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Iraq and North Korea in Focus

Iraq and North Korea dominated events and discussions of international issues on the Stanford campus, and particularly at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (Stanford IIS) during the past academic year. As students organized discussions and many marched against the war in Iraq, Stanford IIS hosted public events and held seminars to consider the unfolding developments in these two countries.

In October 2002, as the probability of a war in Iraq grew larger, the Institute and the Law School jointly organized a panel discussion entitled "Iraq: War or Diplomacy." Participants included Stanford president emeritus and senior fellow at Stanford IIS Gerhard Casper and Law School dean Kathleen Sullivan. As war broke out, the Institute hosted "War in Iraq: A Public Forum" with four leading Institute scholars and with then director David Holloway as the moderator.

A public lecture series during the winter quarter examined "Islam and the Rule of Law." Organized jointly by the Institute and the Law School, the series drew large crowds, both from campus and the wider community.

In February, APARC hosted a major, two-day conference, "North Korea: New Challenges, New Solutions," under the leadership of then-acting APARC director Gi-Wook Shin and his colleagues Daniel Okimoto and Michael Armacost. The three subsequently published a policy brief, "Addressing the North Korea Nuclear Challenge." Plain-spoken and prescriptive, the brief was distributed widely to outside audiences; an excerpt appears on page 5.

At a March event for the Stanford community in New York City, former secretary of defense William Perry, a Stanford professor and senior fellow at the Institute, and Gi-Wook Shin, discussed the security crisis on the Korean peninsula in front of a packed house. Perry called North Korea's decision to re-start its nuclear program a "more serious problem than Iraq."

In May, the Spring 2003 Payne Lecturer, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Mrs. Sadako Ogata delivered two lectures on "Humanitarian Action and War." These thoughtful and heavily attended talks covered her own experiences in Iraq and other crisis areas. Humanitarian missions, Mrs. Ogata declared, should also include the "rebuilding of war-torn societies through building security and communal reconciliation."

Stanford IIS faculty also appeared widely in the media, participating regularly in the national public debate on Iraq and Korea. Some examples:

- Institute director Coit D. Blacker wrote in the *San Jose Mercury News* that war in Iraq was "signaling the end of the prolonged and fundamental transition in international relations that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991."
- In the *Washington Post*, William Perry wrote about the nuclear crisis in North Korea, asking "How did we get into this mess?"
- Laura Donohue, a CISAC visiting fellow, considered, also in the *Washington Post*, the effects of the Patriot Act on our basic values; and,
- Ivo Lupis from CDDRL compared his experiences in Bosnia with the situation in Iraq in an article in the *San Francisco Chronicle*. ■

FOR MORE ON IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA, SEE PAGES 4 AND 5.

PHOTOGRAPHY: Rod Searcey

Coit D. Blacker New Director of Stanford IIS

COIT D. "CHIP" BLACKER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IIS), HAS BEEN SELECTED TO LEAD THE INSTITUTE FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS, PROVOST JOHN ETCHEMENDY ANNOUNCED JUNE 25.

Blacker, a senior fellow at IIS and a professor, by courtesy, of political science, will become director on September 1, 2003, (when the institute also changed its name to the Stanford Institute for International Studies (Stanford IIS). He succeeds David Holloway, the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, director since 1998.

"As deputy director at IIS, Chip Blacker has played a central role in advancing the institute to a position of national prominence in the area of research in international studies," Etchemendy said. "Moreover, Chip's experience in government paired with his unparalleled dedication to students has created a critical link that will help produce a generation of leaders prepared to confront complex international issues."

The institute, established in 1987, is the university's primary forum for interdisciplinary research on key international issues. The institute comprises five research centers that bring together faculty, staff and students from across campus. It also hosts scholars, government and business leaders for research projects, lectures, conferences and new scholarly initiatives. It operates on an $18 million annual budget, 85 percent of which comes from sponsored research and other funds the institute raises. The university provides the remaining financial support.

Blacker, 53, first came to campus in 1977 as a postdoctoral fellow in the university's Arms Control and Disarmament Program. He is an expert in U.S. and Soviet/Russian foreign and security policies, and national and international security relations. A native of Santa Monica, Blacker earned advanced degrees in the 1970s from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

While Blacker has spent much of his professional life in academia, he also has used his skills in government. In 1981 and 1982, Blacker worked as a legislative assistant to then Democratic Senator Gary Hart of Colorado. In 1995 and 1996, he served as President Bill Clinton's special assistant for national security affairs and senior director of Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council. During the 2000 presidential race, Blacker advised Vice President Al Gore on foreign policy issues.

At Stanford, Blacker was named deputy director of the institute in 1998, and served as its acting director from 2000 to 2001. In 2001, he was awarded the Laurence and Naomi Carpenter Hoagland Prize for undergraduate teaching, and the following year was named the Olivier Nomellini Family University Fellow in Undergraduate Education.

Blacker was chosen following a two-month search by a committee headed by Charles Kruger, outgoing vice provost and dean of research and graduate policy. Other committee members included political science Professor David Brady; President Emeritus Gerhard Casper; medicine Professor Alan Garber; IIS Senior Fellow Gail Lapidus; Pamela Matson, dean of the School of Earth Sciences; Joanne Murphy, IIS associate director for academic affairs; history Professor James Sheehan; and sociology Professor Andrew Walder.

Sheehan said the search committee considered candidates who understood the institute's "distinct character" and would be able to represent it effectively to the university. "We wanted someone who could bring together all of its elements and manage a variety of goals [involving] policy, teaching and research," he said. "We thought that Chip did that extraordinarily well."

Borrowing from a statement by Holloway, Blacker described IIS as "a multidisciplinary community of scholars that works." Although long respected by academics, the institute's public profile increased visibly following September 11, 2001, as people struggled to understand the broader implications of the terrorist attacks.

"The effect of September 11 was to destroy the illusion that we, as a society, could be sympathetic to, but not affected by, [issues] going on in other parts of the world," Blacker said. Such problems include the consequences of failed and failing states, and public health crises associated with infectious diseases. "The institute is part of a larger educational enterprise to bring us closer to these problems, and to continue the process of generating knowledge and ideas that inform policy making," he said.

Blacker said his first task will be to support the institute's five centers "to become better at what they do" and help IIS understand itself as "a core part of the university and vice versa. Since September 11, 2001, he said, "the university is thinking hard about what it means to be more aware of, and active in, international life. IIS can be a catalyst for work that draws people together from multiple fields of experience."

Blacker said Holloway will be a hard act to follow. "I think David has been great for IIS," he said. "I feel fortunate to have worked together for so long." Blacker said he expects the next four years to be challenging and rewarding but "I couldn't ask for a better group of faculty with whom to work." ■

EDITED VERSION OF ARTICLE IN THE STANFORD REPORT, JULY 9, 2003

Krasner to Lead Democracy Center

Stephen D. Krasner, professor of political science and senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (Stanford IIS), has been appointed director of its Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

Krasner succeeded Coit D. Blacker, who took over as the new director of Stanford IIS on September 1, 2003.

"I am delighted that Steve has accepted my offer to take on this important task, as we continue to build up and strengthen CDDRL as well as Stanford IIS. He will be a tremendous asset not only for all of us here but for the entire Stanford community," said Blacker.

Stephen D. Krasner, who came to Stanford University in 1981, is the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations and the coordinator of the program on sovereignty at CDDRL, one of five major research centers at Stanford IIS. He was the chair of the political science department from 1984 to 1991. Between 1986 and 1992, he was editor of *International Organization*. In 2002, he served as director of governance and development at the National Security Council. He was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1987–88) and at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (2000–01). He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

His writings have dealt primarily with the political determinants of international economic relations; American foreign policy; and sovereignty. His major publications include "Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy" (1978); "International Regimes," ed. (1983); "A Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism" (1985); "Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics," co-editor (1999); "Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy" (1999), and "Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities," editor (2001).

Krasner received his B.A. from Cornell, M.A. from Columbia, and Ph.D. from Harvard. Before coming to Stanford, he taught at Harvard and UCLA. ■



"International studies is no longer a matter of studying the exotic, but about collaboration between different peoples of the world on trying to understand how to deal with the challenges we all face in today's world."

DAVID HOLLOWAY IS RAYMOND A. SPRUANCE PROFESSOR IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

DAVID HOLLOWAY ON HIS FIVE YEARS AS DIRECTOR OF IIS

Q. WHAT HAS CHANGED SINCE YOU TOOK OVER AS DIRECTOR OF IIS FIVE YEARS AGO?

A. There have been two or three major changes. One is our new home in Encina Hall, which opened just as I took over as director of the Institute. That meant that we at the Institute now were all together in one building, which has made quite a difference to the cohesion. We now all feel that we belong to one entity. The second change is that we now have three new centers, making a total of five centers. The Center for Environmental Science and Policy (CESP) grew out of the Environmental Forum but it was really created when Wally Falcon stepped down as director of the Institute. The same is true for the Center for Health Policy (CHP). Both of these have been thriving. IIS has been a good parent, or a good guardian, for both of them. And then, of course, the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), the newest center, created in September last year, which is still finding its feet. But those three centers are quite big initiatives and we have made them work. The third thing that I am pleased about is that we have made very good faculty appointments, especially some younger faculty. They have brought a lot to the Institute and they will provide future leadership. All these three things constitute the strengthening of the Institute. We have some really interesting research groups, we are doing a broader array of research, and we are a real presence on the Stanford campus.

Q. DO YOU NOW FEEL THAT THE INSTITUTE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE STANFORD COMMUNITY?

A. We are part of the Stanford community now, but that does not mean that we can't do better and serve the University better. I think this is a gradual process. Initially, IIS did not have any research centers, besides CISAC (Center for International Security and Cooperation) and APARC (Asia-Pacific Research Center), both of which existed before IIS was created in 1987. They were brought in under IIS while area studies went to Humanities & Sciences (H&S). So IIS then had a quite different profile than it does today. Today, IIS is an Institute with major research centers dealing with the key international challenges and interesting work goes on here. This is not a sort of a "minidean's office" trying to service lots of different places around the University. At the same time, one question is how far we should go to encourage international work across the University and support such activities outside of IIS. We try to do a good deal of that but I think there is still a lot of work to be done here and to let people know what is going on here at the Institute. We have made real progress and I feel people think of us as a lively and active place on campus that draws in students, faculty, and the community. That's what we have been striving for.

Q. WHAT DO YOU FEEL YOUR MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAVE BEEN DURING YOUR FIVE YEARS?

A. Well, I have tried to bring in faculty and to strengthen the research that goes on here as well as the policy work. I believe that has happened, we've made progress, and that's what I am most pleased about. As a whole, I believe that IIS is in good shape. The larger question for IIS and for Stanford is how we should organize international studies in the age of globalization. International studies is no longer a matter of studying the exotic, but about collaboration between different peoples of the world on trying to understand how to deal with the challenges we all face in today's world. No matter where we come from we face many common issues, and international studies can help us think about these issues in a collaborative way.

Q. SO IN YOUR VIEW, THERE IS NO DOUBT FOR THE NEED FOR AN INSTITUTE LIKE THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES?

A. No, there is no doubt at all, and if IIS were abolished it would still be needed and we would end up recreating it, because faculty would still come together from different departments to do research on issues that cross different disciplines. There must be room for improvisations and new initiatives, and we must always be open to try new things. And if things don't work, we must be prepared to admit that and try something else. IIS can play an important role here, to support and guide, to provide a framework for the research centers, but there is no blueprint for how to do this. We have to make sure that what we do, we do well.

Q. AS YOU NOW LEAVE THE DIRECTORSHIP OF THE INSTITUTE, DO YOU SEE ANY PARTICULAR NEEDS AND WHAT WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE HAPPENING AT IIS?

A. I'd like to see more faculty in international studies, not only at the Institute but also at Stanford in general. I think it's clear that if IIS did not exist, a lot of faculty would not have been hired. But for IIS to be strong, it needs to draw from Stanford, and if Stanford is weak it affects us at IIS. Today, for example, we are affected by the relatively small number of faculty in East Asian studies and in Islamic studies. It is hard for us to be strong in certain areas if the University as a whole is not strong. We draw our strength from Stanford and in this respect I would like to see more opportunities to move faculty in and out of the Institute.

Q. AN INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED AT STANFORD. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ABOUT IT AND HOW DOES IIS FIT INTO THIS EFFORT?

A. Ideally, this initiative will strengthen international studies as a whole at Stanford. One can think of this in several ways. The first is that it will make Stanford the place to come for people interested in doing work in areas such as development, democratization, and international security. Secondly, that we would have a greater international element in our curriculum and have teaching organized in an interdisciplinary fashion around issues and problems, at least on the graduate level. And thirdly, I'd like to see the initiative result in an internationalization of the University with a greater proportion of our undergraduate students coming from other countries. I'd like to see a more international cast at the University, because our task is to educate students who live and function in an increasingly interconnected world.

Q. WHAT ARE YOUR FEELINGS ABOUT LEAVING IIS?

A. To tell you the truth, I have somewhat mixed feelings. I have enjoyed it very much. I hope I have helped the Institute become stronger. I am very happy that Chip (Professor Coit D. Blacker) is taking over and I wish him well. I hope to continue to be very active here. ■

Iraq and North Korea in Focus

"The outcome of the war in Iraq signals the end of the prolonged and fundamental transition in international relations that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991."

COIT D. BLACKER

WAR PUSHES U.S. SUPREMACY TO FOREFRONT

"The war (and its outcome) should also bring to an end the lingering debate over whether the new international system that is emerging is more 'unipolar' or more 'multipolar.' So far, attempts to 'balance' U.S. power have been highly visible, but also stunningly ineffective. This will change, but anything approximating genuine multipolarity is probably decades away, given the ever-widening gap in military capabilities between the United States and all others, the sheer size of the U.S. economy, and this country's global political and cultural reach.

As a result, all other actors on the global stage are almost certain to adjust their perspectives and tweak their policies. Expect many more Syrian episodes in the months and years to come—dramas in which weaker countries, doing things to which U.S. leaders take exception, seek to stay out of Washington's crosshairs by altering their behavior in measurable ways.

Their comparative weakness notwithstanding, the true would-be 'balancers' to U.S. power—France, Russia, China, and on occasion, Germany, India, and maybe others—will persist in their efforts to constrain or moderate America's behavior on a case-by-case basis. They will do so whenever they determine that it is in their interest and that the costs are manageable.

In all likelihood, that means continuous friction between the United States and that next-most-powerful tier of states. The intensity of the friction will turn on how, at a fundamental level, these nations regard the United States.

An American propensity to act either alone or in defiance of 'the international community' (whatever that means) will aggravate and prolong such conflicts; U.S. behavior that is seen to be more benign will alleviate tensions. Frictions will also arise if and when the United States perceives such balancing behavior on the part of others to be gratuitous and self-interested.

What this suggests for 'global governance'—or the ability of the United States and other key nations to work together to preserve stability, promote economic growth, protect human rights, and the like—is unclear. Actions and outcomes will vary, depending on the particular issue at stake. However, on balance, the ability of the United States and the four other permanent members of the UN Security Council, in particular, to act in concert—indeed, to act as a concert—will decline over time.

That is not good news for those who had hoped to see an invigorated and reformed United Nations play a more central role in the management of the international system."

EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE BY COIT D. BLACKER, IN THE *SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS*, MAY 7, 2003.

IT'S EITHER NUKES OR NEGOTIATION

"There are three basic approaches for dealing with this dangerous situation.

The administration can continue to refuse to negotiate, 'outsourcing' this problem to the concerned regional powers. This approach appears to be based on the hope that the regional powers will be able to prevail on North Korea to stop its nuclear program. But hope is not a strategy. If their hopes are not realized and North Korea continues on its present course, it will soon have a significant nuclear arsenal. And while the regional powers could play a role in resolving this crisis, they are unlikely to succeed in the absence of a clear American negotiating strategy in which they can participate.

A second alternative is to put economic pressure on North Korea and hope for 'regime change.' Or the United States could take military action to bring this change about. But while the regime may one day collapse, with or without economic pressure, there is no reason to believe that it will happen in time—the nuclear threat is imminent. Taking military action to force a timely regime change could result in a conflict comparable to the first Korean War, with casualties that would shock the world.

The third alternative is to undertake serious negotiations with the North Koreans to determine if there is a way to stop their nuclear program short of war. The administration is clearly reluctant to negotiate with the North Koreans, calling them loathsome and cheaters. It is easy to be sympathetic with this position; indeed, the only reason for considering negotiation with North Korea is that the other alternatives are so terrible. The administration, seeing the danger, has said that it 'would not tolerate' a North Korean nuclear arsenal. The North Koreans responded to this declaration by accelerating their program. The conflict between our views and their actions is a formula for drifting into war. It is imperative that we stop that drift, and the only clear way of doing that is by negotiating.

Any negotiations with the North Koreans are likely to be difficult and protracted, so they should be predicated on a prior agreement that North Korea will freeze its nuclear activities during the negotiations. For negotiations to have a chance of success, they would need to have a positive dimension, making it clear to North Korea that forgoing nuclear weapons could lead it to a safe and positive future. But they would also need a negative or coercive dimension, both to induce North Korea to take the right path and to give our allies and us more credible options if diplomacy should fail. President Kennedy said it best: 'We should never negotiate from fear, but we should never fear to negotiate.'"

EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE BY WILLIAM PERRY IN THE *WASHINGTON POST*, JULY 23, 2003.

ECHOES OF SARAJEVO IN BAGHDAD

"The reconstruction of Bosnia is now winding up its eighth year…The anarchy, crime, violence, arson and vandalism unfolding in the presence of U.S. troops in Baghdad today are echoes of the Sarajevo experience. The lack of American assertiveness and manpower to restore law and order in Iraq is enabling Iraqis to draw similar conclusions as the Bosnians did eight years ago.

In Baghdad, the lack of security, basic services, and early employment opportunities will force many war-affected locals into the hands of organized crime syndicates, religious extremists, and anyone who can offer some sort of guidance or protection during the current anarchy. Once the locals become integrated into these networks, corruption will flourish and vested interests will begin to harden. American money and state-building efforts will come up against a much more resistant environment in Iraq."

EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE BY IVO LUPIS IN THE *SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE*, JUNE 3, 2003.

BY MICHAEL ARMACOST, SHORENSTEIN DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, APARC
DANIEL I. OKIMOTO, SENIOR FELLOW, STANFORD IIS
GI-WOOK SHIN, SENIOR FELLOW, STANFORD IIS

Addressing the North Korea Nuclear Challenge

North Korea's renewed bid for nuclear weapons poses an urgent foreign policy challenge to the United States. The current situation—though it bears a resemblance to the events of 1993–1994—is far more dangerous and difficult. North Korea has developed longer-range ballistic missiles; South Korea's growing nationalism has put its alliance with the United States on shakier ground; and the United States is distracted by the wars on terrorism and for regime change in Iraq. Whatever Washington may choose to call it, this is a serious crisis.

Is Washington positioned to foster a diplomatic resolution? U.S. relations with Japan, China, and Russia are in better shape than in 1994, but Moscow and Beijing are tailoring their diplomacy toward the North to cues they receive from Seoul. The efficacy of U.S. strategy toward North Korea will therefore depend heavily on the degree to which Washington and Seoul can align their views on what North Korea is up to, and what we should do together in response.

Despite these challenges, there are grounds for a diplomatic resolution to the North Korea problem. Korea's dire economic circumstances have made it more vulnerable to outside pressure at a time when its neighbor nations and the United States are increasingly concerned about its nuclear ambition. Military means would not only exact huge human casualties but also deepen U.S. estrangement from Seoul and diminish prospects for developing a joint strategy with other Asian powers.

NORTH KOREA: CHANGING OBJECTIVES?

Much depends on North Korean intentions, and as usual, these are unclear. We do know that North Korea's society and economy are under heavy pressure to change. Externally, the North seems to recognize that its protracted quest for political/military predominance on the Korean peninsula is hopelessly unrealistic. Pyongyang's formal proposals for "hegemonic" unification have not only been modified to support a confederation based on "equality with the South," but the North's overriding objective also now appears to be the survival of its system and its regime. Its current insistence on a formal nonaggression pact with the United States is, perhaps, one reflection of that aim.

On the home front, there exists a grudging acceptance of the need for economic reform. This is evident in the North's heightened interest in specialized economic zones. Hints of economic pragmatism are not yet matched by any apparent comprehension of market forces, let alone trust in them. The government's legitimacy rests on a contrived and absurd myth of the superiority of the North Korean system. This in turn reinforces its reluctance to expose its citizens to the truth about conditions elsewhere, and severely limits the scope and contours of change.

SOUTH KOREA: THE FUTURE OF THE "SUNSHINE POLICY"?

What can North Korea expect from Seoul? In recent years, the South has pursued a rather unreciprocated form of engagement with the North in the hope that magnanimous gestures toward Pyongyang would, at best, facilitate its gradual reform, or, at worst, postpone its eventual collapse. Kim Dae-Jung did not demand strict reciprocity from the North, presumably because Seoul was seeking to build trust from a position of strength. His proximate goal was a prolonged period of peaceful coexistence on the peninsula.

Since the election of Roh Moo-Hyun, several factors have emerged that may induce Seoul gradually to adopt a firmer approach to the North. First, the North's belligerence has contributed to tougher economic prospects in South Korea. Second, if President Roh expects to obtain wider bipartisan backing for his policy toward the North, he will presumably have to insist that Pyongyang accommodate Seoul's major interests. Third, the United States has begun to adjust the size and location of its ROK military deployments, a potential source of leverage with Seoul. In short, the Roh administration may begin to recognize the advantages of using sticks as well as carrots to discourage Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions.

WHAT SHOULD WE DO?

The first objective of U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea must be to ascertain whether some combination of contingent threats, inducements, and assurances can dissuade North Korea from pursuing its nuclear weapons aspirations.

The most plausible negotiating approach would involve presenting North Korea with some variation on the tough choice that former Secretary of Defense William Perry offered to Pyongyang in 1999—substantial economic cooperation and security assurances if the North is prepared verifiably to abandon all nuclear activities; dire consequences if it is not.

Any new agreement must avoid the deficiencies of the 1994 Framework Agreement. That is, it must be more verifiable, less readily reversible (by removing spent fuel rods from the country), more comprehensive (by embracing uranium enrichment activities, missile tests, and exports), more politically defensible (by replacing promises of light water reactors with supplies of more conventional sources of fuel), and more enforceable through the involvement of North Korea's neighbors.

To achieve these ambitious negotiating objectives, the United States will need more substantial bargaining leverage than we mustered in 1994. Our most urgent need remains a coordinated negotiating strategy among the United States, South Korea, China, and Russia toward the North.

What are the prospects for this approach? It requires major adjustments in policy by all parties. Washington and Seoul will have to engage urgently in real "give and take" at a time when both are preoccupied with other concerns. To get other governments on board, we will need to address their concerns. Moving forward with the sense of urgency this problem demands may require the appointment of a special coordinator for North Korean policy to help the administration to shape a more unified policy, sell it to Congress, coordinate it with allies, and present it to Pyongyang. Whether it looks for outside help or not, the time has come to push this issue much higher on the administration's action agenda, lest Pyongyang resume production of plutonium, or irretrievably crosses other critical "red lines." ■

ABRIDGED FROM AN APARC POLICY BRIEF, APRIL 15, 2003. TO READ THE FULL TEXT, PLEASE VISIT HTTP://APARC.STANFORD.EDU, AND CLICK ON "PUBLICATIONS."

"There is a powerful triangular relationship between democracy, development, and the rule of law, and you cannot understand one leg of the triangle without viewing it in interaction with the other two."

LARRY DIAMOND IS COORDINATOR OF CDDRL'S PROGRAM ON DEMOCRACY, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY (BY COURTESY), AND A HOOVER SENIOR FELLOW

LARRY DIAMOND ON DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT

Q. WHAT IS THE ORIGIN OF THE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM?

A. The origin lies in an ongoing faculty seminar on democratization that I started here at Stanford with Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl around 1990. It was largely inspired by democratic changes taking place in southern Europe, (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) and in Latin America. Schmitter, together with Guillermo O'Donnell, and with a lot of involvement from Terry Karl, had laid the intellectual groundwork through their 1986 four-volume book, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Then, in 1990, the quarterly *Journal for Democracy* (which I edit with Marc F. Plattner) was founded. Once the Institute for International Studies was inaugurated, our faculty/student democratization seminar gravitated quite understandably towards the Institute. When CDDRL in the Institute for International Studies was started in September last year, it was a natural home for all of us involved in the effort, Michael McFaul, Gail Lapidus, Terry Karl, and myself. We have also been working closely with Donald Emmerson on the seminar.

Q. YOU HAVE HAD AN ACTIVE FIRST YEAR?

A. Yes, we have had three conferences. The first one looked at the transitions from communism after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, bringing together many leading American and international scholars. Mike McFaul will edit a book based on the contributions to that conference. Then we had a conference in July about public opinion in new democracies—how people view democracy and we discussed their research from different public opinion surveys. This will also lead to an edited book.

Finally, the October 2003 workshop, which Leonardo Morlino, a political scientist from the University of Florence who was an IIS Visiting Scholar last year, has helped to shape and which will also produce an edited book, examines and seeks to advance the growing concern with the quality of democracy. We explore this both through theoretical chapters—on issues of the rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, equality, and freedom—and through paired case studies, for example Poland vs. Romania, India vs. Pakistan, and Spain vs. Italy. Most of the world, about three in every five states, is now formally democratic, with their governments chosen in reasonably free, fair, and competitive elections. However, the quality of that democracy is low or unsatisfying in a number of ways, with citizens everywhere complaining about rampant corruption and undue influence of special interests. In a number of new democracies, there are also serious problems with human rights abuse and generally weak, feckless institutions.

Q. WHY HAS SCHOLARLY ATTENTION ON DEMOCRACY EXPLODED IN THE LAST TWENTY YEARS?

A. Scholarly attention has followed the real-world trends. The two main driving factors have been, first, the broad failure of authoritarian regimes to deliver economic development, protect human rights, and be accountable to their people, and second, the universal aspiration of people for the human rights guaranteed in all the international covenants. The defining story of the past thirty years is people living under authoritarian regimes mobilizing for freedom. Even in the Middle East, which has remained virtually the only region untouched so far by this third wave of global democratization, Arab intellectuals, activists, and civil society leaders are saying that the lack of political freedom and accountability, which democracy makes possible, is a fundamental problem for development.

Q. IS DEMOCRACY GOOD FOR DEVELOPMENT?

A. There has been a huge debate about the relationship between democracy and development. The comparison between China and India is still often cited as an argument for "developmental dictatorship." However, the gap in economic development between the two countries is beginning to narrow and some have started to argue that in the long run, India may be better poised for long-run economic growth because of its vast array of small entrepreneurs. China has depended more on large-scale enterprises and the shadow of the socialist state still hangs over much of the Chinese economy. India started late but it is beginning to liberalize economically, and if it went further toward opening its economy it could match or exceed China's phenomenal growth of the past decade. So while China undoubtedly has grown faster than India in the last thirty years, the story is not over yet and I think we should be cautious about drawing conclusions. In fact, there is a growing body of recent research finding that democracies actually have done better in economic development and in improving various aspects of human development (such as reducing infant mortality and birth rates). This research, some of which we have published in the *Journal of Democracy*, also shows that those countries that have gone through a democratic transition have actually improved their economic performance and that this performance actually accelerates if they sustain their democracy. On the other hand, those countries that go from democracy to authoritarian rule tend to experience diminished development performance. So there is new and intriguing evidence that democracy benefits development, and that, at least, it is not an obstacle.

Q. IS THE LACK OF DEMOCRACY THE REASON FOR AFRICA'S POOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE?

A. Yes, bad governance—the absence of democracy, accountability, and a rule of law—has been a major factor in Africa's failure to develop. Most African countries are worse off now than in 1980, with the exception of Botswana and Mauritius, which are the only two countries in Africa to have maintained democracy continually since independence. The way out for Africa lies in dramatic improvements in governance. Good governance includes democracy, but it is much more, such as independent agencies to monitor, punish, and control corruption, restrain the abuse of power, and provide a true rule of law. Africa desperately needs democracy for development, to compel public officials to govern for the broad public good instead of being obsessed with generating private wealth for their families and cronies. Good governance is not going to be realized in Africa without democracy. We know that the people of Africa want it, but the rulers don't, and so what is needed is massive international scrutiny and pressure.

Q. DO YOU HAVE A GOAL WITH YOUR WORK ON DEMOCRACY?

A. We don't have any one culminating goal, where we will be able to say, "Our work is finally done." I don't think we will ever be able to say that, because democracies keep evolving and their problems persist and mutate. There will always be a large gap between our aspirations for freedom, accountability, equality, responsiveness, and the rule of law and reality. One thing I have learned is that there is an irrepressible human instinct to seek advantage and privilege. It's in the human make-up, no matter what we do to reform democracy. Only continual democratic vigilance, reform, and innovation can combat that. Immediate democratization is not the answer everywhere. Some countries need more time to get there in a viable way. But democracies do perform better over the long run in ensuring human rights and welfare, and prolonged authoritarian rule is not the answer to the problems of any country in the world today. ■

Salmon Farms Threaten Fisheries in Pacific Northwest

Rosamond Naylor of CESP interviewing salmon farmer Rob Miller, Bainbridge Island, Washington.

The growing popularity of farm-raised salmon has plunged the commercial fishing industry in the Pacific Northwest into a state of crisis, according to a new report by Stanford University researchers.

Writing in the October issue of ENVIRONMENT magazine, the research team found that, since the late 1980s, worldwide production of farm salmon has increased fivefold, while the market share of wild-caught salmon from Alaska, British Columbia, and Washington state has steadily declined.

"Farm salmon represents one of the fastest-growing and most lucrative segments of the global aquaculture industry," said Rosamond Naylor, lead author of the report and Julie Wrigley Senior Fellow at CESP. "In 1980, commercial fisheries produced more than 99 percent of salmon consumed worldwide. Today, they catch less than 40 percent."

The impact has been particularly devastating in Alaska, where 10 percent of the workforce is employed in some aspect of the salmon fishing industry, noted Josh Eagle, director of the Stanford Fisheries Policy Project and co-author of the report together with CESP research fellow Whitney L. Smith.

"Wild salmon capture historically has played an important economic role by providing employment and incomes to a vast number of Native American and non-native communities along the coast," Naylor said. However, Alaska's share of the global salmon market declined from 40 to 50 percent in the early 1980s to less than 20 percent in 2000—mainly because of competition from salmon farms in Chile, Norway, the United Kingdom, and other countries, she said.

In response, the Alaska state government recently declared a state of emergency and offered commercial salmon fishers a series of financial relief programs. In British Columbia and Washington, low fish stocks and low prices have induced some boat owners to participate in vessel buy-back programs.

Commercial fishers from Juneau to Seattle are losing market share not only to overseas competitors but also to local farming operations. Salmon aquaculture was virtually nonexistent in the Pacific Northwest prior to 1985. But today, 70 percent of the salmon produced in British Columbia and Washington comes from salmon farms—121 in British Columbia and nine in Washington.

ECOLOGICAL THREATS

Salmon aquaculture is currently prohibited in Alaska, for economic and environmental reasons. Raised in pens built along the shore, farm salmon are particularly susceptible to diseases and parasites, such as sea lice, that can be lethal to fish. The report cited instances where lice, viruses, and other pathogens have contaminated wild salmon stocks swimming nearby.

"A more insidious ecological risk to wild salmon comes from the escape of farm fish from netpen facilities," the authors wrote, noting that well over a million salmon have escaped from farms in Washington and British Columbia during the past decade. Most of the escapees were Atlantic salmon (*Salmo salar*), which, although not indigenous to the Pacific Northwest, are the main species raised in West Coast fish farms.

"Escapees are capable of establishing and reproducing in the wild and competing with wild salmon populations for food and habitat," according to the authors, who noted that Atlantic salmon have been found in dozens of rivers and lakes throughout British Columbia and Alaska. The report also found that open netpen aquaculture can threaten other organisms by releasing untreated nutrients, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals into the marine ecosystem. Such concerns led the government of British Columbia to establish a six-year moratorium on salmon farming in 1996. Strict regulations for waste disposal were finally introduced last year when the moratorium was lifted. Whether the regulations are successful in curbing pollution will depend on how rigorously they are enforced, the authors wrote.

YEAR-ROUND DEMAND

The authors pointed to several reasons why aquaculture producers have been able to outcompete commercial fishers—including technological advancements, a highly capitalized and consolidated corporate sector, cost-cutting measures, and the ability to provide consumers with a consistently fresh product year-round. Commercial fisheries, on the other hand, tend to be relatively small operations that depend on seasonal harvests, which vary in size and quality from year to year.

According to the report, salmon farmers also have benefited from several globalization trends: rapid expansion of the seafood trade; overnight transport of fresh products around the world; and a strong market demand for homogenous, made-to-order products.

"Unfortunately, the globalized market structure and increasing international competition for salmon products often undermine local efforts to protect environmental quality and marine resources," Naylor explained.

INDUSTRY OVERHAUL

According to the report, the fishing sector is now on the verge of major restructuring—similar to the transformation that occurred in agriculture and rural communities in the lower 48 states. In Alaska, plans are currently on the table for new cooperative fishing programs and a restructuring of producer-processor relationships.

"The good news is that the aquaculture revolution is forcing more efficiency on a sector sorely in need of such change. The bad news is that such change involves considerable human suffering and community disruption," Naylor explained. "The social impacts of salmon aquaculture in the Pacific Northwest and Alaska have been equally, if not more, acute than the environmental impacts."

Despite the obvious environmental and social impacts of salmon aquaculture, the United States, Canada, and other salmon fishing countries have yet to implement and enforce effective measures to protect coastal ecosystems and communities.

The authors suggest the following strategies to minimize the potential harm caused by aquaculture operations:

- Enforcing an international moratorium on salmon farming—as was done in British Columbia—to allow environmental policy to catch up with the rapid growth of the industry;
- Creating a single agency to regulate commercial fishing and aquaculture in each country;
- Increasing demand for environmentally friendly fish by marketing them with eco-labels;
- Creating an international treaty with specific environmental and product-quality mandates.

The report was funded by the David and Lucile Packard Foundation. ■

PAYNE LECTURES

There were two Visiting Payne Distinguished Lecturers at Stanford IIS during the past academic year.

During the winter quarter, **Walter van Gerven** delivered a four-part series on the European Union called "EU: Scandals, Reforms, Future."

Walter van Gerven is professor of law at the Leuven Center for a Common Law of Europe in Belgium. He was formerly vice rector and chairman of the Social Sciences Group of Leuven and formerly president of the Belgian Banking Commission. He has also served as Advocate General of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg and on a committee of independent experts to examine fraud, nepotism, and mismanagement in the European Union Commission.

Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was the Spring 2003 Payne Lecturer at the Institute. In lectures collectively entitled "Humanitarian Action and War," she shared lessons learned during her decade-long tenure as High Commissioner in the 1990s.

Observing firsthand the large-scale human displacements resulting from war, Mrs. Ogata noted specifically the problems of protection, resettlement, and reintegration. Her experiences in Iraq, the Balkans, and later in Rwanda confirmed her belief that in addition to protecting refugees in the height of the conflict, the humanitarian mission should also include "rebuilding war-torn societies through phases of building security and communal reconciliation" after the conflict. This belief served as the basis for a recent report on human security published by the Commission on Human Security, which she chaired.

The report outlines six broad steps for furthering human security in distressed regions by means of individual empowerment. ■

CISAC'S 20 YEARS

The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) is one of the nation's leading university-based research institutes in the field of international security.

CISAC traces its roots to an undergraduate class first offered in 1970 entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament." The turbulence of the Vietnam War years had arrived at Stanford, and anti-war protests and mass teach-ins were common occurrences on campus. At one of the teach-ins, John Lewis, a noted China scholar, met Wolfgang Panofsky, then director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), and John Barton, a professor at the Law School. All three, Lewis recalls, found that the students at the protests had little knowledge about how security policy is made and about larger dangers of a possible war with the Soviet Union. In response, the professors set out to create a teaching environment in which students from different backgrounds could examine international security issues and better understand how government policy is formulated.

The "Arms Control and Disarmament" class was the seed for a larger program in arms control, which evolved into the Center for International Security and Arms Control in 1983, with John Lewis and Sidney Drell as its first co-directors. In 1998, the Center for International Security and Arms Control changed its name to the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Over its 20 years, CISAC faculty and staff have produced award-winning research, contributed to national and international policy making, and trained many specialists in international security affairs.

The Center continues to promote a creative and collaborative environment in which scholars, scientists, policy-makers, and students can explore innovative solutions to complex international security issues from a variety of viewpoints and disciplines. ■


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STANFORD IIS

1 Andrei Sakharov visited CISAC in August 1989. He is pictured with Sidney Drell.

2 Colonel Zou Yunhua of China's Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense was a 1997–98 visiting scholar with CISAC's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

3 Lynn Eden is associate director for research and a senior research scholar. Her work focuses on nuclear history over the past half century and organizational approaches to security.

4 In 2000, Susan Rice, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, discussed implementing peace agreements at CISAC. The Center's work on ethnic conflict, civil wars, and peacekeeping has grown over the past several years.

5 Ashton Carter, co-director of the Preventive Defense Project, Willam Perry, the 19th Secretary of Defense, David Hamburg, co-chair of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and president emeritus of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and Warren Christopher, the 63rd Secretary of State, convened a conference in 1999 on "Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Defense" in response to the nuclear developments in India and Pakistan. Perry chairs CISAC's executive committee and is also co-director of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard Universities.

6 David Holloway's historical work on the Soviet nuclear weapons program helped broaden the Center's growing focus on the Soviet Union. Holloway was director of the Stanford Institute of International Studies from 1998 until September 2003.

7 John Lewis escorted Li Peng, then vice premier of China, around the Stanford campus during a 1985 visit. Lewis, one of CISAC's founders, directs the work of the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.

8 CISAC traces its roots to an undergraduate class first offered in 1970 entitled "Arms Control and Disarmament." Since 1970, more than 2,500 students have enrolled in the course, and many of them have gone on to work in security policy. Here Brad Cohen and Marco Costales take part in a crisis simulation, signing an arms control agreement, in 1984.

9 Her Excellency Maleeha Lodhi, then ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, spoke on the future of security in South Asia in 2001. She is pictured with Thomas Simons, former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, and Scott Sagan, CISAC co-director. Sagan's work

"Avoiding nuclear war is a moral obligation we all have. Self-appointed scientist-experts cannot wage that battle alone. …What can one person do? Let me assure you, when there is a sustained, informed, responsible public constituency, it does make a difference."

SIDNEY DRELL, LECTURING TO STANFORD STUDENTS IN 1985

CISAC'S CO-DIRECTORS

Sidney Drell	1983–1988
John Lewis	1983–1991
William Perry	1988–1993
Michael May	1993–2000
David Holloway	1991–1997
Scott Sagan	1997–present
Christopher Chyba	2000–present


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
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focuses on the perils of proliferation in South Asia and elsewhere in the world.

10 Training the next generation of security specialists is a key component of CISAC's mission. The Center's university setting provides a world-class training ground in the field of security studies for undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate students from a variety of disciplines. This year CISAC graduated the third class of its Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies. Here Steve Stedman, honors program director, leads the convocation.

11 Michael May, director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, conducts research on the technical aspects of international security. In 1999, he discussed China's energy infrastructure with research associate Chi Zhang.

12 Sally Ride, the first American woman in space, was the Center's annual Drell Lecturer in April 2002. The Drell Lecture is named for physicist, arms control expert, and CISAC founder Sidney Drell, with whom Ride worked as a CISAC science fellow in the late 1980s.

13 In 1997, Condoleezza Rice, currently National Security Advisor, and Coit Blacker, currently director of Stanford IIS, team-taught "International Security in a Changing World" with Mike May, William Perry, and Scott Sagan. The course surveys the major international and regional security problems of the modern world. Rice and Blacker have been involved in CISAC since its inception.

14 Christopher Chyba was awarded a MacArthur Fellowship in October 2001. Chyba works on recommendations for biodefense strategies for the United States and the world, in addition to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy.

15 In 1999, Gail Lapidus, senior fellow, led a study tour along the Silk Road in Central Asia. Her work focuses on the impact of the Soviet legacy on patterns of conflict in the post-Soviet states, and conflict management and prevention.

Nuclear Threats, Rogues, and Madman Theory

BY SCOTT D. SAGAN, CO-DIRECTOR OF CISAC AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE MOST IMPORTANT FACT about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program has been ignored in the debate about the inaccuracy of U.S. prewar intelligence: we were extremely fortunate that Saddam Hussein did not deploy such weapons into the field where they could have been used against American soldiers. Widespread use of chemical weapons and especially biological agents could have caused thousands of casualties among U.S. troops and innocent Iraqi bystanders.

How would President Bush have responded in that grisly scenario? More important, how should he respond in the future if the two remaining members of the "axis of evil"—North Korea and Iran—use biological or chemical weapons against the U.S. or its allies? The U.S. government long ago got rid of the biological and chemical weapons that were plentiful in our early Cold War arsenal and could therefore not retaliate in kind. Is nuclear retaliation a possibility?

These are not fantastic questions. Policy pronouncements from Pyongyang, Teheran, and Washington should raise alarms about dangers on the horizon.

U.S. intelligence officials are unsure whether North Korea is bluffing when it claims to possess a handful of nuclear weapons. But they do believe that North Korea has chemical weapons—Pyongyang refuses to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention—and could produce biological agents such as anthrax, cholera, and plague quickly if needed. Moreover, North Koreans state that they have every right to use weapons of mass destruction in a war against the U.S. since they apparently believe allegations (which have been revealed as KGB fabrications) that the U.S. used biological weapons to spread smallpox, influenza, and cholera during the Korean War. If there is a conventional war on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang is primed to use all available weaponry to stave off defeat.

The political leaders in Teheran will also be tempted to use chemical or biological weapons if the U.S. military launches a preventive attack on their nuclear facilities. The Islamic revolutionaries developed and used chemical weapons in response to Saddam's chemical attacks in the Iraq-Iran war. The CIA now believes that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps possesses both chemical and biological weapons and has trained extensively for their use.

In Washington, Bush Administration officials have repeatedly said that they hold open the possibility of nuclear retaliation in response to a large-scale biological or chemical attack and the administration recently ordered the national laboratories to design new nuclear warheads that could destroy underground biological weapon stores. When asked last year why he wanted these low-yield nuclear weapons, President Bush said "we've got all options on the table, because we want to make it very clear to nations that you will not threaten the United States or use weapons of mass destruction against us, our allies or friends."

Should President Bush directly threaten or actually use nuclear weapons under any circumstances in a future conflict with Iran or North Korea? Most Americans would assume that prudent Washington officials would never take reckless actions.

The confidence that American leaders are always responsible custodians of nuclear power should be shaken, however, by newly declassified evidence analyzed by Jeremi Suri and me in an article, "The Madman Nuclear Alert," in the Spring 2003 issue of *International Security*. In October 1969, Richard Nixon secretly ordered U.S. nuclear weapons to be readied for use to convince the Soviets that he would "do anything" to end the Vietnam War if Moscow would not convince Hanoi to accept a negotiated peace on America's terms. Eighteen B-52 bombers flew over the Arctic Ocean with thermonuclear weapons on board and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) placed over 150 bombers on the runways of air bases across the country and quickly loaded them with nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird sought to stop what he believed was a dangerous military operation, but Nixon was encouraged by Henry Kissinger to believe that his "madman theory" might work and insisted that Laird carry out his orders.

The American system of checks and balances failed to inhibit the execution of this unbalanced presidential decision. Moreover, recently declassified documents demonstrate that Laird's concerns were well founded. Two of the nuclear-armed bombers nearly collided over the Arctic, and the local SAC commanders waived the strict peacetime safety regulations to permit uncertified personnel to handle nuclear weapons during the air base alert operation.

Today, as then, nuclear threats and alerts raise hidden dangers. One obvious risk is an accident that would produce a "dirty bomb" effect: if a nuclear weapon's conventional explosive discharged without detonating the nuclear component, the spread of the radioactive material would produce an environmental and health disaster.

An even more serious danger could emerge, however, if U.S. threats encouraged North Korea to place its nuclear weapons on an increased readiness state. Because new proliferators have primitive weapons designs, the risk of an accidental nuclear detonation there is grave. If a mushroom cloud appeared with little warning over North Korea's Yongbyong reactor site, would leaders in the capital assume this was an American attack or consider the possibility that their own bomb went off by accident?

A final danger of nuclear threats is that they can create a commitment trap. U.S. threats may indeed help deter some aggressive regimes by increasing the costs that their leaders would consider when contemplating a biological or chemical attack. But what if deterrence fails? If our bluff is called after making a threat, then concerns about international credibility and domestic reputation would put intense pressures on any president to follow through on his threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons.

History and logic suggest that nuclear threats are a most dangerous tool for diplomatic signaling. Instead of brandishing its nuclear arsenal, the United States should state clearly that it will overthrow any regime—and punish all military officers and political leaders—responsible for using weapons of mass destruction. Such a policy would enhance deterrence without raising hidden dangers or increasing pressures on a president to do what he would not want to if biological or chemical attacks occur.

During the 1991 Gulf War, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft advised President George H.W. Bush that "it is bad practice to threaten something that you have no intention of carrying out." That is advice that deserves to be repeated and remembered today. ■

DRELL LECTURE

The 2003 Drell Lecturer, Dr. Margaret Hamburg, vice president for biological programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative in Washington, DC, spoke on May 29 about "Bioterrorism: A Challenge to Science and Security" at Kresge Auditorium, Stanford University.

Dr. Hamburg noted that the issue of bioterrorism is broad and has no quick fixes. Instead, there is a need for new priorities, partnerships, and investments.

Bioterrorism, she said, is an international problem that must be addressed internationally, with the recent SARS outbreak and anthrax cases illustrating the importance of advance preparation for bioterrorist attack.

The annual Drell Lecture is sponsored by the Center for International Security and Cooperation at the Stanford Institute for International Studies. Last year's Drell Lecturer was Dr. Sally Ride, Professor of Space Science at the University of California, San Diego, who spoke about "Space and National Security." ■

EARLIER THIS YEAR, Stanford IIS scholars were active in the public and policy discussions on SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and ways to protect the United States against global epidemics, whether natural or due to bioterrorism.

In June, CISAC sponsored a panel discussion on SARS with John Lewis, director of the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region at CISAC; Michael Lynn, a physician and a CISAC visiting scholar; Douglas Owens, associate professor of medicine with CHP/PCOR; and Margaret Race, visiting fellow at CISAC.

Drawing on the advice of CISAC co-director Christopher Chyba and other leading experts, U.S. Senator Joseph Biden introduced new legislation in April aimed at combating the worldwide spread of infectious diseases. The Global Pathogen Surveillance Act would enhance global disease surveillance by providing targeted assistance for developing nations to improve their capability to link up with the World Health Organization's global surveillance network. In June, U.S. Rep. Mark Kirk, along with U.S. Rep. Ellen Tauscher, introduced the identical bill in the House of Representatives. The legislation has been referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on International Relations.

SARS

(SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME)

Only luck has spared the U.S. from the SARS epidemic so far, experts say.

The United States can best protect itself against global epidemics by bolstering the defense capabilities of its allies, university experts said last week.

"The lesson from SARS, when it come to bio-defenses, is not so much what we need to do within the U.S. but what we need to do internationally," said Michael Lynn, a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). "The better able countries are in dealing with their own epidemics, the better off we are. SARS is a gentle reminder that our fate is intertwined with that of other nations."

Lynn, a physician, discussed the worldwide SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic at a panel sponsored by the Institute for International Studies on June 4. At the time, 8,300 cases of the contagious virus had been reported, 5,350 of which were in the People's Republic of China, where it first appeared last fall. John Lewis, professor emeritus of Chinese politics; Douglas Owens, associate professor of medicine; and Margaret Race, a biologist and visiting CISAC fellow, also participated in the lunchtime discussion.

Although the broader U.S. medical community has understood the significance of SARS as a new kind of disease, Lynn said he was skeptical of the level of understanding among Washington policymakers.

"They've been congratulating themselves we've done such a fantastic job in this country... [that] we've done everything right," he said. "I would argue that is exactly the wrong lesson to take from SARS. I think we've been exceptionally lucky [that no one in the United States has died from SARS] and that this will come back to haunt us if we're not careful next fall and winter. If SARS follows the traditional appearance pattern of influenza, I suspect we will see a lot more cases at that time."

According to Owens, SARS could become a "spectacularly difficult" problem during the upcoming flu season because both illnesses share the same symptoms. Diagnosis of SARS—which is untreatable—remains difficult. "No one has said a good diagnostic test will be developed by winter," Owens said. "It's going to be a major problem." Developing an effective vaccine "could take years," he added.

Lewis, a veteran China expert, cautioned that SARS could proliferate in a manner similar to the deadly Spanish influenza pandemic of 1918-19. Although Western sources report that 22 million died from the disease, Lewis said, Chinese figures state a far higher 70 million deaths because "huge numbers of deaths in Asia didn't get reported."

China is particularly sensitive to the global outbreak of SARS, Lewis continued, because in the spring of 1917, tens of thousands of Chinese workers were sent to the Franco-German front to dig trenches during World War I. According to Lewis, workers carried the flu virus, which then spread to soldiers, who brought it home after the war and it quickly spread worldwide. Lewis said this experience helps explain why Chinese authorities, after initially failing to face the SARS crisis, have launched a full-scale military response to the epidemic.

This time, with the escalating number of reported SARS cases causing worldwide outcry, Lewis said, the Chinese Politburo met in "full battle crisis" April 19. China's firm response appears to have helped stem the epidemic. For the first time in six months, Lewis said, no new cases of SARS were reported June 3 and 4.

Nevertheless, Lynn said SARS should be a "wakeup call" to the potential threat posed by future epidemics. He said, the United States should help pay for stockpiles of medicines, antibiotics, vaccines, and antidotes to be set up in allied nations.

While such stockpiles would be ineffective against SARS, Lynn said they could be critical in combating other deadly epidemics in an interconnected world. "The fact remains that a smallpox outbreak anywhere in the world, for example, in Paris, is going to guarantee an outbreak in New York," he said. ■

EDITED VERSION OF ARTICLE IN THE STANFORD REPORT, JUNE 11, 2003

CISAC Scholar Urges More Protections for Nation's "Biological Security"

More than 140 million people fly into the United States from overseas every year. Most flights take less than one day—far less than the 12-day incubation period for smallpox. The upshot? A contagious disease outbreak overseas, whether natural or due to bioterrorism, could spread to the United States long before an epidemic is recognized.

Christopher Chyba, co-director of the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, talked about the growing need for biological security and how it differs from nuclear security at an April 3 talk sponsored by Biomedical Ethics Grand Rounds in the Medical School. Chyba, an associate professor of geological and environmental sciences, argued that early detection and containment of a biological attack is the most effective response to this growing threat.

"Not only is there a moral argument for improving international disease surveillance and response, there is a pure national interest argument," Chyba said. "We want to detect outbreaks as quickly as possible and shut them down. There's a huge impact in terms of reduction of casualties and economic harm if you can recognize it's happening quickly and therefore can respond quickly."

Unlike the production of nuclear weapons, which still largely depend on large, expensive facilities, biological weapons can be made in a variety of settings that can be harder to detect and monitor because they can be designed for more than one purpose, he said. Established strategies used to combat the spread of nuclear weapons —nonproliferation and deterrence—are less effective in combating the spread of biological weapons. Unlike nuclear weapons that require highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium—substances that are complicated and expensive to manufacture—biological agents can be obtained from natural disease outbreaks or even from laboratories.

Furthermore, a strategy of deterrence is unlikely to be effective in a biological or chemical terrorist attack, he said. For example, it is still unknown who carried out the deadly anthrax attacks in the United States in October 2001.

Since the mid-1990s, Chyba has called for improved disease surveillance as part of a broader effort to combat bioterrorism. On April 10, his lobbying efforts and those of other experts paid off when Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) introduced legislation aimed at combating the worldwide spread of infectious diseases.

"Homeland security requires that we recognize disease outbreaks overseas quickly, so that they can be controlled as fast as possible," he said after the legislation was introduced. "Yet, the global disease surveillance system remains surprisingly weak—outbreaks can go unrecognized for too long, allowing contagious disease to spread before we know what's happening. The [act] tackles this problem head on by building infrastructure, communications, and training." ■

EDITED VERSION OF ARTICLE IN THE STANFORD REPORT, APRIL 18, 2003

Prominent Islam Scholars Draw Large Campus Crowds

BY ERIK G. JENSEN AND SHRIN SINNAR

As events in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Palestine/Israel continue to dominate headlines, the public demand for information on Islam and what it stands for is thriving. Last winter's initiative on "Islam and the Rule of Law" at the Stanford Institute for International Studies in collaboration with Stanford Law School responded to the burgeoning curiosity about Islamic law in the Stanford community and public at large.

Offering both a lecture series open to the public and classroom seminars for enrolled Stanford students, the program was held during winter quarter 2003 and drew the most noted scholars in Islamic law from around the country to campus. The speakers focused on Islamic legal issues of greatest contemporary interest: women's rights, criminal law, democracy, violence and tolerance, and economic development. At the same time, the lecturers returned repeatedly to questions of interpretation and historical context in analyzing these hot-button issues that are challenging Muslim societies the world over.

The majority of public lectures drew audiences of over one hundred, forcing the Institute to find a larger room to accommodate the unanticipated enthusiasm for the series. Students who enrolled in the course attended both the lectures and separate seminars with the same speakers on the following day.

The lectures and course introduced the public and students to some of the gripping questions of contemporary Islam: Who has authority to interpret and implement the law in Islam? How do Muslim thinkers reconcile eternal divine law with particular social and historical conditions? How does Islam view the ethics of warfare and the rules within war? How do Islamic economic principles, like the prohibition on bank interest, affect economic development in Muslim countries?

Many of the speakers were Muslims who approach these questions from an "internal" perspective. That is, rather than dispassionate scholars observing changes in Islamic thought from the outside, they are scholars who are triggering internal debates within Muslim communities.

Khaled Abou El Fadl, a UCLA law professor who spoke on Islam and the rules of war, has achieved fame and notoriety in recent years for criticizing modern Islamic movements for deviating from the original diversity and richness of Islamic thought. He provoked the audience by arguing that those who simplistically claim that Islam is either inherently violent or inherently peace-loving are both misguided.

Sherman Jackson, of the University of Michigan, a prominent Muslim thinker and orator, engaged the audience as he examined the tension and competition between classical Islamic jurisprudence and the advancement of a political agenda through "a vision of that which is truly Islamic."

Stanford historian Ahmad Dallal, who also served as a key adviser for the course, surprised the audience by arguing that historically, the Islamic world had two centers of authority: the state and the 'ulema, or religious scholars, and that the 'ulema had been successful throughout most of Islam's history in resisting cooptation by the state. Amira Sonbol, a Georgetown historian, argued that women had more rights in courts of the Ottoman Empire than they did after the coming of the nation-state.

The course moved from the historical to the contemporary and introduced Afghanistan as an example of a Muslim country struggling anew to find a relationship between religion and the state that works for its people, and Pakistan, a country that has tried for decades to find its equilibrium. One speaker, Stanford Law graduate Alex Thier, flew in from Kabul, where he is an adviser to The Asia Foundation in the development of Afghanistan's legal system. Hamid Sharif, of the Office of General Counsel of the Asian Development Bank, discussed contemporary issues of legal and judicial reform in Pakistan.

The course ended with a remarkably lucid, accessible, and thought-provoking account of Islamic law and economic development (or underdevelopment) by Mahmood El Gamal, an economist at Rice University.

Members of the public and students asked why the course was entitled Islam and the "rule of law." This dimension of the series attempted to relate Islamic law and institutions to contemporary international development. In Western liberal thought, the "rule of law" means many things, but usually includes a certain commitment to democracy, limitations on the power of government, and a respect for individual rights.

The international enthusiasm for "rule of law" funding in the millions of dollars annually includes the Middle East and Muslim countries. But very little attention has been paid to the interaction of the usual rule of law projects—strengthening the courts, codifying laws, etc.—with Islamic law and legal institutions, or with the culture, history, and politics that surround those institutions in Muslim countries.

The lecture series was made possible by donations from Ms. Lola Grace, a Stanford graduate and New York-based investment banker who sits on the Board of Visitors of Stanford IIS; and Microsoft Corporation through its grant to the Law School's Rule of Law Program. ■

ERIK G. JENSEN, WITH CDDRL, IS CO-DIRECTOR OF THE RULE OF LAW PROGRAM AT STANFORD LAW SCHOOL. SHRIN SINNAR, A TEACHING ASSISTANT AT THE LAW SCHOOL LAST YEAR, IS CLERKING FOR JUDGE WARREN J. FERGUSON OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

Two Reports on Bioterrorism Preparedness

The Stanford-UCSF Evidence-Based Practice Center, which operates under the leadership of key members of the Center for Health Policy/Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research, has produced two evidence reports on bioterrorism preparedness, whose conclusions may help clinicians, public health officials, and government agencies to more effectively design and evaluate tools and strategies for responding to bioterrorism.

The reports, funded by the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, have been prepared by Dr. Dena Bravata, Dr. Douglas Owens, and Kathy McDonald at CHP/PCOR.

The first report, "Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response: Use of Information Technologies and Decision-Support Systems," synthesizes the available data on the usefulness and effectiveness of more than 200 computer-based systems designed to facilitate diagnosis, management, communication/reporting, surveillance, outbreak investigation, and command-and-control tasks during a bioterrorism response. The broad variety of systems examined are used around the world and ranged from a Web-based system that tracks influenza cases worldwide to handheld devices that test suspicious powders for the presence of anthrax spores.

The same CHP/PCOR team is now preparing a second report that examines whether regionalized responses to bioterrorism, such as centralizing surveillance at a countywide or statewide level, would be demonstrably more effective than a localized approach.

For the project, titled "Regionalization of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response," the researchers examined and synthesized more than 10,000 peer-reviewed articles, news media accounts, and Web-based material on regional responses to the 2001 anthrax outbreaks, the emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), natural disasters such as hurricanes and earthquakes, bioterrorism surveillance, and the provision of specialty medical care such as trauma care.

The researchers found numerous systems that have been designed for regional responses to natural disasters but have recently been expanded for bioterrorism, such as mutual aid agreements that facilitate the sharing of personnel and resources during emergencies. But they found no evaluative information about the costs and benefits of regionalizing the distribution of antibiotics for and vaccinations against bioterrorism-related illnesses such as anthrax and smallpox.

The report will be available in early 2004. ■

New Publications from SPICE

THE STANFORD PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS-CULTURAL EDUCATION (SPICE) SERVES AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN STANFORD UNIVERSITY AND K-14 SCHOOLS BY DEVELOPING MULTIDISCIPLINARY CURRICULUM MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL THEMES. AS PART OF STANFORD IIS, IT REFLECTS THE SCHOLARSHIP OF THE UNIVERSITY IN ITS CURRICULA AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SEMINARS FOR TEACHERS.

COMPARATIVE HEALTH CARE

This curriculum unit introduces students to health care in general and to comparative health-care-related issues between the United States and Japan, specifically. The unit includes a lesson on bioethics that introduces students to the ethical considerations surrounding the issues of brain death and organ transplantation in the United States and Japan. Other lessons focus on aging and health care financing and delivery.

DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH: BASEBALL AND JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT

The purpose of this curricular guide is not only to introduce Japanese–American internment through the prism of baseball but also to encourage students to consider civil liberties during times of crisis. This guide (with accompanying book and documentary) can be used as a supplement to SPICE's comprehensive curriculum unit Civil Rights and Japanese–American Internment.

ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS IN CHINA

In this unit, students examine the experiences and challenges of China's ethnic groups as well as their geographic distribution and cultural and linguistic features. Focusing on the Hui, Tibetans, Mongols, and the Miao, topics such as the creation of ethnic identities and groups, sovereignty, assimilation, stereotypes, and representation are addressed. Through studying another country's experiences and challenges, students can apply what they have learned to similar issues in their own society and culture.

ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION AND THE ARTS

The objective of this unit is to teach students about various elements of Islamic civilization through a humanities approach. A hands-on exploration of Islamic art and architecture, Arabic script and calligraphy, mosques, music, and poetry will encourage students to gain an appreciation for Islamic history and culture.

MAPPING EUROPE

This curriculum unit introduces students to the concept of political geography. Interactive activities introduce Europe's principal physical features, major cities, and climate. Special attention is devoted to the development of the European Union over time.

REGIONAL WARS AND PEACEKEEPING

This curriculum unit examines three case studies of ongoing regional wars—in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kashmir—and one past regional war, in Guatemala. Students are introduced to these wars in their historical and global context, as well as in the context of efforts to establish and maintain peace.

SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND TERRORISM

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism has become the defining characteristic of U.S. foreign policy. This unit, based on and including annotated lectures from a Stanford University course,



provides students with the background and tools to define terrorism; understand the nature of liberal democratic societies; evaluate specific counterterrorist measures; and decide how they think terrorism is best countered. ■

SPICE PROGRAMS & SEMINARS

The Reischauer Scholars Program is a distance-learning course sponsored by SPICE and the United States–Japan Foundation. Twenty U.S. high school students will be selected to participate in an Internet-mediated course from February to June 2004.

The program will provide participants with a broad overview of Japanese history, literature, religion, art, politics, and economics, with a special focus on the U.S.–Japan relationship. Stanford IIS senior fellows Michael Armacost and Daniel Okimoto from the Asia-Pacific Research Center, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S. Ryozo Kato, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Howard Baker, and other top scholars will provide lectures on CD-ROM and many will engage students in on-line dialogue.

Concurrent with the Internet-based course, students will develop individual research projects. Students will also be required to lead two presentations on Japan at their schools or in their communities.

In January, SPICE will begin its third year of teacher professional development seminars on East Asia. The seminars are a collaboration between SPICE and the National Consortium for Teaching about Asia in an effort to promote and enrich teaching and learning about East Asia in middle and high school classrooms.

Teacher participants attend five full-day sessions, each of which includes a content lecture by a specialist covering a topic such as contemporary Korea or religions in China. Lectures are followed by a curriculum presentation by SPICE staff demonstrating ways in which teachers can present the content to their students through hands-on activities. ■

The Initiative on Distance Learning: Can International Security Courses Be Successfully Offered in a Distance Setting?

"Understanding each other's values, beliefs and intentions—that is what is needed today in order to cooperate and strengthen partnership between countries and societies…" Alexander Larichev, Law Department, Petrozavodsk State University

For three years, the Initiative on Distance Learning (IDL), which is part of Stanford IIS, has been offering Stanford courses in international security to a regionally and ethnically diverse group of students in the Russian Federation.

The initial goals of the program were to modify Stanford courses for use in a Russian educational environment in order to help rejuvenate the study of the social sciences in Russia, and to create a network of partner universities that would be actively involved in the creation and implementation of the program.

However, as work progressed with the Russian students and instructors, and as discussions about the program's goals continued, it became clear that this was something more than imparting content matter to the students regarding international security—it was about giving the students the skills and dispositions to think critically.

During academic year 2003–2004, IDL will have reached its goal of offering four courses to ten regional universities, from the Siberian plains to the Karelian peninsula. The Russian students and instructors continue to demonstrate their eagerness to participate in this exciting endeavor, despite the "unknowns" that can be associated with a distance-learning setting.

Of the 800 students and 14 instructors involved to date, all have been pleased to learn that they are expected to formulate and defend their own positions and ideas. As Yuliya Yamineva, an instructor from Southern Ural State University, commented on the inclusion in the syllabus of articles by Russian experts (which often contradict the opinions of those expressed by the American authors), "…the content of the course is balanced enough not only to encourage fruitful discussions but also to help the students to live in a pluralistic environment and to form their own positions on various controversial issues."

The IDL program is looking forward to working with the Stanford Center for Innovations in Learning (SCIL) during the next two years to assess the program under the auspices of a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. The Foundation is interested in examining an international distance-learning program that contains high levels of interactivity between the host campus and the learners. And those involved in IDL are eager to learn whether its distance-learning model, which has been implemented for the past three years, is robust, and whether it can be used as a viable mechanism for offering international security courses to students in other transitioning countries. ■

FOR MORE INFORMATION ON IDL, PLEASE VISIT OUR WEBSITE AT HTTP://IDL.STANFORD.EDU.

ALLEN WEINER HAS JOINED STANFORD IIS

Allen S. Weiner, the first holder of the Warren Christopher Chair in International Law and Diplomacy, joined the Stanford Institute for International Studies in September 2003.

Professor Weiner is primarily associated with the research program in the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), where he will be a member of the Rule of Law group, along with Gerhard Casper, Tom Heller, Helen Stacy, and Erik Jensen. He will also have ties with the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), given his earlier experience in the State Department's Office of Politico-Military Affairs and his interest in international humanitarian law.

He will be teaching in the Law School as a member of the law faculty, and he will advise undergraduate and graduate students.

Professor Weiner graduated from Stanford Law School in 1989. He joined the State Department and in 1996 became legal counselor at the U.S. Embassy in The Hague, where he served as the U.S. government's principal legal representative to various international legal institutions including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice. Professor Weiner will bring an informed perspective on the changing nature of international law, which will be important for the work of the Rule of Law group in CDDRL and for students in the Law School.

FOUR NEW STANFORD IIS FACULTY FELLOWS

The Stanford IIS Faculty Fellows Program was created in 2001 to encourage international research across disciplines and to foster collaboration between Institute faculty and Stanford faculty throughout the University. Appointment term is one academic year and is open to all faculty who are members of the Stanford University Academic Council. Each faculty fellow will actively engage in collegial interaction with scholars in other international disciplines at the Institute and is expected to offer a seminar summarizing his or her work at the end of the term of appointment.

During the 2003–04 academic year, four Stanford faculty members will take up residence in Encina Hall as Stanford IIS Faculty Fellows. They are:

Elizabeth Bernhardt, director of the Stanford Language Center and professor of German studies. Research title: "Foreign Language Study, International Studies, and the American University: The Evolution of Policy Perspectives and Their Prospects."

Lynn Hildemann, associate professor of Environmental Engineering and Science; Air Pollution Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering. Research title: "Assessing the Impacts of Dry Deposition of Air Pollutants on Ecosystems."

Nancy Kollman, professor of Russian History and director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies. Research title: "Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia, 1500–1740."

Frank Wolak, professor of Economics. Research title: "Institutional Design and Market Performance in International Electricity Markets."



WHOLE WORLD ON FIRE

ORGANIZATIONS, KNOWLEDGE, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVASTATION

By Lynn Eden
Cornell University Press

Whole World on Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in an organizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war?

U.S. bombing in World War II caused massive fire damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but later war plans took account only of damage from blast; they completely ignored damage from atomic firestorms. Recently a small group of researchers has shown that for modern nuclear weapons the destructiveness and lethality of nuclear mass fire often—and predictably—greatly exceeds that of nuclear blast. This has major implications for defense policy: the U.S. government has underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons, Lynn Eden finds, and built far more warheads, and far more destructive warheads, than it needed for the Pentagon's war-planning purposes.

How could this have happened? The answer lies in how organizations frame the problems they try to solve. In a narrative grounded in organization theory, science and technology studies, and primary historical sources (including declassified documents and interviews), Eden explains how the U.S. Air Force's doctrine of precision bombing led to the development of very good predictions of nuclear blast—a significant achievement—but for many years to no development of organizational knowledge about nuclear fire. Expert communities outside the military reinforced this disparity in organizational capability to predict blast damage but not fire damage. Yet some innovation occurred, and predictions of fire damage were nearly incorporated into nuclear war planning in the early 1990s. The author explains how such a dramatic change almost happened, and why it did not.

Whole World on Fire shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't do well, may build a poor representation of the world—a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences. In a sweeping conclusion, Eden shows the implications of the analysis for understanding such things as the sinking of the Titanic, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, and the poor fireproofing in the World Trade Center.

The book will be available in December 2003.

LYNN EDEN IS ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH AND SENIOR RESEARCH SCHOLAR AT CISAC.

REFUGEE MANIPULATION

WAR, POLITICS, AND THE ABUSE OF HUMAN SUFFERING

Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, Editors
Brookings Institution Press

Since World War II, refugee organizations have faced a recurrent challenge: the manipulation of refugees by warring parties to further their own aims. Some armies in civil wars, facing military defeat, use refugees as assets to establish the international legitimacy of their cause, treat refugee camps as sanctuaries and recruitment pools, and limit access to refugees to ensure that they will not repatriate.

Focusing on the geopolitical security environment surrounding militarized camps and the response of humanitarian agencies, the contributors to this volume examine the ways armed groups manipulate refugees and how and why international actors assist their manipulation. They then offer suggestions for reducing the ability of such groups to use the suffering of refugees to their own advantage.

The contributors examine three cases: Cambodian refugees along the Thai border in the 1970s and 1980s, Afghan refugees in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and Rwandan refugees in Eastern Zaire from 1994 to 1996. They argue that refugee manipulation occurs because warring parties gain resources in their fight for power and other actors—often the host government and regional and major powers—encourage and support it. Manipulation is allowed to occur because the international refugee regime and major states have not identified a consistent approach to stopping it. In the post-Cold War era the United Nations and its members have chosen to treat the issue as a humanitarian problem instead of a security problem.

As the contributors make clear, however, manipulation of refugees has important ramifications for international security, turning some civil wars into larger protracted regional wars. They argue that the geopolitics of refugee manipulation leads to sobering conclusions about stopping it. Solutions must change the moral, political, and strategic calculations of states that are implicated in the manipulation. As long as the problem is not deemed a security threat, refugee organizations must choose between assistance that prolongs war or walking away from millions who deserve help.

STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN IS SENIOR FELLOW AT CISAC.

FRED TANNER IS DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ACADEMIC AFFAIRS AT THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY.

NEW APARC PUBLICATIONS 1/2003–11/2003

CHINESE ECONOMICS AND FISCAL POLICY

"Tax Reforms for Enhancing the Stable Development of the Chinese Financial System," by Lawrence J. Lau and Guijuan Wang. September 2003.

"The Politics of China's Shareholding System," by Mary Comerford Cooper. June 2003.

"Local Governments and the Chinese Stock Market," by Mary Comerford Cooper. May 2003.

"Internal Organizations and Democratization: Testing the Effect of GATT/WTO Membership," by Mary Comerford Cooper. April 2003.

CHINESE HISTORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

"Politics and Property in Transitional Economies: A Theory of Elite Opportunity," by Andrew G. Walder. April 2003.

"Sociological Dimensions of China's Economic Transition: Organization, Stratification, and Social Mobility," by Andrew G. Walder. April 2003.

KOREAN STUDIES PROGRAM

"The Paradox of Korean Globalization," by Gi-Wook Shin. January 2003.

SOUTH ASIA INITIATIVE

"Went for Cost, Stayed for Quality? Moving the Back Office to India," by Rafiq Dossani and Martin Kenney. September 2003.

"Farmers' Willingness to Pay for Power in India: Conceptual Issues, Survey Results, and Implications for Pricing," by Rafiq Dossani and V. Ranganathan. July 2003.

URBAN DYNAMICS OF EAST ASIA

"Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Urban Dynamics in Chengdu, 1975–2002," by Annemarie Schneider, Karen C. Seto, Douglas R. Webster, Jianming Cai, and Binyi Luo. September 2003.

"Emerging Third-Stage Peri-Urbanization: Functional Specialization in the Hangzhou Peri-Urban Region," by Douglas R. Webster, Jianming Cai, Larissa Muller, and Binyi Luo. September 2003.

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Bequests and life income gifts generally are motivated by affection for Stanford University, or a desire to make a difference. Equally important is the donor's confidence that Stanford will honor the gift, invest it wisely, and use it as intended.

The Founding Grant Society was created to recognize and honor those who have acted to provide future support for Stanford University, including its medical center and the Stanford Institute for International Studies.

Membership in the Society involves no dues or obligations, but is Stanford's way to thank all those who provide support for the University in their estate plans through wills, trusts, life income gifts, IRAs, retirement plans, life insurance designations, and other vehicles. Members receive periodic mailings with campus information and are invited to attend special events featuring prominent faculty speakers.

For more information about the Founding Grant Society and deferred gifts to benefit the Institute, please contact:
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THE NEWSLETTER OF THE STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

FALL 2003

INSIDE:

WELCOME TO Encina COLUMNS

This is the inaugural issue of *Encina Columns*, the new biannual newsletter of the Stanford Institute for International Studies (Stanford IIS), the new name as of September 1, 2003 of the Institute for International Studies (IIS).

The Institute is Stanford University's primary forum for interdisciplinary research on key international issues and challenges. It consists of five major research centers: Asia-Pacific (APARC); Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL); Environmental Science and Policy (CESP); Health Policy (CHP); and International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). It is also home to several other research and educational programs, including the European Forum, the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education, and the Initiative on Distance Learning.

Its mission is to have an impact on international policy by making its research available to a wide audience as it seeks to enrich the educational experience of all members of the Stanford community.

It is our hope that *Encina Columns* will tell the story of the problem-oriented scholarship and policy analysis conducted by the Institute's faculty, who represent a wide array of disciplines and specialties, as well as its visiting scholars. We also hope it will reflect their participation as public intellectuals in the great international debates of the day.

Two issues have dominated foreign-policy discussions during the past year: Iraq and North Korea. As you will see in *Encina Columns*, faculty, visiting scholars, and researchers at Stanford IIS have been at the forefront of these discussions.

In addition, a lecture series on Islam and the Rule of Law was organized jointly with the Law School; bioterrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the problem of failing and failed states continue to be at the top of the Institute's research agenda. Important research has been produced on global warming and other leading environmental and agricultural issues, international health problems, and on democracy-building, economic reform, and the problem of corruption.

Encina Columns will be published each fall and spring and will complement other Stanford IIS publications. We look forward to your participation in our activities and to your comments. Welcome again!

COIT D. BLACKER, DIRECTOR