that quasi-legislative TRCs struggle to meet their lofty expectations. With their superior institutional capacity and credibility deriving from electoral accountability rather than indirect appointment, genuine legislative bodies are better positioned to implement sustainable social and economic reform. A truth commission should nonetheless advise the legislative process. Peacebuilders must prevent the government from discarding the TRC's report and any attendant policy recommendations on social welfare, domestic security, criminal justice reform, and anti-corruption protections. Accordingly, the TRC's charge should mandate that the incumbent administration publish and archive the commission's conclusions. Should the commission offer policy recommendations, the law should require legislative review or constitutional referenda to consider their proposals. While no guarantee of passage, such mandates would encourage public debate and reinforce electoral pressure to respond to social demands.

Mexico, of course, should also learn from its own troubled history with transitional justice. Despite Fox's evident enthusiasm for documenting the PRI's atrocities, his inability to insulate CISEN from conflicts of interest prevented the commission from compiling a factual narrative. López Obrador, in pitching truth commissions to the public, must reassure skeptics that he would prevent oppressors from protecting themselves once more. Considering the numerous documented links between government officials, business elites, and cartels, López Obrador should refrain from appointing politicians, "senior statesmen," or business executives to a new truth commission. Rather, respected civil society leaders and even lay members of the general public affected by the drug war should lead the TRC to mitigate pro-government bias.

Mexico's cultural and political realities inspire cautious optimism that a TRC could jumpstart the long journey towards peace. As a predominantly Catholic nation, norms of expressing contrition and granting forgiveness have long guided conflict resolution. When visiting rural Acetal in 1998, a village where the Red Mask paramilitary group massacred 45 churchgoers the year prior, Nobel literature laureate Antonio Gutiérrez recorded a story of community members praying for their attackers: "Forgive them, Lord, these men know not what they are doing." More broadly, forgiveness was valued throughout society for its potential to "break the cycles of violence by transforming perpetrators and victims."⁶³

Appeals for reconciliation extend into the current drug war discourse. María Herrera Magdalena—popularly known in Mexico as the "first lady of the disappeared" in memory

of the four sons she lost to the conflict—has publicly offered forgiveness in exchange for information, remorse, and accountability. Civil society groups also urge rewriting state history, which for too long has downplayed the role of corrupt officials and slandered innocent victims as cartel members deserving of their fates. These demands for information leave the government room to negotiate the delicate balance in treating alleged perpetrators, satisfying the need to incentivize crucial testimony without enraging the public with overly generous or inequitable leniency. A well implemented TRC could fulfill this appetite to resolve grievances against organized crime and the government.⁶⁴

Those longing for closure might find their champion in López Obrador, whose presidency represents a unique opening within Mexico's politics to attempt a truth commission. A liberal reformer who campaigned on finding missing people and national reconciliation, López Obrador has endorsed amnesty for low-level offenders and truth commissions (albeit more limited than the model proposed here) to study mass-casualty events.⁶⁵ Although he maintains popularity, a recent fall in approval ratings attributed to a resurgence in violence and economic stagnation—captured prior to the country's COVID-19 outbreak—could pressure him to redouble reconciliation efforts.⁶⁶ Limited to a single six-year term, López Obrador still has four years to pursue transitional justice without fear of electoral consequences.

Serious doubts linger about the president's priorities, however. Many of López Obrador's actions contradict his campaign promises, a trend which jeopardizes conflict resolution and the public's faith in his government. He maintains traditional justice systems by investing heavily in militarized law enforcement, which contradicts his pledges to de-escalate the conflict.⁶⁷ He has failed to execute reforms approved by the legislature without proposing meaningful alternatives.⁶⁸ His administration labors to separate itself from corruption.⁶⁹ The COVID-19 pandemic, pressuring Mexico's security and fiscal resources as well as its public health infrastructure, will likely force truth-telling even further down the administration's agenda. Even if López Obrador refocuses on transitional justice, his commitment might not surmount the same spoiler dynamics which foiled his predecessor Fox. Subsequent research should apply political will models to diagnose this blueprint's political feasibility with more precision, ideally featuring document analyses, stakeholder interviews, and expert consultations.⁷⁰

Even in the best case, a TRC alone will not suffice. Peace cannot hold in Mexico without holding the drug war's major players accountable. Given Mexico's compromised law enforcement and judicial systems, the country should complement a TRC with hybrid

prosecutors to try sensitive criminal cases and break cycles of impunity.

Hybrid Prosecutors for High-Impact Trials

Just months after El Chapo's sentencing in 2019, another cartel leader was sentenced in the same Brooklyn courthouse to 20 years in federal prison. This defendant was no typical drug war belligerent: Edgar Veytia served as the attorney general for the Mexican state of Nayarit. Veytia abused his office's powers to conspire with the multinational H-2 cartel. Betraying his role as the state's chief law enforcement officer, Veytia accepted bribes in return for redirecting police and prosecutors under his supervision to target rival cartels.⁷¹ Conspiracies between law enforcement and criminal organizations continue to surface. In recent months, agents arrested a former commander of the Mexican Federal Police's Sensitive Investigation Units and a former federal secretary of public security on trafficking and bribery charges.⁷²

These indictments pose a dilemma in holding leaders in cartels and the government accountable for high-level offenses. With police, prosecutors, and cartels practically indistinguishable, López Obrador cannot rely on traditional law enforcement services. Outsourcing major cases to the United States may also prove unsustainable given recurring tensions between U.S. and Mexican security services, which may pressure López Obrador to distance relations with his northern neighbor. Indeed, the López Obrador administration has already reasserted sovereignty in combating organized crime.⁷³ To advance transitional justice beyond fact-finding, the president must pursue an alternative domestic approach to eradicate impunity by convicting cartel leaders and their protectors in government and industry.

Peacebuilders as prominent as UN Secretaries-General have long considered how to proceed when "domestic authorities do not want to or cannot prosecute human rights violators" and where "new threats to the rule of law emerge, such as organized crime and trafficking."⁷⁴ The international community has accordingly developed several models of intergovernmental organizations to meet these challenges. Existing separately from nation-states, intergovernmental organizations maintain their own headquarters, personnel, budgets, rules, norms, and symbolism. They manifest in the judicial space most commonly as technical assistance programs, international criminal tribunals (which try perpetrators in foreign venues under international law), or mixed courts (which complement local justice systems with foreign lawyers and judges).⁷⁵

Hybrid prosecutor offices supplement this landscape with an approach balancing

external neutrality with internal credibility, and transactional cooperation with strategic capacity development. HPOs, staffed by foreign lawyers, operate as parallel criminal investigation and prosecution agencies to assist their traditional domestic counterparts with sensitive, complex cases.⁷⁶ Unique among the prevailing peacebuilding judicial interventions, HPOs rely fully on local legal systems. HPOs command a prosecutor's investigatory tools but lack the independent ability to bring indictments in domestic courts or access external venues. Rather, HPOs cooperate with local prosecutors to try cases, a collaboration which allows foreign experts to introduce best practices to domestic law enforcement services.⁷⁷ These structural features offer two enticing benefits relative to other hybrid structures. First, by invoking domestic law and placing local prosecutors in the lead, HPOs respect sovereignty, which could make the intervention more palatable to the host government and more legitimate in the public's eyes. Second, the HPOs' supporting role incentivizes capacity-building—the more expertise they confer, the better chance they have of helping win cases—potentially leading to long-term security sector reform along with more immediate courtroom victories.

Mexico could draw inspiration from Guatemala, which has struggled from a kindred history of protracted conflict, organized crime, lack of pluralism, and government corruption. Following Guatemala's thirty-six-year civil war, a UN peacekeeping mission determined the country's security and justice systems could not adequately investigate criminal organizations and illicit security networks. Accordingly, the UN proposed a temporary autonomous prosecution agency, the International Commission Against Illegal Security Groups and Clandestine Security Organizations (CICIACS), which would effectively sideline the Public Prosecutor's Office and the National Civilian Police. International lawyers would try Guatemalan defendants in Guatemalan courts under Guatemalan law.⁷⁸

Negotiations between the United Nations and the host government stalled over sovereignty concerns, but the failed CICIACS proposal laid groundwork for a compromise. The parties agreed to a hybrid structure which allowed external lawyers to serve as complementary prosecutors. International commissioners could lead independent investigations and recommend institutional reforms, supported by powers to subpoena, grant confidentiality, hire staff, file complaints against public servants, and publish findings. The government, however, reserved exclusive powers to arrest and indict.⁷⁹ Negotiators also modified CICIACS' mandate to emphasize human rights issues and restructured the proposal into an independent commission rather than a UN body, financed primarily by international donors and subject to the host government's

assent every two years. Reflecting these amendments, a bilateral agreement between the UN Secretary-General and the host nation reestablished CICIACS as CICIG, the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala. The revised proposal still encountered resistance, but a confluence of political events, including a presidential campaign overshadowed by the murder of four Salvadoran politicians by Guatemalan police officers, led to CICIG's domestic ratification in 2008.⁸⁰

Even as an advisory investigative partner, CICIG substantially improved Guatemala's law enforcement capacity and helped domestic prosecutors win important convictions. CICIG experts modernized policing by instructing officials in forensics and legal surveillance and by instilling professional standards.⁸¹ These methods facilitated the takedown of 60 criminal organizations and contributed to a five percent homicide rate decrease annually over the next decade.⁸² CICIG reported more than 1,700 corrupt police officers and at least ten senior prosecutors to the Interior Ministry, resulting in their dismissal.⁸³ Most visibly, the commission penetrated high-level conspiracies. Following the apparent assassination of government critic Rodrigo Rosenberg Marzano, a CICIG investigation concluded that Marzano in fact staged his own death to undermine President Álvaro Colom.⁸⁴ This dramatic finding absolved the government and relieved the public, averting a civil crisis and inspiring faith in CICIG. Emboldened by its success, the commission fearlessly investigated government corruption. In 2015, CICIG uncovered President Otto Pérez Molina's involvement in customs fraud, leading to his resignation and arrest. Thousands gathered in the capital's square to celebrate the apparent end of the elite's invincibility.⁸⁵

Optimism faded in 2019, however, when President Jimmy Morales allowed CICIG's mandate to expire, a move permitted by the country's agreement with the UN. Following the United States' withdrawal of support for CICIG, costing the commission its best financial and political lifeline, Morales' path cleared to dismiss the hybrid prosecutors.⁸⁶ Morales and his supporters disparaged the hybrid prosecutors as biased, interventionist, and disrespectful of due process, claims which CICIG's commissioner disputed as a "smear campaign" to shield the powerful against justice. Whomever one believes, CICIG's success and popularity undoubtedly threatened the political establishment.

CICIG's legacy as a victim of its own success highlights weaknesses from which Mexico can learn in embracing hybrid prosecutors. The commission's structure exposed itself to fatal political risks. CICIG's operations required productive relationships between its commissioners and Guatemala's law enforcement leadership, a luck-of-the-draw proposition. The hybrid prosecutors enjoyed strong collaboration with Attorney General

Claudia Paz y Paz, a human rights activist.⁸⁷ Relationships with other office holders such as Juan Luis Florido, who eventually resigned after obstructing the commission, were more fraught.⁸⁸ Furthermore, with CICIG's mandate subject to biannual renewal, any administration could have easily revoked the commission's license. Only continuous pressure applied through conditional aid or sanctions threats from CICIG's donor nations could protect the commission from wary domestic powerbrokers. Without those incentives, a recalcitrant government faced few obstacles in removing independent investigators.

Mexico has never hosted hybrid prosecutors, though the country has experimented with other judicial interventions with poor results. In conjunction with his broader transitional justice strategy, Fox established a Special Prosecutor's Office (SPO) in 2001 to fight corruption. As with the CISEN-affiliated TRC, PRI loyalists sabotaged the SPO, running it on their terms according to traditional power structures. Special prosecutors routinely found insufficient evidence against suspected corrupt senior officials, despite those subjects' obvious enrichment beyond legitimate compensation while in office.⁸⁹ The SPO also failed to address human rights violations by rigging legal definitions to preclude prosecution against most perpetrators. Ultimately, the SPO served only to preserve the elite's impunity, nominally improving the judicial system's image without instilling any tangible accountability during a sensitive time in Mexico's nascent democratization.⁹⁰ Working in a fundamentally different institution than the SPO, hybrid prosecutors would meet a blank slate, although they could face comparable threats from spoilers.

Evidence on this innovative intervention is limited to Guatemala's case, but that experience suggests hybrid prosecutors can develop state capacity, hold powerful actors accountable, and build the justice system's credibility. Adopting CICIG's principles while adapting its structure to reflect domestic needs and insulating hybrid prosecutors against politics could help Mexico sustain transitional justice reforms. In structuring its own HPO, Mexico should retain many productive features from CICIG's design. The administration must consent to providing an HPO with autonomous staffing discretion, full investigatory powers, and authority to publish independent findings. In Guatemala, these parallel and public prosecutorial capabilities pressured the attorney general's office into pursuing controversial yet substantiated cases, mitigating resistance from concerned elites. These powers would likewise insure HPOs against reluctant power brokers in Mexico. Although an HPO would still depend on domestic counterparts to punish impunity, this prescription at least provides hybrid prosecutors unilateral power to expose impunity.

CICIG struggled, and ultimately stumbled, because of host government opposition abetted by inadequate international support. Adversarial relations between the commission and the attorney general's office delayed and occasionally impeded justice. The agreement between Guatemala and the United Nations offered the host government too easy of an exit, with Guatemala's termination option exercised in accordance with an arbitrary timeframe instead of substantial reform benchmarks. Rather than receiving support from a variety of donor nations with aligned interests, CICIG's funding structure rendered it overly reliant on the United States' generosity. More robust international agreements, such as those provided for under the Rome Statutes and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, would benefit the Mexican transitional justice process by detailing working obligations between the HPO and host government, securing more diversified funding, and establishing meaningful conditions for the intervention's conclusion.⁹¹

A well-constructed HPO would offer Mexico much hope in eradicating impunity, but present political conditions internally and externally appear unfavorable. Inviting an HPO requires sharing sovereignty over criminal justice matters, a level of consent possible only with a president's enthusiastic approval. President López Obrador's platform included calls for a new independent federal prosecutor dedicated to corruption, implying awareness of the traditional institutions' limitations.⁹² But while he appointed the country's first-ever independent attorney general, who in turn appointed a special anti-corruption prosecutor, critics complain his administration only reinforces political patronage.⁹³ Compounded by the president's general disengagement from the international community, his administration's apparent insincerity towards confronting impunity suggests hostility towards foreign intervention.⁹⁴ While the United Nations could force the issue by invoking Chapter VII or the Rome Statute, such proposals would likely fail if presented in the Security Council today if the United States' withdrawal from CICIG serves as any indication of its priorities (although the new Biden administration may revive hopes for global engagement). And whereas societal yearning for truth-telling raises political momentum for a TRC, the Mexican public's cynicism regarding the rule-of-law dims hope that popular energy could persuade López Obrador to welcome hybrid prosecutors.⁹⁵

Nevertheless, transitional justice advocates within Mexico and throughout the international community must press the case for judicial intervention. Truth-telling can only accomplish so much; without removing perpetrators from power, post-conflict nations deny victims justice and leave barriers to reform intact. Peacebuilders must overcome these obstacles to fulfill a comprehensive transitional justice strategy which,

by ending impunity and increasing public sector professionalism, strengthens state capacity, promotes faith in democratic institutions, and protects human and civil rights.

The Next Four Years

Transitional justice aims to break cycles of violence and retribution committed by state and non-state actors alike. Mexico's longstanding drug conflict continues as a catastrophe exacerbated by corruption, impunity, and disastrous policy interventions. Often responding to international incentives, multiple administrations failed by themselves responding to force with force. Rather than weakening kingpins, state-sponsored violence too often targeted the vulnerable, festering more anti-government resentment.

Transitional justice resurfaces in North American political discourse just as Mexico confronts fresh scandal.⁹⁶ This article's strategy—document the truth, apportion amnesty, and hold perpetrators accountable—offers a more compassionate and effective blueprint for healing the drug war's many pernicious symptoms. An independent TRC—fully transparent, empowered with investigative authorities, and equipped to adjudicate amnesty petitions—would bring the country closure by validating people's lived experiences of physical and structural violence. Although this commission would not deliver reparations or socioeconomic reform outright, by illuminating needs and offering policy recommendations it would establish a “platform for a transition” to a more equitable, just, and secure society.⁹⁷ Hybrid prosecutors would complement the TRC's retrospective focus by removing spoilers from power. With structured international support and domestic cooperation, an HPO would provide Mexico the expertise and independence necessary to target architects of violence and expose officials who betray the public trust. Over time, as state capacity improves and judicial sanctions build law enforcement's credibility, Mexico could transition to a society where accountability replaces impunity and responsiveness to social needs inspires previously unimaginable faith in democratic government.

Will the remaining four years of President López Obrador's administration meet his campaign's lofty rhetoric? His stated support for amnesty for low-level offenders, truth commissions to study mass casualty events, and independent federal prosecutors preserves the chance for a meaningful transitional justice agenda.⁹⁸ His attention to remedying economic inequity suggests a willingness to combat the root causes of violence, resentment, and clientelism. In a conflict marked by a greyscale of victims and perpetrators, this attitude indicates that transitional justice could extend into the

socioeconomic reform necessary to prevent a relapse.⁹⁹ Unlike some of his predecessors who attempted transitional justice, López Obrador's MORENA party leads majority coalitions in both houses of the Mexican Congress.¹⁰⁰ And yet, despite his popular and political support, his administration has largely disappointed peace advocates. He promised “hugs, not guns,” but so far he has only delivered air hugs of empty promises.

Power does not surrender easily. As the López Obrador presidency approaches its midpoint, corruption remains widespread throughout Mexico. The dissonance between the administration's drug war platform and accomplishments reaffirms the challenge of implementing fair processes to address wrongdoings when many in power stand to lose. Overcoming fierce political headwinds to not only start but complete transitional justice will require concerted popular energy and international engagement. The public's grassroots urgency for finding answers to their suffering may compel López Obrador to return to his platform, create a truth commission, and begin the healing process. As long as those questions lie unanswered, peacebuilding activists can energize the Mexican electorate to demand their government organize a TRC.

Disillusionment over government corruption will likely prevent more technocratic HPO proposals from attracting the same political momentum. New coalitions must therefore emerge from the international community to reinvigorate enthusiasm for helping oppressed populations prevail over cronyism. CICIG relied on traditional diplomacy. From 2007 to 2017, the United States led all donor nations in contributing \$44.5 million to the hybrid prosecutors.¹⁰¹ During the Obama administration, the Guatemalan government understood renewing CICIG as “practically a condition” for receiving general U.S. aid.¹⁰² CICIG disappeared when those incentives vanished. Only diplomacy can sustain transitional justice from internal attack, and the international community must negotiate conditional assistance to earn consent for peacebuilding missions and monitor the process' integrity.

López Obrador may prove incapable or unwilling to confront his government's corrupt elements, but the next election could yield a worse alternative, especially given Mexico's strongman lineage. Transitional justice advocates, both within and outside the country, must seize the rare opportunity over the next four years to implement and improve López Obrador's peace agenda.

Samuel P. LeRoy works as a management analyst in Washington, D.C. He earned his Master's of Public Policy in 2020 from the University of Michigan Ford School of Public

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
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