When Blue Helmets Do Battle:

Civilian Protection in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE

INTERSCHOOL HONORS PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION
FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

BY
TEO B. LAMIOT
MAY 2015

ADVISOR:
PROFESSOR STEPHEN J. STEDMAN

Abstract

For the past fifteen years, United Nations (UN) peacekeepers have had robust mandates that require them to protect civilians and authorize them to use force beyond self-defense to achieve that goal. Despite these changes, longstanding debates on the offensive use of force in peacekeeping continue. This thesis enters into these debates by asking the following question: *How does the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers affect rebel violence against civilians?* In particular, it examines UN peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 2000 to the present as a case study. Drawing on both data analysis and qualitative research, this thesis finds that the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers in the DRC often contributed to a substantial decrease in rebel violence against civilians. These findings demonstrate that the offensive use of force can, in certain contexts, be an effective tool for the protection of civilians. Given this potential, Blue Helmets should have the choice to do battle.

This thesis also presents four factors that influenced whether the offensive use of force contributed to the military defeat of rebels and, in turn, to a decline in violence against civilians. These are the deployment of additional UN peacekeepers, the capacity of rebel groups relative to Blue Helmets and their allies, rebel tactics, and problematic alliances between the government and rebels who commit atrocities. Blue Helmets should take these four factors into account when considering the offensive use of force to protect civilians.

Acknowledgements

To my thesis advisor Professor Stedman: thank you for guiding me on my journey to a research question, reading and editing all of my drafts, and helping me to untangle my own thoughts. Your simple advice – "be productive" – was the best I received all year.

To the CISAC community: thank you for enabling my research and surrounding me with brilliant people. Professor Blacker, your sophomore college inspired me to study political science and your mentorship has been invaluable. Thank you for helping me navigate my years at Stanford. Professor Crenshaw, your questions and generous introductions helped to shape this project. Thank you both for your fearless leadership. To all of my CISAC classmates, thank you for the comments and the laughter.

To all of my Stanford friends: thank you for your moral support and for making these last four years among the best so far. Alina, Anne, Cara, Crystal, Nicole, Salil, Taylor, and everyone else, your friendship and brilliance have kept me going.

And, finally, to Mom, Gramsie, Grandpa, Beben, Casey, Papy, Mamie, Ralph, and Napoleon: thank you all so much for the endless support on my way to Stanford and ever since. Your care packages and love remind me what's important.

Table of Contents

Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ADF-NALU	Allied Democratic Forces–National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
CNDP	National Congress for the Defense of the People
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FNI	Front of Integrationist Nationalists
FPJC	Popular Front for Justice in the Congo
FRPI	Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M23	March 23 movement
MONUC	UN Organization Mission in the DRC
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
MRC	Congolese Revolutionary Movement
ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo
PARECO	Alliance of Resistant Congolese Patriots
RCD	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RCD-K/ML	Rally for Congolese Democracy-Kisangani-Movement for Liberation
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement
UCDP GED	Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset
UN	United Nations
UPC	Union for Congolese Patriots
UPC-K	Union for Congolese Patriots-Kisembo
UPC-L	Union for Congolese Patriots-Lubanga

Chapter I – Introduction

Story of a Massacre

On June 6, 2014, a few hours after sunset, armed men opened fire on an outdoor church ceremony in Mutarule, a small village in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The assailants attacked the village with rifles and grenade launchers, shooting civilians at close range and then burning them alive. A survivor described the experience to Human Rights Watch: "We heard bullets coming from all sides. We all got down on the ground. They came in by the door […] and there were many of them. The first one said: "Exterminate them." […] Then they started shooting." All told, the attackers killed thirty-eight villagers in a few hours, including at least nine children. Many more were injured, stabbed with bayonets or burned past recognition. Those who managed to survive fled from Mutarule to neighboring villages where they remained for the summer, spending nearly all their savings on food and shelter.

This tragedy could have been avoided. A United Nations (UN) peacekeeping base, located just an eight-minute drive from Mutarule in a nearby town, received frantic phone calls from villagers asking for help as the massacre began. Although the peacekeeping mission in the Congo has the authority to use force to protect civilians, UN soldiers stayed in their barracks. Only two days later did the Blue Helmets visit Mutarule.[1]

This story illustrates that peacekeepers' choices, in particular the choice to use force, matter a great deal to the protection of civilians. For most of their history UN troops did not have much say in the matter, as their mandates only allowed for the use of force in self-defense.

---

[1] Human Rights Watch. "DR Congo: Army, UN Failed to Stop Massacre." *Hrw.org*, 3 July 2014. Web. 5 May 2015. I also draw some details from my experience as an intern at the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa. In this capacity, I visited Mutarule to investigate the massacre described above. All information presented here is unclassified. All statements reflect my own understanding and not the views of the U.S. State Department.

Today, however, Blue Helmets have an obligation to protect civilians and the authority to use "all necessary means" to fulfill this mission, including the use of force beyond self-defense.[2] This thesis examines instances in which Blue Helmets chose, unlike in Mutarule, to employ offensive force against a rebel group. It finds that the use of offensive force often helped to protect civilians and prevent the kind of violence described above.

Background on Force in UN Peacekeeping

Twenty-first century peacekeeping operations do not resemble their predecessors, especially with respect to the use of force. Today, Blue Helmets are required to protect civilians under threat of violence. Robust mandates, authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allow them to use force beyond self-defense to achieve this goal. However, when the UN first deployed peacekeepers during the Cold War, peacekeepers had neither this obligation nor authority and could use force only in self-defense. This section traces the evolution of the use of force in UN peacekeeping from Cold War into the twenty-first century.

Three principles dominated UN peacekeeping from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s: consent of parties to the conflict, impartiality, and the use of force in self-defense.[3] In traditional missions, peacekeepers entered post-conflict areas as armed observers to monitor that parties to the conflict, almost always states, complied with ceasefire agreements and demilitarized zones. Acting with the parties' consent, the UN could remain impartial and assure each side that the other did not violate existing agreements.[4] Using force in self-defense stemmed from the first

---

[2] United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.* New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 18 January 2008, pg. 22-23.
[3] Sloan, James. "The Evolution of the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping." *Strategic Studies* 37.5 (2014): 674-702, pg. 682. Web. 6 Dec. 2014.
[4] United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.* New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 18 January 2008, pg. 22-23.

two principles, as the architects of the first operation presumed that the use of force in any other capacity would erode consent and impartiality. These peacekeepers did not act to change the political or military situation on the ground, but rather to facilitate existing agreements.[5] Throughout the Cold War, most peacekeeping operations adhered to this logic.

Intense debate on the use of force first erupted in 1960 when UN peacekeepers deployed to post-independence Zaire, which would later become the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) operated in a complex civil conflict, in which no ceasefire or peace agreement existed and rebel groups launched attacks on UN peacekeepers and civilians. Given the difficult circumstances, Blue Helmets received permission to interpose themselves between aggressors and civilians and then respond with force if attacked.[6] They could also use force to protect civilians at risk of harm and to prevent human rights violations.[7] Moreover, ONUC shifted away from traditional peacekeeping to the offensive use of force. Peacekeepers engaged in heavy fighting with rebels in the secessionist province of Katanga and, in 1962, destroyed the Katangan air force with airstrikes and captured Elisabethville and other strategic cities, effectively ending the Katanga secession crisis. The mission received tremendous criticism for citing "self-defense" to depose the Katangan regime and taking sides in the conflict. By 1964, the UN was more than happy to end the controversial mission.[8] The primary legacy of ONUC was an enduring reluctance of the UN to get involved in messy civil conflicts or use offensive force, even for the protection of civilians.[9]

---

[5] Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print, pg. 5
[6] Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print, pg. 56-64
[7] Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print, pg. 82
[8] Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print, pg. 75-82
[9] Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print,, pg. 87

Enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping soared at the end of the Cold War, when superpower gridlock no longer paralyzed the UN Security Council. This optimism reflected a widespread hope that the UN could finally "achieve the great objectives of its Charter." Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in a 1992 report titled *An Agenda for Peace*, outlined his vision for more ambitious peacekeeping.[10] He called for "peace enforcement units" that could use force to compel parties to comply with existing ceasefires and, second, suggested that peacekeeping operations did not always require the consent of parties to the conflict.[11] From 1988 to 1993, the UN deployed more missions than it had in the last forty years.[12] Once again, Blue Helmets operated in contexts like Cambodia, Bosnia, and Somalia that resembled Zaire in the 1960s. In these intrastate conflicts, missions became multidimensional in that UN peacekeepers took on responsibilities like the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, election monitoring, protection of civilians, and the delivery of humanitarian aid.[13] However, in the mid-1990s, prominent peacekeeping failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda diffused the initial optimism for such operations and sparked a great deal of soul-searching at UN headquarters.

As the UN Secretariat debated the future of peacekeeping and the use of force therein, officials drew different lessons from the three high-profile failures. Many advocated for a return to traditional peacekeeping and argued that the offensive use of force and peacekeeping had proved to be incompatible. Kofi Annan and other officials, meanwhile, held the UN responsible for the tragedies in Bosnia and Rwanda and advocated for a "new [peacekeeping] paradigm" in which Blue Helmets could use force to "induce consent" and protect civilians. Annan outlined

---

[10] Sloan, James. "The Evolution of the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping." *Strategic Studies* 37.5 (2014): 674-702, pg. 665. Web. 6 Dec. 2014.
[11] Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print,, pg. 160-161
[12] Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lise Morjé Howard. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11.1 (2008): 283-301, pg. 284 Web. 13 Dec. 2014.
[13] Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print,, pg. 148-153

this argument in his reports on Rwanda and Bosnia and, after his election as Secretary-General, established the Panel on UN Peace Operations to conduct a full review of UN peacekeeping.[14] The panel's findings, known as the Brahimi Report, reinforced the conclusions of Annan and made myriad recommendations. Notably, the authors concluded that Blue Helmets "must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence" and to "project credible force."[15] Brahimi heralded a new approach to the offensive use of force in UN peacekeeping.

New Peacekeeping, Old Debates

Peacekeeping has changed substantially in the last fifteen years. Eighteen new missions have deployed and, today, more than 120,000 military and civilian personnel serve in sixteen operations in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa.[16] At the same time, the annual budget of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has grown from less than $3 billion to $7.06 billion USD.[17] Of the eighteen twenty-first century operations, fifteen received robust Chapter VII mandates that authorize troops to use "all necessary means" to fulfill the mandate. These includes the use of force beyond self-defense, breaking the third principle of traditional peacekeeping.[18] Meanwhile, in 1999 and 2000, the UN Security Council passed resolutions expressing its "willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are […] targeted" and its intention to provide peacekeepers with the authority and the capacity to protect civilians.[19] In turn, UN peacekeepers now routinely have the authority to

---

[14] Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print,, pg. 321-337
[15] United Nations. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. New York: General Assembly and Security Council, 21 August 2000, pp. viii.
[16] United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet*. New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 December 2014, pg. 1-2.
[17] United Nations. *Peacekeeping Budgets*. New York: Department of Management, February 2012, pg. 1-2.
[18] Hultman, L. "UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50.1 (2013): 59-73. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.
[19] Holt, Victoria and Tobias Berkman. *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center. 2006. Print, pg. 24-25.

"protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" through the offensive use of force. Increasingly, they also have the capacity to act on this obligation.[20]

Despite the changed nature of UN peacekeeping, debates on the use of force that erupted in the 1960s and 1990s continue. As before, critics of robust mandates oppose the use of force beyond self-defense and argue that the "bedrock" principles of consent of parties to the conflict and impartiality erode when the UN becomes a party to the conflict. Moreover, many argue that the offensive use of force serves to escalate conflict, with detrimental outcomes for civilians.[21] Most academic arguments to this effect simply point out this possibility. Alternately, they focus on peacekeeping missions with robust mandates and argue, without much precision, that the mandate brought about the failure of the mission. These works echo academic literature of the 1990s that focused on failure.[22] Sloan (2011), for example, examines the "militarization" of peacekeeping since 2000 and concludes that these operations are ineffective. The author argues that Chapter VII missions are under-trained, under-funded, and have counterproductive effects. He claims that they do not succeed in the offensive use of force and, moreover, that they are perceived to be partial and so have difficulty carrying out traditional peacekeeping activities.[23] Diehl & Druckman (2010) note that many studies, like this one, make arguments about the effectiveness of the use of force without articulating the precise effects of eroded principles or presenting a rigorous analysis of the evidence.[24]

Proponents of robust mandates that allow the offensive use of force, on the other hand, argue that the traditional principles of UN peacekeeping must be updated given the contexts in

---

[20] Sloan, James. "The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping: A Cycle of Boom and Bust?" *Hastings International and Comparative Law Review* 30.3 (2007): 385-452, pg. 434-438. *HeinOnline*. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.
[21] Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print, pg. 154-159.
[22] Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lise Morjé Howard. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11.1 (2008): 283-301, pg. 287-288. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.
[23] Sloan, James. *The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the 21st Century*. Oxford: Hart Pub., 2011. Print.
[24] Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. *Evaluating peace operations*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.

which Blue Helmets now operate. Many point out that in intrastate conflicts, "spoilers" who see themselves as threatened by a peace agreement might use violence to undermine the process, as outlined in Stedman (1997).[25] In turn, Cammaert & Blyth (2014) and others argue that aggressive shows of force by the UN can reduce the threat of spoilers and deter bad actors from attacking civilians and UN personnel, at least for a short time.[26] Hultman et al. (2014) make a similar point when they identify the interposition of peacekeepers between belligerents as a mechanism that links an increase in UN troops with decreasing battlefield deaths. This tactic puts Blue Helmets in a position where they are more likely to use offensive force and, according to the authors, contributes to a reduction in violent deaths.[27] Finally, Terrie (2010) argues that the offensive use of force enhances the deterrent effect of deploying peacekeepers, as credibility stems not only from the number of troops but from the belief that force will be used.[28]

This thesis contributes to this ongoing debate, among policymakers and academics alike, on the place of the offensive use of force in UN peacekeeping. It asks the following question: *How does the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers affect rebel violence against civilians?* This question focuses on a particular goal of UN peacekeeping relevant to modern missions, the protection of civilians, rather than how the "effectiveness" or "success" of missions relates to robust mandates. Precise hypotheses about how the offensive use of force affects an outcome of interest can therefore be tested. For example, critics argue that the offensive use of force escalates conflict and so helps to bring about an increase in rebel violence against civilians.

---

[25] Stedman, Stephen. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." *International Security* 22.2 (1997): 5-53, pg. 5. Web. 21 May 2015.

[26] Cammaert, Patrick, and Fiona Blyth. "The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." International Peace Institute. *Ipinst.org*, pg. 8. Web. 21 May 2015.

[27] Hultman et al. "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting." *American Political Science Review* 108.4 (2014): 737-53, pg. 737. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.

[28] Terrie, Jim. "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC." *African Security Review* 18.1 (2009): 22-23, pg. 28. Web. 5 Nov. 2014.

Meanwhile, proponents hold that the offensive use of force can have a deterrent effect on rebels, reducing rebel violence against civilians. This thesis can adjudicate between these two claims by examining how violence against civilians changes after the offensive use of force.

Academic Importance

This research also makes a contribution to existing academic literature on peacekeeping. Most peacekeeping literature since the early 2000s has focused on systematic and rigorous analyses of the effects and the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Unlike the literature in the 1990s, which focused on peacekeeping failures at the exclusion of successes, the most recent studies have pointed to the effectiveness of peacekeeping in keeping peace.[29] Fortna (2004), for instance, examines peacekeeping missions in post-conflict situations and finds that they contribute to the durability of peace.[30] More recently, authors have looked at the effect of robust mandates on violence against civilians. Kreps & Wallace (2009), for example, find that UN operations with Chapter VII mandates reduce civilian killings.[31] They hypothesize that these missions, with heavily armed and well-trained enforcement troops, reassure belligerents that violations will be punished and so decrease violence against civilians.[32] The authors also find that traditional operations reduce violence through interposition, ceasefire monitoring, and buffer zones, but not as much because they cannot impose high costs.[33] Hultman (2010), meanwhile, analyzes

---

[29] Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lise Morjé Howard. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11.1 (2008): 283-301, pg. 283. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.

[30] Fortna, Virginia Page. "Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war." *International Studies Quarterly* 48.2 (2004): 269-292.

[31] Kreps, Sarah, and Geoffrey Wallace. "Just How Humanitarian are Interventions? Peacekeeping and the Prevention of Civilian Killings during and after Civil Wars." *Paper prepared for the 2009 APSA Annual Meeting*.

[32] Kreps, Sarah, and Geoffrey Wallace. "Just How Humanitarian are Interventions? Peacekeeping and the Prevention of Civilian Killings during and after Civil Wars." *Paper prepared for the 2009 APSA Annual Meeting*, pg. 12.

[33] Kreps, Sarah, and Geoffrey Wallace. "Just How Humanitarian are Interventions? Peacekeeping and the Prevention of Civilian Killings during and after Civil Wars." *Paper prepared for the 2009 APSA Annual Meeting*, pg. 24-25.

intrastate conflicts from 1989 to 2006 and demonstrates that operations with an explicit mandate

to protect civilians significantly reduce violence against civilians by rebels.[34]

While these studies establish a relationship between robust, civilian protection mandates

and rebel violence against civilians, they rely on indicators that measure the presence or absence

of a mission in any given country-year.[35] This approach does not indicate how specific actions,

like the offensive use of force, actually affect rebel violence against civilians. Recent studies

have begun to dig deep into the micro-foundations of deterring violence. Hultman et al. (2014),

for instance, explore the relationship between the number of UN troops and battlefield deaths in

African civil conflicts from 1992 to 2011.[36] Rather than focusing on whether or a peacekeeping

mission was deployed in a given year, the authors focus on the number and composition of UN

personnel deployed and track these measures on a precise time-scale.[37] Hultman et al. (2013),

similarly, explore the ability of peacekeeping operations to provide civilian protection in African

civil conflicts from 1991 to 2008. Using a precise time-scale, they find that deploying more UN

military and police personnel is systematically associated with fewer civilian casualties. They

hypothesize that peacekeepers mitigate violence by interceding between combatants on the

frontlines and enforcing civilian protection behind the front lines.[38] These studies point to the

usefulness of looking beyond the country-year level at specific events and demonstrate a clear

relationship between troop levels and reduced rebel violence against civilians.

---

[34] Hultman, Lisa. "Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians." *Civil Wars* 12(1): 29-46 (2010).
[35] Kathman, Jacob D., and Reed M. Wood. "Stopping the Killing During the "Peace": Peacekeeping and the Severity of Postconflict Civilian Victimization." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2014), pg. 6-7.
[36] Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting." *American Political Science Review* 108.4 (2014): 737-53, pg. 737. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.
[37] Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting." *American Political Science Review* 108.4 (2014): 737-53, pg. 739-740. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.
[38] Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 57.4 (2013): 875-91, pg. 877-883. Web. 12 Dec. 2014

This thesis complements the literature described above. Although several articles find that robust mandates contribute to a decrease in rebel violence against civilians, they do not address the actual effects of the offensive use of force. Other work finds that the deployment of additional peacekeepers contributes to a decrease in rebel violence against civilians, but again does not address the effects of the use of force beyond self-defense. Terrie (2010), for one, argues that deploying additional peacekeepers alone cannot have a deterrent effect on rebels unless the perception exists that Blue Helmets would in fact use offensive force, as deterrence depends on both force strength and perceived willingness to use force.[39] The use of force might therefore have an effect on rebel violence against civilians independent of troop deployments. This thesis examines the impact of events on a precise time-scale, as in Hultman et al. (2014), but focuses on a different independent variable.

Research Design

To answer the central research question, this thesis focuses on UN peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An analysis of the relationship between the use of force beyond self-defense and rebel violence against civilians in all fifteen peacekeeping operations with robust mandates falls outside the scope of this project, hence the focus on a single country. However, the duration and magnitude of UN peacekeeping in the DRC make the country an excellent case study. Blue Helmets have operated continuously in the country since 1999 under the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC), later rebranded the UN Organization *Stabilization* Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Today, this operation stands as the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operation in history with over 25,000 total personnel and an annual

---

[39] Terrie, Jim. "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC." *African Security Review* 18.1 (2009): 22-23, pg. 28. Web. 5 Nov. 2014

budget of almost \$1.4 billion.[40] In 2000, coinciding with the publication of the Brahimi Report, MONUC received the first civilian physical protection mandate in the history of peacekeeping, which allowed peacekeepers to "take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to […] protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."[41] Since then, Blue Helmets have used offensive force against a variety of different Congolese rebel groups in different contexts. This allows for a comparison between instances of the use of force, while staying within one country. Finally, DRC ranks among the most difficult operating environments in the world, given its rough terrain, weak government, scarce infrastructure, and numerous rebel groups.[42] In this difficult context, any demonstrated effect of the offensive use of force would be significant.

The following two chapters combine data analysis and qualitative analysis to answer the research question, focusing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2000 to the present. In the second chapter, micro-level data on civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa provide an accurate understanding of when UN peacekeepers have used force beyond self-defense and of patterns in rebel violence against civilians. These data show correlations to be explained, but cannot prove causation on their own. Once patterns in the data have been established, however, the qualitative analysis of academic and journalistic writings on the conflict in DRC will help to identify any causal relationship between the use of force and rebel violence against civilians. Historical accounts of the conflict might also reveal conditions under which the use of force appears more likely to have an effect on rebel violence against civilians.

---

[40] United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet.* New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 December 2014.
[41] United Nations. *Resolution 1291.* New York: Security Council, 24 February 2000, pg. 4.
[42] Holt, Victoria and Tobias Berkman. *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center. 2006.

Policy Relevance

By examining actual instances in which Blue Helmets used force beyond self-defense, this thesis informs decisions from the UN Security Council down to local force commanders. Charged with the protection of civilians, the UN peacekeeping apparatus constantly makes decisions on whether or not to use force to achieve this outcome. Existing academic literature, which either focuses on the abstract implications of the offensive use of force or examines the effects of having a robust mandate, does not inform these choices. Using examples from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this thesis informs peacekeeping by establishing what effect the offensive use of force has on rebel violence against civilians.

This thesis also informs American foreign policy. Of course, U.S. soldiers have not participated in UN peacekeeping missions since the *Black Hawk Down* incident in 1993.[43] However, the U.S. remains the largest single financial contributor to UN peacekeeping missions to this day. In 2014, the U.S. gave almost $2 billion USD to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, nearly thirty percent of its annual budget.[44] As the largest single donor, the U.S. has a vested interest in the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations and an outsized influence over peacekeeping policy. Moreover, as one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the U.S. has strong influence over the creation and oversight of all UN peacekeeping missions. This thesis informs how the U.S. chooses to wield this influence.

---

[43] Gorur, A. "Supporting Their Troops: America's Role in UN Peacekeeping." (May 28, 2014). Washington, DC: The Stimson Center. Web.

[44] United Nations. *Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations peacekeeping operations.* New York: General Assembly, 27 December 2012, pg. 2.

Chapter II – Data Analysis

Overview

This chapter uses data to make progress toward answering the central research question: *How does the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers affect rebel violence against civilians?* The following sections describe the datasets employed, define the two variables and how they are measured, and lay out the analysis used to clarify the relationship between the two variables. According to the tables and graphs presented in this chapter, the use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers is often followed by a sizeable decrease in rebel violence against civilians. This establishes a correlation to be investigated in the next chapter.

In four of nine episodes presented in this chapter, rebel violence against civilians declined sharply after the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers. Further analysis shows that, in each of these episodes, the rebel group targeted by the UN contributed to this decrease and carried out less violence against civilians. And, in three of these four episodes, attacks on civilians by other rebel groups decreased as well. The analysis also shows that violence declined most prominently near the area where peacekeepers used offensive force and, furthermore, that rebel groups did not simply move away from UN peacekeepers and attack civilians in other areas. Although these findings do not prove a causal link between the offensive use of force by the UN and decreased rebel violence against civilians, they do establish a strong correlation.

In the other five episodes presented, the data do not demonstrate a clear relationship between the rebel violence against civilians and the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers. However, in not one episode did violence increase after the UN used force beyond self-defense. In three of these episodes, the offensive use of force does not seem to have had an impact on

rebel violence against civilians. The targeted rebel group and others continued to attack civilians, violence against civilians did not decline overall, and violence persisted even in the area where the UN used force. In the other two episodes, data cannot help to clarify the relationship between the two variables. Once again these findings do not demonstrate causation, but rather establish a correlation to be explored in the next chapter.

A Tale of Two Datasets

This thesis draws on two datasets for its quantitative analysis: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset (UCDP GED) and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Each contains georeferenced, micro-level data on civil conflicts in Africa that can be used to study subnational dynamics in environments with UN peacekeeping missions. Both provide a good deal of information on each event listed, including the date, precise location, actors, and estimated fatalities. Human coders compile each dataset drawing from news sources, NGO reports, and other materials. However, there are also differences between the two datasets that affect the analysis.

First, UCDP GED contains data on organized violence in Africa from 1989 to 2010 while ACLED covers 1997 to March 2015. As this thesis focuses partly on events occurring after 2010, some analysis necessarily relies on ACLED rather than UCDP GED. Second, the datasets both include one-sided violence, or violence against civilians, but define the concept in different ways. UCDP GED defines an event as "the use of armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting in at least 1 direct death."[45] ACLED, meanwhile, has no fatality threshold and so includes events in the "violence against civilians"

---

[45] Sunderberg, R., and E. Melander. 2013. "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4): 523-532.

category that do no result in civilian deaths.[46] This means that ACLED might cast too wide a net sometimes and capture incidents that most would not classify as violence against civilians, such as cattle theft.[47] However, this broader definition proves useful in the DRC, where armed groups often carry out attacks against civilians that do not necessarily result in fatalities, such as sexual violence or attacks that result only in injuries. A brief examination of the notes in ACLED reveals that the vast majority of events classified as "violence against civilians" fall within a commonsense definition of the term. Lastly, only ACLED includes UN peacekeeping troops as a conflict actor, meaning that any data on the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers or attacks against them must come from that dataset.[48]

Eck (2012), comparing the two datasets, notes that fewer academic articles draw from ACLED than UCDP GED, as the former has looser requirements for what constitutes an actor and includes unidentified actors, which might mean that some attacks do not stem from political groups but rather criminal elements.[49] In the DRC, however, this might not matter much as the line between rebel and criminal often blurs. Eck (2012) also analyses one year of data in Algeria and in Burundi and determines that ACLED has many more miscoded events than UCDP GED, as only the latter employs a "triple-checking process" where the coder, project leader, and also software check for inconsistencies.[50] (It should be noted, however, that the author in question works at Uppsala University and has published several articles with the makers of UCDP GED.)

---

[46] Raleigh, C., and C. Dowd. 2015. "Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook."
[47] Eck, K. "In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and CLED conflict events datasets." *Cooperation and Conflict* 47.1 (2012): 124-141.
[48] Raleigh, C., and C. Dowd. 2015. "Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook."
[49] Eck, K. "In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED conflict events datasets." *Cooperation and Conflict* 47.1 (2012): 124-141, pg. 135.
[50] Eck, K. "In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED conflict events datasets." *Cooperation and Conflict* 47.1 (2012): 124-141, pg. 132.

Assuming ACLED does contain less accurate data, however, this thesis still requires the dataset given the temporal and conceptual restrictions of UCDP GED.

Defining the Variables

This thesis investigates the relationship between an independent variable (IV), the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers against rebel groups, and a dependent variable (DV), rebel violence against civilians. More precisely, the IV is defined as instances in which UN peacekeepers use force beyond self-defense. The DV, meanwhile, is defined as attacks by armed groups against civilians that cause fatalities, injuries, or physical harm. The quantitative portion of this thesis relies on the datasets described above to understand the relationship between these two variables in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Understanding the effects of the offensive use of force (IV) on the rebel violence against civilians first requires identifying the instances in which UN peacekeepers used offensive force. As UCDP GED does not include UN troops as participants in battles, these data come entirely from the ACLED dataset. To identify instances of the IV, the data were filtered to create a list of all battles in the DRC from 2001 to the present that included either MONUC or, after 2010, MONUSCO as one of the belligerents. The list included seventy-eight events. However, most of these events did not involve the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers, but rather ambushes on UN troops, battles where peacekeepers were caught in the crossfire, and events without any description. Blue Helmets only used force beyond self-defense in sixteen events, as indicated in the notes for each battle. Fourteen of the seventy-eight events had no accompanying notes, so some instances of the IV might be missing from the data. However, assuming that the IV occurs as often in unannotated events as in the events with descriptions, only three or four instances of

the IV have been lost. In short, these sixteen instances capture most of the universe of cases, insofar as the data accurately reflect the actions of MONUC and MONUSCO.

Measuring rebel violence against civilians (DV) with the datasets proves more complex. UCDP GED, for one, categorizes many events as one-sided violence and defines those events as "violence against civilians perpetrated by organized non-state groups or governments."[51] For the purposes of this thesis, violence against civilians perpetrated by governments is excluded from the analysis, for reasons explained later on. As the dataset includes only events with at least one fatality, non-lethal violence against civilians does not appear. ACLED, on the other hand, also categorizes events as "violence against civilians" but uses a broader definition that includes events with no civilian casualties. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. Focusing on fatalities helps to clarify the severity of attacks on civilians but excludes many attacks that do not result in death. Focusing on the number of attacks without regard to fatalities, meanwhile, does not capture the magnitude of different attacks. This thesis employs both approaches, drawing on fatality estimates and also tracking the total number of attacks recorded.

Graphing the Variables

After identifying the relevant data to measure the dependent and independent variables, the relationship between the two is expressed using simple bar graphs.[52] In the middle of each graph, a red line indicates an "episode" where UN troops used force beyond self-defense (IV). These episodes are not the same as the sixteen instances found in ACLED, as Blue Helmets often use offensive force multiple times in the same area over the course of several days, weeks, or even months. Evaluating the impact of each instance separately would make little sense when

---

[51] Sunderberg, R., and E. Melander. 2013. "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4): 523-532.
[52] See Table A for a summary of the results.

instances cluster, so the sixteen original instances are consolidated into nine episodes. These vary from one day to five months in length. To each side of the red line, the graphs include one year of data on rebel violence against civilians (DV) before and after an episode. Each episode has two graphs, one with monthly fatalities from one-sided violence and another with number of events coded as one-sided violence per month. UCDP GED data appear in blue and ACLED in orange, side by side on each graph to conserve space.

Only certain data are included in the analysis. First, civilian deaths that occur during battles between parties to the conflict, rather than during attacks on civilians by armed groups, are excluded. Both datasets do not define civilians killed in the crossfire as one-sided violence, as the intentions of the belligerents are unknown. Second, data on the DV are only collected for the province in which the episode occurred because, given the enormous size and rough terrain of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the use of force by UN troops in one province would not be expected to deter armed groups in another province. In the case of the Orientale province, larger than California and with few roads, the analysis is restricted to sub-regions, closer in size to Wisconsin. Lastly, violence against civilians carried out by the Congolese army or police, foreign militaries (e.g. Rwanda), or UN peacekeepers are excluded, as the relationship between these groups and peacekeepers differs from that between peacekeepers and rebel groups. Namely, the UN can deter neither state actors nor itself. Hultman (2010) analyzes all intrastate armed conflicts from 1989 to 2006 and confirms this, demonstrating that the deployment of peace operations do not have an impact on government violence against civilians.[53] Fortunately, these actors attack civilians far less frequently than armed groups.

---

[53] Hultman, Lisa. "Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians." *Civil Wars* 12(1): 29-46 (2010).

These graphs help to clarify the relationship between the IV and DV, but they cannot prove a causal relationship. They simply indicate whether the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers in a given province might have changed the pattern of rebel violence against civilians there. In other words, data on such violence from one year before and after an episode help to establish a correlation to be explored in the next chapter.

However, this approach cannot be applied to Episode 7 because ACLED omits some instances where UN peacekeepers used force beyond self-defense in this case. In all other episodes, the use of force beyond self-defense recorded in ACLED corresponds with the actual, documented use of force. Although the instances that ACLED does record in Episode 7 are all accurate, the dataset misses several other instances.

This omission may stem from a variety of factors. Episode 7 consists of a joint campaign between the Congolese army and UN troops against a rebel group called the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). This operation lasted three full years, much longer than any other episode. Also unlike the other episodes, UN troops used force beyond self-defense routinely over a long period of time, sometimes providing artillery support to the Congolese army and sometimes launching their offensives on their own. Both count as the use of force beyond self-defense. However, as these actions were considered routine in the context of this particular operation, they may not often have made news. The length and scope of the engagement might also have contributed to the underreporting of instances of offensive force in the media and elsewhere. With fewer reports, ACLED would naturally omit several instances. Moreover, many reports on these operations lack details on the type of support given by the UN to the Congolese army. Artillery support would make the UN a belligerent, while logistical support would not, meaning that perhaps the ACLED coders erred on the side of not including

19

events in ambiguous cases. This does not seem to be a problem in other cases, but the graphical

approach described above cannot be applied to Episode 7. Instead of producing the graphs

described earlier for this episode, this next section simply presents data on rebel violence against

civilians for North Kivu for the three years during which the operation took place. While these

graphs present no correlation to be explained, the data can still inform the qualitative analysis in

the following chapter.

Analysis and Results

Using the graphs to understand the relationship between the offensive use of force (IV)

and violence against civilians (DV) is complicated. The question is the following: *After the IV,*

does the DV increase, decrease, or is the relationship between the two ambiguous? This question

must be asked for each of the nine episodes to establish a general relationship. (The graph for

Episode 7 cannot help to answer this question, however, as explained in the previous section).

However, there are two measures of violence against civilians – fatalities and the number of

attacks against civilians – and these measures might tell different stories. Neither measure

appears more valid than the other. Also, the first five episodes happen before 2010 and so

include data from both UCDP GED and ACLED. These datasets might also tell different stories.

Keeping these complications in mind, each episode is analyzed more than once.

For example, the first five cases are analyzed four times: once with the fatalities measure

and UCDP GED data, once with the fatalities measure and ACLED data, once with the number

of attacks measure and UCDP GED data, and once with the number of attacks measure and

ACLED data. The last five episodes are analyzed twice, once with fatalities and once with the

number of attacks measure. Each analysis is then labelled as an increase in violence against

civilians (I), a decrease (D), or unclear (U). Finally, different analyses are reconciled when they

tell different stories to establish the relationship in each episode. For the first five episodes, when at least three of four analyses reach the same conclusion then the episode is labelled as such. Otherwise, the episode is labelled unclear (U).[54] For the other episodes, when the two analyses reach the same conclusion then the episode is labelled as such. Otherwise, the episode is labelled unclear (U).[55] The results of this approach are reproduced in the table below.

Table A: What happens to rebel violence against civilians after the offensive use of force?					
Episode No.	Episode Name	Increase	Decrease	Unclear	No Data
1	Ituri 2003		X		
2	South Kivu 2004		X		
3	Ituri 2005		X		
4	Haut-Uele 2006				X
5	North Kivu 2006			X	
6	Ituri 2009			X	
7	North Kivu 2008-2012				X
8	North Kivu 2013			X	
9	Ituri 2014			X	

This analysis demonstrates that, overall, rebel violence against civilians often decreases after UN peacekeepers use force beyond self-defense. Three of nine episodes featured an overall decline in rebel violence against civilians for anywhere from six months to a year after the use of force. This does not prove causation in these three episodes, of course, but rather establishes a correlation to be explored in the next chapter. Moreover, rebel violence against civilians does not increase after the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers in any episode. This makes it unlikely that the IV leads to an escalation in rebel violence against civilians, as hypothesized by critics of peace enforcement. In the four other episodes, those that do not show a decrease in violence against civilians, the graphs demonstrate no apparent relationship between the IV and

---

[54] For example, if four analyses of one episode yield [D, D, D, U] then the episode is labelled D. If the four analyses yield [D, D, U, U] then the episode is labelled U.
[55] For example, if two analyses of one episode yield [D, D] then the episode is labelled D. If the two analyses yield [D, U] then the episode is labelled U.

the DV. (Episode 4, meanwhile, cannot be evaluated because there appears to be no attacks on civilians in the year before or after the offensive use of force.) The next two sections probe these findings further to understand what happens in episodes where violence decreases and in the ambiguous episodes where the relationship is ambiguous.

The next section presents the bar graphs used to create the table above. For each episode, a small table summarizes the results of each individual analysis and the final determination. Then, two bar graphs illustrate the overall relationship between the IV and the DV.

Graphs and Tables

Episode 1: Ituri 2003 (June 6 – October 10)

Analysis	Label
UCDP GED Fatalities	D
ACLED Fatalities	U
UCDP GED Number of Attacks	D
ACLED Number of Attacks	D
Final Determination	*D*

*Aug '02 and May '03 in UCDP GED are outliers and were changed to improve readability. Aug '02 had 712 fatalities and May '03 had 974 fatalities, according to UCDP GED.

Episode 2: South Kivu 2004 (June 20)

Analysis	Label
UCDP GED Fatalities	D
ACLED Fatalities	D
UCDP GED Number of Attacks	D
ACLED Number of Attacks	D
Final Determination	*D*

South Kivu 2003-2005, Fatalities

South Kivu 2003-2005, Number of Attacks

Episode 3: Ituri 2005 (February 25 – April 16)

Analysis	Label
UCDP GED Fatalities	D
ACLED Fatalities	U
UCDP GED Number of Attacks	D
ACLED Number of Attacks	D
Final Determination	*D*

Ituri 2004-2006, Fatalities

Ituri 2004-2006, Number of Attacks

Episode 5: North Kivu (November 25 - 28)

Analysis	Label
UCDP GED Fatalities	I
ACLED Fatalities	U
UCDP GED Number of Attacks	I
ACLED Number of Attacks	U
Final Determination	*U*

26

Episode 6: Ituri 2009 (July 15 - 29)

Analysis	Label
ACLED Fatalities	U
ACLED Number of Attacks	U
Final Determination	*U*

Ituri 2008-2010, Fatalities

*Oct '08 and Dec '09 are outliers and were changed to improve readability. According to ACLED, Oct '08 had 240 fatalities and Dec '09 had 345 fatalities.

Ituri 2008-2010, Number of Attacks

27

Episode 7: North Kivu 2008-2012*

North Kivu 2008-2012, Fatalities

ACLED

North Kivu 2008-2012, Number of Attacks

ACLED

*As described earlier, UN troops used force beyond self-defense continuously in this episode. These graphs, therefore, do not have any red lines.

Episode 8: North Kivu 2013-2014 (Aug 26-28 2013; Nov 4 – Dec 25 2013)

Analysis	Label
ACLED Fatalities	D
ACLED Number of Attacks	U
Final Determination	*U*

North Kivu 2012-2014, Fatalities

North Kivu 2012-2014, Number of Attacks

.

Episode 9: Ituri 2014 (June 3 – June 25)

Analysis	Label
ACLED Fatalities	I
ACLED Number of Attacks	U
Final Determination	*U*

Ituri 2013-2015, Fatalities

Ituri 2013-2015, Number of Attacks

30

Perpetrators of Violence

This section investigates one possible explanation of the results shown in the last section, again using the UCDP GED and ACLED datasets. This explanation focuses on the perpetrators of rebel violence against civilians (DV). More precisely, it hypothesizes that the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers (IV) has a deterrent effect, but only on rebel groups against which the UN launches offensive operations. Other groups, knowing that the UN has limited resources and so chooses to target only a handful of rebel groups at any given time, might continue to conduct violence against civilians. This might obscure the deterrent effect of the IV in the episodes with no obvious decrease in violence.

Evaluating this hypothesis requires finding out who perpetrated violence against civilians before and after an episode, as well as which rebel group the UN targeted with offensive force. The question here has two parts. First, *do the primary targets of offensive force carry out less violence against civilians after the IV?* Second, *do other rebel groups carry out less violence against the civilians after the IV?* This section works to answer these questions using the datasets. First, the perpetrators of rebel violence against civilians before the IV are recorded. Second, the target of the use of force beyond self-defense is recorded. And, lastly, the perpetrators of the DV after the IV are recorded. Using this information, the answer to each question is coded as yes (Y), no (N), or unclear (U) for each episode. For the five episodes that draw on both datasets, this analysis is carried out twice. When both analyses have the same result the episode is coded accordingly. When the analyses reach different conclusions, the episode is coded as unclear (U).[56]

---

[56] For example, if two analyses of one episode yield [Y, Y] then the episode is labelled Y. If the two analyses yield [Y, U] then the episode is labelled U.

This analysis demonstrates that, in the three episodes with an overall decline in violence against civilians after the offensive use of force, both the targeted rebel group and other groups carried out fewer attacks on civilians after the IV. Moreover, in one episode that shows no overall decrease in violence against civilians – Episode 8 in North Kivu – this analysis shows that violence carried out by the targeted group and other perpetrators actually did decrease after the IV. However, a new rebel group then emerged and began to attack civilians, meaning that overall violence did not decrease. In all four of these episodes, the targeted group carried out many fewer attacks on civilians in the year following the IV. Moreover, other rebel groups also carried out fewer attacks, although in one case this decrease did not last an entire year and in most cases new rebel groups emerged and went on to attack civilians. In three other cases, meanwhile, neither the targeted group nor other groups attacked civilians less often after the IV. Overall, these findings do not support the hypothesis that the targeted group and other groups react differently when UN peacekeepers use offensive force. Rather, they reveal variation in how rebel groups behave following the IV. In four episodes they carry out many fewer attacks, while in three episodes their behavior does not change. As before, this does not establish causation but rather prevents a finding to be explored in the next chapter.

Table B: Do the targets of offensive force carry out less violence against civilians after the IV?

Episode No.	Episode Name	Yes	No	Unclear	No Data
1	Ituri 2003	X			
2	South Kivu 2004	X			
3	Ituri 2005	X			
4	Haut-Uele 2006				X
5	North Kivu 2006		X		
6	Ituri 2009		X		
7	North Kivu 2008-2012				X
8	North Kivu 2013	X			
9	Ituri 2014		X		

Table C: Do other rebel groups carry out less violence against the civilians after the IV?

Episode No.	Episode Name	Yes	No	Unclear	No Data
1	Ituri 2003	X			
2	South Kivu 2004	X*			
3	Ituri 2005	X**			
4	Haut-Uele 2006				X
5	North Kivu 2006		X		
6	Ituri 2009		X		
7	North Kivu 2008-2012				X
8	North Kivu 2013	X**			
9	Ituri 2014		X		

*Other groups carried out less violence, but for only six months after the offensive use of force.
**Other groups carried out less violence, but new groups emerged and carried out violence later on.

Displacement of Violence

This section investigates a second possible explanation of the results, involving the location of the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers. This explanation hypothesizes that use of force beyond self-defense (IV) deters rebel groups from violence against civilians (DV), but that this deterrent effect is constrained by geography. In other words, the IV only deters rebel groups from attacking civilians in the area where UN peacekeepers use force, given that rough terrain and poor infrastructure may prevent the Blue Helmets from posing a credible threat elsewhere. If this explanation is correct, the IV might simply displace rebel groups and, therefore, attacks on civilians, to other areas. Where the graphs do not demonstrate a clear relationship, rebels might have moved to another location in the same province. Where the graphs demonstrate a decline in rebel violence against civilians, rebels might have moved to a different province.

Evaluating this explanation requires finding out where rebel violence against civilians took place before and after each episode, as well as where the UN used offensive force. The

33

question is the following: *Does rebel violence against civilians change locations after the offensive use of force?* This section seeks to answer this question using the datasets introduced earlier, as each dataset records where exactly an event took place. First, the location of rebel violence against civilians before the IV is recorded. Second, the location of the use of force beyond self-defense is recorded. And, lastly, the location of the DV following the IV is recorded. If the location of violence against civilians changes after the IV and decreases in and around the location of the IV, the answer to the question is recorded as yes (Y). If the location of such violence does not change or does not decrease in that area, the answer is recorded as no (N). Otherwise, the answer is recorded as unclear (U). For the first five episodes, which draw on both ACLED and UCDP GED, this analysis is carried out using each dataset. When both analyses have the same result the episode is coded accordingly. When the analyses reach different conclusions, the episode is coded as unclear (U).[57]

This analysis demonstrates that the location of rebel violence against civilians changes within a given province, but only in episodes where there is an overall decrease in such violence. In other words, when the offensive use of force is followed by less violence against civilians in a province, the DV decreases substantially in and around where the UN used force. Although violence against civilians might recur in the same province, its does not recur in the area where the UN used force. Moreover, only in one episode do these new attacks outnumber those before the offensive use of force.[58] Meanwhile, violence against civilians does not change locations in episodes where the relationship between the IV and DV is unclear. Rather, violence persists in and around where the UN used force beyond self-defense. This shows that violence is not simply

---

[57] For example, if two analyses of one episode yield [Y, Y] then the episode is labelled Y. If the two analyses yield [Y, U] then the episode is labelled U.
[58] Episode 8 in North Kivu.

displaced in these episodes. Overall, these findings do not support the hypothesis that the IV has a localized deterrent effect in episodes where the DV does not seem to decrease. They do, however, further sharpen the distinction between two different "sets" of episodes. One group of episodes features an overall decline in the DV after the IV, fewer attacks by the targeted rebel group and other rebel groups after the IV, and fewer attacks where the IV took place. The second group of episodes, meanwhile, does not demonstrate any of these patterns.

Table D: Does rebel violence against civilians change locations after the IV?

Episode No.	Episode Name	Yes	No	Unclear	No Data
1	Ituri 2003	X			
2	South Kivu 2004	X			
3	Ituri 2005			X	
4	Haut-Uele 2006				X
5	North Kivu 2006		X		
6	Ituri 2009		X		
7	North Kivu 2008-2012				X
8	North Kivu 2013	X			
9	Ituri 2014		X		

This analysis captures whether violence against civilians is displaced within a province. However, in episodes where rebel groups carry out fewer such attacks after IV and the in the area where the offensive use of force took place, the DV might still be displaced to another province. The subsequent analysis explores this possibility in the three relevant episodes. The question is the following: *Do rebel groups who carry out less violence against civilians in a given province, after the IV, carry out more such attacks in neighboring provinces?* First, the main perpetrators of the DV who carried out fewer attacks after the IV are identified. Second, data on these groups and violence against civilians is collected for provinces, or in the case of Ituri sub-provinces, bordering the province in question for the period of time analyzed before. If one perpetrator

carries out more violence in a neighboring province after the IV, the answer to the question is coded as yes (Y). If this condition is not met, the answer is coded as no (N). This analysis is carried out for each neighboring province or sub-province. For the first two episodes, which draw on both ACLED and UCDP GED, each analysis is carried out using both datasets. When all analyses are labelled no (N), the episode is labelled as such. When at least one analysis is labelled yes (Y), then the episode is labelled as such, unless UCPD and ACLED tell different stories for that area. In the latter case, the episode is marked unclear (U).[59]

This analysis demonstrates that rebel groups who commit less violence against civilians after the IV do not simply move to a neighboring province and continue with such attacks. In two of the three episodes examined, rebel groups did not carry out more attacks in any neighboring province after the UN used force beyond self-defense. In the one other episode, Episode 2, one dataset records slightly more attacks by the targeted rebel group in the neighboring province of North Kivu, while the other dataset shows no such increase. Together, these results discredit the hypothesis that the IV displaces violence to other provinces.

Table E: Does rebel violence against civilians move to a new province after the IV?				
Episode No.	**Episode Name**	**Yes**	**No**	**Unclear**
1	Ituri 2003		X	
2	South Kivu 2004			X
9	North Kivu 2013		X	

Details of the analysis described in this section and the previous section may be found in Appendix A. For each episode, section headings indicate the analysis that follows. Tables then summarize the conclusion of each analysis and the overall recommendation.

---

[59] For example, if six analyses of one episode yield [N, N, N, N, N, N] then the episode is labelled N. If the analyses yield [Y, Y, N, N, N, N], and the Ys refer to the same neighboring area, then the episode is labelled Y. If the analyses yield [Y, N, N, N, N, N] then the episode is labelled U.

Conclusion

This chapter made progress toward answering the central research question of this thesis: *How does the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers affect rebel violence against civilians?* Using two georeferenced datasets, this chapter established a solid correlation to be investigated in the next chapter, drawing on qualitative accounts of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. From 2003 to 2014, Blue Helmets used force beyond self-defense against rebel groups in nine discrete episodes. Following four of these episodes, rebel violence against civilians followed the same pattern: civilian fatalities and attacks against civilians decreased in the province in question, both the targeted rebel group and other groups carried out fewer attacks, and violence declined most sharply in and around where the UN used offensive force. Moreover, these decreases did not correspond with increased violence against civilians in neighboring provinces. In another three cases, however, none of these patterns appear and rebel violence against civilians proceeded largely as before. Two other episodes cannot be evaluated for lack of data on rebel violence against civilians and because ACLED omits instances of the offensive use of force, respectively. These results discredit the argument that the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers necessarily leads to an escalation in civilian casualties.

These results also raise the following question: what explains the divergent patterns in rebel violence against civilians in these two groups of episodes? However, this question also presumes that the offensive use of force had an effect on the behavior of rebel groups in some cases but not others. This may or may not true. The next chapter tackles the question of causation in the first set of episodes and also explores the divergence between the two sets.

Chapter III – Qualitative Analysis

Chapter Overview

This chapter introduces qualitative material to provide an answer to the research question: *How does the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers affect rebel violence against civilians?* The following sections give historical context on the conflict in eastern Congo, present the nine episodes in chronological order, and then summarize the overall findings from all nine episodes. According to the analysis in this chapter, paired with the data analysis from the previous chapter, the use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers often contributed to a sizeable decrease in rebel violence against civilians. This chapter also highlights four conditions under which this effect was more likely occur, listed below.

In the four episodes where rebel violence against civilians declined after the use of force, UN peacekeepers contributed to a decrease in attacks on civilians. The offensive use of force changed the calculus of rebel groups, who decided to disarm and demobilize rather than continue to attack civilians. This tended to happen when the UN deployed additional peacekeepers at the same time, when rebel groups had lower capacity relative to UN and Congolese troops, when rebels used conventional rather than guerilla tactics, and when the Congolese army did not ally with rebel groups who perpetrated violence against civilians.

In four episodes where the offensive use of force did not appear to have any effect on rebel violence against civilians, UN troops did not change the calculus of rebel groups and violence against civilians persisted. This tended to happen when the UN deployed no additional peacekeepers, when rebel groups had higher capacity relative to UN and Congolese troops as well as outside support, when rebels waged guerilla warfare, and when the Congolese army

38

allied with rebel groups who carried out violence against civilians. The last episode remains ambiguous, even after an analysis of qualitative accounts.

Background on the Conflict in Eastern Congo

The primary actors in the twenty-first century Congolese drama are, of course, African. However, for more than fifty years, Belgian rulers and colonial administrators shaped the future of the Congolese people. This section first describes two colonial legacies of the Belgian Congo, state weakness and narratives of ethnic superiority and inferiority, which prove important to understanding the roots of conflict in the modern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Second, this section emphasizes the role that the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko played in extending these colonial legacies from the independence of the Congo in 1960 through the end of the Cold War. Third, this section sketches the history of the First Congo War that toppled Mobutu in the late 1990s and then of the Second Congo War that followed and embroiled nine African countries. And, finally, this section situates all ten episodes in this historical context and introduces the actor at the center of each episode: the United Nations peacekeeping mission. While not a comprehensive account of Congolese history, this section provides a historical background to better contextualize the analysis presented in the following section.

Unlike British and French colonialism, which left behind bureaucratic institutions and structures in their former African colonies, Belgian colonialism left the Congo with nothing close to a functional state. King Leopold II of Belgium, in 1885, established the Congo Free State as his own personal property and created a colonial system focused on the extraction of rubber. Under this system, forced labor killed or maimed hundreds of thousands of Congolese and pushed millions more to starvation. Conditions improved little after the Belgian government took over in 1908, as the colonists continued to focus on the extraction of resources and provided

almost nothing to the local population. Military personnel and civil servants were almost entirely white.[60] This left few educated locals and almost no functioning institutions when the Congo gained its independence in 1960.

The Belgians also cultivated narratives of ethnic superiority and inferiority that persist in Congo to this day. This holds especially true in the two provinces discussed most often in this chapter: North Kivu and Ituri. In the former, relations between "indigenous" Congolese and immigrants from Rwanda, the Banyarwanda, have been strained since Belgian colonists helped Hutu and Tutsi resettle in North Kivu to work on plantations and in mines.[61] Anywhere from 150,000 and 300,000 Banyarwanda immigrated under this program from 1928 to 1956, sparking resentment on the part of "indigenous" Congolese who lost their land.[62] In Ituri, meanwhile, Belgian colonists structured the political system to facilitate the extraction of gold. Like in neighboring Rwanda, this involved creating narratives of ethnic superiority and inferiority.[63] The explorer Henry Morton Stanley, on an expedition to Ituri, received cooperation from the Hema and considered them to be "tall, finely-formed men, with almost European features" and "true descendants of Semitic tribes." The Lendu people, meanwhile, met the expedition with resistance and were described as "abrasive and violent."[64] These views informed Belgian colonial policy,

---

[60] Stearns, Jason. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. New York: PublicAffairs, 27 March 2012. Print, pg. 7.

[61] I use the word indigenous to denote residents of eastern Congo like the Nande and Hunde who do not have historical roots in Rwanda. The parentheses hint at the extent to which the politics of the indigeneity are fraught in the DRC. Even though many Hutu and Tutsi have lived in eastern Congo for decades, some for more than a century, many in the DRC consider them to be foreigners. Banyarwanda, especially the Tutsi, face discrimination as a result. In response, many Congolese Tutsi self-identify as Banyamulenge ("those from Mulenge," a territory in South Kivu) precisely to highlight their roots in eastern Congo.

[62] Stearns, Jason. *North Kivu: The Background to the Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 15-17.

[63] Fahey, Dan. *Ituri: Gold, land, and ethnicity in north-eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 8-9.

[64] Fahey, Dan. *Ituri: Gold, land, and ethnicity in north-eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 17-18.

which favored the Hema in education, business, and administration, and generated land conflicts as the Hema elite acquired territory in Lendu areas.[65]

Mobutu Sese Seko, ruler of the Republic of the Congo (later renamed Zaire) from his coup d'état in 1965 until his removal in 1997, extended the colonial legacy of the Belgians for more than thirty years after independence. With the backing of the United States and the CIA, Mobutu helped to orchestrate the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minster of the Congo who had gravitated toward the Soviet Union. Four years later, in 1965, Mobutu became president. A kleptocrat beyond compare, he plundered an estimated five billion dollars from the national treasury and state enterprises during his reign, more than enough to pay off the foreign debt of Zaire. He owned villas and yachts in Europe and built a Versailles-like palace in his rural hometown of Gbadolite, while his country remained one of the poorest in the world. The dictator also used his wealth to maintain power, rewarding allies and paying off opponents. Corruption, patronage, and political killings under Mobutu extended the legacy of state weakness left by the Belgian colonists. When the Cold War ended in 1991, American support for Mobutu came to an end as well, leaving Zaire fragile and with almost no functional political institutions.[66] With a relatively small push, the state would collapse just a few years later.

Mobutu also set up the collapse of Zaire by integrating colonial structures into his own patronage networks. This allowed him to keep tenuous control over a territory the size of Western Europe, with rugged terrain, almost nonexistent borders, and virtually no infrastructure. In North Kivu, this meant that Hutu and Tutsi immigrant populations benefitted from state patronage in the 1980s, fueling even more resentment on the part of "indigenous" Congolese

[65] Fahey, Dan. *Ituri: Gold, land, and ethnicity in north-eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 17-28.
[66] Berkeley, Bill. "Zaire: An African Horror Story." *The Atlantic*, August 1993. Web. 13 May 2015.

groups. When this resentment threatened to spark unrest in the early 1990s, Mobutu changed

tactics and allowed the provincial assembly of North Kivu to exclude the Banyarwanda from

elections and deny them legal rights.[67] In Ituri, meanwhile, the dictator incorporated the Hema

into his patronage networks, generating more land conflicts with the disenfranchised Lendu

population.[68] These localized ethnic tensions, fostered by Belgium and perpetuated by Mobutu,

fed into and exacerbated the conflicts that followed.

If state weakness and ethnic tensions were the tinder that fueled the First Congo War,

then the Rwandan Genocide constituted the spark. In April and May of 1994, over 800,000 Tutsi

and moderate Hutu were killed in massacres orchestrated by the Rwandan regime. At the same

time, as the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) moved to depose the government, a

million Hutu civilians streamed across the border to Zaire. They were accompanied by thousands

of government soldiers and militiamen, including members of the Interahamwe, a Hutu extremist

militia that played a central role in the genocide.[69] An aging Mobutu, who had supported the

Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) against the RPF, welcomed the former Rwandan officials with

open arms. In refugee camps in North and South Kivu, the ex-FAR reorganized and carried out

raids in Rwanda for the next two years. To the chagrin of Kigali, the international community

failed to break the control of ex-FAR over these camps.[70] In October 2006, the First Congo War

erupted when the Rwandan army invaded the DRC to solve the problem on its own.[71] Finding

[67] Stearns, Jason. *North Kivu: The Background to the Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 24-28.
[68] Fahey, Dan. *Ituri: Gold, land, and ethnicity in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 17-28.
[69] Stearns, Jason. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa.* New York: PublicAffairs, 27 March 2012. Print, pg. 14-15.
[70] Stearns, Jason. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa.* New York: PublicAffairs, 27 March 2012. Print, pg. 26-30.
[71] Stearns, Jason. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa.* New York: PublicAffairs, 27 March 2012. Print, pg. 41-44.

the Zairian state in total decay, Rwanda formed an alliance with Uganda, Angola, Burundi, and the Congolese rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila to overthrow the Mobutu regime. This coalition, called the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), marched through the streets of Kinshasa in triumph just six months later, in May 1997. Kabila then became president of the newly christened Democratic Republic of the Congo.[72]

The Second Congo War erupted shortly after the first ended, when President Kabila ordered Rwandan and Ugandan troops out of the country in August 1998. Rwanda and Uganda, unhappy with this loss of influence over the regime they had effectively brought into being, spearheaded the creation of a rebel movement called the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), made up largely of Congolese Tutsi.[73] Kinshasa, meanwhile, provided support to the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, a group composed of Interahamwe and ex-FAR that would become the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in 2001.[74] The war ultimately involved nine African states and over twenty rebel groups. In less than five years, it brought about the deaths of five million people, making it the deadliest single conflict since World War II.[75] Given the complexity of the conflict, only a brief outline can be sketched here. The rebel coalition made gains early on, but faced a stalemate after President Kabila convinced Angola, Chad, Libya, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe to support him.[76] In 1999, the RCD began to splinter as tensions mounted between Rwanda and Uganda and fighting continued across the

---

[72] Zapata, Mollie. "Congo: The First and Second Wars, 1996 to 2003." *Enoughproject.org*, 29 November 2011. Web. 13 May 2015.

[73] Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6 April 2011. Print, pg. 181-183.

[74] Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6 April 2011. Print, pg. 193-195.

[75] The Economist. "Chronicle of death ignored: Five million people have died in Congo in a war that no one really understands." *The Economist*, 28 April 2011. Web. 13 May 2015.

[76] Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6 April 2011. Print, pg. 181-192.

country with no clear winner.[77] Then, in 2001, a bodyguard assassinated Laurent-Desire Kabila and his son, Joseph Kabila, became president of the DRC.[78] This change, paired with defections from the RCD and friction between the Congolese Tutsi and Rwanda, helped to bring about a series of agreements in 2002 that ended the conflict on paper.[79] In July 2003, after Rwandan and Ugandan troops had withdrawn, the Transitional Government came into existence and the Congolese conflict entered a new phase.

All the episodes analyzed in the next section of this chapter take place in the aftermath of the Second Congo War, from 2003 to the present. Nine of ten – those in South Kivu, North Kivu, and Ituri – stem in part from the historical context outlined above. The fourth episode, an outlier in many respects, stems from the relocation of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from Uganda to northeastern Congo. This episode has its own history, described later on.

The five episodes in North Kivu and South Kivu involve rebel groups that served as Congolese and Rwandan proxies in the conflict, namely the FDLR and former members of RCD. Conflicts involving these actors stemmed from failures in the peace process, which did little to resolve the presence of FDLR in eastern Congo. These ex-FAR and Interahamwe had prompted Rwandan intervention in the first place, and their survival worried both Rwanda and the Congolese Tutsi.[80] The peace process failed to adequately address these concerns, leading Rwanda to continue the fight against FDLR through Congolese Tutsi proxies.

---

[77] Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6 April 2011. Print, pg. 240-242.
[78] Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6 April 2011. Print, pg. 249-255.
[79] Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6 April 2011. Print, pg. 249-255.
[80] Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6 April 2011. Print, pg. 309.

The four episodes in Ituri, meanwhile, took place both during and after the Ituri Conflict, a regional war within the Second Congo War. This "war within a war" had its roots in the conflict between Hema and Lendu described above. In 1999, the rebel group RCD-K/ML, the Ugandan-backed wing of the rebellion, controlled the Ituri province. In 2000, however, Hema officers mutinied because they perceived their leader to be pro-Lendu. These officers then formed the Union for Congolese Patriots (UPC) and named Thomas Lubanga their leader. Meanwhile, relations between Uganda and Rwanda deteriorated. RDC-K/ML and Uganda then switched sides to support the Congolese government and began to arm Lendu militias. In turn, UPC turned to Rwanda for military assistance, incorporated Hema militias, and allied with other proxies of Rwanda in eastern Congo. Thus, the Congolese government, Uganda, and Rwanda militarized and fueled the local conflict between Hema and Lendu.[81] One episode focuses on the end of this conflict, and three more involve its aftermath.

Of course, all ten episodes involve the UN peacekeeping mission deployed to grapple with the aftermath of the Second Congo War and the Ituri Conflict: the UN Organization Mission in the DRC, or MONUC. Later rebranded as the UN Organization *Stabilization* Mission in the DRC, or MONUSCO, this mission received the first physical protection mandate in the history of UN peacekeeping in 2000. The mandate allowed peacekeepers to "take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to […] protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."[82] The next section analyzes nine episodes in which MONUC and MONUSCO decided to exercise this mandate and use force beyond self-defense to protect civilians.

---

[81] Tamm, Henning. *UPC In Ituri: The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 15-30.
[82] United Nations. *Resolution 1291*. New York: Security Council, 24 February 2000, pg. 4.

The next section presents qualitative literature on the nine episodes introduced in the previous chapter. They are presented in chronological order for the sake of clarity, as every episode but one picks up where another left off. One series of episodes follows the aftermath of the Second Congo War in North and South Kivu; another traces the legacy of the Ituri Conflict. Each section introduces the rebels in question and traces the response of the Congolese army and MONUC or MONUSCO to their activities, with an emphasis on rebel violence against civilians. Of course, each episode also features the use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers. At the end of each section, the relationship between the use of force by UN peacekeepers (IV) and rebel violence against civilians (DV) is analyzed.

Episode 1: Ending the Ituri Conflict, 2003

MONUC did not play an important role early in the Ituri Conflict, as the peacekeeping mission had only 4,200 Blue Helmets total and almost no presence in Ituri at the end of 2002.[83] This changed in March 2003 after the Ugandan army recaptured the capital city of Bunia from UPC and took over most territory controlled by the rebel group. A ceasefire agreement followed that created an interim administration in Ituri, composed of various rebel groups. MONUC then deployed 800 Uruguayan troops to protect this administration, as well as UN facilities and the Bunia airfield. As stipulated in the agreement, Ugandan troops withdrew from Ituri in May.[84] However, UPC had refused to sign the ceasefire deal and, with Rwandan support, regrouped and recaptured Bunia a few days later.[85] While the Congolese government had deployed a police

---

[83] Mansson, Katarina. "Use of force and civilian protection: Peace operations in the Congo." *International Peacekeeping* 1.4 (2005): 503-519. Web. 2 May 2014, pg. 506.
[84] United Nations. *Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. New York: Security Council, 27 May 2003, pg. 4-5.
[85] Tamm, Henning. *UPC In Ituri: The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 38.

intervention force in Bunia, this unit disintegrated as violence began.[86] MONUC, meanwhile, did

not have the capacity to prevent the rebel takeover.[87] Smarting from this loss, the UN Security

Council authorized a temporary European Union (EU) force to improve the security situation in

Bunia and to protect civilians.[88] During this operation, MONUC increased its presence in Bunia

to 2,400 troops and continued to deploy peacekeepers in Ituri over the next few months.[89]

Blue Helmets used offensive force for the first time in the Democratic Republic of Congo

in Ituri, during and after the EU operation. From June to October 2003, UN troops carried out

operations against UPC and the National and Integrationist Front (FNI), a Lendu rebel group.

Simultaneously, European troops engaged both UPC and Lendu militias in offensive operations,

demanding that all rebel groups leave Bunia and forcibly removing those who failed to comply.[90]

These measures made Bunia unassailable and, in turn, rebel groups began to negotiate with the

Congolese government and MONUC. Moreover, the head of the MONUC office in Bunia used

this leverage to pressure Floribert Kisembo, UPC army chief of staff, to defect from the group,

which split into UPC-Lubanga and UPC-Kisembo. Finally, in May 2004, these splinter groups,

FNI, and other rebel groups signed a peace deal with the Congolese government and agreed to a

UN disarmament program.[91] Rebel violence against civilians declined a great deal after the UN

used offensive force and remained low for the following year.

---

[86] United Nations. *Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 27 May 2003, pg. 4.
[87] Ulriksen, Stale, et al. "Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?" *International Peacekeeping* 11.3 (2004): 508-525. Web. 2 May 2014, pg. 511.
[88] United Nations. *Resolution 1484.* New York: Security Council, 30 May 2003, pg. 2.
[89] Tamm, Henning. *UPC In Ituri: The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 38-39.
[90] Ulriksen, Stale, et al. "Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?" *International Peacekeeping* 11.3 (2004): 508-525. Web. 2 May 2014, pg. 517-519.
[91] Tamm, Henning. *UPC In Ituri: The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 38-41.

The use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers appears to have contributed to reduced rebel violence against civilians in this episode. As outlined above, offensive operations deterred rebel groups in Ituri from attacking Bunia, allowed MONUC to establish a presence in other areas of Ituri, and gave the MONUC commander in Bunia leverage to split the UPC in two. Following military defeats at the hands of Blue Helmets, rebel groups likely calculated that more armed resistance and attacks on civilians would yield little benefit. They then signed a peace deal and agreed to a disarmament program.

Of course, other factors likely contributed to this outcome. First, the number of UN troops in Ituri more than tripled at the time. This alone might have changed the calculus of rebel groups and decreased rebel violence. However, if peacekeepers had never defeated or killed rebels in combat, armed groups might not have perceived the MONUC forces as credible. Second, European Union forces also launched offensive operations against rebel groups and killed many militiamen. As these troops had past experience with combat in Africa, heavy weaponry, and air support,[92] one might argue that rebels responded to this force rather than MONUC. However, all EU troops left Ituri in September 2003 and rebel violence against civilians remained low for another year, indicating that the UN troops had an independent effect.

Episode 2: Taking Back Bukavu, 2004

In June 2004, General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Jules Mutebutsi rolled past both the Congolese army and MONUC to capture Bukavu, lakeside capital of the South Kivu province.[93] These mutineers, former commanders in the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) rebel group, led this rebellion in part because of their ethnic background: Congolese Tutsi. A history of

---

[92] Ulriksen, Stale, et al. "Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?" *International Peacekeeping* 11.3 (2004): 508-525. Web. 2 May 2014, pg. 517-519.
[93] Human Rights Watch. "D. R. Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu." 2004. Web. 12 December 2014, pg. 5.

discrimination against and persecution of Congolese Tutsi by "indigenous" Congolese, starting with the colonial legacy described in the opening section of this chapter, informed the decision of Nkunda and Mutebutsi to launch their takeover of Bukavu.

These defectors also responded to failures in the transition from the Second Congo War, which threatened to deprive them of physical and economic security. Nkunda and Mutebutsi feared that the RCD, now a political party, would lose influence in the transition and, in turn, feared for their lives. Although the peace agreement allowed the group to maintain control of North Kivu, upcoming elections threatened to deprive the RCD of political power, as many Congolese considered the rebels to be Rwandan stooges. Moreover, those who joined the national army rarely received a regular salary, meaning these commanders also feared for their economic security. Fearing persecution and seeing no future in the Congolese army, Nkunda and others defected in September 2003. According to many former officers, Rwanda influenced this decision. Two months later, General Nkunda created a political movement to spread the message that Kinshasa did not care about Congolese Tutsi. He also contacted Tutsi officers in the Masisi and Walikale territories to prepare for rebellion.[94]

From the perspective of Congolese Tutsi in the RCD, a worrying sequence of events triggered the brief rebellion of General Nkunda and Colonel Mutebutsi. First, in February 2004, a general loyal to the government arrested an RCD major in Bukavu who had been sentenced in absentia, alongside Colonel Mutebutsi, for the assassination of President Laurent-Desire Kabila. Mutebutsi, senior RCD commander of Bukavu, responded by ousting the government general.[95] Three months later, in May 2004, fighting broke out between the troops of Colonel Mutebutsi

---

[94] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 17-20.
[95] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 21.

and government troops, who responded with the summary execution of fifteen Tutsi in Bukavu.[96]

From Goma, the capital of North Kivu, General Nkunda then started an offensive to reinforce

Mutebutsi, despite threats from MONUC to use force with support from attack helicopters.[97]

Rwanda also condemned the execution and provided weapons to Nkunda.[98] On their way to

Bukavu the mutineers killed civilians in several villages, foreshadowing the atrocities to come.[99]

To counter this advance, MONUC doubled the number of peacekeepers in Bukavu to 1,000 and

created front lines. However, Congolese troops abandoned the peacekeepers and fled on June 1.

The very next day, Nkunda and Mutebutsi led over 2,000 troops into Bukavu and looted, raped,

and murdered indiscriminately as Blue Helmets looked on.[100]

Humiliated by the capture of Bukavu and with the peace process teetering on the brink,

the Congolese government and MONUC worked to rectify the situation. First, international

pressure on Rwanda and the RCD forced General Nkunda to retreat to North Kivu on June 6.

After a Congolese army offensive in November, he retreated to the Masisi highlands defeated.[101]

Colonel Mutebutsi, however, proved more obstinate and fought the Congolese army in Bukavu

on June 7 and June 8 before retreating south to Kamanyola, near the Rwandan border.[102] Later,

on June 20, a MONUC patrol close to Kamanyola came under fire from the soldiers of Colonel

Mutebutsi and mobilized attack helicopters in response, opening rocket fire and spurring the

[96] Stearns, Jason. *North Kivu: The Background to the Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 37.
[97] Cammaert, Patrick. "Learning to Use Force on the Hoof in Peacekeeping: Reflections on the Experience of MONUC's Eastern Division." *Institute for Security Studies* (2007): 2. Web. 12 Nov. 2014.
[98] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 21.
[99] Human Rights Watch. "D. R. Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu." 2004. Web. 12 December 2014, pg. 5.
[100] Walsh, Declan. "Rebel Troops Capture Bukavu and Threaten Third Congo War." *The Independent*. Independent Digital News and Media, 03 June 2004. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.
[101] Stearns, Jason. "Laurent Nkunda and the National Congress for the Defense of the People." *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs Annuaire* (2006-2007): 245-267. Web. 3 May 2015, pg. 248-249.
[102] Human Rights Watch. "D. R. Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu." 2004. Web. 12 December 2014, pg. 5.

rebels to flee toward the Rwandan border. The next day, the rebel commander crossed into Rwanda with his 300 troops.[103] Rwanda disarmed the mutineers, who never returned to DRC.[104] With Bukavu back under the government control, the Congolese army and MONUC made significant changes to their efforts in South Kivu and neighboring provinces. Kinshasa, for one, deployed more than 15,000 additional troops to the region.[105] MONUC, meanwhile, faced demonstrations and condemnation across the DRC for failing to use its Chapter VII mandate to defend Bukavu.[106] In response the Security Council passed Resolution 1565 to increase the troop ceiling to 16,700, establishing a headquarters to oversee tactical operations in the eastern Congo, and deploying additional brigades to North and South Kivu.[107]

The use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers appears to have contributed to reduced rebel violence against civilians in this episode. After Blue Helmets used offensive force against the troops of Colonel Mutebutsi near Kamanyola, the rebel commander decided to flee to Rwanda the next day. This reaction to peacekeepers signaled a change from just days before, when Mutebutsi and Nkunda felt secure taking Bukavu despite the presence of 1,000 UN troops. This newfound ability to credibly threaten the use of force likely increased the deterrent effect of extra peacekeepers as well. However, in this episode, the actions of MONUC cannot be the sole determinant of violence against civilians. After all, an offensive of the Congolese army drove Mutebutsi out of Bukavu and into the arms of the UN in the first place. Moreover, the Congolese army increased its presence in South Kivu alongside MONUC, making the effects of these two

---

[103] United Nations. *Third special report to the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. New York: Security Council, 16 August 2004, pg. 9-11.
[104] Carroll, Rory. "New warlord opens Congo's old wounds." *The Guardian*, July 10 2004. Web.
[105] United Nations. *Third special report to the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. New York: Security Council, 16 August 2004, pg. 11.
[106] United Nations. *Third special report to the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. New York: Security Council, 16 August 2004, pg. 8-10.
[107] Terrie, Jim. "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC." *African Security Review* 18.1 (2009): 22-23. Web. 5 Nov. 2014.

troop increases inseparable. Nonetheless, UN troops do seem to have prompted the exit of Colonel Mutebutsi into Rwanda. While not the largest factor, the use of force by the UN did contribute to reduced rebel violence against civilians in this episode.

Episode 3: A Full Court Press, 2005

Offensive operations by MONUC and European Union troops helped to stabilize the situation in Ituri for most of 2004, as presented in Episode 1. As the Congolese government and the UN pressured rebel groups to disarm and demobilize in the next few months, some assented. For example, the Union of Congolese Patriots-Kisembo faction (UPC-K) joined the Congolese military in early 2005.[108] However, many groups refused to participate in the process and continued to operate in Ituri. The National and Integrationist Front (FNI), for instance, relocated after the arrival of European troops in Bunia, allied with other rebel group, and profited from gold mining to purchase weapons.[109] In September 2004, the security situation deteriorated sharply. UPC-Lubanga faction (UPC-L), for one, resisted disarmament attempts by MONUC and the Congolese army to ensure access to customs revenue along the Ugandan border. Meanwhile, fighting broke out between UPC-L and FNI and sparked reprisal attacks on civilians. [110] In addition, the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI) attacked the village of Lengabu, killing fourteen civilians. Although the Congolese government deployed three Belgian-training battalions to stabilize the situation, sporadic pay and a lack of equipment and logistical support limited their capacity.[111]

---

[108] Tamm, Henning. *UPC In Ituri: The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 41.
[109] Tamm, Henning. *FNI and FRPI: Local resistance and regional alliances in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 16 July 2013. Web. 05 May 2015, pg. 31.
[110] United Nations. *Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 15 March 2005, pg. 3-4.
[111] United Nations. *Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 31 December 2004, pg. 3-4.

MONUC responded to this situation with the offensive use of force. In February 2005, when FNI killed nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers on patrol, the peacekeeping mission sent reinforcements to pursue the militiamen. In the largest battle for Blue Helmets since Somalia, featuring attack helicopters and lasting four hours, UN troops killed over fifty rebel combatants. MONUC then shifted from reactive to preventative operations in Ituri, deploying near civilian populations under threat.[112] Over the next few months, peacekeepers used offensive force against rebel groups and launched operations to dismantle their camps and arrest combatants.[113] In May, Blue Helmets expelled UPC-L from its stronghold in Katoto, improving security in the area. [114] Besides the use of force, MONUC called on militias to disarm. The Special Representative for the Secretary-General set a deadline for disarmament and, moreover, the Chief of Staff added: "If you do not surrender your arms […] you will be treated like armed bandits and war criminals and we will chase you." [115] Additionally, the UN pushed for the government to arrest rebel leaders. Kinshasa followed through and arrested the heads of both FNI and UPC-L.[116] Together, these activities constituted a full-court press on the part of MONUC.

The full-court press proved a winning strategy. By August 2005, FNI had transitioned from rebel group to political party and UPC-L had ceased to exist. The number of combatants in the disarmament program increased dramatically to 15,000 and only some 1,200 militiamen and

---

[112] Terrie, Jim. "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC." *African Security Review* 18.1 (2009): 22-23, pg. 23. Web. 5 Nov. 2014.
[113] United Nations. *Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 15 March 2005, pg. 3-4.
[114] United Nations. *Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 2 August 2005, pg. 5.
[115] Terrie, Jim. "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC." *African Security Review* 18.1 (2009): 22-23, pg. 23. Web. 5 Nov. 2014.
[116] Tamm, Henning. *UPC In Ituri: The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 42.

fifty or so rebel leaders remained in Ituri.[117] Most important, rebel violence against civilians

declined sharply and remained at low levels.[118] Increased pressure by MONUC did elicit a

reaction, though, as the leader of FNI leveraged his connections in prison to create an alliance

amongst rebels, called the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC).[119] Moreover, conflict

dynamics shifted as militias focused less on fighting each other and more on targeting UN and

Congolese troops.[120] Accordingly, attacks on the MONUC Ituri brigade increased.[121] However,

this trend did not lead to more violence against civilians and did not prevent the Congolese

government and MONUC from stabilizing the region. In November 2005, operations in Djugu

and Irumu prompted over 1,000 MRC fighters to surrender and enter the disarmament process.[122]

This victory ushered in a period of relative peace and stability in Ituri.

The use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers appears to have contributed to

reduced rebel violence against civilians in this episode. When MONUC used offensive force

against various rebel groups, numerous militia leaders and combatants from FNI, UPC-L, and

others made the decision to demobilize and disarm rather than continue fighting. The leaders of

MONUC explicitly threatened to use force beyond self-defense if a rebel group did not

demobilize, changing the calculus of rebel leaders. Other factors, like the arrests made by the

Congolese government, may have contributed as well. However, arrests alone would not likely

---

[117] United Nations. *Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 2 August 2005, pg. 5.
[118] See the relevant graph in Chapter 2.
[119] Tamm, Henning. *UPC In Ituri: The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015, pg. 42-44.
[120] Cammaert, Patrick. "Learning to Use Force on the Hoof in Peacekeeping: Reflections on the Experience of MONUC's Eastern Division." *Institute for Security Studies* (2007): 2-17, pg. 6. Web. 12 Nov. 2014.
[121] United Nations. *Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 31 December 2004, pg. 3-4.
[122] United Nations. *Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 28 December 2005, pg. 6.

have spurred 15,000 militiamen to lay down their arms. The Congolese army, meanwhile, appears to have made little contribution to reduced violence against civilians until the operations against MRC in late 2005, after most rebel groups had already disarmed. Overall, the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers seems to have played a prominent role, arguably the most important role, in reducing rebel violence against civilians.

Episode 4: Thugs Without Borders, 2006[*]

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group founded in 1986 in northern Uganda, fought to overthrow the government in Kampala over the next two decades. In this time, the LRA displaced over two million people, abducted children to work as soldiers and sex slaves, hacked off limbs, and killed thousands of civilians.[123] The government of Sudan, embroiled in a civil war at the time, provided support to the LRA. In response, the government of Uganda supported the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) rebel movement that opposed the Sudanese government in the south.[124] In 2005, however, the Sudan and the SPLA/M signed a peace agreement and Sudanese support for the LRA subsequently declined. Under increasing pressure from Ugandan and southern Sudanese troops, LRA leader Joseph Kony ordered his rebel group to withdraw from Uganda across the border to the DRC, Central African Republic, and southern Sudan (South Sudan as of 2011).[125] MONUC responded to reports in September 2005 of LRA activity in Haut-Uele, the remote district to the north of Ituri in the

---

[*] I did not come up with this brilliant heading myself, sadly. Pulled straight out of Gerard Prunier's *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* All other section headings are my own creations.
[123] Rice, Xan. "Background: The Lord's Resistance Army." *The Guardian*, 20 October 2007. Web. 08 May 2015.
[124] Allen, Tim, and Koen Vlassenroot. *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality.* London, UK: Zed Books, 2010. Web. 09 May 2015, pg. 205.
[125] U.S. Department of State. "The Lord's Resistance Army." *State.gov*, 23 March 2012. Web. 08 May 2015.

Orientale province, by airlifting hundreds of Congolese troops and deploying a MONUC company to the border with Sudan.[126]

In January 2006, after receiving reports that the LRA deputy leader Vincent Otti had relocated to Garamba National Park in the Haut-Uele territory of the DRC, MONUC sent its Guatemalan Special Forces unit to the park.[127] Their mission was to kill or capture Otti and evict the rebels.[128] On January 23, the Blue Helmets came under heavy fire from the LRA, resulting in a four hour firefight. The UN suffered eight fatalities and five casualties.[129] Although the Guatemalan troops managed to kill fifteen LRA rebels, they ultimately did not succeed in their mission of finding Otti or evicting the rebels.[130] Despite anti-LRA operations by the Congolese army in the fall of 2006 and additional joint operations with the Ugandan military later on, the rebel group remained in Haut-Uele for several more years.

In this episode, the relationship between the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers and rebel violence against civilians appears unclear. This stems mostly from the fact that the LRA does not seem to have attacked civilians before or after the offensive use of force, as neither dataset shows any violence against civilians in DRC in this two year time period. Qualitative accounts confirm this lack of attacks.[131] The question then becomes a counterfactual: would the LRA have started to carry out violence against civilians had MONUC not used force? Not enough information is available on the motivations of the LRA to answer that question.

---

[126] United Nations. *Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 28 December 2005, pg. 6.

[127] United Nations. *Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 13 June 2006, pg. 8.

[128] Lewis, David. "Guatemalan blue helmet deaths stir Congo debate." *Reuters*, 31 January 2006. Web. 08 May 2015.

[129] United Nations. *Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 13 June 2006, pg. 8.

[130] Lewis, David. "Guatemalan blue helmet deaths stir Congo debate." *Reuters*, 31 January 2006. Web. 08 May 2015.

[131] The Enough Project. "The LRA in Congo, CAR, and South Sudan." *Enoughproject.org*. Web. 08 May 2015.

Perhaps the group preferred to keep quiet in DRC and use Haut-Uele as a launching pad for attacks on civilians in Sudan, which occurred often from 2005 to 2007. Or, perhaps the rebel group did not attack civilians as it acclimated to Haut-Uele and then decided to continue this pattern because MONUC used force. It is impossible to tell. Moreover, peace talks between the LRA and the Ugandan government began in May 2006 in Haut-Uele under the auspices of the Government of South Sudan.[132] A desire to prolong talks might also explain the lack of attacks against civilians in the DRC. For these reasons, this episode does not demonstrate a clear relationship between the offensive use of force and rebel violence against civilians.

Episode 5: The Return of Laurent Nkunda, 2006

After his ouster from Bukavu, detailed in Episode 2, General Laurent Nkunda retreated to the Masisi highlands to rebuild his movement. In late 2005, with support from Rwanda, he began recruiting for a rebellion that aimed to overthrow the Congolese government, protect Congolese Tutsi from persecution, defeat the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), and secure the return of Tutsi refugees in Rwanda. Several thousand soldiers from the Masisi and Walikale territories joined him and, together with Tutsi recruits from refugee camps, these defectors took over the Masisi highlands. Finally, in July 2006, Nkunda merged his political and military organizations to form the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). Inspired by the example of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), CNDP became the most powerful, organized, and structurally sophisticated rebel group in the DRC. It operated a radio station and websites, included a public relations team to issue press statements, engaged the local population with rallies, and offered management courses for senior officers at its military camps.

---

[132] Allen, Tim, and Koen Vlassenroot. *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality.* London, UK: Zed Books, 2010. Web. 09 May 2015, pg. 205.

Moreover, the group immersed fighters in a coherent ideology and set up grassroots efforts to spread this ideology and attract both recruits and funding in the DRC, Canada, South Africa, and Belgium. CNDP even extracted taxes and, in return, established a police force to provide security, paid school and health fees for poor families, and organized road construction.[133]

National elections in August 2006, the first since Congolese independence from Belgium, fueled fears of persecution on the part of General Nkunda and the CNDP. President Kabila and his coalition garnered eighty percent of the vote in areas under CNDP control and, moreover, not one Congolese Tutsi won office in the North Kivu provincial assembly or the national assembly. Three months later, when policemen in Sake shot a Tutsi businessman, CNDP leapt into action. Labelling the incident a deliberate killing, the group launched a military offensive the next day, taking Sake after the Congolese army crumbled and moving toward Goma, the provincial capital. Given this rapid advance, the operation had likely been planned beforehand.[134]

Following the failure of the Congolese army, MONUC used force beyond self-defense to halt the CNDP advance and recapture Sake. On November 24, the day that Nkunda took Sake, UN troops defended Goma and gunned down 150 rebels between Sake and Goma using armored vehicles and attack helicopters.[135] Two days later, MONUC launching an offensive operation to retake Sake that killed anywhere from 200 and 400 of Nkunda's troops.[136] This attack pushed CNDP into the hills east of Sake and allowed the Congolese army to regain control of the

[133] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 22-26.
[134] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 29.
[135] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 29.
[136] International Crisis Group. "Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu." *Crisisgroup.org*, 31 Oct. 2007, pg. 8. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.

town.[137] Their defeat forced CNDP to the negotiating table. The subsequent deal, signed in

Kigali, required the integration of the rebel into the national army but allowed Nkunda and his

troops to remain in North Kivu. The first priority of these "integrated" units would be defeating

FDLR. However, General Nkunda managed to keep his units intact at the battalion level and

simply acquired money and equipment to improve the CNDP. The campaign against FDLR, in

turn, heralded the end of this integration as CNDP abused Hutu civilians living alongside FDLR.

Fighting broke out between the Congolese army and CNDP and, at the same time, rebel groups

like the Alliance of Resistant Congolese Patriots (PARECO) emerged as officers and politicians

tired of the inability of the Congolese government to protect civilians. In December 2007,

Kinshasa launched a 20,000 troop offensive against CNDP with the help of FDLR, PARECO,

and other militias, but CNDP routed this coalition at the battle of Mushaki.[138]

The use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers did not contribute to reduced

rebel violence against civilians in this episode. Although the offensive use of force did protect

Goma, recapture Sake, and force CNDP to negotiate, violence against civilians did not decline in

the following year. This can be attributed to several factors. First, CNDP retained a significant

operational advantage over the Congolese military even after its defeat by MONUC. This

allowed the rebel group, nominally part of the national army, to continue its attacks on civilians.

Second, FDLR carried out the most violence against civilians before the offensive use of force.

Not only did UN peacekeepers not target this rebel group, but the Congolese army began

collaborating with FLDR and several other rebel groups to defeat CNDP. UN troops could

hardly threaten these groups with the use of force beyond self-defense while they allied with the

---

[137] Gangale, R. 2006. "Fighting Continues in Congo for 4th Day." *The Associated Press*, November 28. Web. 12 December 2014.
[138] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 29-31.

Congolese government. Finally, even after deploying thousands more troops, the Congolese military failed to defeat the highly sophisticated CNDP.

Episode 6: Remnants of Militias Past, 2009

Following the offensive operations by MONUC detailed in Episode 3, the Ituri peace process concluded in late 2007 when Cobra Matata of the Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force (FRPI) joined the national army. With his integration, most rebel groups in Ituri had disarmed and demobilized, transitioned into political parties, or been defeated. However, a few holdouts from each rebel group remained in the bush. After Matata and the FRPI leadership left for Kinshasa, the rank and file were joined by remnants of the Front of Integrationist Nationalists (FNI), the Union for Congolese Patriots (UPC), and other groups in the remote Tsey forest, south of Bunia. In September 2008, they formed the Popular Front for Justice in the Congo (FPJC) and named Charif Manda, former commander of FNI and the Congolese Revolutionary Movement (MRC), their leader. The rebel group comprised only 200 combatants, though, and so posed little threat outside the Irumu territory of Ituri.[139]

Despite its small size, FPJC managed to wreak havoc in Ituri and displaced some 60,000 people from 2008 to 2010.[140] The violence began in October 2008, when the rebel group attacked two villages to the southwest of Bunia, capturing positions held by the Congolese military and looting hospitals, stores, and houses. Rebels then moved toward another village but retreated when they met MONUC peacekeepers along the way.[141] Another wave of violence

---

[139] Tamm, Henning. *FNI and FRPI: Local resistance and regional alliances in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 16 July 2013. Web. 05 May 2015, pg. 38-39.

[140] Tamm, Henning. *FNI and FRPI: Local resistance and regional alliances in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 16 July 2013. Web. 05 May 2015, pg. 39.

[141] UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. "DR Congo/Ituri: MONUC stops FPJC advance towards Marabo." *Reliefweb.com*, 17 October 2008. Web. 10 May 2015.

occurred in spring of 2009, when FPJC attacked villages to the south of Bunia where the Congolese army had no presence.[142] On July 22, heavily armed rebel troops encircled six more villages with no Congolese army presence.[143] In response, MONUC used force beyond self-defense and launched an offensive against FPJC, pushing the rebels back into the Tsey forest.[144] In the next few days, the Congolese army deployed additional soldiers in the area and retook several villages, killing several militiamen.[145] These efforts failed to stop FPJC from attacking civilians, however, as the rebel group continued to capture Congolese army positions and attack villages with no army presence in 2009 and 2010. During this time, FPJC rejected multiple offers from the government in Ituri to begin peace talks.[146] Only in May 2010 did the Congolese military make progress, killing ninety-eight rebels and destroying rebel bases in Operation Safisha.[147] After this defeat most of the FPJC leadership was arrested in Uganda, bringing its activities to an end.[148]

The use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers did not contribute to reduced rebel violence against civilians in this episode. Although the offensive use of force did protect villages from FPJC and force the rebel group into the forest, violence against civilians did not decline in the following year. While information on this conflict is limited, this pattern might be attributed to several factors. First, the Congolese army did not have the capacity to protect all

Radio Okapi. "Ituri: la milice FPJC s'affronte aux FARDC à Bulanzabo." *Radiookapi.net*, 17 October 2008. Web. 10 May 2015.

[142] Radio Okapi. "Irumu : nouvelle incursion des miliciens du FPJC, 3 morts et 5 femmes violées." *Radiookapi.net*, 21 April 2009. Web. 10 May 2015.

[143] Radio Okapi. "Bunia : les miliciens de FPJC encerclent plusieurs villages de Walendu Bindi." *Radiookapi.net*, 22 July 2009. Web. 10 May 2015.

[144] IRIN News. "DRC: Hoping for peace in Ituri." *Irinnews.org*, 10 February 2009. Web. 12 December 2014.

[145] Radio Okapi. "Bunia : les FARDC conquièrent 3 nouveaux villages, 12 miliciens FPJC tues." *Radiookapi.net*, 28 July 2009. Web. 10 May 2015.

[146] See http://radiookapi.net/tag/fpjc/ for articles highlighting the activities of FPJC.

[147] Radio Okapi. "Ituri : opération « Safisha », 98 miliciens du FPJC et 2 soldats des FARDC tués." *Radiookapi.net*, 20 August 2010. Web. 10 May 2015.

[148] Radio Okapi. "Bunia : le leader du FPJC, Sharif Manda aux arrêts." *Radiookapi.net*, 4 September 2010. Web. 10 May 2015.

villages or even villages under its control from FPJC. Second, the rebel group operated in a remote and forested region and had only 200 fighters, who may therefore have been difficult to track and defend against. Third, as FPJC was composed of remnants of other rebel groups who had already refused to disarm and demobilize, this rebel group might have been particularly difficult to deter, even in conjunction with the offensive use of force.

Episode 7: Strange Bedfellows, 2008-2012

In early 2009, the dynamics of the conflict in North Kivu changed in a dramatic way. Since the creation of the CNDP rebel group, detailed in Episode 5, General Laurent Nkunda had led the Rwandan proxy in a battle against the Congolese army and the FDLR, a proxy of Kinshasa that contained remnants of the former Rwandan army and Interahamwe. However, after a ceasefire in January 2009, both Kinshasa and Kigali changed tactics. Kinshasa, on the one hand, had seen little military success in the last few years and hoped to cut out Nkunda and integrate CNDP into the Congolese army. Kigali, meanwhile, had come under pressure for its support of CNDP and thought General Nkunda had gotten full of himself. The two sides cut a deal and, in January 2009, Bosco Ntaganda announced the removal of Nkunda from CNDP. He then appeared in Goma, next to the Rwandan Defense Minister and Congolese Interior Minister, and announced that CNDP would join the Congolese army to fight FDLR. Meanwhile, Nkunda was invited to Rwanda and arrested by the government. On January 20 2009, Rwanda and the DRC launched a joint offensive, called Umoja Wetu ('Our Unity'), against FDLR.[149] With the

---

[149] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 32-35.

arrival of four thousand Rwandan troops, the armies dislodged FDLR from strongholds in the

North Kivu. The operation ended just over a month later.[150]

MONUC did not play a role in Umoja Wetu, but stepped in once the Rwandan military

withdrew from North Kivu and operations against FDLR continued. On March 2 2009, the

Congolese army launched operation Kimia II with the support of MONUC, to retain control of

the locations from which FDLR had been dislodged.[151] This support sometimes consisted of little

more than logistical help, including helicopter lifts, medical evacuations, and ration deliveries.

These actions do not qualify as the use of force beyond self-defense. At other times, however,

MONUC provided artillery support or even carried out offensive operations on its own, both of

which count as the offensive use of force.[152] The nine-month operation managed to retain control

of the territory gained in Umoja Wetu and also eliminated FDLR units in Virunga national park.

It disrupted rebel command and control, logistics, and administrative structures.[153] By the end of

the offensive, the number of fighters in FDLR had declined from 6,000 to 3,000 as rebels

deserted and disarmed.[154] In terms of military goals, Kimia II largely succeeded.

However, the operation failed to protect civilians. In response to Congolese army gains,

FDLR carried out many reprisal attacks against civilians, including looting and pillaging, sexual

violence, and mass killings.[155] ACLED data confirm that rebel violence against civilians did in

---

[150] United Nations. *Twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 27 March 2009, pg. 3.
[151] United Nations. *Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 June 2009, pg. 1-2.
[152] United Nations. *Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 4 December 2009, pg. 2.
[153] United Nations. *Twenty-ninth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 18 September 2009, pg. 2.
[154] United Nations. *Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 March 2010, pg. 2.
[155] United Nations. *Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 June 2009, pg. 1-2.

fact increase during this operation, relative to the level of violence before joint Rwanda-DRC

operations against FDLR began. However, rebel violence against civilians was similarly high

during Umoja Wetu earlier in the year. Moreover, undisciplined and newly integrated Congolese

army units also killed civilians, leading MONUC to suspend logistical support for one unit on

November 1 and outline the conditions under which its could provide logistical support.

However, monitoring conduct on the ground and securing the removal of certain officers proved

difficult.[156] The abject failure of the integration process compounded this problem. CNDP

maintained a parallel chain of command during the operation and profited from control over

several mining areas.[157] CNDP troops, technically part of the Congolese army, perpetrated much

of the rebel violence against civilians in 2009.

Yet another operation, titled Amani Leo ('Peace Today'), began in February 2010 and

continued for more than two years. Again, the Congolese army and MONUC, rebranded as

MONUSCO in July 2010, carried out joint operations against FDLR with the peacekeeping force

providing logistical and artillery support and, on occasion, using offensive force on its own.[158]

However, this time FDLR reoccupied territory captured by the Congolese army across North

Kivu and recruited new members.[159] The FDLR leadership had remained largely intact, and the

rebel group established a presence in the Maniema and Katanga provinces. Kinshasa, meanwhile,

had difficulty holding onto territory.[160] This likely stemmed from the relative sophistication of

---

[156] United Nations. *Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 4 December 2009, pg. 1.
[157] United Nations. *Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 4 December 2009, pg. 4.
[158] United Nations. *Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 March 2010, pg. 2.
[159] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 8 October 2010, pg. 3.
[160] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 17 January 2011, pg. 3.

the Hutu rebels. Led by former Rwandan military and government officials, the group constituted a small conventional army with ranks, paperwork, and leaves of absence.[161] FDLR also had educated leaders with ties to European countries. For example, Ignace Murwanashyaka, leader of the group, lived in Germany before the Rwandan genocide and was arrested there in November 2009.[162] Losses also stemmed in part from the regimentation process, which sought to consolidate Congolese army units into regiments in February 2011. This meant withdrawing troops from the front lines, allowing FDLR to advance.[163]

Rebel violence against civilians varied greatly over the course of operation Amani Leo. In the first phase, from February to June 2010, rebel violence against civilians remained at a lower level than anytime during the two previous operations. This might stem from the lessened territorial control, troop numbers, and command and control structures of FDLR during operation Umoja Wetu. Reprisal attacks against civilians may also have decreased because the rebels did not lose as much territory to the Congolese army. In July 2010, however, rebel violence against civilians increased for a short period of time as FDLR regained territory and recruited new members.[164] Then, in September and December 2010, MONUSCO launched three consecutive and unilateral offensive operations in the Walikale and Masisi territories.[165] Perhaps because of these efforts, rebel violence against civilians dropped again until the reintegration process began in early 2011. This period, also characterized by fewer joint operations between the Congolese military and MONUSCO, featured high numbers of attacks on civilians.

---

[161] Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6 April 2011. Print, pg. 309.

[162] BBC News. "Germany arrests top Rwanda rebels." *News.bbc.co.uk*, 17 November 2009. Web. 14 May 2015.

[163] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 39.

[164] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 8 October 2010, pg. 3.

[165] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 17 January 2011, pg. 2.

In this episode, the relationship between the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers and rebel violence against civilians appears unclear. As MONUC and MONUSCO used force beyond self-defense almost continuously for three years, the before-and-after approach used in the other episodes proves unhelpful here. However, it does not appear that the use of force, by UN peacekeepers in particular, led to an overall increase in rebel violence against civilians. Attacks did not increase when the joint DRC-Rwanda operation turned into a joint DRC-UN operation, decreased as artillery support and unilateral offensives by Blue Helmets continued, fell following especially large operations by MONUSCO, and finally increased as UN support for the Congolese army fell. These correlations rule out the possibility that the use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers increased the number of rebel attacks. (The possibility that support from MONUC and MONUSCO facilitated more *government* attacks on civilians is a separate question, not treated in this thesis.) The relationship between the use of force by the Congolese army and rebel violence against civilians appears clearer. Although initial advances sparked reprisal attacks on civilians, such violence fell as the FDLR lost territory and troops. When the Congolese army withdrew for regimentation, attacks on civilians increased sharply. These trends suggest that the offensive use of force reduced rebel violence against civilians in the long-term, despite short-term increases in reprisals. However, the inability of the Congolese army to maintain control of territory mitigated any initial gains.

Episode 8: Enter the Force Intervention Brigade, 2013

Three years of inertia in the military campaign against FDLR, as detailed in Episode 7, sparked the most recent chapter of Congolese Tutsi rebellion in eastern Congo. In May 2012, former members of CNDP defected from the national army and announced the March 23 (M23) movement, named after the date of the agreement that integrated CNDP into the Congolese army

three years earlier.[166] Since that day, little to no integration had taken place. CNDP maintained a parallel chain of command during the operations against FDLR and profited from control over several mining areas.[167] Its soldiers rejected Congolese army identity cards, which supposedly did not reflect their new ranks, and refused to redeploy to other provinces. CNDP elements of the Congolese army carried out human rights abuses, especially against Hutu, including sexual violence.[168] In February 2011, when the army began the regimentation process to remove parallel chains of command, CNDP chief Bosco Ntaganda co-opted the process and named his allies to important positions.[169] However, Kinshasa continued its efforts to dismantle the rebel group, offering money to commanders and Rwandan officials alike to buy loyalty and incentivize redeployment to other provinces. Meanwhile, the international community pushed for the arrest and transfer of Ntaganda to the International Criminal Court.[170] Under pressure, several hundred former members CNDP defected from the army in May 2012 to form the M23, complaining that no progress had been made against FDLR.

The founding members of M23 left the Congolese army with only the weapons they could carry on their backs, meaning that the group lacked equipment early on. Rwanda, which had covertly supported the mutiny for over a year, filled this gap with weapons, medical care, and even Rwandan soldiers. After capturing the town of Rutshuru in June 2012, M23 leaders drew from their experience in CNDP years earlier and trained up to 1,500 new soldiers, named

---

[166] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 44.

[167] United Nations. *Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 4 December 2009, pg. 4.

[168] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 12 May 2011, pg. 3-4.

[169] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 39.

[170] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 41-42.

local political chiefs, created two websites, and began collecting taxes.[171] With this newfound

capacity, M23 went on to deal the Congolese government and MONUSCO a humiliating blow.

In November 2012 the rebels captured Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu. As in Bukavu

nine years earlier, Congolese troops vanished as M23 advanced and MONUSCO troops watched

idly as rebels entered the city and began attacking civilians and pillaging.[172] Once again, the

citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the international community heaped blame

on the peacekeeping mission for not exercising its Chapter VII mandate.

MONUSCO responded to this disaster with unprecedented reform. The Security Council,

in March 2013, voted unanimously to increase the size of the peacekeeping mission and to create

a body unique in the seventy-year history of peacekeeping: the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB).

For the first time, the UNSC explicitly authorized this piece of MONUSCO to "carry out

targeted offensive operations […] either unilaterally or jointly with [the Congolese armed forces]

to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them."[173]

The resolution also laid out a unique structure for the FIB, which would be comprised of three

infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and one Special Forces and Reconnaissance Company,

under direct command of the UN Force Commander.[174] South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania

together contributed more than 3,000 troops to the FIB.[175]

In late October 2013, the FIB and the Congolese army launched a devastating offensive

against the M23 in North Kivu. South African peacekeepers in the FIB used their advanced

---

[171] Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015, pg. 45-46.
[172] Plett, Barbara. "UN under Fire over Fall of Goma in DR Congo." *BBC News*. N.p., 21 Nov. 2012. Web. 17 Nov. 2014.
[173] United Nations. *Resolution 2098.* New York: Security Council, 28 March 2013, pg. 6.
[174] United Nations. *Resolution 2098.* New York: Security Council, 28 March 2013, pg. 6.
[175] Cammaert, Patrick, and Fiona Blyth. "The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." International Peace Institute. *Ipinst.org*, pg. 6. Web. 21 May 2015.

attack helicopters to help Congolese troops retake the highlands from M23. At the same time, under pressure from the U.S. and facing negative press coverage, Rwanda withdrew its support from the M23 rebellion. The very next week, M23 disbanded and its leaders escaped to Uganda and Rwanda. For the first time since the end of the Second Congo War, Kinshasa defeated a sophisticated rebel group and Rwanda had no proxy in eastern Congo.[176] MONUSCO also called on other groups to step forward and disarm, or face the consequences. More than 1,500 members of M23 and another 1,000 combatants from allied rebel groups joined the disarmament process in the wake of this offensive.[177] Moreover, violence against civilians by M23 dropped to zero and rebel violence against civilians decreased for several months.

Unfortunately, as is often the case in the eastern Congo, yet another rebel group stepped in to fill the power vacuum left by M23. The Allied Democratic Forces – National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU) captured a town in the Beni territory in December 2013.[178] Formed in 1996 by disaffected Ugandan Muslim groups, former soldiers of Idi Amin, and others, ADF-NALU supposedly aimed to create an Islamic state in Uganda. Over time, however, the group became integrated into the economy and society of North Kivu and shifted from majority Ugandan to majority Congolese.[179] With between 1,200 and 1,500 fighters and outside support from unidentified Islamic organizations, the rebel group is highly organized relative to others.[180] With air support from the FIB, the Congolese army recaptured the territory in Bunia in late 2013

[176] Stearns, Jason. "Congo's Sudden Calm: A Break in Rwandan Meddling and the Defeat of the M23 Rebels." *Foreign Affairs*, 11 November 2013. Web. 15 May 2015.
[177] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 17 December 2013, pg. 5
[178] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 5 March 2014, pg. 5
[179] Scorgie, Lindsay. "The Allied Democratic Forces: Moving beyond popular narratives." *Aljazeera.com*, 17 July 2013. Web. 15 May 2015.
[180] Mueller, Timo. "Understanding Eastern Congo's ADF-NALU Rebels." *Enoughproject.org*, 29 January 2014. Web. 15 May 2015.

and violence against civilians perpetrated by ADF-NALU decreased for several months.[181] However, despite further offensives by the Congolese army, ADF-NALU contributed to a sharp increase in rebel violence against civilians in late 2014.[182]

The use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers appears to have contributed to reduced rebel violence against civilians in this episode. Once paired with the MONUSCO FIB, the Congolese military that had dissolved as the rebels advanced on Goma only months earlier actually managed to defeat the well-armed and well-organized M23 on the battlefield. Of course, the end of Rwandan support also played a necessary role, given the importance of Rwandan backing to the strength of the rebellion. However, had the FIB not assisted the Congolese troops, they might well have failed to defeat M23 despite the lack of Rwandan assistance. Moreover, the presence of the FIB and the commitment signaled by its capacity and its mandate may have helped to change the calculus of the Rwandan regime. After the end of M23, MONUSCO threatened to use offensive forces against those who failed to disarm and persuaded over 1,000 combatants to lay down their weapons. In turn, rebel violence against civilians dropped for a few months. With ADF-NALU soon after, the FIB paired with the Congolese army managed to defeat the rebel group and reduce violence against civilians for a few months. The subsequent failure to deal with ADF-NALU, meanwhile, might well tem from the fact that the Congolese army has engaged the group without assistance from the FIB. Given the relative size and organization of this group, Congolese troops might lack the capacity to handle the situation on their own. In this episode, then, the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers appears to have played a substantial role in reducing rebel violence against civilians.

---

[181] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 5 March 2014, pg. 5
[182] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 December 2014, pg. 5.

Episode 9: The Return of Cobra Matata, 2014

While the Congolese military evicted the Popular Front for Justice in the Congo (FPJC) from Ituri in mid-2010, as detailed in Episode 6, the province continued to suffer from violence. After the dissolution of FPJC, former members of the Ituri Patriotic Resistance Front (FRPI) remained in the remote Tsey forest area. These Lendu rebels had lost their leader Cobra Matata in late 2007, when he and others joined the Congolese army.[183] However, the rebel group had sprung from decentralized militias in the Irumu territory, which surrounds the Tsey forest, and so continued to operate without a commander.[184] In June 2010, the group received an unexpected boost when Cobra defected from the Congolese army, citing insufficient rank, infrequent pay, and poor housing in Kinshasa, and returned to southern Ituri to rejoin and lead the FRPI rebels. In 2011, the group had only 100 fighters and remained in the forest, conducting hit-and-run operations and evading the Congolese army. Then, in February 2012, government soldiers in Ituri defected and joined FRPI, more than doubling its size. The army withdrew to accelerate the regimentation process, allowing the rebels to take hold of the Walendu Bindi area.[185]

Almost immediately, Cobra Matata began negotiating with the army on reintegration, demanding that FRPI remain based in Ituri. The rank and file, meanwhile, lived in camps and received food and money from the government as they awaited integration.[186] In October 2012, however, Cobra added new conditions, demanding the departure of the Congolese army colonel

---

[183] Tamm, Henning. *FNI and FRPI: Local resistance and regional alliances in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 16 July 2013. Web. 05 May 2015, pg. 38.

[184] Tamm, Henning. *FNI and FRPI: Local resistance and regional alliances in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 16 July 2013. Web. 05 May 2015, pg. 12.

[185] Tamm, Henning. *FNI and FRPI: Local resistance and regional alliances in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 16 July 2013. Web. 05 May 2015, pg. 40-42,

[186] Tamm, Henning. *FNI and FRPI: Local resistance and regional alliances in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 16 July 2013. Web. 05 May 2015, pg. 41-42,

in Ituri and that Ituri be made a province rather than a territory.[187] Negotiations stalled for almost

a year and, in fall 2013, the Congolese army launched an offensive and managed to recapture all

the FRPI strongholds and all villages under rebel control in the Walendu Bindi area.[188] Over the

next year, the rebels carried out sporadic attacks on civilians. Then, in early 2014, FRPI attacked

Congolese army positions and carried out a great deal more violence against civilians, including

kidnapping, looting, and sexual violence.[189] Government troops responded with another

offensive, this time with air support from MONUSCO. More than a dozen rebels were killed.

However, FRPI continued to carry out attacks on civilians and negotiations between Cobra and

the Congolese government continued with little to no progress.[190]

In August 2014, the head of MONUSCO and the Congolese army commander in Ituri

announced that they would conduct a joint military operation against FRPI at an undisclosed

date. In an interview, the UN force commander called the rebel actions "intolerable" and

promised that the operation would begin "quite soon."[191] Perhaps in response to these threats,

Matata surrendered with other FRPI leaders in late November, demanding the rank of general in

the Congolese army and insisting that FRPI members be granted amnesty and an equivalent rank

to what they already had. Hundred of combatants agreed to lay down their weapons.[192] However,

in the last days of 2014 only seventy of some 1,000 FRPI militiamen had disarmed.[193] Moreover,

---

[187] Radio Okapi. "Ituri : les défections des militaires inquiètent la société civile." *Radiookapi.net*, 19 August, 2010. Web. 16 May 2015.
[188] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 September 2013, pg. 6.
[189] See http://radiookapi.net/tag/frpi/ for an overview of FRPI activities in Ituri.
[190] United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 25 September 2014, pg. 6-7.
[191] Radio Okapi. "Ituri : la Monusco annonce des frappes ciblées contre les rebelles de FRPI." *Radiookapi.net*, 30 August 2014. Web. 16 May 2015.
[192] AFP. "DR Congo rebel chief Cobra Matata transferred to Kinshasa." *Dailymail.com*, 5 January 2015. Web. 16 May 2015.
[193] Radio Okapi. "Ituri : le processus d'intégration des miliciens de FRPI dans l'armée piétine." *Radiookapi.net*, 6 December 2014. Web. 16 May 2015.

FRPI attacks on civilians continued despite the surrender of Matata and the promises to disarm, with rebels burning homes and stealing livestock.[194] In January 2015, MONUSCO and the government followed up on their threat a joint operation against FRPI. They also arrested Cobra after he tried to return to the bush and regain command of the rebels, flying him to Kinshasa in handcuffs.[195] Clashes between UN, Congolese, and rebel troops continued in the next month, killing at least thirty militiamen.[196] Violence against civilians continued unabated.

The use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers does not appear to have contributed to reduced rebel violence against civilians in this episode. Each joint offensive by the Congolese army and MONUSCO did succeed in removing FRPI from towns and killing rebels, but failed to prevent future attacks on civilians. And, while the threat to use force might have compelled Cobra Matata to surrender, the rebel rank and file continued to loot, kill, and rape just as before. This failure might stem from several factors. First, FRPI had roots in the Walendu Bindi area and so could easily disappear into the local population when attacked. One commander, explaining the difficulty in confronting FRPI, emphasized that the rebels were "sons of the soil" who could easily blend into the local population without being turned in. Another complained that, before each Congolese operation, the rebels received word in advance from kinsmen and hid amongst the local population.[197] Remedying this particular problem would require a counterinsurgency approach, rather than just the offensive use of force. Second, as in Episode 6, the rebel group operated in the Tsey forest and may have been more difficult to

---

[194] Radio Okapi. "Ituri : les exactions des miliciens de la FRPI continuent malgré la reddition de Cobra Matata." *Radiookapi.net*, 8 December 2014. Web. 16 May 2015.

[195] UN News Centre. "UN Mission chief applauds joint operations against armed groups in eastern DR Congo." *UN.org*, 6 January 2015. Web. 16 May 2015.

[196] Radio Okapi. "Ituri : 29 morts enregistre dans les affrontements entre FARDC et FRPI." *Radiookapi.net*, 22 January 2014. Web. 16 May 2015.

[197] Radio Okapi. "Ituri : 3 femmes violées après une attaque des miliciens de la FRPI a Ituri." *Radiookapi.net*, 1 April 2015. Web. 16 May 2015.

contain because of the terrain. Lastly, FRPI had a decentralized structure and often continued to operate independent of its leadership. Even if MONUSCO could change the calculus of Cobra Matata, the rank and file might continue to attack civilians. In any case, MONUSCO failed to reduce violence against civilians with the use of force.

Analysis and Findings

The analysis indicates that the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers did in fact contribute to a decrease in rebel violence against civilians in four of nine episodes. In all the episodes where attacks on civilians decreased after the UN used force – Episodes 1, 2, 3, and 8 – the offensives launched by the UN contributed to fewer attacks on civilians. In three of four episodes, rebel groups had defeated the Congolese army or rolled past Blue Helmets just days, weeks, or months earlier.[198] The use of force by UN troops changed the calculus of rebel groups. In Episode 8, for instance, a robust UN force partnered with the Congolese army to flatten the March 23 (M23) movement, only four months after the rebel group captured the provincial capital of Goma with ease. Days after the joint offensive, M23 dissolved and hundreds of combatants joined the disarmament program. Each of these four episodes follows a common pattern: the use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers contributes to the defeat of rebels on the battlefield and, in turn, rebel groups decide to demobilize and disarm. Of course, the explanatory power of the IV varies by the episode. In Episode 3, for example, Blue Helmets carried out an extensive campaign against rebel groups in Ituri with little help from Kinshasa. Here, the IV played the most important role in changing rebel calculus. In Episode 2, on the other hand, UN action prompted one of two rebel groups to surrender, while the Congolese army contributed to this defeat and defeated the other group on its own. Here the use of force by UN

---

[198] Episodes 1, 2, and 8.

peacekeepers played an important but secondary role. In nearly half of the nine episodes, the IV helped contributed to a substantial decrease in the DV.

In four episodes where the relationship between the IV and DV remained ambiguous in the previous chapter – Episodes 5, 6, 7, and 9 – the analysis demonstrates that the use of force beyond self-defense by UN peacekeepers had no impact on rebel violence against civilians. While Blue Helmets did protect civilians from violence in three of these four episodes, by halting a rebel offensive or freeing a town, the use of force did not contribute to a decrease in the DV.[199] Rebel groups did not change their calculus and instead continued to attack civilians as before. However, in not a single episode does the IV appear to have contributed to an increase in violence against civilians. In Episode 7, the joint UN-DRC offensive against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) does appear to have prompted reprisal attacks against civilians. However, these reprisals also occurred before UN participation and, as the FDLR lost territory, violence against civilians likely decreased because the group diminished in size and capacity. The offensive use of force did not led to more violence against civilians.

Even after an analysis of the relevant qualitative literature, Episode 4 remains a mystery. Both datasets indicate that the rebel group in question, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), did not attack civilians either in the year before or after the UN used offensive force against them. Qualitative accounts confirm this. While the IV might have changed the calculus of the LRA and stopped them from carrying out attacks they would have otherwise have committed, the group had other compelling reasons to lie low in the DRC. The episode remains ambiguous.

The analysis reveals not only that the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers can help to decrease rebel violence against civilians, but also highlights the circumstances under which

---

[199] Episodes 5, 6, and 9.

the IV might be expected to have this effect. First, in three of four episodes when the DV falls, an increase in the number of peacekeepers in the area accompanied the offensive use of force.[200] As outlined in the first chapter, academic literature finds that the addition of peacekeepers leads to a decrease in rebel violence against civilians. In all three cases, the deployment of more peacekeepers likely had an effect independent of the IV. However, the addition of peacekeepers alone would probably not do as much to change rebel calculus if the Blue Helmets could not credibly threaten to the use of force beyond self-defense. These two factors, the use of force and addition peacekeepers, almost certainly have the greatest effect when combined.

Second, the impact of the IV on the DV depends on the relative capabilities of the rebels, UN peacekeepers, and the Congolese military. Rebel capacity varies most widely across these episodes and depends in part on external support. In three of four episodes where the DV falls, UN peacekeepers used force against rebel groups with relatively less internal organization and fewer adherents. Moreover, these rebel groups received little support from external governments at the time. In Episode 1, for example, Blue Helmets confronted rebel groups in Ituri that grew from local militias and had little previous military experience. Although Uganda and Rwanda had provided weapons for a time, this support dried up before the use of force. Faced with defeat in the field, most rebel groups decided to disarm and demobilize. In half the episodes where the DV did not decrease, meanwhile, UN troops confronted larger and more organized opponents with the backing of the Rwandan government. In Episode 5, for instance, the rebel group had at least 8,000 combatants, ranks and training camps, a public relations apparatus, a radio station, two websites, and tax collectors. In the one episode where the UN confronted a stronger enemy and the DV decreased, Episode 8, the UN force had exceptional capacity. Rwanda also dropped

---

[200] Episodes 1, 2, and 8.

its support of the rebel group in conjunction with the offensive use of force. This case hints at the importance of UN capacity. The Congolese army, meanwhile, demonstrated low capacity in all episodes where the DV did not decrease. However, in Episode 3 and others, UN peacekeepers defeated the enemy with almost no help from the national army. However, in Episode 2, there probably would not have been a decrease in the DV without a successful offensive by the Congolese military. Overall, the capacity of a rebel group relative to UN and Congolese troops influenced the extent to which the calculus of rebels changed after the IV.

Third, the impact of the IV on the DV depends on whether the rebel groups can be defeated through conventional military operations. In all four episodes where the DV decreases, UN and Congolese troops fought and won conventional battles. However, in the two episodes where the DV did not decrease and peacekeepers did not face a relatively powerful opponent, Episodes 6 and 9, the rebel group did not use conventional tactics. Both episodes occurred in the Ituri province and pitted Blue Helmets against rebel groups with only a few hundred combatants and no external support. However, neither the UN nor the Congolese army could dissuade the opponent from carrying out violence against civilians. Each group employed guerilla tactics, carrying out hit-and-run operations and disappearing into the vast Tsey forest when attacked. Moreover, the groups had roots in the local population and so could also blend into villages and receive advanced warning of attacks from their kinsmen. Only a counterinsurgency strategy, rather than the offensive use of force, would make a difference in that context.

Finally, the IV cannot decrease the DV when the Congolese army allies with rebel groups who commit the majority violence against civilians. In Episode 5, for example, the army allied with FDLR to combat the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). However, FDLR carried out most attacks on civilians before the IV and continued to do so after the fact.

77

UN peacekeepers could not credibly threaten to use force against a group allied with Kinshasa, given the political fallout that would ensue, so FDLR had no reason to change its behavior.

Overall, the analysis demonstrates that the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo either helped to decrease rebel violence against civilians or had no effect. In no episode did the use of force beyond self-defense lead to an increased in rebel violence against civilians. Moreover, the offensive use of force appears more likely to have the desired effect when (1) there is a simultaneous increase in the number of UN peacekeepers, (2) rebel groups have relatively little capacity, including support from external actors, compared to UN peacekeepers and Congolese troops, (3) rebel groups use conventional military tactics, and (4) the Congolese government does not ally with offending rebel groups. When these conditions are present, rebel leaders and combatants are more likely to change their calculus and demobilize, thereby decreasing the level of rebel violence against civilians.

Conclusion

This chapter arrived at a response to the central research question of this thesis, namely: *How does the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers affect rebel violence against civilians?* Combining the data compiled in the previous chapter with qualitative accounts of how the UN and the Congolese army responded to rebel violence against civilians, this chapter found that the use of force beyond-self defense by UN peacekeepers contributed to a decrease in violence against civilians in four of the nine episodes presented. In each of these episodes, the use of force contributed to the military defeat of a rebel group and, in turn, changed the calculus of rebels. Groups targeted by the UN decided to disarm and demobilize, rather than continue to carry out violence against civilians. As established in the last chapter, attacks on civilians decreased in the province as a result and decreased most sharply near the area where the UN used offensive force.

Moreover, this decrease did not correspond with an increase in violence against civilians in neighboring provinces. In short, the IV led to a decrease in DV nearly half the time.

In another four episodes, the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers did not have an effect on rebel violence against civilians. Although the UN likely saved lives when it used force, protecting civilians from a rebel offensive or ending a rebel occupation, the use of force did not contribute to an overall decrease in attacks on civilians. Rather, the rebel groups continued to perpetrate violence against civilians as before. Fortunately, however, the use of force did not contribute to an increase in violence against civilians. Lastly, in one episode the relationship between the variables remained unclear even after the qualitative analysis.

This chapter showed not only that the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers can reduce rebel violence against civilians, but outlined the conditions under which this outcome was most likely. First, the use of force beyond self-defense appeared more effective when paired with the deployment of additional UN peacekeepers. These factors likely have the greatest impact when combined. Second, rebel groups appeared more likely to choose disarmament and demobilization over continued violence against civilians when they had less capacity relative to UN and Congolese troops. Weaker groups tended to surrender, while stronger groups with foreign support tended to carry on. Third, the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers only caused a decrease in violence against civilians when rebel groups employed conventional tactics. Blue Helmets failed to stop rebel groups who used guerilla tactics from attacking civilians. Lastly, the offensive use of force by the UN did not prevent rebels allied with the government from perpetrating violence against civilians, as UN peacekeepers cannot threaten these rebels with force. These four conditions helped to determine whether or not the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers contributed to a decrease in rebel violence against civilians.

Chapter IV – Conclusions

The main conclusion of this thesis is that United Nations peacekeepers should have robust mandates that allow them to use force beyond self-defense in order to protect civilians. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, from 2003 to 2014, Blue Helmets launched nine offensive operations against rebel groups. This thesis demonstrates that the offensive use of force by UN peacekeepers contributed to a sharp decrease in rebel violence against civilians in four of those cases. In these four episodes, peacekeepers contributed to the defeat of rebel groups and prompted rebels to disarm and demobilize, leading to significantly fewer attacks on civilians. Even when the use of force did not bring about an overall decrease in violence against civilians, peacekeepers often saved lives by halting a rebel advance or freeing a town. The analysis demonstrates that Blue Helmets on the offensive often save lives.

This thesis also identifies four factors that UN peacekeepers should take into account when considering the offensive use of force. First, the deployment of additional peacekeepers likely amplifies the deterrent effect of the use of force. In three of the four episodes where violence decreased, Blue Helmets simultaneously launched an offensive and deployed in greater numbers to the province in question. This combination probably did more to change the calculus of rebels than the offensive use of force alone, which failed to quell rebel violence against civilians in another four cases. Existing academic literature, such as Hultman et al. (2013), establishes that deploying more peacekeepers reduces violence against civilians.[201] This thesis finds that the offensive use of force amplifies that effect. When Blue Helmets take the initiative, therefore, they should do so with a sufficient number of troops.

---

[201] Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 57.4 (2013): 875-91, pg. 877-883. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.

The UN should also weigh the capacity of rebel groups, compared to peacekeepers and their allies, when contemplating the use of force. Blue Helmets and the Congolese army failed to change the behavior of sophisticated rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including both the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) in and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). These large and well-trained forces, with external financial or military support, continued to target civilians during and after the offensive use of force. Peacekeepers only dissuaded a powerful rebel group from attacking civilians in one case, when the Force Intervention Brigade brought exceptional strength to bear against the March 23 (M23) movement. Blue Helmets should not expect to deter rebel groups unless they and their allies have sufficient capacity,

Moreover, rebel groups that adopt guerilla tactics might not often respond to the offensive use of force. In two episodes, UN peacekeepers confronted small rebel groups in the Ituri province with relatively little training and no outside support. While peacekeepers could have defeated these groups in a pitched battle, the rebels operated out of a vast and remote forest, employed hit-and-run tactics, and could disappear into the local population. These guerilla tactics meant that UN offensives did not bring about a decrease in rebel violence against civilians.

Lastly, UN peacekeepers might not be able to protect civilians through the use of force when the national government allies with a rebel group that commits atrocities. In the campaign against CNDP in 2006, the Congolese army joined forces with FDLR, which carried out the majority of violence against civilians before the operation and continued to take innocent lives. When the government allies with an offending rebel group, Blue Helmets would incur a high political cost if they targeted the group with offensive force. In these situations, the UN might have to turn to other tools to persuade the government to reconsider the alliance or to otherwise

protect civilians. These tools might include diplomatic pressure or threatening to suspend certain forms of cooperation with the government.

All four factors should all be taken into consideration when UN peacekeepers make choices about the use of force beyond self-defense. Although this thesis delves deep into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, these factors likely help to determine the effect of the offensive use of force in other countries. In addition, the methodology employed in this thesis could be applied to other peacekeeping missions to identify other relevant factors. This thesis demonstrates that pairing micro-level data on intrastate conflict with qualitative literature can, unlike some more systematic studies, inform the decisionmaking of Blue Helmets.

This thesis does not resolve the longstanding debate on the offensive use of force in United Nations peacekeeping operations. It also does not argue that the use of force can address the root causes of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo outlined in the qualitative analysis, such as corruption, state weakness, or narratives of ethnic superiority and inferiority. There is no purely military solution to the conflict. However, the offensive use of force has often contributed to the disarmament and demobilization of rebel groups and, in turn, to a substantial decrease in violence against civilians. When UN troops have launched offensive operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, they have consistently saved civilian lives and often convinced rebel leaders and combatants to end their struggle. Had UN troops not used force beyond self-defense, the conflicts in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces would probably have consumed many more civilian lives. This fact alone justifies the main conclusion of this thesis: Blue Helmets should have the authority to do battle.

Bibliography

AFP. "DR Congo rebel chief Cobra Matata transferred to Kinshasa." *Dailymail.com*, 5 January 2015. Web. 16 May 2015..

Allen, Tim, and Koen Vlassenroot. *The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality.* London, UK: Zed Books, 2010. Web. 09 May 2015.

BBC News. "Germany arrests top Rwanda rebels." *News.bbc.co.uk*, 17 November 2009. Web. 14 May 2015.

Berkeley, Bill. "Zaire: An African Horror Story." *The Atlantic*, August 1993. Web. 13 May 2015.

Boulden, Jane. *Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 54-56. Print.

Boutellis, J. Arthur. "From Crisis to Reform: Peacekeeping Strategies for the Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2.3 (2013): 2. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.

Cammaert, Patrick. "Learning to Use Force on the Hoof in Peacekeeping: Reflections on the Experience of MONUC's Eastern Division." *Institute for Security Studies* (2007): 2. Web. 12 Nov. 2014.

Cammaert, Patrick, and Fiona Blyth. "The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." International Peace Institute. *Ipinst.org*. Web. 21 May 2015.

Carroll, Rory. "New warlord opens Congo's old wounds." *The Guardian*, July 10 2004. Web.

Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. *Evaluating peace operations*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.

Durch, William J., ed. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. New York, NY: St. Martin's, 1993. Print.

Durch, William J., Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, and Moira K. Shanahan. *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003. XVI-XXVI. Print.

The Economist. "Chronicle of death ignored: Five million people have died in Congo in a war that no one really understands." *The Economist*, 28 April 2011. Web. 13 May 2015.

The Enough Project. "The LRA in Congo, CAR, and South Sudan." *Enoughproject.org*. Web. 08 May 2015.

Eck, K. "In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and CLED conflict events datasets." *Cooperation and Conflict* 47.1 (2012): 124-141.

Fahey, Dan. *Ituri: Gold, land, and ethnicity in north-eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015.

Fortna, Virginia Page. "Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war." *International studies quarterly* 48.2 (2004): 269-292.

Fortna, Virginia Page, and Lise Morjé Howard. "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11.1 (2008): 283-301. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.

Findlay, Trevor. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*. Solna, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002. Print.

Gangale, R. 2006. "Fighting Continues in Congo for 4th Day." *The Associated Press*, November 28. Web. 12 December 2014.

Gilligan, Michael J., and Ernest J. Sergenti. "Do UN interventions cause peace? Using matching to improve causal inference." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3.2 (2008): 89-122.

Gorur, A. "Supporting Their Troops: America's Role in UN Peacekeeping." (May 28, 2014). Washington, DC: The Stimson Center. Web.

Holt, Victoria and Tobias Berkman. *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center. 2006.

Hultman, Lisa. "Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians." *Civil Wars* 12(1): 29-46 (2010).

Hultman, Lisa, 2012. "Attacks on Civilians in Civil War: Targeting the Achilles Heel of Democratic Governments", *International Interactions* 38 (2): 164-181.

Hultman, Lisa. "UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50.1 (2013): 59-73. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.

Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting." *American Political Science Review* 108.4 (2014): 737-53. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.

Hultman, Lisa, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 57.4 (2013): 875-91. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.

Human Rights Watch. "D. R. Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu." 2004. Web. 12 December 2014.

Human Rights Watch. "DR Congo: Army, UN Failed to Stop Massacre." *Hrw.org*, 3 July 2014. Web. 18 May 2015.

International Crisis Group. "Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu." *Crisisgroup.org*, 31 Oct. 2007. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.

IRIN New. "DRC: Hoping for peace in Ituri." *Irinnews.org*, 10 February 2009. Web. 12 December 2014.

Kathman, Jacob D., and Reed M. Wood. "Stopping the Killing During the "Peace": Peacekeeping and the Severity of Postconflict Civilian Victimization." *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2014).

Kocher, Matthew Adam. "The Effect of Peacekeeping Operations on Violence Against Civilians in Africa: A Critical Re-Analysis." (November 11, 2014). Available at SSRN. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.

Kreps, Sarah, and Geoffrey Wallace. "Just How Humanitarian are Interventions? Peacekeeping and the Prevention of Civilian Killings during and after Civil Wars." *Paper prepared for the 2009 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*.

Lewis, David. "Guatemalan blue helmet deaths stir Congo debate." *Reuters*, 31 January 2006. Web. 08 May 2015.

Mansson, Katarina. "Use of force and civilian protection: Peace operations in the Congo." *International Peacekeeping* 1.4 (2005): 503-519. Web. 2 May 2014.

Mueller, Timo. "Understanding Eastern Congo's ADF-NALU Rebels." *Enoughproject.org*, 29 January 2014. Web. 15 May 2015.

Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. "Problematic Potential: The Human Rights Consequences of Peacekeeping Interventions in Civil Wars." *Human Rights Quarterly* 32.1 (2010): 49-72. Web. 13 Dec. 2014.

Political Instability Task Force (PITF). 2009. "Political Instability Task Force Worldwide Atrocities Event Data Collection Codebook Version 1.0B2."

Plett, Barbara. "UN under Fire over Fall of Goma in DR Congo." *BBC News*. N.p., 21 Nov. 2012. Web. 17 Nov. 2014.

Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic, 2002. 348-364. Print.

Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, The Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 6 April 2011. Print.

Radio Okapi. "Ituri: la milice FPJC s'affronte aux FARDC à Bulanzabo." *Radiookapi.net*, 17 October 2008. Web. 10 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Irumu : nouvelle incursion des miliciens du FPJC, 3 morts et 5 femmes violées." *Radiookapi.net*, 21 April 2009. Web. 10 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Bunia : les miliciens de FPJC encerclent plusieurs villages de Walendu Bindi." *Radiookapi.net*, 22 July 2009. Web. 10 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Bunia : les FARDC conquièrent 3 nouveaux villages, 12 miliciens FPJC tues." *Radiookapi.net*, 28 July 2009. Web. 10 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Ituri : les défections des militaires inquiètent la société civile." *Radiookapi.net*, 19 August, 2010. Web. 16 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Ituri : opération « Safisha », 98 miliciens du FPJC et 2 soldats des FARDC tués." *Radiookapi.net*, 20 August 2010. Web. 10 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Bunia : le leader du FPJC, Sharif Manda aux arrêts." *Radiookapi.net*, 4 September 2010. Web. 10 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Ituri : 29 morts enregistre dans les affrontements entre FARDC et FRPI." *Radiookapi.net*, 22 January 2014. Web. 16 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Ituri : la Monusco annonce des frappes ciblées contre les rebelles de FRPI." *Radiookapi.net*, 30 August 2014. Web. 16 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Ituri : le processus d'intégration des miliciens de FRPI dans l'armée piétine." *Radiookapi.net*, 6 December 2014. Web. 16 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Ituri : les exactions des miliciens de la FRPI continuent malgré la reddition de Cobra Matata." *Radiookapi.net*, 8 December 2014. Web. 16 May 2015.

Radio Okapi. "Ituri : 3 femmes violées après une attaque des miliciens de la FRPI a Ituri." *Radiookapi.net*, 1 April 2015. Web. 16 May 2015.

Raleigh, C., and C. Dowd. 2015. "Armed Conflict and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook."

Rice, Xan. "Background: The Lord's Resistance Army." *The Guardian*, 20 October 2007. Web. 08 May 2015.

Scorgie, Lindsay. "The Allied Democratic Forces: Moving beyond popular narratives." *Aljazeera.com*, 17 July 2013. Web. 15 May 2015.

Sloan, James. "The Evolution of the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping." *Strategic Studies* 37.5 (2014): 674-702. Web. 6 Dec. 2014.

Sloan, James. *The Militarisation of Peacekeeping in the 21st Century*. Oxford: Hart Pub., 2011. Print.

Sloan, James. "The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping: A Cycle of Boom and Bust?" *Hastings International and Comparative Law Review* 30.3 (2007): 385-452. *HeinOnline*. Web. 12 Dec. 2014.

Stearns, Jason. "Laurent Nkunda and the National Congress for the Defense of the People." *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs Annuaire* (2006-2007): 245-267. Web. 3 May 2015.

Stearns, Jason. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. New York: PublicAffairs, 27 March 2012. Print.

Stearns, Jason. *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015.

Stearns, Jason. *North Kivu: The Background to the Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 26 November 2012. Web. 03 May 2015.

Stearns, Jason. "Congo's Sudden Calm: A Break in Rwandan Meddling and the Defeat of the M23 Rebels." *Foreign Affairs*, 11 November 2013. Web. 15 May 2015.

Stedman, Stephen. "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." *International Security* 22.2 (1997): 5-53. Web. 21 May 2015.

Sunderberg, R., and E. Melander. 2013. "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4): 523-532.

Sunderberg, R., M. Lindgren, and A. Padskocimaite. 2010. "UCDP GED Codebook Version 1.0-2011." Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research.

Tamm, Henning. *UPC In Ituri: The external militarization of local politics in north-eastern Congo*. London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 01 March 2013. Web. 01 May 2015.

Tamm, Henning. *FNI and FRPI: Local resistance and regional alliances in north-eastern Congo.* London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 16 July 2013. Web. 05 May 2015.

Terrie, Jim. "The Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping: The Experience of MONUC." *African Security Review* 18.1 (2009): 22-23. Web. 5 Nov. 2014.

Ulriksen, Stale, et al. "Operation Artemis: the shape of things to come?" *International Peacekeeping* 11.3 (2004): 508-525. Web. 2 May 2014.

UN News Centre. "UN Mission chief applauds joint operations against armed groups in eastern DR Congo." *UN.org*, 6 January 2015. Web. 16 May 2015.

UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. "DR Congo/Ituri: MONUC stops FPJC advance towards Marabo." *Reliefweb.com*, 17 October 2008. Web. 10 May 2015.

United Nations. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. New York: General Assembly and Security Council, 21 August 2000.

United Nations. *Resolution 1291*. New York: Security Council, 24 February 2000.

United Nations. *Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. New York: Security Council, 27 May 2003.

United Nations. *Resolution 1484*. New York: Security Council, 30 May 2003.

United Nations. *Third special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 16 August 2004.

United Nations. *Sixteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 31 December 2004.

United Nations. *Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 15 March 2005.

United Nations. *Eighteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 2 August 2005.

United Nations. *Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 28 December 2005.

United Nations. *Twenty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 13 June 2006.

United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.* New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 18 January 2008.

United Nations. *Twenty-seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 27 March 2009.

United Nations. *Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 June 2009.

United Nations. *Twenty-ninth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 18 September 2009.

United Nations. *Thirtieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 4 December 2009.

United Nations. *Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 March 2010.

United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 8 October 2010.

United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 17 January 2011.

United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 12 May 2011.

United Nations. *Peacekeeping Budgets*. New York: Department of Management, February 2012.

United Nations. *Expenses of the United Nations peacekeeping operations.* New York: General Assembly, 27 December 2012.

United Nations. *Resolution 2098.* New York: Security Council, 28 March 2013.

United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 September 2013.

United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 17 December 2013

United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 5 March 2014.

United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 25 September 2014.

United Nations. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* New York: Security Council, 30 December 2014

United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet.* New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 31 December 2014.

U.S. Department of State. "The Lord's Resistance Army." *State.gov*, 23 March 2012. Web. 08 May 2015.

Walsh, Declan. "Rebel Troops Capture Bukavu and Threaten Third Congo War." *The Independent*. Independent Digital News and Media, 03 June 2004. Web. 10 Nov. 2014.

Zapata, Mollie. "Congo: The First and Second Wars, 1996 to 2003." *Enoughproject.org*, 29 November 2011. Web. 13 May 2015.

Appendix A – Extended Methodology

This appendix contains details on the analysis presented earlier in Chapter II in the

"Perpetrators of Violence" and "Displacement of Violence" sections. The tables and information

below were used to produce the tables in those two sections. Seven of the nine episodes appear,

as Episode 4 and Episode 7 are excluded. For each episode, the first section contains the analysis

relevant to "Perpetrators of Violence" and the second section contains the analysis relevant to

first table in "Displacement of Violence." For three of the seven episodes, there is a third section

relevant to the second table in "Displacement of Violence." For a complete description of the

methodology, please refer back to Chapter II.

Episode 1: Ituri 2003 (June 6 – October 10)

Perpetrators

Targets of offensive force	
Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	Y
ACLED	Y
Final Determination	*Y*

Other rebel groups	
Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	Y
ACLED	Y
Final Determination	*Y*

A. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *before* the IV?
UCDP GED: UPC (15), FNI (15), FRPI (5), MLC (3), RCD/N (3), RCD-K-ML (2), FAPC (1)
ACLED: Lendu Militia [FNI] (6), RCD-K-ML (5), RCD (3), UPC (2), Hema Militia [UPC] (1)

B. Who did the IV target? FNI and UPC

C. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *after* the IV?
UCDP GED: FAPC (3), FRPI (3), FNI (1)
ACLED: UPC (4)

Displacement I

Analysis	Label
UCDP GED	Y
ACLED	Y
Final Determination	*Y*

A. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *before* the IV?
UCDP GED: Irumu (17), Djugu (13), Mambasa (2), Mahagi (1)
ACLED: Djugu (8), Irumu (7), Mahagi (6)

B. Where did the IV take place? Irumu

C. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *after* the IV?
UCDP GED: Irumu (2), Djugu (2), Mahagi (1), Aru (1)
ACLED: Irumu (4)

Displacement II

Main perpetrators: FNI and UPC

Timeframe: June 2002 – June 2003; October 2003 – October 2004

Neighboring areas: North Kivu, Haut-Uele, Tshopo

Analysis	Label
UCDP GED North Kivu	N
ACLED North Kivu	N
UCDP GED Haut-Uele	N
ACLED Haut-Uele	N
UCDP GED Tshopo	N
ACLED Tshopo	N
Final Determination	*N*

A. North Kivu

- UCDP GED : no events involving FNI or UPC
- ACLED : no events involving FNI or UPC

B. Haut-Uele (Orientale)

- UCDP GED : no events involving FNI or UPC
- ACLED : no events involving FNI or UPC

C. Tshopo (Orientale)

- UCDP GED : no events involving FNI or UPC
- ACLED : one event involving FNI after the IV

Episode 2: South Kivu 2004 (June 20)

Perpetrators

Targets of offensive force	
Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	NA
ACLED	Y
Final Determination	*Y*

Other rebel groups	
Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	Y
ACLED	Y*
Final Determination	*Y**

A. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *before* the IV?

UCDP GED: FDLR (3), CNDD-FDD (2), Palipehutu-FNL (2)
ACLED: Interahamwe Militia (3), FNI (2), FDLR (1), Mutiny-Nkunda (1), Palipehutu-FNL (1)

B. Who did the IV target? Mutiny-Nkunda

C. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *after* the IV?

UCDP GED: Rastas (3)
ACLED: Interahamwe Militia (5), FDLR (6), Mayi Mayi (1)

Displacement I

Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	Y
ACLED	Y
Final Determination	*Y*

A. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *before* the IV?

UCDP GED: Uvira (5), Bukavu (1), Walungu (1)
ACLED: Uvira (4), Bukavu (2), Walungu (1), Shabunda (1)

B. Where did the IV take place? Uvira (Kamanyola)

C. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *after* the IV?

UCDP GED: Shabunda (2), Kabare (1)
ACLED: Walungu (7), Kabare (2), Kalehe (2), Shabunda (1), Mwenga (2), Fizi (1)

<u>Displacement II</u>

Main perpetrators: FDLR and Interahamwe Militia,

Timeframe: May 2003 – May 2004; June 2004 – June 2005

Neighboring areas: North Kivu, Maniema, Tanganyika (Katanga)

Analysis	Label
UCDP GED North Kivu	N
ACLED North Kivu	Y
UCDP GED Maniema	N
ACLED Maniema	N
UCDP GED Tanganyika	N
ACLED Tanganyika	N
Final Determination	*U*

A. North Kivu

- UCDP GED : 1 event involving FDLR before the IV; 0 after the IV
- ACLED : 3 events involving FDLR or Interahamwe Militia before the IV; 6 events after

B. Maniema

- UCDP GED : no events involving FDLR or Interahamwe Militia
- ACLED : no events involving FDLR or Interahamwe Militia

C. Tanganyika (Katanga)

- UCDP GED : no events involving FDLR or Interahamwe Militia
- ACLED : no events involving FDLR or Interahamwe Militia

Episode 3: Ituri 2005 (February 25 – April 16)

Perpetrators

Targets of offensive force	
Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	Y
ACLED	Y
Final Determination	*Y*

Other rebel groups	
Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	Y
ACLED	Y**
Final Determination	*Y**

A. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *before* the IV?

UCDP GED: FAPC (3), FRPI (3), FNI (2)
ACLED: UPC (2), FNI (1)

B. Who did the IV target? FNI and UPC

C. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *after* the IV?

UCDP GED: N/A
ACLED: MRC (2), ADF-NALU (1), FRPI (1), FNI (1)

Displacement

Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	Y
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*U*

A. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *before* the IV?

UCDP GED: Djugu (3), Irumu (2), Mahagi (1), Aru (1)
ACLED: Irumu (4), Djugu (3)

B. Where did the IV take place? Djugu and Irumu

C. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *after* the IV?

UCDP GED: Irumu (1)
ACLED: Irumu (4), Djugu (3), Mahagi (1), Mambasa (1)

Episode 5: North Kivu 2006 (November 25 - 28)

Perpetrators

Targets of offensive force	
Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	N
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*N*

Other rebel groups	
Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	N
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*N*

A. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *before* the IV?

UCDP GED: Mayi Mayi (2)
ACLED: FDLR (14), Interahamwe Militia (13), Mayi Mayi (7), MRC (1)

B. Who did the IV target? FDLR (Nkunda)

C. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *after* the IV?

UCDP GED: FDLR (10), Mayi Mayi (7), CNDP (5)
ACLED: FDLR (11), Mayi Mayi (6), CNDP (3), Interahamwe Militia (1)

Displacement

Analysis	**Label**
UCDP GED	N
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*N*

A. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *before* the IV?

UCDP GED: Lubero (1), Beni (1)
ACLED: Lubero (11), Rutshuru (8), Masisi (8), Walikale (6), Goma (1), Butembo

B. Where did the IV take place? Masisi (Sake)

C. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *after* the IV?

UCDP GED: Masisi (6), Rutshuru (5), Goma (2) Beni (1), Lubero (1)
ACLED: Rutshuru (12), Masisi (6), Goma (2), Walikale (1), Lubero (1), Oicha (1)

Episode 6: Ituri 2009 (July 15 - 29)

Perpetrators

Targets of offensive force	
Analysis	**Label**
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*N*

Other rebel groups	
Analysis	**Label**
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*N*

A. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *before* the IV?

ACLED: LRA (16), FPJC (16), FDLR (3), FRPI (1)

B. Who did the IV target? FPJC

C. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *after* the IV?

ACLED: LRA (10), FPJC (9), NALU (1)

Displacement

Analysis	**Label**
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*N*

A. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *before* the IV?

ACLED: Irumu (20), Djugu (14), Mambasa (2)

B. Where did the IV take place? Irumu (Bunia)

C. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *after* the IV?

ACLED: Irumu (16), Djugu (4), Aru (2), Mahagi (1)

Episode 8: North Kivu 2013-2014 (Aug 26-28 2013; Nov 4 – Dec 25 2013)

Perpetrators

Targets of offensive force	
Analysis	**Label**
ACLED	Y
Final Determination	*Y*

Other rebel groups	
Analysis	**Label**
ACLED	Y**
Final Determination	*Y**

A. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *before* the IV?

ACLED: Mayi Mayi (93), M23 (80), ADF-NALU (14), FDLR (8), APCLS (4), FPD (4)
ACLED (1): Mayi Mayi (5), M23 (3), ADF-NALU (3), FDLR (2)
ACLED (2): FDLR (21), NDC (5), ADF-NALU (2)

B. Who did the IV target? M23

C. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *after* the IV?

ACLED (3): ADF-NALU (21), FDLR (8), NDC (5)

Displacement I

Analysis	**Label**
ACLED	Y
Final Determination	*Y*

A. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *before* the IV?

ACLED: Goma (54), Rutshuru (41), Masisi (23), Beni (17), Lubero (15), Walikale (6),
ACLED (1): Rutshuru (6), Beni (5), Goma (3), Masisi (3), Walikale (2)
ACLED (2): Lubero (18), Rutshuru (7), Walikale (5), Masisi (2), Beni (1)

B. Where did the IV take place? Goma; …

C. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *after* the IV?

ACLED (3): Rutshuru (17), Oicha (13), Walikale (11), Beni (9), Goma (5), Masisi (3)

<u>Displacement II</u>

Main perpetrators: M23

Timeframe: August 2012 – August 2013; Sept 2013 – June 2014; August 2014 – March 2015

Neighboring areas: South Kivu, Maniema, Ituri (Orientale), Tshopo (Orientale)

Analysis	Label
ACLED South Kivu	N
ACLED Maniema	N
ACLED Ituri	N
ACLED Tshopo	N
Final Determination	*N*

A. South Kivu

- ACLED: 14 events involving M23 before the first instance of the IV; 0 such events since

B. Maniema

- ACLED: no events involving M23

C. Ituri (Orientale)

- ACLED: no events involving M23

D. Tshopo (Orientale)

- ACLED: no events involving M23

Episode 9: Ituri 2014 (June 3 – June 25)

Perpetrators

Targets of offensive force	
Analysis	**Label**
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*N*

Other rebel groups	
Analysis	**Label**
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*N*

A. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *before* the IV?

ACLED: FRPI (12), Mayi Mayi (7)

B. Who did the IV target? FRPI

C. Who perpetrated violence against civilians *after* the IV?

ACLED: FRPI (38), Mayi Mayi (5), ADF-NALU (4)

Displacement

Analysis	**Label**
ACLED	N
Final Determination	*N*

A. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *before* the IV?

ACLED: Irumu (18), Aru (5), Djugu (5), Mambasa (4)

B. Where did the IV take place? Irumu

C. Where did rebel violence against civilians occur *after* the IV?

ACLED: Irumu (43), Mambasa (7), Djugu (7), Aru (1)