THE NEWSLETTER OF THE STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES



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SPRING ISSUE
2005

SIIS Panel on the Tsunami

"I think the politics of the tsunami's aftermath can be summarized in two words: carpe diem. Seize the day. Crisis as tragedy, yes, but also as opportunity… And, on balance, I am very, very, very, very, very, very cautiously optimistic." DONALD EMMERSON

SEE PAGES 8 AND 9

VAST DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI ALONG THE INDONESIAN COAST. UN PHOTO BY EVAN SCHNEIDER

Charting Reforms for United Nations

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan created the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change in September 2003 with SIIS and CISAC senior fellow Stephen J. Stedman as its research director to identify the major global threats and generate new ideas about policies and institutions to enable the U.N. to be effective in the 21st century.

The panel issued a four-part report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, in December 2004.

PART ONE: The panel identifies six types of threats of greatest global concern: war between states; violence within states; poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation; nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons; terrorism; and transnational crime. A collective security system must take all member states' threats seriously and deal with them equitably.

PART TWO: In prescribing policies to prevent threats from spreading or worsening, the report emphasizes development as the first line of defense. Combating poverty and infectious disease, the panel argues, will save millions of lives and strengthen states' capacity to deter terrorism, crime, and proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons. The report also urges the U.N. to improve its capacity for preventive diplomacy and mediation and to forge a counterterrorism strategy.

PART THREE: The report reiterates the U.N.'s recognition of states' right to self-defense, but also suggests that the Security Council should consider stepping in more often to exercise its preventive authority. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building are vital to global security, and developed nations should do more to transform their armies into units suitable for peace operations. Post-conflict peace building should be a core function of the U.N.

PART FOUR: The report prescribes revitalization of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and creation of a new Peacebuilding Commission. On the Security Council, the report provides two options for achieving reforms: one would appoint new permanent members, and the other would establish new long-term, renewable seats. Neither option creates any new vetoes. ■

SEE PAGES 4 AND 5

SIIS INTERNATIONAL DAY
Challenges in a New Era

Stanford Institute
for International Studies
First Annual Conference & Dinner

May 6, 2005
Stanford University

SEE PAGE 13

Why Nation Building Is a Known Unknowable

BY JASON BROWNLEE

AS THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ REMINDS US, nation building confounds its architects' designs with almost predictable regularity. Investments of time, resources, and specialized knowledge have not enabled large-scale political engineering. Instead, would-be nation builders have been frustrated by a proliferation of unintended consequences and their inability to elicit societal participation in their projects. Results depend more upon initial conditions prior to an intervention than the nation builder's exertions upon arrival.

Hence, the U.S. has performed most poorly when its mission required the most work (e.g., Somalia, Haiti, Iraq). Conversely, it has done best where it did less (Germany, Japan), deferring to old-regime civil servants and upgrading already functional institutions. Given the humbling record of Western powers at navigating the perils of macro-level political planning, the "how" of nation-building should be considered, in the formulation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, a known unknown.

> *"[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know."*
>
> U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD

More likely, it is a known unknow*able*. The extent of unintended consequences and contingency in large-scale political engineering makes disappointment certain and disaster likely.

Twentieth-century experiences belie the notion that nation-building successes will solve the problem of state failures. Forces trying to impose regime change and raise new state structures immediately grapple with societal inertia and their own deficit in understanding local politics.

This dilemma pushes would-be nation builders down one of two undesirable paths. Either they recognize their inability to restructure indigenous political arrangements or they attempt to do so in vain. Despite plans of change at the outset of nation building, those executing the project soon embrace a change of plans.

Thus, even the most committed states have been hampered by an inability to develop political capacity on the ground and improve upon the initial endowments of the country being occupied. Institutional value-added has been minimal, reflecting the problem of state instability back upon those who expected to solve it.

These patterns raise serious doubts about the chances of success in even the most well-intentioned of regime-change missions. They demarcate the limits of projecting state power abroad, whether for humanitarian or security purposes. The failures of imposed regime change lead to the conclusion that indigenous gradual political development—with all of its potential for authoritarianism and civil unrest—may be the optimal path for sustainable democratization and state building.

When comparing the uneven history of post-colonial development with the poor record of nation building we are left paraphrasing Churchill's endorsement of democracy as the worst kind of government except for the alternatives: Sovereign political development may be the worst form of government except for all those kinds of nation building that have been tried.

Infrastructural weakness is not a technical problem surmountable through systematic review of prior experiences. Indeed, the notion of "learning past lessons" deceptively implies that the current generation of academics and policymakers can succeed where their predecessors failed. The idea that nation building is a flawed but salvageable project prejudges its fundamental viability.

Once we have set our sights on rescuing an enterprise that has repeatedly frustrated its architects and their subjects, we screen out alternatives that more effectively serve the same development goals. We also risk funneling research down an intellectual cul-de-sac, at great cost in time, resources, and lives lost for those participating in failed regime-change missions. Therefore, a more productive direction for contemporary interest in nation building may mean backing up and reassessing the core problem of weak states, on one hand, and the limits of foreign intervention, on the other. Ensuring a positive impact on the country considered for intervention requires orienting the enterprise away from the takeover of state functions and toward the short-term provision of aid to local communities.

Apart from the futile pursuit of infrastructural power or the doomed deployment of despotic power (coercion), one can envision a third kind of influence, "regenerative power," which is exercised during relief efforts, such as emergency assistance following natural disasters.

Regenerative power involves neither the adoption of domestic state functions nor physical coercion. It denotes the ability of a state to develop infrastructure under the direction of the local population. For example, it means rebuilding a post office, but not delivering the mail. It is typified by the U.S. response to natural disaster relief within its own borders and abroad.

Regenerative power turns nation building on its head. Rather than imposing a blueprint from outside, participants respond to the needs of the affected community. It is restorative rather than transformative. There is no preexisting master plan for what the "final product" will be, but rather an organically evolving process in which the assisting group serves at the direction of the people being assisted.

The exercise of regenerative power is inherently limited in scale since it depends on local engagement rather than elite planning. It is inimical to macro-level ambitions but it also acquires a bounded effectiveness that imposed regime change lacks. Where nation building attempts to overwrite existing organization and only belatedly incorporates local understanding, disaster relief efforts and regenerative projects begin from the assumption that local communities know best their own needs. Existing social networks and patterns of authority are an asset, not a hindrance, and local know-how offers the principal tool for resolving local crises.

Rather than pursuing the often destructive delusion of interventionist state transformation, regenerative power starts from an interest in using state power for constructive purposes and a sober assessment of the limits of that aim. The assisting foreign groups serve under the direction of indigenous political leaders toward the achievement of physical reconstruction and emergency service provision.

With remarkable prescience Rumsfeld commented in October 2001, "I don't know people who are smart enough from other countries to tell other countries the kind of arrangements they ought to have to govern themselves."

The experience of twentieth century U.S. interventions and ongoing operations in Iraq supports his insight. Proponents of nation building or shared sovereignty arrangements have exaggerated the ability of powerful states to foster institutions in developing countries. The empirical record, from successful outcomes in Germany and Japan to dismal failures across the global south, shows the societies alleged to be most in need of strong institutions have proven the least tractable for foreign administration. Rather than transmitting new modes of organization, would-be nation builders have relied upon existing structures for governance.

This dependence on the very context that was intended for change reveals how little infrastructural power nation builders wield. They are consistently unable to implement political decisions through the local groups. Contrary to recent arguments that sustained effort and area expertise can enable success, nation building has foundered despite such investments.

Understanding that nation building is a "known unknowable" is crucial for redirecting intervention where it can be more effective. Advocates of humanitarian assistance should consider the merits of smaller, regenerative projects that can respond better to uncertainty and avoid the perils of large-scale political engineering. ■

JASON BROWNLEE, A VISITING FELLOW AT CDDRL, IS AN ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN THE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, AUSTIN. HE IS CURRENTLY COMPLETING A BOOK MANUSCRIPT ENTITLED "DURABLE AUTHORITARIANISM IN AN AGE OF DEMOCRACY."

Iraq: Lessons (Not) Learned

BY LARRY DIAMOND

Among the growing number of recent cases where international actors have become engaged in trying to rebuild a shattered state and construct democracy after conflict, Iraq is somewhat unique. The state collapsed not as a result of a civil war or internal conflict, but as a result of external military action to overthrow it. We are still very much in the middle of an internationally assisted political reconstruction process in Iraq, and we will not know for a year or two, or maybe five or ten, the outcome of the postwar effort to rebuild the Iraqi state. Nevertheless, some important lessons can be identified.

PREPARE FOR A MAJOR COMMITMENT

Rebuilding a failed state is an extremely expensive and difficult task under any circumstance, and even more so in the wake of violent conflict. Success requires a very substantial commitment of human and financial resources, delivered in a timely and effective fashion, and sustained over an extended period of time, lasting (not necessarily through occupation or trusteeship, but at least through intensive international engagement) for a minimum of five to ten years.

COMMIT ENOUGH TROOPS

One of the major problems with the American engagement in Iraq is that there were not enough international troops on the ground in the wake of state collapse to secure the immediate postwar order. As a result, Iraq descended into lawless chaos once Saddam's regime fell. The United States Army wanted a much larger force on the ground in order to secure the postwar order, something like 400,000 troops rather than the total invasion force of less than 200,000 that was ultimately authorized. Of course, what is needed is not simply enough troops but the right kind of troops with the proper rules of engagement. It does no good to have troops on the ground if they simply stand by and watch what is left of the state being stolen and burned. One lesson of Iraq is that international post-conflict stabilization missions need to be able to deploy not just a conventional army but a muscular peace implementation force that is somewhere between a war-making army and a crime-fighting police, between a rapid reaction and riot control force.

MOBILIZE INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND COOPERATION

In the contemporary era, a successful effort at post-conflict reconstruction requires broad international legitimacy and cooperation, for at least two key reasons. First, the scope and duration of engagement is typically more than any one country—and public—is willing to bear on its own. The broader the international coalition, the greater the human and financial resources that can be mobilized, and the more likely that the engagement of any participating country can be sustained, as its public sees a sense of shared international commitment and sacrifice.

Second, when there is broad international engagement and legitimacy, people within the post-conflict country are less likely to see the intervention as the imperial project of one country or set of countries. All other things being equal, international cooperation and legitimacy tends to generate greater domestic legitimacy—or at least acceptance—for the intervention.

GENERATE LEGITIMACY AND TRUST WITHIN THE POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY

No international reconstruction effort can succeed without some degree of acceptance and cooperation—and eventually support and positive engagement—from the people in the post-conflict country. Without some degree of trust in the initial international administration and its intentions, the international intervention can become the target of popular wrath, and will then need to spend most of its military (and administrative) energies defending *itself* rather than rebuilding the country and its political and social order. Unfortunately, these qualities were lacking in the occupation of Iraq, and the Iraqi people knew it. From the very beginning, the American occupation failed to earn the trust and respect of the Iraqi people. As noted above, it failed in its first and most important obligation as an occupying power—to establish order and public safety. Then it failed to convey early on any clear plan for post-conflict transition.

All international post-conflict interventions to reconstruct a failed state on more democratic foundations confront a fundamental contradiction. Their goal is, in large measure, democracy: popular, representative, and accountable government, in which "the people" are sovereign. But their means are undemocratic: in essence, some form of imperial domination, however temporary and transitional. This requires a balancing of international trusteeship or imperial functions with a distinctly non-imperial attitude and some clear and early specification of an acceptable timetable for the restoration of full sovereignty. As much as possible, the humiliating features of an extended, all-out occupation should be avoided.

HOLD LOCAL ELECTIONS FIRST

One of the toughest issues on which to generalize concerns the timing of elections. Ill-timed and ill-prepared elections do not produce democracy, or even political stability, after conflict. Instead, they may only enhance the power of actors who mobilize coercion, fear, and prejudice, reviving autocracy and even precipitating large-scale violent strife. In Angola in 1992, in Bosnia in 1996, and in Liberia in 1997, rushed elections set back the prospects for democracy and, in Angola and Liberia, paved the way for renewed civil war. There are therefore compelling reasons, based in logic and in recent historical experience, for deferring national elections until militias have been demobilized, new moderate parties trained and assisted, electoral infrastructure created, and democratic media and ideas generated. International interventions that seek to construct democracy after conflict must balance the tension between domination *for* democracy and withdrawal *through* democracy. In these circumstances, two temptations compete: to transform the country, its institutions and values, through an extended and penetrating occupation (à la British colonial rule), and to hold elections and get out as soon as possible. The question is always, in part, how long can international rule be viable? In Iraq, for better or worse, the answer—readily apparent from history, and from the profound and widespread suspicion of American motives in the region and among Iraqis themselves—was: not long.

DISPERSE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUNDS AND DEMOCRATIC ASSISTANCE AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE

Both for the effectiveness and speed of economic revival, and in order to build up local trust and acceptance, there is a compelling need for the decentralization of relief and reconstruction efforts, as well as democratic civic assistance. The more that the international administration, as well as private donors, works with and through local partners, the more likely that their relief and reconstruction efforts will be directed toward the most urgent needs, and the better the prospect for the accumulation of political trust and cooperation with the overall transition project. In Iraq there was a particularly compelling need for the creation of jobs, which might have been done more rapidly by channeling repair and reconstruction contracts more extensively through a wide range of local Iraqi contractors, instead of through the big American mega-corporations.

PROCEED WITH SOME HUMILITY

This encompasses perhaps the ultimate, overarching contradiction. It is hard to imagine a bolder, more assertive, and self-confident act than a nation, or a set of nations, or "the international community," intervening to seize effective sovereignty in another nation. There is nothing the least bit humble about it. But ultimately the intervention cannot succeed, and the institutions it establishes cannot be viable, unless there is some sense of participation and ultimately "ownership" on the part of the people in the failed and re-emerging state. This is why holding local elections as early as possible is so important. It is why it is so vital to engage local partners, as extensively as possible, in post-conflict relief and economic reconstruction. And it is why the process of constitution making must be democratic and broadly participatory. ■

LARRY DIAMOND, A SENIOR FELLOW AT THE HOOVER INSTITUTION, HEADS THE DEMOCRACY PROGRAM AT CDDRL. THIS ARTICLE IS AN EXCERPT FROM HIS ARTICLE IN THE JANUARY 2005 ISSUE OF THE *JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY*, "LESSONS FROM IRAQ, BUILDING DEMOCRACY AFTER CONFLICT."

University Scholars Play Prominent Role in Charting Reforms for United Nations

STEPHEN STEDMAN

A NEW UNITED NATIONS REPORT recommending the most sweeping reform in the institution's history offers a global vision of collective security for the 21st century that is as committed to development in poor nations as it is to prevention of nuclear terrorism in rich ones.

The point is, according to the report's research director, Stephen Stedman, a threat to one is a threat to all in today's world. "Globalization means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the industrial world would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions around the developing world," the document states.

The report's value lies in putting forward a comparative framework of collective security that addresses all the compelling threats of the day, Stedman explained. "The recommendations really are the most important possible makeover of the institution in 60 years," he said. "I think something is going to come out of it."

Stedman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS), was recruited a year ago by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to direct research for the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. Stedman is an expert on civil wars, mediation, conflict prevention, and peacekeeping.

Annan created the 16-member blue-ribbon panel, made up mostly of former government leaders and ministers, in the wake of widespread heated criticism of the United Nations following the U.S.-led war in Iraq. In Annan's annual report to the General Assembly in 2003, he said, "Rarely have such dire forecasts been made about the U.N. ... We have reached a fork in the road ... a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the U.N. was founded." The panel was charged with analyzing global security threats and proposing far-reaching reforms to the international system.

On December 2 the panel, chaired by former Thai prime minister Anand Panyarachun, issued its 95-page report: "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility." The document identifies six major threats to global security:

- War between states;
- Violence within states, including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses, and genocide;
- Poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation;
- Nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons;
- Terrorism; and
- Transnational organized crime.

Although states do not face these threats equally, a collective security system must take all member states' threats seriously and deal with them equitably, the report noted. It specifically mentioned the world's appallingly slow response to AIDS.

The report makes 101 recommendations for collective prevention and response to the threats, including ways to reform the United Nations. Annan described these in a December 3 editorial in the *International Herald Tribune* as "the most comprehensive and coherent set of proposals for forging a common response to common threats that I have seen."

The document also reaffirms the right of states to defend themselves—even preemptively—when an attack is imminent, and it offers guidelines to help the Security Council decide when to authorize the use of force. Stedman said other significant proposals involve improving biosecurity, strengthening nuclear nonproliferation, and defining terrorism. Panel members agreed that any politically motivated violence against civilians should be regarded as terrorism and condemned.

The panel was very critical of the Human Rights Commission, a body that has often harmed the United Nations' reputation by permitting the membership of some of the worst human-rights violators, including Cuba, Libya, and Sudan. The report also discussed the need for new institutions, such as a peace-building commission, that would support countries emerging from conflict.

STANFORD'S STEPHEN STEDMAN DISCUSSES HIS REPORT WITH THE U.N.'S KOFI ANNAN.

Scott Sagan, co-director of CISAC, described the report as hard-hitting, although he said he would have tried to extend the withdrawal clause of the nonproliferation treaty from three months to a year. "I think it's the beginning of some major changes that will be helpful," he said. "We need to get states to work together to reform the U.N. rather than sniping at it."

CISAC was closely involved in the panel's work and was named in a cover letter accompanying the report from Panyarachun to Annan. Co-director Chris Chyba served on the panel's 30-member resource group, providing expertise on nuclear nonproliferation and bioterrorism. Bruce Jones, a former CISAC Hamburg Fellow, acted as Stedman's deputy, and Tarun Chhabra, a graduate of CISAC's undergraduate honors program and recent Marshall Scholarship recipient, worked as a research officer. Political science Professors David Laitin and James Fearon, and SIIS Senior Fellow David Victor, provided, respectively, expertise on terrorism, civil wars, and the environment, Stedman said. "There is an immense amount of Stanford influence in the report," he added.

CISAC also hosted a nuclear nonproliferation workshop for the panel on campus last March and helped organize a meeting during the summer in Bangkok. SIIS co-hosted a conference on governance and sovereignty on campus in April and a meeting at Oxford University in June. CISAC provided workspace to give the research team a quiet place to focus on writing the report's first draft in August.

The report has attracted intense international media interest in part because it calls for expanding the U.N. Security Council, its top decision-making group, from 15 to 24 members. The panel was unable to agree on one proposal and offers two options that would make the council more representative and democratic. "I believe either

formula would strengthen the legitimacy in the eyes of the world, by bringing its membership closer to the realities of the 21st century—as opposed to those of 1945, when the U.N. Charter was drafted," Annan wrote in the *International Herald Tribune.*

According to Stedman, the media has highlighted the Security Council's proposed expansion because so many nations have a stake in it. "But in the absence of a new consensus on international peace and security, expansion of the council will not be effective," he explained.

In March, Annan will use the report to inform a series of proposals he will present to the 191 U.N. member states. These, in turn, will be submitted to a summit of world leaders before the General Assembly convenes next September in New York. Stedman said he has been asked to stay on for another year as a special advisor to the secretary general to keep the United Nations "on message" during negotiations.

Engagement by the United States, which has openly questioned the institution's relevance, will be critical to implementing the report's recommendations, said Stedman, who added that the superpower can benefit from a revamped United Nations. "Putting threats to the United States into a global framework makes it more secure," he said.

Stedman noted that one of the most disturbing aspects of the panel's consultations was listening to government representatives from civil-society organizations dismiss the seriousness of bio- and nuclear terror threats against the United States. "They were essentially denying this as a real threat to American security," he said. "I said it's as real a threat to the U.S. as other threats are to you."

When Stedman accepted the job, he thought he would spend 80 percent of his time on research and writing and 20 percent on consultations and negotiating. In fact, he said, it was the other way around. "It's unlike anything I've ever done," he said. "It's been a blast." In contrast to academia, where a researcher presents his or her best findings and defends them, Stedman was faced with 16 people who would push back, reject, or accept his work. "I had to work to change language to include their concerns," he said. "My biggest concern at the beginning was that the report would be based on the lowest common denominator. It's not."

Stedman said the panel members remained open-minded throughout the year. "They showed flexibility, listened to arguments, and changed their minds," he said. "Our job was to be as persuasive, rigorous, and comprehensive in our analysis as we were able to achieve."

In the end, Stedman said, the report belongs to the panel. "Parts of what the exercise shows is that access to those making policy is really important," he said. "If you do really good work and you have access, you have a chance of being heard. Kofi Annan gave me that opportunity." ■

REPRINTED FROM THE STANFORD REPORT, DECEMBER 8, 2004.

> *"...a threat to one is a threat to all in today's world."*
>
> STEPHEN STEDMAN

A Way Forward on Global Security

BY KOFI A. ANNAN



While the world has come to a remarkable degree of consensus over the last 10 years on how to grow economies, alleviate poverty, and protect the environment, we are still some way from similar agreement on how to make the world more secure. There, things have, if anything, gotten worse in the last few years.

A moment of global solidarity against terrorism in 2001 was quickly replaced by acrimonious arguments over the war in Iraq, which turned out to be symptomatic of deeper divisions on fundamental questions. How can we best protect ourselves against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction? When is the use of force permissible—and who should decide? Is "preventive war" sometimes justified, or is it simply aggression under another name? And, in a world that has become "unipolar," what role should the United Nations play?

Those new debates came on top of earlier ones that arose in the 1990s. Is state sovereignty an absolute principle, or does the international community have a responsibility to resolve conflicts within states—especially when they involve atrocities?

To suggest answers to such questions, a year ago I appointed a panel of 16 people from all parts of the world and from different fields of expertise, asking them to assess the threats facing humanity today and to recommend how we need to change, in both policies and institutions, in order to meet those threats. On Thursday, they delivered their report, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility." Its 101 recommendations are the most comprehensive and coherent set of proposals for forging a common response to common threats that I have seen.

The report reaffirms the right of states to defend themselves, including preemptively when an attack is imminent, and says that in the case of "nightmare scenarios," for instance those involving terrorists with weapons of mass destruction, the U.N. Security Council may have to act earlier and more decisively than in the past. And it offers guidelines to help the council decide when to authorize the use of force.

No less useful is the panel's reaching of consensus on a definition of terrorism. That is something U.N. members have been unable to do because some have argued that any definition must include the use of armed force against civilians by states, as well as by private groups, and some—especially Arab and Muslim states—have insisted that the definition must not override the right to resist foreign occupation.

But the panel members (including several very eminent Muslim representatives) point out that international law as it stands is much clearer in condemning large-scale use of force against civilians by states than by private groups; and they agree that "there is nothing in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians." If governments follow their lead—as I hope they will—it will be much easier for the U.N. to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, and for me to take the lead in promoting it, as the report asks me to do.

The report also contains a welter of practical proposals to prevent a cascade of nuclear proliferation, to improve bio-security and to make the U.N. itself more effective, notably in prevention and peace-building.

Among the most significant recommendations is the expansion of the Security Council from 15 to 24 members, either by adding six new permanent members, without veto, or by creating a new category of four-year, renewable seats, which would be regionally distributed. I believe either formula would strengthen the council's legitimacy in the eyes of the world, by bringing its membership closer to the realities of the 21st century—as opposed to those of 1945, when the U.N. Charter was drafted.

Above all, it clearly spells out the interconnectedness of our age, in which the destinies of peoples and the threats they face are interwoven. Not only is a threat against one nation a threat against all, but failure to deal with one threat can undermine our defense against all the others. A major terrorist attack in the industrial world can devastate the world economy, plunging millions of people back into extreme poverty; and the collapse of a poor state can punch a hole in our common defense against both terrorism and epidemic disease.

Few people could read this report and remain in doubt that making this world more secure is indeed a shared responsibility, as well as a shared interest. The report tells us how to do it, and why we must act now. It puts the ball firmly in the court of the world's political leaders. It is for them to negotiate the details, but I strongly urge them to act on the main thrust of the recommendations. ■

KOFI ANNAN IS THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL. THIS ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED IN THE *INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE* ON DECEMBER 3, 2004.

Reducing the Risk of Accidental Launch:
A Case for Unilateral Action

BY PAVEL PODVIG

TEN YEARS AGO, on January 25, 1995, Russian early-warning radars detected a scientific rocket launched from Norway. Details of what followed have never been officially disclosed, but the detection apparently generated an alarm that made its way to the Russian political leadership. The nuclear forces' command-and-control system worked exactly as it was supposed to, stopping the alert without launching an attack, but the accident vividly demonstrated the dangers inherent in the launch-on-warning posture of nuclear forces.

The Soviet Union and the United States are the only nuclear states to have implemented launch-on-warning, a combination of early-warning systems to detect a missile attack and command-and-control systems that can launch a retaliatory strike while the aggressor's missiles are in flight. The United States and Russia have preserved this capability as an option for using their strategic nuclear weapons.

The dangers of this rapid-response nuclear posture are widely recognized, but the United States and Russia have nevertheless failed to address this issue. Reducing the level of readiness, known as de-alerting, has not come to the forefront of the U.S.-Russian agenda. One of the reasons for this is their reluctance to enter into new arms control agreements, which are thought to be necessary for a coordinated action in this area. Careful examination of the arguments for de-alerting, though, suggests that there are a number of steps that the United States and Russia could and should take unilaterally.

Discussion of launch-on-warning dangers usually concentrates on the decline of Russian early-warning and command-and-control systems. As a result, most de-alerting measures proposed on the U.S. side are seen primarily as a way to create incentives for Russia to reciprocate. But this perspective overestimates Russia's reliance on the launch-on-warning posture and underestimates the dangers associated with that of the United States.

History shows that the Soviet strategic forces could never rely on radars and satellites to get a timely and accurate assessment of an incoming attack. As a result, the Soviet military never displayed high enough confidence in its early-warning system to make a launch decision based solely on the information provided by the early-warning system.

The United States, on the other hand, built a highly capable and sophisticated early-warning system. It provides global coverage and very high probability of detection of a missile launch, which allows the United States to have a very high degree of confidence in the system. Paradoxically, this confidence potentially makes a catastrophic technical malfunction more dangerous than in the Russian case, since operators might be less likely to question the data provided by the system.

Although it is difficult to quantify the two systems' vulnerability to a possible technical malfunction, the less sophisticated Russian system does not necessarily pose a substantially greater risk of a catastrophic accident than its U.S. counterpart. This means that efforts to reduce the readiness level of the U.S. forces would bring benefits regardless of reciprocity.

Concerns about the deterioration of the Russian early-warning system are well founded. With the breakup of the Soviet Union most radars were left outside of the Russian territory, and many are not operational. The system's space-based tier is hardly better off. Russia is currently operating only three early-warning satellites, while a complete constellation would require ten satellites. Russia would need at least five satellites to provide minimum coverage of the U.S. territory.

Although the Russian system's decline is indeed serious, it does not necessarily increase the dangers associated with launch-on-warning. A loss of early-warning capability would pose a dire risk only if it were sudden and unexpected or discovered at the time of an attack. But this is not the case in Russia, where deterioration of the early-warning network has been gradual and well understood.

Since the early-warning system is an essential element of a launch-on-warning posture, it is understandable that a number of proposals that aim at reducing the risks of accidental launch suggest helping Russia to repair or upgrade its system. Instead of reducing the risk, however, upgrades would most likely increase risk by introducing new elements into the already complex system and increasing confidence in its performance.

Instead of trying to help Russia repair its early-warning system, efforts should be directed at helping Russia change the command-and-control procedures to accommodate the loss of early-warning capability. These changes would almost certainly result in a shift away from the launch-on-warning posture, reducing the risk of an accidental launch.

TRUST AND DO NOT VERIFY

One reason de-alerting measures have not yet been implemented is that most of them are thought to require intrusive verification procedures. Indeed, measures like removal of nuclear warheads from missiles or limiting strategic submarine patrol areas, proposed by many, would be very difficult to implement in a transparent and verifiable manner.

Transparency, however, is not required to achieve the main goal of de-alerting—reduction of the risk associated with the launch-on-warning postures. The benefits of de-alerting do not depend on the ability to verify them. For example, submarines that are out of range of their targets cannot take part in a launch-on-warning strike regardless of whether the other side is able to verify their locations. Of course, without verification the opponent would have to assume that these submarines are in full readiness, but there is nothing wrong with that as long as we do not consider de-alerting a substitute for disarmament.

In fact, transparency makes de-alerting not only harder to implement but potentially dangerous. If measures that reduce the readiness level are visible and verifiable, an attempt to bring missiles back into operation could create instability in a crisis situation, when countries could find themselves in a rush to re-alert their forces. The dangers associated with this kind of instability could well outweigh any benefits of de-alerting.

Ideally, de-alerting measures should be designed in a way that would make them undetectable. That way, each side could reap the benefits—missiles not being available for launch-on-warning—while avoiding the instabilities associated with re-alerting.

UNILATERAL SOLUTIONS

The greatest challenge to de-alerting is not devising technical proposals but finding ways to convince the United States and Russia to implement them. This would be very difficult, for the United States and Russia have grown wary recently of negotiated agreements that would impose limits on their strategic forces. However, de-alerting seems ideally suited for unilateral non-binding declarations that might work now.

Russia and the United States could begin with a public commitment to de-alert a portion of their strategic arsenals. Of course, there will be plenty of questions about the value of a commitment that is neither enforceable nor verifiable. But this value would be quite real if both sides follow through and change their practices and procedures to exclude at least part of their forces from the launch-on-warning arrangements. The risk of a catastrophic accident will be reduced and these practices could then be extended to the whole force, further reducing the risk.

Making practical steps toward reducing the danger of accidental launch will not be easy. But de-alerting is one of those few arms control issues that still enjoy fairly strong political and public support. This support certainly creates an opportunity for action. ■

PAVEL PODVIG IS A RESEARCH ASSOCIATE AT CISAC.

Putin's Chechnya Policies Contribute to Spread of Terrorism in Russia

BY GAIL LAPIDUS

For over five years the war in Chechnya has occupied a central and neuralgic place in Vladimir Putin's political agenda. In unleashing a renewed military campaign in September 1999—abrogating the cease-fire agreement that had terminated the earlier 1994–1996 war launched by then president Boris Yeltsin—President Putin sought to win American and Western acquiescence in, if not support for, Russia's military campaign by framing the conflict as a war on international terrorism.

However, far from extinguishing the conflict, or confining it within the territory of Chechnya, these policies have contributed to the spread of violence and instability far beyond the borders of the Chechen republic. Instead of pursuing strategies that would address the larger socioeconomic crisis of the predominantly Muslim regions of the Northern Caucasus, marginalize extremists, and win broad support from the population of the region, the brutality of Russian military forces and their local allies in the war in Chechnya and the repressive actions of the security services in neighboring republics have fanned the flames of hostility to Moscow and created conditions for the spread of radical Islamist ideologies and the recruitment of new adherents across the Northern Caucasus.

President Putin has treated the problems facing Russia as a product of state "weakness" and has called for strengthening Russia's unity and state power in response. Ostensibly in order to better combat terrorism, he has introduced a series of measures aimed at strengthening Russia's political unity and executive power at the expense of political pluralism, freedom of information, and civil society development. But by weakening or undermining Russia's fragile and weakly developed system of institutional checks and balances on central power, and reducing the transparency and accountability of official behavior, these policies may well be exacerbating rather than mitigating the challenges facing Russia today.

What began as a secular conflict over the political status of Chechnya has progressively been transformed into a wider struggle involving more radical fighters from other Muslim republics with an avowedly Islamist agenda that now threatens to destabilize the broader region of the Northern Caucasus. The past few years have also seen a rising tide of terrorist actions directed against local authorities and security services in other republics of the Northern Caucasus as well as against the Russian government and population more broadly, including terrorist acts aimed at targets in the city of Moscow itself.

From the dramatic seizure of some 800 hostages in a Moscow theater in October 2002, in which 129 hostages died from the effects of a lethal gas used by Russian security services in a bungled rescue operation, to the September 2004 horrific siege of an elementary school in Beslan, Southern Ossetia, in which over 300 civilians died—over half of them children—these episodes have not only challenged the official assertions that the war could be confined to Chechnya alone but have dramatized the inability of the Russian government to adequately protect the security of its population.

The inept and chaotic handling of many of these terrorist attacks has brought into stark relief the poor performance of the security services, the incompetence of local officials, serious intelligence failures, and above all widespread official corruption. In the Beslan episode, to take just one example, the siege was carried out by some thirty-two terrorists, of several different nationalities, who were apparently able to bribe their way across a series of checkpoints to enter the republic and to utilize weapons and explosives stored on the site beforehand. The local authorities and the federal security services proved incapable of coordinating their actions to control the situation, and the Moscow-appointed president of the republic proved completely inept. Indeed, the most courageous and effective actor was Ruslan Aushev, the former president of Ingushetia, a figure removed from power by Moscow for resisting pressure for more coercive policies.

The Putin government has used these events to justify a series of measures which are ostensibly intended to more effectively combat terrorism but which appear to have little relation to the real terrorist threat. First, it has refused to seek a political solution to the conflict in Chechnya and has deliberately sought to undermine possible negotiations or international mediation and to delegitimize potential negotiating partners by demonizing a broad array of Chechen political figures within the country and abroad as "terrorists."

Conflating Chechen resistance with international terrorism, President Putin has explicitly refused to distinguish between more moderate figures and extremists and has exaggerated their ties to international terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda.

Domestically, the Russian government has used security concerns to justify ever greater restrictions on freedom of information, on civil rights, and on the role of nongovernmental organizations, particularly those engaged in the defense of human rights. The military and the organs of law enforcement have been given an ever freer hand, rarely if ever held accountable for their abusive behavior and atrocities against civilians.

Refugee camps in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia were closed and the international non-governmental organizations providing medical care and humanitarian assistance to refugees there were compelled to depart. The mass media have largely lost their independence and editors and journalists have been dismissed or attacked for expressing critical views.

A whole series of measures aimed at further centralization of political power and the strengthening of the executive branch have eroded the already fragile elements of federalism and separation of powers in the Russian political system. The autonomy and political influence of regions and republics has been sharply reduced. Parliament, now dominated by a single pro-presidential party, no longer acts as an independent check on executive power, and liberal political parties and their leaders have been marginalized. Most recently, the popular election of regional governors was abolished in favor of their appointment by Moscow, and a discussion is now under way of bringing even local government under tighter central control by eliminating the election of mayors as well.

Moreover, a high proportion of President Putin's appointees to key positions in the regions are drawn from the military and security services, selected for their presumed loyalty to the president but often lacking political skills or understanding of local conditions. But the substitution of appointed for elected officials does not necessarily guarantee either loyalty or competence.

In the absence of a competitive party system in which political parties help create a web of ties between the central government and local populations, Putin's centralizing measures could well widen the chasm between state and society.

This growing emphasis on centralization, unity, repression, and secrecy is arguably exacerbating rather than mitigating the problems and making state power even more dysfunctional. In Chechnya and in the broader Caucasus region the brutality as well as the corruption of Russian military and security forces and their local allies—and their extensive reliance on torture, mass roundups, indiscriminate executions, disappearances of civilians, and simple extortion—has embittered many toward Moscow and made it increasingly difficult to win "hearts and minds" and build popular support.

Indeed, the lack of transparency, and the difficulty of holding Russian officials accountable for abusive behavior, has led unprecedented numbers of Russian citizens frustrated by the unresponsiveness of their own government to seek redress at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

Lacking a positive agenda for ameliorating socioeconomic conditions in the Northern Caucasus, the expanding operations of security forces across the Northern Caucasus, the closure of mosques, and the wave of often indiscriminate arrests have served to drive Islam underground and facilitated the spread of extremist ideologies. Without a coherent and sustained program of economic development that would create employment, housing, and education and offer alternative opportunities to an impoverished and alienated population, particularly young males, and absent a serious effort to eliminate corruption, these trends are likely to worsen.

Russia under Putin is facing a somber future. ■

GAIL LAPIDUS IS A SENIOR FELLOW AT SIIS.

"A key for us is to start the reconstruction efforts in ways that do not undermine the local population."

LIZANNE MCBRIDE

SIIS PANEL ON THE TSUNAMI AND TI



Long-Term Attention and Aid Needed for Victims

Indonesia needs a three- to five-year commitment from the international community to help it recover from the devastating December 26 tsunami, according to Lizanne McBride of the International Rescue Committee (IRC).

While the world has responded with unprecedented levels of support, McBride told about 120 people attending a January 24 discussion at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS) that the real test will happen when "the cameras leave" and the disaster no longer makes global headlines. "The opportunity is here now," she said, "but experience has shown that the attention just can't be sustained."

As director of the post-conflict development initiative at the IRC, McBride is concerned with maintaining critical support for the victims of the Indian Ocean tsunami as well as other people suffering from natural disasters and conflicts around the globe. "Past experience shows that money disbursed does not always equal amounts pledged —nor do all pledges represent new money," she said. "Some may have come from other crises that need equal attention. It's really important for us in the aid community to keep that pressure on" so assistance is spread equitably.

McBride, a visiting fellow at the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, joined former Stanford president Donald Kennedy, the Bing Professor of Environmental Sciences, Emeritus; Eric Weiss, an assistant professor of surgery; and Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum at SIIS, to discuss the immediate and long-term implications of the tsunami that has killed an estimated 212,611 people in 11 countries. Stephen Krasner, deputy director of SIIS, moderated the panel.

So far, the catastrophe has elicited enormous empathy worldwide because it is a natural disaster, Emmerson said: "There is no guilty party here." In contrast, he noted, the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region is manmade. "Although the memory of [the genocide in] Rwanda and the failure to respond impels a response to Darfur, that's a historical precedent that's not as immediate as images of the tsunami," he said.

Emmerson, an expert on Indonesia, said he is very cautiously optimistic that the disaster could have positive political implications concerning the ongoing Islamic insurrection in Aceh, the worst-hit province of Indonesia that also has been under a state of emergency since 2003. He noted that a Finnish organization, Crisis Management Initiative, has offered to "establish a dialogue" this week between the separatists and the Jakarta government. "This is a remarkable development and very encouraging," he said. But he cautioned that the Free Aceh Movement does not represent everyone in the province and that elevating it to a status it does not deserve could complicate the crisis in the long term.

In addition to humanitarian motives, Emmerson said domestic and foreign actors have a calculated self-interest in their response to the crisis. For example, he said, the Indonesian government has sent additional troops into Aceh to perform disaster relief, and it is coordinating resources flowing into the region—two developments that give it leverage in the conflict. China also has strategic goals, he said. "It's timing much of its assistance to later, when [most] of the relief workers have gone home and the relief effort has dropped off the front pages of western papers," he said. "Then it can say that China is a permanent friend, not a temporary one."

Weiss, an expert in disaster medicine and chair of Stanford's Bioterrorism and Emergency Preparedness Task Force, said that assistance geared to helping victims become self-sufficient in the long term is more important than "band-aid" help from well-meaning but untrained health workers. He talked about two groups responding effectively to the tsunami: the International Medical Corps, a private, nonsectarian nonprofit dedicated to rehabilitating devastated health care systems, and Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), an independent humanitarian medical aid agency. "A disaster like this draws many health care providers out of their nests, and they have a strong urge to help," Weiss said. "But a lot of people don't have the training, experience, and expertise, and end up being more of a liability than an asset."

According to Weiss, the most important relief work needed in Aceh now is mass immunizations. "It may not be the stuff that hospital TV dramas are made of, but immunizations are vital to health care in a devastated region like this," he said. For example, he said, more than 60 cases of tetanus, a preventable disease, have been reported in Aceh. Other major health problems requiring treatment include infected wounds, aspiration pneumonia, and diarrhea, he said.

As emergency relief efforts roll out, McBride said relief agencies must plan for medium- and long-term recovery efforts that do not undermine a local population's dignity and self-reliance. When faced with survivor needs as well as pressure to spend funds and show results, McBride said aid groups may be inclined to lead reconstruction efforts—a tendency that must be fought at all costs. "It's a hard balancing act, but it's an important one," she said. "When we miss that we don't do good development work." ■

REPRINTED FROM THE STANFORD REPORT, JANUARY 26, 2005.

"There is no system of depth gauges and buoys in the Indian Ocean to warn of tsunamis. So the first problem was that we didn't know how big the earthquake was and how likely it was to produce a major tsunami."

DONALD KENNEDY

HE IMPLICATIONS OF A CATASTROPHE

and Stricken Nations

Panel: Relief Efforts Face Hurdles

MODERATOR:
Stephen D. Krasner, SIIS deputy director

PANELISTS:
Donald Kennedy, Stanford president, emeritus, professor of biological sciences, emeritus
Donald K. Emmerson, SIIS senior fellow
Eric A. Weiss, Assistant professor of surgery, emergency medicine
Lizanne McBride, director, International Rescue Committee

The Stanford Institute for International Studies assembled a panel of experts last night to discuss the aftermath of last month's devastating South Asian tsunami and the future of the affected region.

The speakers highlighted the scope of the international relief effort and agreed that the focus of the assistance should be on aiding nations in regaining self-sufficiency.

They argued that affected countries must take a proactive role in the rebuilding process.

"The key for us is to start the reconstruction efforts in ways that do not undermine the well-being of the population," said Lizanne McBride, the director of the nonprofit International Rescue Committee and expert on Indonesian humanitarian issues.

When it comes to rebuilding countries ravaged by disaster, "the tendency for countries like the U.S. is to do it ourselves, and what we need to do is help them do it themselves," McBride said.

Eric Weiss, assistant professor of surgery and international health expert, agreed.

"One of the main things is to help bring the local people back to self-reliance," he said.

"In a lot of relief, we send people to help people who can't help themselves, but there is little focus of promoting self-sufficiency. I think that is critical to addressing these crises."

The panelists also addressed the barriers impeding the relief effort, like the political instability of the region.

"Before the wave hit, one had to question the administrative capacity of the provincial government [in Indonesia]," said international relations professor Donald Emmerson.

"The governor [in one affected area] isn't giving out aid and taking charge because he is currently in prison on corruption charges."

For years, the relationship between the United States and Indonesia has been icy, some panelists noted, a fact that may have long-term effects on a sustained aid effort.

"For us, security, logistical access, and political access are key; without these we are crippled," McBride said. "The Indonesian military are providing us with security, and rebel groups have remained quiet, but as the region stabilizes—and it will stabilize—we will probably be increasingly denied access."

Religious differences may also play a factor in the outcome of relief efforts, Emmerson added.

"There are in fact Christian aid-givers in Indonesia who say that they are here to lead by example and not to evangelize the population, but the predominately Muslim population seems to be skeptical," he said. "I think this may pose a problem."

The panelists also argued that it will be difficult to maintain a long-term relief effort as time passes.

"The task for us is to hold attention to it," McBride said. "The hardest thing to do is to keep attention to the crisis after the cameras go away."

Donald Kennedy, University president emeritus and an environmental science and policy professor, agreed.

"Our political attention span about this sort of thing is notably short," he said. "The door won't be open for long."

This idea resonated with students in attendance as well.

"People seem to only want to do things that will make a quick impact," said freshman Aaron Berg. "There isn't a whole lot of popularity for groups or causes that pick a difficult task and try to stay with it until it is solved."

Political science professor Stephen Krasner, deputy director of the Stanford Institute for International Studies and moderator for the event, argued that this country still hasn't found an effective formula for providing humanitarian relief.

"We don't know how to do this," he said. "It isn't all about improving our political attention span. We just don't know how to do this." ■

REPRINTED FROM THE STANFORD DAILY, JANUARY 25, 2005.

China-U.S. Health and Aging Fellowship Trainee Returns to China
Starts Survey of Elderly Health Needs

BY SARA SELIS



CHINA HAS A LARGE AND GROWING ELDERLY POPULATION, but to be old in China—particularly in the countryside—is to be vulnerable. In the country's rural areas there are few clinics and hospitals, and health insurance is virtually nonexistent. Compared with elderly Chinese living in urban areas, those in rural areas have a shorter life expectancy and a poorer quality of life.

Further, little academic research has focused on the health needs and health status of China's elderly. It is with the goal of addressing this deficit that Pengqian Fang, a trainee with CHP/PCOR's China-U.S. Health and Aging Research Fellowship, recently returned to China from Stanford. Fang is seeking to document the health disparities between China's rural and urban elderly population, and to use his findings to propose healthcare assistance programs for the elderly in rural areas of China.

Fang spent a year at Stanford studying health-services research concepts and methods and developing his research project.

In the project, which Fang refined with guidance from CHP/PCOR faculty, Fang will conduct a detailed survey of the health status, health needs, and healthcare utilization of elderly people in rural and urban areas of China, through in-home interviews in three Chinese provinces with different geographic and socioeconomic characteristics: Guizhou (in southwest China), Hubei (in central China), and Guangdong (in the southeast).

He will conduct the project in collaboration with the health departments of the three provinces, and with support from Tongji Medical College in Wuhan, where he is director and associate professor of healthcare management.

Fang's study will be among the first of its kind in China. Such research is needed, Fang explained, because China's elderly population (of whom 70 percent reside in rural areas) is growing steadily, and in the coming years its members will require medical services at increasing rates. According to the country's 2000 census, China has 132 million people over age 65, making up more than 10 percent of the population; the over-80 population, which numbers 10 million people, is increasing by 5.4 percent a year; and about 20 percent of all elderly people in the world live in China.

The elderly in China's rural areas face particular challenges in getting high-quality, affordable healthcare services, Fang explained. There are few clinics and hospitals in rural areas, and there is no government-sponsored health coverage for the elderly (like the United States' Medicare program) anywhere in China. All of these factors put China's rural elderly in a vulnerable position, especially those with disabilities or serious illnesses.

"This research will show the disparities that exist, and it will encourage a dialogue about policies to help rural elderly people in China," Fang said.

Fang plans to conduct his survey in the first half of 2005, analyze the data in the summer and fall, and return to Stanford in November 2005 to present the results. In each of the three provinces studied, the research team will recruit 500 households and will conduct interviews with all individuals age 65 and over who reside there, for an estimated final sample of 2,500 people.

The respondents will be asked for a variety of information, including their income and education, insurance status, health status, daily activities, social activity, mental health, utilization of healthcare services, and accessibility and affordability of medical care. The researchers will also interview community healthcare workers—including physicians, nurses, and administrative staff—to seek information on the health needs of the elderly and the barriers they and their healthcare providers face.

The China-U.S. Health and Aging Research Fellowship, administered jointly by CHP/PCOR and the China Health Economics Institute (Beijing), aims to improve healthcare quality and efficiency in China through an exchange program in which selected Chinese health services researchers come to Stanford to study for six months to a year, and then return to China to conduct an original research project. The fellowship is funded by the National Institutes of Health's Fogarty International Center.

"I have learned very much from Stanford and this program," Fang said. "The classes I attended have given me very useful ideas." He noted that since health services research is still a young field in China—about ten years old—"we learn a lot from the United States, like how to ask the research question, how to get a grant, how to design a study."

One aspect of Stanford that particularly impressed Fang was its emphasis on interdisciplinary collaboration.

"This is a very good feature—the close relationship between different fields," he said. "In my country we are more focused on one narrow field."

Fang said he is interested in establishing research collaborations between Stanford and Tongji Medical College—an idea that he and CHP/PCOR's leadership will be exploring in the coming months.

There is much to admire about the U.S. healthcare system's emphasis on innovation and technology, Fang said. Still, he said, "I don't hope for China to follow the U.S. health system," with its heavy reliance on free-market principles. For one thing, "medicine here is very costly." He cited a personal example of how he fractured his arm in a minor bicycle accident, and how his emergency room visit for the injury, along with a follow-up physician appointment, cost more than $1,000. "I was surprised it cost so much," he said.

A review of the fellowship program conducted by officials at the China Health Economics Institute last fall concluded that it has been successful and valuable. Leaders at the institute said the trainees' Stanford experience has enhanced their intellectual abilities, their knowledge of research methodology, their leadership capacity, and their ability to collaborate internationally. ■

Electricity-Market Reforms and Global Climate Change

BY ROBERT SHERMAN

For nearly two decades, most major developing countries have struggled to introduce market forces in their electric power systems. In every case, that effort has proceeded more slowly than reformers hoped and the outcomes have been hybrids that are far from the efficiency and organization of the "ideal" textbook model for a market-based power system.

At the same time, growing concern about global climate change has put the spotlight on the need to build an international regulatory regime that includes strong incentives for key developing countries to control their emissions of greenhouse gases. In most of these countries, the power sector is a large source of emissions that, with effort, could be controlled.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol included mechanisms that would reward developing nations that cut emissions, but so far the performance of these mechanisms has fallen far short of their potential.

Beginning in 2002, the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development (PESD) at the Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS) and the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad (IIMA) have conducted a set of studies to examine the intersection of these two crucial challenges for the organization of energy infrastructures in the developing world. This research, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, examined power-market reforms and greenhouse-gas emissions in two key states in India. At the same time PESD was conducting a comprehensive study of electricity-market reforms in five developing countries (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa) as well as detailed analyses of the greenhouse-gas emissions from three provinces in China in conjunction with other research partners.

PESD and IIMA presented their findings at a workshop on January 27–28, 2005, at Stanford University. The workshop brought together scholars studying the organization of the electric-power sector and other infrastructures in developing countries with energy policy makers, technologists, and those studying the effectiveness of international legal regimes, with the aim of not only focusing on new theories that are emerging to explain the organization of the power sector and the design of meaningful international institutions, but also identifying practical implications for investors, regulators, and policymakers.

The workshop offered diagnoses of what has gone wrong and what opportunities have nonetheless emerged. It focused on practical solutions and a look at the prospects for different technologies to meet the growing demand for power while minimizing the ecological footprint of power generation.

One of the key conclusions of the research and the workshop, as discussed by David Victor, director of PESD, is that electricity markets in the developing world have not progressed inexorably and consistently from a state-owned model to an open market-based model. Rather, much as the experience of the past ten years in the United States has demonstrated, reform of electric-power systems has proceeded differentially between parts of the industry and between jurisdictional units, with some segments of the power generation, transmission, and distribution systems still dominated by the state and some segments now fully responsive to signals from the market.

This hybrid condition—with portions of the electricity enterprise deregulated and other portions still fully regulated—has proven to be virtually universal and quite durable as well. For the most part, it also has proven beneficial to the overall operation of the system as well as to climate mitigation due to the fact that introduction of market forces to parts of the system tends to have a spillover effect, helping to improve efficiency in parts of the system that remain under state control.

Tom Heller, SIIS senior fellow, noted that the negotiations leading up to the development of the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent discussions and experience have demonstrated that the burden-sharing metaphor—expecting developing nations to make a proportional investment and effort in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions—will not be successful. Rather, as gross and per capita energy consumption increases in developing nations, which is occurring especially rapidly in China and India, policies and mechanisms that facilitate investment in efficient and clean energy production, transmission, and end-use infrastructures will need to be developed and rolled out.

The Kyoto Protocol provided a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to encourage such investment. However, the conclusion reached by practitioners developing such projects in China is that CDM is an inefficient and insufficient mechanism for fostering the magnitude of development projects that will be required to help mitigate the environmental effects of energy growth in the developing nations.



Two problems with CDM were raised at the workshop. First, the bureaucratic hurdles facing developers of CDM projects are daunting. To date no such project has received certification. Second, the Kyoto Protocol's current round of reductions targets expires in 2012, and uncertainty regarding the likely direction and form of future U.S. and European initiatives provides a disincentive to investment in CDM projects.

Alberto Chiappa, managing director of Energy Systems International, noted the good news is that in spite of these difficulties, investors are finding opportunities to develop projects to provide cleaner sources of energy and improve end-use energy efficiency.

Professor P.R. Shukla of IIMA pointed out that there is a great need to align development and climate concerns if future mechanisms for climate mitigation in the developing world are to be successful.

Douglas Ogden, program officer at the Energy Foundation, noted that China has made a firm commitment to greatly increase the market share of electricity from renewable sources to 5 percent by 2010 and 20 percent by 2020 and in 2008 will adopt an automobile fuel-economy standard 20 percent more efficient than U.S. CAFE standards. Also, both China and India are engaged in developing natural gas markets in sectors traditionally dominated by coal.

Mario Pereira, director of Power Systems Research, discussed Brazil's current efforts to develop economical and efficient electricity supply through biomass—specifically ethanol derived from sugarcane bagasse. The ethanol industry was originally developed as a reaction to the oil shocks of the 1970s. Although the majority of electricity in Brazil is provided by hydroelectric projects, sugarcane ethanol has some important advantages. First, the sugarcane fields are geographically close to major centers of demand, and second, sugarcane thrives during drier periods of the year when hydroelectric production declines. The experience in Brazil thus demonstrates that renewables can provide an economically attractive source of energy for developing nations.

Looking toward the future, PESD has several projects under way pertaining to the intersection of electricity-market reforms and global climate change. The program is expanding its research on power-market reforms through a set of case studies on independent power producer projects in ten developing nations and is also initiating a set of studies examining the introduction of natural gas to regions in India and China.

Much work remains to be done before the interface between electricity-market reform and global climate change is well understood. As energy markets in the developing world expand, addressing this question will become more and more important if we are to stabilize atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases. ■

RESULTS FROM THE POWER MARKET REFORMS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE STUDIES AND PRESENTATIONS FROM THE CONFERENCE ARE AVAILABLE ON THE PESD WEBSITE: HTTP://PESD.STANFORD.EDU

"I don't intend to repeat what others elsewhere in the country and the world have already done. I want to focus on social science, and research and publication, and the Journal of Korean Studies *will be a key component of that mission."* GI-WOOK SHIN

GI-WOOK SHIN, DIRECTOR OF APARC's KOREAN STUDIES PROGRAM, REVIVES PREMIER ACADEMIC JOURNAL

Q. WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF THE *JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES*?

A. The *Journal of Korean Studies* was begun, I believe, in 1979 at the University of Washington by Professor James Palais, a preeminent Korean historian. The *Journal of Japanese Studies* appeared at the same time and both journals made tremendous contributions to their respective fields. The *Journal of Korean Studies* was unquestionably the top journal in the field of Korean studies. In fact, one of my first publications appeared in the *Journal of Korean Studies*. However, unlike the *Journal of Japanese Studies,* which has been published without interruption since its founding, publication of the *Journal of Korean Studies* was suspended in 1992 due to financial and administrative problems. So now we're reviving it at long last.

Q. WHY DID YOU FEEL IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REVIVE THE *JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES* AND BRING IT TO APARC?

A. First of all, there isn't really any top journal in the field at present, and Korean studies has grown enormously in the last ten years. As a result, there has been considerable demand for a good journal, especially among young scholars who want to publish their work. For Korean studies to continue to grow in the United States, it's vital for scholars to have a place to publish their research outcomes.

With respect to APARC serving as the home for the *Journal of Korean Studies,* we are still building up Korean studies at the Center, and at Stanford as a whole. I believe that having a premier journal in the program will more quickly place the program itself on the national map. It's also a great service to Korean studies in general. Many people—including very senior leaders in the field—really appreciate that we have put in the effort to bring back this important publication after such a long hiatus. And I'm so grateful to APARC for its financial, editorial, and administrative support in making the issue a reality. Chiho Sawada, postdoctoral research fellow in Korean studies at APARC, assisted me as associate editor and Victoria Tomkinson has done a wonderful job of editing the articles. We will celebrate the revival of the *Journal of Korean Studies* at the upcoming national meetings of the Association for Asian Studies.

Q. WHERE DOES THE *JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES* FIT INTO STANFORD'S KOREAN STUDIES PROGRAM?

A. Stanford's program began relatively late. This isn't to say that we haven't grown hugely, because the program has really taken off in the past three years. Yet there are other programs that have been up and running much longer, and therefore are more established. When I left the University of California, Los Angeles, which has the most well-established program in the nation, I wanted to create a unique Korean studies program at Stanford.

My vision for the Stanford Korean Studies Program can be summarized in two terms: social science and research. The research mission includes student training through research projects. Many students—both undergraduate and graduate—are involved in various research projects within the Korean Studies Program. Most other institutional programs focus on humanities and I don't intend to repeat what others elsewhere in the country and the world have already done. As I want to focus on social science, and research and publication, the *Journal of Korean Studies* will be a key component of that mission.

Q. DOES THE *JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES* HAVE A PARTICULAR FOCUS WITHIN THE FIELD OF KOREAN STUDIES?

A. Until now, the *Journal of Korean Studies* has predominantly published articles on history, literature, and culture, reflecting a general trend in the current field of Korean studies. Going forward, I'd like to publish more papers on social science. The revival issue doesn't reflect that goal and given the current concentration on humanities in the field, it won't be easy. Yet it's my hope that we'll tip the balance toward social sciences in subsequent issues and this is another way of making a contribution to the field as a whole.

Q. PUBLISHING A MAJOR ACADEMIC JOURNAL IS A BIG JOB. WHAT'S THE EDITORIAL PROCEDURE? WHAT, FOR YOU AS THE CO-EDITOR [WITH JOHN DUNCAN, AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES], IS THE MOST CHALLENGING PART OF PUTTING THE *JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES* TOGETHER EACH YEAR?

A. The number one challenge is getting good manuscripts. Last year, we received over twenty articles, but we accepted only one (and asked a few authors to revise and resubmit). Now that the journal is out, we expect more submissions in the months to come. My top priority is to control the quality of what we publish.

The second big challenge is finding good reviewers. The *Journal of Korean Studies* is, of course, a refereed journal. Usually we send each submitted manuscript to two people to read and evaluate, but the field of Korean studies is pretty small, and we can't go back to the same people all the time. Finding good readers will continue to be a vital but time-consuming part of the editorial process.

Q. WHAT TOPICS DO YOU PLAN TO COVER IN FUTURE ISSUES?

A. My plan is to publish one general issue per year that covers a broad spectrum of topics in Korean studies, much like our revival issue. And, beginning this summer, I'm going to hold an annual one-week summer workshop, a small gathering here at Stanford. I'll pick a specific topic or theme and then through open competition select five or six scholars who have a draft paper on the topic. I will bring them to Stanford for one week and work with a senior scholar to lead the workshop. I plan to publish the papers that come out of that workshop as a special issue of the *Journal of Korean Studies*. The workshop we are organizing for summer 2005 will address the globalization of Korea. Professor Michael Robinson of Indiana University (who previously collaborated with me on *Colonial Modernity in Korea*) will lead the workshop. Thus, starting in 2006, the *Journal of Korean Studies* will publish one general and one special issue each year.

Q. ANY HIGHLIGHTS FROM THIS INAUGURAL ISSUE?

A. All of the articles in this inaugural issue have been carefully selected and are very strong in their quality. I'm particularly pleased that the articles range across so many subjects, from Michael Kim's piece on vernacular fiction and popular reading, to Robert Buswell's study of the significance of Sugi's collation notes on the Korean Buddhist canon, to Jin-Kyung Lee's article about feminist literature in 1950s South Korea. In addition to these, there are two other research articles, and a number of reviews of recent books in the field.

Q. HOW CAN PEOPLE GET COPIES OF THE *JOURNAL OF KOREAN STUDIES*?

A. Subscriptions to the *Journal of Korean Studies* are being handled by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, located in Maryland. They, too, have been wonderfully supportive and involved in getting the *Journal of Korean Studies* off the ground. Those wishing to subscribe to the *Journal* can find more information on the Korean Studies Program website at http://ksp.stanford.edu/docs/journalofkoreanstudies ■

SPICE and Documentary Filmmaker Team Up to Teach Students about Afghanistan

The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the U.S. invasion that followed have thrown Afghanistan from the periphery to the center of international affairs. Prior to these events, Americans knew very little about Afghanistan and its history, culture, and politics. This lack of knowledge highlights the need to inform the U.S. public about Afghanistan, as it appears that the Central Asian country will be central to U.S. foreign policy and international affairs for many years to come.

SIIS's Stanford Program on International and Cross-cultural Education (SPICE), which serves as a bridge between the Institute and schools across the nation, is working to address this need by developing a curriculum unit on democracy-building in Afghanistan for advanced high school and community college students. SPICE's Eric Kramon, a master's student in international and comparative education, who received his BA from Stanford in 2004 in political science and history, is developing the curriculum unit with support from faculty and staff from Stanford's Center for Russian, Eastern European, and Eurasian Studies. Using a documentary film and a variety of engaging activities, the curriculum unit will provide students with an understanding of contemporary Afghan politics, the process of creating a new constitution for Afghanistan, and the complexities of democracy-building.

The curriculum is being developed around a documentary originally aired on PBS's *Wide Angle* entitled *Afghanistan: Hell of a Nation,* directed and produced by Tamara Gould. CDDRL fellow J. Alexander Thier served as the project advisor for the documentary, which follows Afghanistan's recent constitution-making process. The collaboration between SPICE and the filmmakers will enhance the pedagogical power of the curriculum and will facilitate more widespread understanding of contemporary Afghan political issues. According to Gould,

Our goal in making Hell of a Nation *was to bring the political drama unfolding in Afghanistan to life. Working with SPICE will allow us to reach the classroom with our film in ways that are far more effective than a national broadcast. Through SPICE, teachers will be able to use this curriculum to teach thousands of students more about Afghanistan, its new constitution, and the process of creating a democracy. This partnership between the filmmakers and SPICE is a win-win for us, and for teachers and students across the country.* ■

CDDRL FELLOWS J. ALEXANDER THIER AND ERIK JENSEN ARE SERVING AS ADVISORS TO THE CURRICULUM UNIT, WHICH IS DUE TO BE COMPLETED IN AUGUST.

CESP Conferences

GLOBAL TRANSFER OF VIRTUAL WATER AND NUTRIENTS RELATED TO INDUSTRIALIZED ANIMAL PRODUCTION SYSTEMS—MARCH 8–10, 2005

The global trade in grain and meat between nations is extensive and projected to grow considerably in the short term. The concept and quantification of "virtual water" involved in these trade exchanges has led to new insights into the larger consequences of global transfers in commodities. CESP hosted a small international team of scholars, including economists, ecologists, and livestock specialists, to scope out this issue as it relates to nitrogen and water in agriculture. By documenting trends and developing scenarios for the future, the group is proposing ways to achieve desired outcomes in a way that is sustainable for the life systems needed to fuel industrial livestock systems.

WHOLE EARTH SYSTEMS SYMPOSIUM—FEBRUARY 10–12, 2005

More than 250 policymakers, scholars, and government leaders participated in the Whole Earth Systems symposium, a three-day international symposium co-hosted by CESP on climate change—informally dubbed "SteveFest," to celebrate the 60th birthday of climatologist Stephen H. Schneider. Participants came from around the world and represented a wide range of disciplines, including business, science, law, and medicine. The symposium also celebrated the professional contributions of Schneider, who is well-known and respected within the climate community both for his in-depth understanding of climate science and for his ability to communicate the complexities of climatology to the public. A highlight of the symposium was a dinner speech delivered by Teresa Heinz Kerry.

YAQUI VALLEY INTEGRATED STUDIES OF SUSTAINABILITY CONFERENCE—OCTOBER 25–27, 2004

In October 2004, CESP held the sixth annual Yaqui Valley Sustainability Conference in Mexico, attended by over 50 researchers from Stanford and Mexico as well as public and private sector leaders from Mexico. The annual conference provides a venue to discuss the past, present, and future conditions of agriculture, water, climate, and aquaculture development in the Yaqui Valley in the context of sustainability and economic growth. 2004 marked the thirteenth year of Stanford's research presence in the valley. Research initiatives include the analysis of different dimensions of agriculture and variability, the role of institutions and impact of national and international policies, water resource use and management, aquaculture development, the effect on estuaries of upland land-use change, and the burgeoning role of the livestock sector.

INTERNATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY DAYS CONFERENCE—OCTOBER 13–16, 2004

The fourth annual International "Sustainability Days" conference held October 13–16, 2004, drew scientists and policymakers from around the world to discuss environmental responsibility in the 21st century. CESP senior fellows were predominantly featured in panels throughout the conference. The three days of panel discussions and plenary talks centered on themes of land use, global climate change, and aquatic and marine ecosystems. Speakers reflected a wide range of academic, public, and political expertise, all sharing the common goal of turning back the tide of global environmental degradation and climate change. The conference was an appropriate kickoff for the academic year and a reflection of future collaborations between CESP and the new Stanford Institute for the Environment. ■

SIIS INTERNATIONAL DAY

Challenges in a New Era

Taking place on Friday, May 6, 2005, in the Arrillaga Alumni Center on the Stanford University campus is the Institute's first annual conference and dinner.

Special guests at this by-invitation-only full day of speeches, discussions, and interaction on critical international issues are:

Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, former national security advisor and chairman of Stonebridge International, **Hans Blix**, former U.N. weapons inspector, and **Philip Zelikow**, former executive director of the 9/11 Commission and counselor of the U.S. Department of State.

During a buffet breakfast between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m., SIIS director **Coit D. Blacker**, will bid everyone welcome followed by introductory remarks by Stanford professor **William J. Perry**, former secretary of defense.

Two morning plenary sessions between 9 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. will follow, with Hans Blix speaking on the risks of a new nuclear arms race and Ernesto Zedillo discussing governance and democracy.

In the afternoon, between 2:30 p.m. and 5:45 p.m., breakout sessions with Stanford faculty, policymakers, international academics, and journalists will take place covering such issues as reform of the United Nations, our energy future, U.S. policy in Korea, the future of U.S.-European relations, Russia, international criminal justice and peace, global climate change, and international responses to infectious diseases.

Participating Stanford faculty include Donald Kennedy, Larry Diamond, Michael Armacost, Gi-Wook Shin, Stephen Stedman, Scott Sagan, Christopher Chyba, Lynn Eden, David Victor, Allen Weiner, Alan Garber, Amir Eshel, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Doug Owens, John McMillan, and Dan Okimoto.

After a reception at 6 p.m., dinner will follow at 7 p.m., where Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger will speak on "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Road Ahead." ■

STEPHEN KRASNER OF SIIS TO WORK FOR RICE IN STATE DEPARTMENT POST

Stephen D. Krasner, deputy director of the Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS), has been appointed director of policy planning in the State Department's internal think tank. Krasner, 62, was named by newly confirmed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, his longtime colleague and friend and Stanford's former provost. Krasner's position, which became official January 31, holds a rank equivalent to an assistant secretary of state.

Krasner, the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, came to Stanford in 1981 after teaching at Harvard and the University of California, Los Angeles. He was chair of Stanford's Political Science Department from 1984 to 1991 and served as editor of *International Organization,* a scholarly journal, from 1986 to 1992. Krasner will take a leave of absence from his position at SIIS and as director of the institute's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law while he is in Washington, D.C.

Krasner is widely known as an expert on failed and wrecked states. His research interests include work on market failure and distributional conflict in the international political economy, and on historical practices of sovereignty, especially with regard to domestic autonomy and non-intervention. Krasner has experience bridging the worlds of academia and policymaking. In 2001 and 2002, he was a member of the State Department's policy planning staff and then worked with Rice at the National Security Council. He helped to formulate the Millennium Challenge Account, which links increased aid to steps that improve governance.

STANFORD REPORT, FEBRUARY 2, 2005

LUCY SHAPIRO, Ph.D., the Virginia and D.K. Ludwig Professor in Cancer Research, was named the recipient of the 2005 Selman A. Waksman Award in Microbiology by the National Academy of Sciences.

Shapiro, who is an SIIS senior fellow, by courtesy, is the first woman to receive this award and was selected for her pioneering work revealing the bacterial cell as an integrated system in which the transcriptional circuitry is interwoven with the three-dimensional deployment of key regulatory and morphological proteins. Shapiro created and chaired the Department of Developmental Biology in 1989 and is currently the associate chair of the department.

The award is supported by the Foundation for Microbiology and will be presented on May 2 at a ceremony in Washington, D.C., during the academy's 142nd annual meeting.

AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM: COMPARATIVE LESSONS OF TRANSITION

Michael A. McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss
Cambridge University Press, 2004

This collection of essays is the result of a conference convened at Princeton University marking the ten-year anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some of the best minds in post-Soviet studies focused on the task of identifying in what ways the post-communist experience with transition has confirmed or confounded conventional theories of political and economic development. The result is a rich array of essays examining vital aspects of the transitional decade following the Soviet collapse and the comparative lessons learned.

This collection of essays explicitly tallies the gains and losses to post-Soviet countries of the last ten years as well as comparing the post-Soviet experience implicitly and explicitly with that of other developing countries. Each essay blends political science theory with fresh empirical analysis.

MICHAEL MCFAUL AND KATHRYN STONER-WEISS ARE AT CDDRL.

IN *INTERNATIONAL SECURITY*: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION RINGS: NEW CHALLENGES TO THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba

The nuclear programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Pakistan provide the most visible manifestations of three broad and interrelated challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. One of those challenges—the focus of this article—is second-tier nuclear proliferation, in which states in the developing world with varying technical capabilities trade among themselves to bolster one another's nuclear and strategic weapons efforts.

HTTP://CISAC.STANFORD.EDU/PUBLICATIONS/20716/

IN *INTERNATIONAL SECURITY*: STATE MILITARISM AND ITS LEGACIES: WHY MILITARY REFORM HAS FAILED IN RUSSIA

Alexander M. Golts and Tonya L. Putnam

Russia's economy and political system have undergone enormous changes since the end of the Soviet era. A burgeoning market system has replaced the Soviet command economy, and open multiparty competition for representation in Russia's political institutions operates in place of the Communist Party that ruled the country exclusively for more than 60 years. In the areas of defense and security, however, radical changes to the organizational and operational system inherited from the Soviet Union have yet to occur. Why have Russia's armed forces—nearly alone among the core institutions of the Russian state—resisted efforts to change their structure and character in accordance with institutional arrangements operative in Western liberal democracies?

HTTP://CISAC.STANFORD.EDU/PUBLICATIONS/20767/

IN *THE JOURNAL OF ANIMAL SCIENCE*: AN UNADDRESSED ISSUE OF AGRICULTURAL TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY ON FEED SECURITY

Margaret E. Kosal

In the late winter of 2003, a number of livestock animals in the Midwest were poisoned due to the accidental contamination of a popular commercial feed with a lethal additive. Although all the evidence indicates this incident had no malicious or terrorist intent, it is informative as a case study highlighting potential security implications with respect to a terrorist event directed at U.S. agriculture.

HTTP://CISAC.STANFORD.EDU/PUBLICATIONS/20763/

IN *THE JOURNAL OF PHYSICAL SECURITY*: DETECTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER SHIPPING: CRITERIA FOR SECURE SYSTEMS

Michael M. May, Dean Wilkening, and Tonya L. Putnam

This article grew out of a weeklong study in August 2002 to assist ongoing efforts inside and outside the government to remedy some vulnerabilities of the international shipping system on which U.S. and a great deal of world prosperity depend. The study's objective was to identify the most important research initiatives and the major policy issues that need to be addressed in order to improve security of imports using shipping containers, particularly against the importation of nuclear materials and weapons, while maintaining an open trading system.

HTTP://CISAC.STANFORD.EDU/PUBLICATIONS/20127/

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA



Edited by Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen
Stanford University Press, 2005

Prospects for Peace in South Asia addresses the largely hostile, often violent relations between India and Pakistan that date from their independence in 1947. The most persistent conflict between the two neighboring countries, over Kashmir, has defied numerous international attempts at resolution.

The struggle over Kashmir is rooted in national identity, religion, and human rights. It has also influenced the politicization of Pakistan's army, religious radicalism, and nuclearization in both countries. This incisive volume analyzes these forces, their impact on relations between the two countries, and alternative roles the United States might play in resolving the dispute. While acknowledging the risks, the book is optimistic about peace in South Asia. The key argument is that many of the domestic concerns (such as territorial integrity and civilian-military rapprochement in Pakistan) that were fueling the conflict have abated.

FOR PURCHASING DETAILS, VISIT STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AT HTTP://WWW.SUP.ORG.

SPICE PUBLICATIONS

AN INTRODUCTION TO AQUACULTURE: THE PROS AND CONS OF FISH PRODUCTION

This unit introduces various types of aquaculture systems and cultivation techniques, explores the effects of aquaculture on the natural environment, specifically on coastal and ocean ecosystems, and introduces students to the issue of sustainability as it pertains to aquaculture. ©2004

INSIDE THE KREMLIN: SOVIET AND RUSSIAN LEADERS FROM LENIN TO PUTIN

This unit examines key elements of Soviet and Russian history through the philosophies and legacies of six of its leaders—Vladimir Lenin, Iosif (Joseph) Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin. Each of the lessons features a 30-minute lecture about one of the leaders, given by a Stanford University professor. ©2004

AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

This unit introduces the role of the United Nations and the international community during humanitarian crises. As students examine case studies (Somalia, Bosnia, Eastern Zaire, Kosovo) and grapple with policy options, they form their own opinions about the value of intervening in humanitarian crises. ©2004

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOVEREIGNTY: A CASE STUDY OF TAIWAN

This unit examines the issue of sovereignty and provides an in-depth look at the unique status of Taiwan. Although Taiwan has control over its internal affairs (domestic sovereignty) and is able to keep outsiders from operating within its borders or influencing internal decisions (Westphalian sovereignty), the island does not have international legal sovereignty. ©2004

AN INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE BUDDHIST ART

This unit includes lessons on art history, Buddhism, religious institutions, and curatorial practices. Students develop an appreciation for Buddhist cultural achievements by studying images of Buddhism. This unit features art of the Ruth & Sherman Lee Institute of Japanese Art at the Clark Center, Hanford, California. ©2004

GEOGRAPHY AND THE HUMAN EXPERIENCE

This unit introduces a broad range of topics that are essential to the study of geography. These issues include map analysis and comparison, migration and perceptions of regions, interactions between humans and the environment and their implications, urban growth and energy consumption, political divisions of the earth, and economic interdependence. ©2004

RECENT CESP PUBLICATIONS

"Nature and Profit," by Gretchen Daily. *Greenpeace Magazine*, January 2005.

"Ecosystem Consequences of Bird Declines," by Gretchen C. Daily et al. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, December 28, 2004.

"Global Climate Change and Wildlife in North America," by Terry Root et al. *The Wildlife Society*, December 2004.

"Using Climate Models to Improve Indonesian Food Security," by Walter Falcon and Rosamond Naylor et al. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, December 2004.

"Economic Value of Tropical Forest to Coffee Production," by Gretchen Daily et al. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, August 2004.

"Efficiency Costs of Meeting Industry-Distributional Constraints under Environmental Permits and Taxes," by Lawrence Goulder et al. *RAND Journal of Economics*, August 2004.

"Emissions Pathways, Climate Change, and Impacts on California," by Steve Schneider et al. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, August 2004.

"Are We Consuming Too Much?" by Kenneth Arrow, Lawrence Goulder, Gretchen Daily, Steve Schneider et al. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Summer 2004.

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The Stanford Institute for International Studies will be a principal driver, participant—and a key beneficiary—of the University's International Initiative campaign. The International Initiative will focus on the overarching global challenges to enhance international peace and security, improve governance at all levels of society, and advance human well-being—all areas of major focus for the Institute's interdisciplinary, policy-oriented research and programmatic activities.

SIIS seeks to strengthen faculty jointly with the University's seven schools, provide support for innovative multidisciplinary research projects, support graduate students in international studies, build the capacity of its five constituent centers, and broaden its outreach activities.

Gift opportunities that represent priorities for the Institute and its centers will be presented in some detail in the coming months on the SIIS website: http://siis.stanford.edu.

For more information about making a gift to SIIS, please contact Evelyn Kelsey, associate director for development and public affairs, at 650-725-4206 or by email at ezkelsey@stanford.edu.

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

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STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

WELCOME TO *Encina* COLUMNS

The Spring 2005 issue of *Encina Columns,* the SIIS newsletter, comes out at a propitious time for the Stanford Institute for International Studies and for the University more broadly. It appears shortly before SIIS International Day on May 6, 2005—the Institute's first annual conference, when leading international voices will gather at Stanford under Institute auspices to discuss the most crucial issues of our time. It also appears shortly before the launch of Stanford University's International Initiative, a most important event not only for SIIS but also for the entire University. The Initiative—like similar interdisciplinary efforts at Stanford in the biosciences and the environment—will involve faculty, research staff, and students from all seven schools. It will promote cutting-edge research—both basic and applied—as well as innovative new programs in education and university outreach in three distinct yet interconnected issue areas: peace and security, governance at all levels of society, and human health and well-being.

SIIS is well placed to lead this University-wide effort, and we are eager to meet the challenges, both intellectual and institutional, that undertakings of this magnitude inevitably pose. We are committed to making SIIS the country's foremost university-based research institute focusing on contemporary international affairs, and we welcome your participation in this effort.

The new issue of *Encina Columns* reflects, as always, the exciting work going on at the Institute. Inside this issue are a range of stories and announcements on such diverse topics as the manifold implications of the tsunami catastrophe, the problem of health care for the elderly in China, the command and control of nuclear weapons, the connection between electricity-market reform and global climate change, and nation-building and lessons learned from Iraq. We are also delighted to announce the launch of a new journal devoted to the study of contemporary Korea.

This issue of *Encina Columns* also takes note of the deepening involvement of SIIS faculty in the policy-making community beyond Stanford. Witness Stephen D. Krasner's recent appointment as director of policy planning in the State Department, and Stephen Stedman's ongoing work as the research director for the U.N. Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes. We miss them both, but appreciate the contribution that each is making to the pursuit of a better and safer world.

Encina Columns is published each fall and spring. As always, we welcome your involvement and your comments.

COIT D. BLACKER, DIRECTOR