Stephen W. Bosworth

PARTING REFLECTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The 2014 Payne Distinguished Lecture Series

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Stanford | APARC Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center

FSI Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

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About Stephen W. Bosworth

Stephen W. Bosworth was a Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University during the winter quarter 2014. At the time, he was also a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He was also the chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). From 2001 to 2013, he served as dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, after which he served as dean emeritus. He also served as the U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 1997 to 2001.

From 1995 to 1997, Bosworth was the executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), an intergovernmental organization established by the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan to deal with North Korea in implementing the U.S.–DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994. Before joining KEDO, he served seven years as president of the United States–Japan Foundation, a private American grant-making institution. He also taught International Relations at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs from 1990 to 1994. In 1993, he was the Sol Linowitz Visiting Professor at Hamilton College. He coauthored several studies on public policy issues for the Carnegie Endowment and the Century Fund, and, in 2006, he coauthored with Morton Abramowitz *Chasing the Sun, Rethinking East Asian Policy*.

Bosworth had an extensive career in the United States Foreign Service, including service as ambassador to Tunisia from 1979 to 1981 and ambassador to the Philippines from 1984 to 1987. He served in a number of senior positions in the Department of State, including director of policy planning, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American Affairs, and deputy assistant secretary for economic affairs. From

March 2009 through October 2011, he served as U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy for the Obama Administration.

Ambassador Bosworth was the recipient of many awards, including the American Academy of Diplomacy's Diplomat of the Year Award in 1987, the Department of State's Distinguished Service Award in 1976 and again in 1986, and the Department of Energy's Distinguished Service Award in 1979. In 2005, the Government of Japan presented him with the Order of the Rising Sun, Gold and Silver Star.

Ambassador Bosworth was a graduate of Dartmouth College, where he was a member of the Board of Trustees from 1992 to 2002 and served as Board Chair from 1996 to 2000.

Ambassador Bosworth passed away at the age of seventy-six on January 4, 2016, of pancreatic cancer at his home in Boston, Massachusetts. His survivors include his wife of thirty-one years, the former Christine Holmes of Boston, and their two daughters and two sons.

Preface

Stephen W. "Steve" Bosworth, a three-time U.S. ambassador and former dean of the Fletcher School, was no stranger to Stanford University and its Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) when he arrived on campus as a Payne Distinguished Lecturer in January 2014. Ambassador Bosworth had been a key participant over the years in Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC)-hosted Koret conferences at FSI examining the North Korea problem in depth. He had also been part of Shorenstein APARC's New Beginnings project to bolster the U.S.–South Korea alliance during a period of turbulence in the relationship. Ambassador Bosworth had many former government colleagues at Shorenstein APARC and elsewhere in the Stanford community looking forward to again enjoying his wisdom and his warmth. I was one of them.

Steve and I shared the special bond of both having served as American ambassador to the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Steve from 1998 to 2001, I ten years later. Steve also served as the U.S. government's Special Representative for North Korea Policy from 2009 to 2011, and so I saw him often when he visited Seoul in that capacity. I benefited from his insights and advice, both on North Korean issues and on South Korean political and economic challenges. I admired the enduring friendships he had with South Koreans across the political spectrum.

But it was during that 2014 winter quarter at Stanford that I really got to know Steve and Christine, his equally remarkable wife. Steve had recently completed a transformative twelve-year tenure as dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, the oldest school in the nation focused on training graduate students in international relations and diplomacy. He had also just been through an exhausting cancer treatment regime. Nevertheless, Steve began his first Payne lecture by alluding to the enthusiasm with which he and Chris were already diving into everything Stanford and the Bay Area had to offer: "To say that Chris and I are enjoying ourselves risks serious understatement." Happily, I shared in many of those pleasures; we explored the restaurants, cultural

scene, and scenic spots with equal verve. Steve was unstintingly generous with his time in meeting with students, and speaking to other classes, including my maiden effort at teaching a Stanford course.

Shorenstein APARC's Michael Armacost, a former ambassador and another old friend of Steve's, introduced the lecture series to a full house. All three of Ambassador Bosworth's Payne lectures are included in this volume. In his first lecture, Ambassador Bosworth reflects on his career in the Foreign Service and in foreign policy more broadly, reminding us of all that has changed—and much that has not—in the practice of American diplomacy. His second lecture looks at the difficult—and to date unsuccessful—efforts over many years to deal with North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Steve had more direct experience with this at a senior level over more years than probably any other American, and this lecture remains essential reading. His final lecture, on American alliances in Asia, provides a perspective that can only come from someone involved closely and successfully over so many years in managing our alliances with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

Ambassador Bosworth touched generations of students, diplomats, politicians, and government, academic, and social leaders—from Harvard to Tufts to Stanford, from Tunis to Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, and Pyongyang—with his wisdom and his humanity. His passing in January 2016 makes the publication of these lectures all the more meaningful and precious.

I last saw Steve at Harvard in October 2015, where we were on a panel together to talk about U.S.-Korea relations. As always, he was wry, funny, and quietly but profoundly wise in looking back and looking forward at U.S.-Asia relations. We were each presented by the Kim Koo Foundation with calligraphy scrolls to mark the occasion. Both then, and especially in hindsight now, they are achingly apt.

Steve received a scroll with a Confucian saying written in Chinese: 思無邪, in Korean "sa-mu-sa," which means "thought without malice." Indeed, that was Stephen Bosworth.

My scroll contained a poem, also in Chinese, by a Chosun dynasty Korean poet.

> Walking in a snowy field,
> Tread with care.
> The footprints you leave
> Will guide those who follow.

The poem now hangs on my wall to remind me of my friend.

In his life's work and in these lectures, among his very last, Stephen Bosworth has left all of us footprints that can guide us well.

Kathleen Stephens
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, 2008–11
William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Stanford University

Stephen W. Bosworth

Parting Reflections and Observations on American Foreign Policy

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Reflections and Observations on American Foreign Policy

I am delighted to be here this afternoon to talk about American foreign policy and share some observations and conclusions drawn from my own experiences over more than a half century in and around the Department of State and the Foreign Service. I am especially pleased and grateful for my time here at Shorenstein APARC and the Freeman Spogli Institute. To say that my wife, Chris, and I are enjoying ourselves risks serious understatement.

We are delighted to be here, and not just because we had the foresight to trade one of the hardest winters in recent memory in the Northeast for the glories of Northern California. We also relish the intellectually stimulating environment of this wonderful university. I would also note that after twelve years as dean of the Fletcher School, it is a particular treat for me to experience the joys of American academia while having no administrative responsibilities.

My Diplomatic Career

Some brief personal background is relevant to some of what I am going to talk about this afternoon. Context, as they say, is crucial. My observations about American foreign policy are for the most part drawn from my personal experiences as a practitioner in and out of the U.S. government and the Foreign Service over more than five decades. I confess that, even to me, that seems a shockingly long time. I can only imagine what it seems to those of you who are still students or have recently embarked on a career.

This lecture was delivered on February 3, 2014. All of Ambassador Bosworth's lectures have been lightly edited for readability.

I joined the Foreign Service as a fresh graduate of Dartmouth College in the summer of 1961. I had gone to Dartmouth from a small public high school in western Michigan where I had grown up on a small farm. Why Dartmouth? Well, someone in Dartmouth's athletic department had thought that I could qualify academically and perhaps play Ivy League football. They were right about the academic part, though my first year was perilous as I discovered I was woefully unprepared for the rigors of Dartmouth. But they were wrong about the football. I managed one year before concluding I was neither big enough nor fast enough afoot.

In any event, in July 1961 I received a telegram (for the younger people in the room, telegrams were a bit like emails but much slower and you actually paid for them by the word) offering me an appointment as a Foreign Service Officer, class 8. My alternative at the time was law school. But neither Harvard nor the University of Michigan was willing to pay me a salary. Rather they wanted me to pay them, and I wasn't sure I really wanted to be a lawyer, and while the Foreign Service did not offer a big salary, it was a salary.

As I went off to Washington to join the Foreign Service, the country was getting accustomed to a new, young president, John F. Kennedy, and his "New Frontier." The Kennedy administration was off to a rocky start in its dealings with the rest of the world. The Soviet Union was testing our resolve in Berlin, where rising tensions over the future of the divided city culminated late in the summer of 1961 in the construction of the Berlin Wall, a thoroughly ugly structure that symbolized the Cold War for nearly thirty years.

Kennedy was also trying to recover from the disaster of the Bay of Pigs, an ill-conceived, bungled attempt to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba. In the scorekeeping of the Cold War, the year 1961 was not shaping up to be a good one for the United States. Yet, it was an exciting time to join the government. As many have written, there was a sense of a new beginning, of generational change.

Washington, D.C., in 1961 was a very different city than the Washington of today, just as the United States was a very different country. Our capital was very much a southern city, one that this young man from Michigan was shocked to find a segregated place, with separate white and "colored" lunch counters, drinking fountains, and public facilities. Here too, though, there was in 1961 a definite sense of change. Young Americans, black and white, were launching, at real personal risk, campaigns of peaceful protest aimed at bringing political and social change through non-violent political action.

The Foreign Service I joined in 1961 was also very different from the one that exists today. It was still "white shoe," an institutional preserve of the so-called East Coast establishment. I qualified for admission by virtue of my Dartmouth diploma—but just barely. In my entering class of thirty-eight people, there were only two women, one of whom was shortly forced to resign because she married one of our classmates. (In those days, you had to be a male to marry and remain in the Foreign Service.) There were zero persons of color and only a handful who were not products of an Ivy League education. As for sexual orientation, well, you can imagine.

At the age of twenty-one, I was the youngest person in my entering class. I was more than a little intimidated by the sophistication and accomplishments of my classmates, some of whom were in their early thirties. They had studied abroad; worked on Wall Street; gone to law school; been Congressional aides; and seen military service. I kept quiet and listened a lot.

Generations of Americans had grown up confident that the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone belonged to the United States.

Early the next year, after basic officer training, a course in consular operations, and four months of Spanish language study, I went off to Panama City on my first assignment. At the time, Panama seemed an unexciting, even boring, first assignment, especially when compared to the first posts of those of my classmates who were going to newly independent countries in Africa and what we still called French Indochina. But it turned out the United States had a good deal of unfinished business in Panama.

Generations of Americans had grown up confident that the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone belonged to the United States. Teddy Roosevelt asserted that he had "taken Panama," and, indeed, he had. When Colombia proved reluctant to grant the United States the right to build and operate a canal across the isthmus, Roosevelt simply recognized a separatist movement in the Colombian province of Panama and declared Panama an independent country before most Panamanians were even aware of what was happening. Then, through the good offices of a prominent New York law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, Roosevelt put in place a treaty giving the United States the right, "as though it were sovereign," to build and operate the Panama Canal.

After a year in our embassy in Panama City, I was detailed to Colon on the Atlantic side of the isthmus, where I manned a one-person Amer-

ican consulate. Colon was a memorable time for me. I was there as the representative of the United States when President Kennedy was killed, a searing experience. It was also in Colon that I had my first exposure to the power of frustrated nationalism and learned that the diplomatic life was not all tea and crumpets.

As one might have expected, Panamanians were generally happy with independence and the economic benefits of the canal, but soon they began to resent, strongly resent, the American assertion of sovereignty over the canal and the slice of land bisecting their country. In early 1964, riots broke out at both ends of the Canal Zone, in Panama City and Colon. In Colon, the rioters assaulted the symbol of the American presence, the U.S. consulate. However, the consulate also happened to be the place where my family and I lived, on the second floor. Fortunately, the Panamanian National Guard eventually responded to the attack on the consulate, dispersed the rioters, and evacuated my first wife, our young son, and me to the Canal Zone.

Panama broke diplomatic relations with the United States, and our embassy chancery became an interests section in the embassy of Switzerland. After several months, the United States agreed to renegotiate the status of our presence in the Canal Zone, and the embassy reopened. But the consulate in Colon was closed forever. So rather than being a quiet place to begin my foreign service career, Panama proved to be quite exciting, sometimes too exciting.

I was transferred back to Washington and assigned to the Panama "desk." Over the next three years, I was a junior participant in the first tentative efforts to renegotiate the Treaty of 1903, a Panamanian demand that had become a rallying issue for anti-Americanism throughout Latin America. The desk was a great learning experience for me. My boss, the director of Panamanian affairs, let me tag along on his trips to Capitol Hill, interagency meetings, and even meetings at the White House. It was very heady stuff.

A new regime for the canal was eventually put in place, but not until 1979 under the Carter administration, which negotiated the reversion of the canal and the Canal Zone to Panama's sovereign control. This was very much the right outcome in terms of our broad national interests, but it was not politically popular. In fact, some observers believe it was a major factor in Ronald Reagan's defeat of Jimmy Carter in 1980.

From the Panama desk I went on to assignments in Madrid and Paris. Both were pleasant places in the late sixties and early seventies, and

Some observers believe the reversion of the canal to Panama's sovereign control was a major factor in Ronald Reagan's defeat of Jimmy Carter in 1980.

professionally they gave me useful breadth of experience. But in neither post was I much involved in any of the central policy issues of the day.

In Spain, however, in what was the twilight of the Franco era, I did have my first exposure to the complicated question of how the United States should deal with aging, generally pro-American dictators. Again, the context was important. Most Americans had no love for the Franco regime. Memories of the Spanish Civil War and Franco's subsequent alignment with Nazi Germany were still fresh. But the Cold War was real, and Franco was at least an anti-communist. Also, we had large military bases in Spain that were crucial to our presence in the Mediterranean and the security of NATO's southern flank.

And, yet, by the late 1960s some tender democratic shoots were beginning to sprout in Spain, though very tentatively. In the embassy and in the State Department, there was some discussion of how the United States should respond. Franco was not eager to see Americans, certainly not American diplomats, have any contact with Spain's young, anti-regime upstarts. The State Department, together with the White House and the Defense Department, chose not to challenge Franco, no matter how avowedly non-communist the oppositionists in question were.

In the early 1970s, after spending a year of relative discontent working for a multinational bank in Chicago under the auspices of a White House exchange program, I decided that the Foreign Service was not such a bad career. And secure in the knowledge, or at least the illusion, that I had career alternatives if I wanted them, I returned to the State Department.

Over the next several years, I was fortunate to be involved, sometimes tangentially but sometimes quite centrally, in the making of American policy on a number of crucial issues. In the 1970s, I worked on international economic issues growing out of the Arab oil embargo of 1973–74 during the Arab-Israeli War and the energy/economic crisis that followed. In fact, these matters were not exclusively or even largely economic. Rather, they were highly political, domestically and internationally.

In these years, I also had my first extended exposure to the role of Congress in foreign affairs and to other, non–State Department executive branch agencies that considered that they, too, had a role in the making

and implementation of foreign policy. I also learned the importance of the press and public opinion and non-government organizations focused on international issues. And I had my first indoctrination into the world of multilateral diplomacy, as the United States led efforts to organize oil-importing countries. We created a new international organization, the International Energy Agency, to deal with the oil-exporting countries in a unified manner.

For the United States, the oil crisis of 1973–74 and the ensuing years marked a loss of innocence. It was not just a matter of having to tolerate long lines to fill the gas tanks of our large cars. We learned that our own economic well-being could be heavily dependent on events. We learned that this was not a problem we could solve by ourselves, though it was essential for us to act. It was not even enough for us, for example, to become energy-independent. As long as our major trading partners and security allies were vulnerable to interruptions of energy supplies, we suffered a

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shared vulnerability because of our trade, finance, and security connections with them.

The same period brought the first outburst of Islamic fundamentalism that transformed Iran and American interests there and then shook power structures throughout much of the Arab world. Those years also saw political unrest, anti-Americanism, and violence, as well as new threats to embassy security and American diplomats.

In the 1980s, I served successively as ambassador to Tunisia and principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Latin America, before moving on to be director of policy planning. I then became ambassador to the Philippines, where I followed Mike Armacost when he went to Washington to become undersecretary of state for political affairs.

Diplomatic Lessons Learned

Looking back on these experiences, I have tried to articulate various caveats, admonitions, and guidelines that I think were relevant then to the conduct of American foreign policy and that remain so today. Above all, I found that the making of U.S. policy is inherently a very, very difficult enterprise. It is definitely not for the faint of heart. The issues tend to be complex, and they frequently pose moral as well as political choices.

I found too that perfection is usually the enemy of the good in the making of foreign policy and that it is usually unattainable. Rather, given the difficulty of making and implementing policy, we sometimes have to settle for policy that is 80 to 85 percent right. Not that less than perfect is ever good enough; we should continue to work to improve policies even after we put them in place. George Shultz used to compare the conduct of foreign policy to gardening: you have to tend to it regularly.

Also, because of the United States' central role in so many international security issues, it is very much in our interest that other countries, friends and adversaries alike, know where the United States is likely to stand on major international issues. This was particularly true during the Cold War, when the consequences of miscalculation could have been so great. But it remains true today, whether in Syria, the South China Sea, or anywhere else. Yes, sometimes there can be virtue in ambiguity, and we may not always wish to spell out fully what we could do in every situation. But for the most part, we don't want others to have to guess at our intentions.

Other countries tend to have longer memories than does the United States, and they are frequently suspicious of American actions, even though we think we are being sincere. People in Central America, for example, were not just reacting to domestic developments in deciding to support guerilla movements and organize against the United States. They were also responding to their memories of the U.S. role in overthrowing the populist Arbenz government in Guatemala in the 1950s and similar interventions over the decades. Likewise, the intense anti-American temper of the Iranian revolution, which continues today, grew in large measure from the U.S. decision to depose a popular Iranian leader and reinstall the Shah on his throne. In the Philippines during the Marcos period and the transition back to democracy, many Filipinos had quite contradictory views of the United States. We were regarded as the "great Satan" and former colonial power responsible for most of the ills besetting the country. Yet we were also seen as the *deus ex machina* that would eventually bring solutions to all problems.

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In general, I have found that there has been considerable continuity in American foreign policy from administration to administration. After all, U.S. national interests

don't change just because we have a change of government. I must confess, however, that this is not always the case. In early 2001, as I was preparing to leave Seoul, I had a final meeting with President Kim Dae-jung. He was worried that our newly inaugurated president, George W. Bush, might not support his strategy of engagement and opening to North Korea as the Clinton administration had done in its final years. I quoted the axiom about American interests not changing and said I expected that, after its settling-in period was over, the Bush administration would pursue roughly the same policy as Clinton. My prediction of course proved to be very wrong, and it took some years for the U.S.–South Korea relationship to recover from President Bush's abrupt reversal of American policy toward Pyongyang.

What we say is frequently as important in American foreign policy as what we do. Among the things we say tends to be a lot of warnings. We call these "redlines" and warn of dire consequences if they are ignored. In my view, redlines should be seldom drawn, but when they are, they should always be crafted with great care. And once issued, crossing them should have consequences. We should not warn of dire consequences unless we are prepared to follow through. In dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat, for example, we have said repeatedly we cannot tolerate a nuclear North Korea. Yet North Korea now has or can plausibly claim to have nuclear weapons, and we seem to be tolerating it or at least trying to ignore it.

We have said repeatedly we cannot tolerate a nuclear North Korea. Yet North Korea now has or can plausibly claim to have nuclear weapons, and we seem to be tolerating it or at least trying to ignore it.

I also believe it remains true that because of the structure of our government and the way in which Americans view ourselves and our role in the world, American foreign policy must have the support of the American people if it is to be sustained. For the post-Vietnam generations of American policymakers, this was a principal lesson that we took from our experience in that country. Here again, however, I must note that context matters. In the post-9/11 world, policies and actions that would not have been previously sustainable in terms of public support were in fact sustained for a considerable period of time. In fact, in some cases they are still being sustained.

It is also important to try as much as possible to avoid hubris. Ours is now, without question, the most powerful country in the world, economically, politically, and, most of all, militarily. We are frequently insensitive about how other people react to our power. American power makes many people abroad very uneasy. In reality, the only effective constraint on American power tends to be our own self-restraint. And in the recent past, self-restraint has not been all that characteristic of American behavior.

At the moment, our self-restraint seems greater, reflecting our current economic realities and our painful experiences of the last decade. But this is not necessarily a permanent condition. It will remain extremely risky to overestimate our ability to control events, especially those inside other countries. Rather, we should try to understand the history and current circumstances of other countries and why they frequently see us so very differently from the way we see ourselves.

Our experience to the contrary notwithstanding, we have a tendency to believe we can stick our hands into another society, including ones we don't know all that well, and stir things around until we have a more satisfactory arrangement. This approach usually doesn't turn out very well. Our recent adventures in Southwest Asia, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan, are vivid examples of the dangers of hubris.

We also need to examine why, all too frequently, we have resorted to the use of military force. I believe that, when at all possible, we need to choose diplomacy over force, although it is sometimes the case that diplomacy backed by the potential of force can be more effective than diplomacy without it. In general, however, the last several years have shown that the risk of having a seemingly all-powerful military in our national security toolbox is equivalent to having only a hammer and thus making everything look like a nail.

In truth, there has been a clear militarization of American foreign policy in the post–Cold War era and especially in the post-9/11 period. In some ways, that is understandable. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is much less risk that the use of American military power will be matched by Moscow. Presidents want to be seen as acting, to be solving problems. That is especially so in international affairs, where to be deemed weak or indecisive can be damning.

Doing nothing is seldom deemed an adequate response. When presidents do make a decision, they want to see something happen. Sitting in the White House situation room with their national security teams, presidents ask for options. Almost always the options offered by the military promise faster, more concrete, more quantifiable results than those of-

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fered up by the State Department, which usually calls for consultations with allies, searching through foreign assistance budgets for some money, and talking to the Congress. Fortunately, our military leadership tends to be more cautious in its willingness to use military power than does civilian leadership. However, it is also true that the American military is very much subordinate to civilian leadership.

American Diplomacy and the Promotion of Democracy

Finally, I come to what I consider the most complicated aspect of American foreign policy: the extent to which the promotion of democracy and what we consider to be American values should be central in the U.S. approach to the rest of the world.

There is a school of thought that holds that the circumstances of our creation as a nation and the values that underpin our system of government give the United States a special mission in the world, a mission beyond the maintenance of our national security and the promotion of our economic interests. The argument that we have an obligation to the rest of the world and to ourselves to promote American values and democracy in our foreign dealings is largely unchallenged by most Americans. But when and how to promote our democratic values poses some complex questions.

In practice, we are more than a bit confused in our thinking and political discourse about matters of democracy and foreign policy. No one would argue that democracy is not a desirable form of government. But we have learned over the years, or at least should have learned, that there is no "one size fits all" democratic model. We have also learned that democracy works best when it is homegrown and that it can be a very fragile flower when transplanted.

But there are even more basic questions. What is democracy? Is it a matter of one person, one vote? Or is a more representative system appropriate? What are the essential qualities of a democracy—transparency, accountability? These are all questions that American policymakers have to deal with on a regular basis. My own experience in this rocky garden was during my time working on Latin American policy in the early 1980s and, most notably, later in the decade when Mike Armacost and I, with

the leadership of George Shultz, struggled to find the right path forward for U.S. policy in the Philippines.

I returned to Washington from Tunisia in the early 1980s to find myself back where I had started more than twenty years earlier, dealing with Latin America. But this was quite a different Latin America from the one I had experienced as a young Foreign Service Officer in Panama. The upbeat spirit of the Alliance for Progress and the confidence that American capital and American know-how could begin to transform the hemisphere had given way to a discouraging reality: a cluster of repressive military

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regimes in South America and left-wing guerilla movements in Central America modeled on the Sandinistas, who had seized power in Nicaragua.

There was also an exaggerated but real fear in some political circles in the United States that our national security was directly threatened by what was seen as a Soviet/Cuban–inspired wave of unrest sweeping north. This all seems overblown thirty years later but, remember, this was the Cold War. Many Americans, including some in the newly inaugurated Reagan administration, believed the country had been left in a very vulnerable position by the policies of the Carter administration. We were seen to be paying a price for abandoning long-standing allies like the Shah in Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua, and of course for our decision to open full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) at the expense of our ties to the remnants of the Nationalist regime in Taiwan.

In the first months of the Reagan administration, there was much talk about the need to "go to the source" of the unrest in Central America, that is, to find ways to hold Cuba accountable and, through them, the Soviets themselves. For many who had a longer and more balanced perspective on the region, such talk seemed bizarre, but the proponents of such policies felt genuine conviction. As we searched for a sustainable strategy for the hemisphere, it was clear that it would not be enough to support anti-communist forces, whether the Contras in Nicaragua or rightist groups elsewhere. Going "to the source" was also not possible.

And, so, we came to the option of democracy, a strategy on which we were able to join together with the moderate center in the Latin American countries. In Central America, we put our support behind elections in El Salvador in 1982. The elections weren't pretty but they were elections,

and over the next several years, elections and democracy spread elsewhere in the hemisphere. In South America, democratic elections offered a path to civilian government and a return to the rule of law. In most cases, the military was eager to return to the barracks. Military leaders had learned that running countries was difficult and dangerous to the integrity and reputation of their own institutions.

By and large, democracy has prevailed in Latin America over the past couple of decades. We don't always like what it produces, as, for example, in Venezuela. Democracy does not always bring good governance. Democratic governments are also susceptible to corruption and inefficiency. But the people of Latin America are undeniably better off now than they were twenty years ago thanks to the progress of democracy.

I want to conclude by moving from Latin America to Asia, where I have focused my professional and personal interests over much of the past thirty years. In Asia, the promotion of democratic values has been a major component of U.S. foreign policy for some time. In the Philippines in the 1980s, democratization, or re-democratization, was the centerpiece of our policy. The regime of Ferdinand Marcos was faltering. Marcos' health was deteriorating, the economy was spiraling downward, and in the countryside a communist-inspired insurgency was gaining momentum. The assassination of opposition leader Ninoy Aquino in August of 1983 was a major blow to hopes that Marcos might be prepared to "go gentle into that good night."

Fortunately, there was a democratic opposition in the Philippines, weak and factionalized, but democratic. There was also a collective memory of the democratic institutions that had existed before Marcos declared martial law in 1972. The United States did not try to pick and choose among the various candidates to lead the opposition movement. But we did press Marcos to allow political space for the opposition in which they could organize and campaign for popular support.

The People Power Revolution of 1986 was the first popular revolution of the CNN era. It provided weeks of compelling drama for the world. Corazon Aquino, the widow of the assassinated Ninoy, led the opposition in the presidential election in February. When Marcos sought to steal an electoral victory, Manila and much of the rest of the country rose up in protest, and the military refused Marcos' orders to use force against the protesters. With American encouragement and logistical assistance, Marcos then fled the country for exile in Hawaii. (In some quarters, I became known as Marcos' travel agent.) The United States played an im-

portant role in this bloodless revolution, but it was the Filipino people who brought democracy back to the Philippines.

Democracy is not, however, a cure-all for all that ails the Philippines. Democracy did not immediately bring good governance and it did not end corruption. It did not eliminate or even significantly reduce poverty, and the Philippines remained vulnerable to populist impulse. Only now, nearly thirty years after the end of the Marcos era, does there seem to be some prospect of sustained economic growth and a reduction of poverty in the country. My own optimism is tempered by the fact that there are now roughly twice as many Filipinos—nearly 100 million—as there were when Marcos left. It makes it that much harder for the country to get ahead.

Democracy is not, however, a cure-all for all that ails the Philippines. Democracy did not immediately bring good governance and it did not end corruption. It did not eliminate or even significantly reduce poverty.

My other experience with the cultivation and blooming of democracy in Asia was in the Republic of Korea in the late 1990s. After some three years of helping to create and then lead the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and dealing directly with North Korea, I was asked to come back into the U.S. government and go to Seoul as ambassador.

When I arrived in Seoul in November 1997, circumstances were quite different from those that existed in Manila a decade earlier. South Korea was already in the midst of a transition from thirty years of military rule to a democratically elected civilian government. In 1992, long-time opposition leader Kim Young Sam had been elected president of the country after merging his party with that of then-outgoing President Roh Tae-woo, a former general and co-conspirator in Chun Doo-Hwan's coup d'état in 1979–80.

In December 1997, Kim Young Sam's long-time rival in the opposition, Kim Dae-jung, was elected president in the first full-fledged, sustained transfer of power in South Korea from a ruling party to the opposition. Moreover, the transfer occurred smoothly despite a severe financial crisis that put South Korea's economic progress at risk.

Again, the United States had played a role in the consolidation of democracy in Korea, but it was very much a supporting role. We had made clear our support for the democratic process and greater openness,

especially with regard to the issue of greater respect for human rights. But it was the Koreans themselves who took the personal risk involved in bringing democracy to their country. Now South Korea seems very much a mature democracy, and it has transferred power from one civilian administration to another four times, twice to the candidate of the opposition party.

It has to be said that in South Korea, as in the Philippines, the U.S. decision to support democratization was not simple. In both cases, we had other powerful interests, which, it was argued at the time, could be jeopardized by an excess of zeal in our support for democracy. The transition in the Philippines occurred at the height of the Cold War, when our two major military bases there were seen as critical to the global containment of the Soviet Union. In South Korea, democratization took place in the face of North Korea's unrelenting hostility and the absolute need for credible deterrence of the threat it posed.

Looking now at Asia more broadly, the progress of democracy is to some degree encouraging, though there are major question marks. Japan remains a key strategic ally in East Asia, in large measure because it is regarded as staunchly democratic. South Korea is of course in the same category. In much of Southeast Asia, what is sometimes called "guided democracy" seems the preferred model, as in Singapore. For the most part, guided democracy exhibits a healthy degree of transparency and growing accountability, which tend to limit abuses and punish malefactors when excesses of power do occur. Indonesia is a sprawling, heavily populated, Islamic nation that continues along a democratic path. It has gone through election cycle after election cycle and is moving forward economically. Malaysia is a similar case. Taiwan seems to have found a democratic space compatible with its delicate status vis-à-vis China. Burma may be the latest example of democratic progress, though it is still too early to make a firm judgment.

Thailand, on the other hand, seems to offer a sobering reality check on democratic progress in Asia. Money and populism have seemingly sparked a thoroughly undemocratic reaction from Thai elites, who have little confidence that elections will produce a result they can tolerate. The Thai military apparently is no longer a threat to civilian rule. Rather, to paraphrase the language of Pogo, the wise comic strip character, the Thai middle and upper classes "have met the enemy and we are him."

The two big outliers in East Asia are of course China and Vietnam. In neither case does a transition to what might even loosely be described as democracy seem remotely imminent. Neither country welcomes Amer-

ican evangelism on the subject of democracy, and, in truth, promoting democracy does not seem to be a central element of American policy toward them. Our diplomacy does continue to feature calls to respect human rights and permit greater openness, but we do not push that hard. The reasons for that, in the case of Vietnam, are probably found in the history of our relationship in the sixties and seventies. In the case of China, our own economic well-being seems increasingly dependent on China's continued growth. There is thus reluctance outside as well as within the country to risk possible political disruption. In addition, given the

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volatility of nationalism in China as well as elsewhere, it is appropriate to ask what the likely consequences of more direct democracy in China would likely be on PRC policy, for instance, toward Japan.

That leaves North Korea. It is difficult under present conditions even to talk about the Democratic People's Republic and democracy. I will turn to that country in my next lecture.

In conclusion, I would state the obvious: it is awkward for the United States to campaign for more democracy elsewhere when our model seems to experience increasing difficulty in producing reasonable solutions to even our own problems. I remain confident that our democratic system can eventually work better than it seems to be doing now. But for countries still struggling to provide a better standard of living for their citizens, it is not surprising that some conclude they cannot yet afford the luxury of American-style democratic governance.

Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

A New Approach Needed?

Let me begin with a very brief summary of the history of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The country had had a small experimental nuclear program for some years and had been receiving limited technical and material assistance from its close ally, the Soviet Union. Pyongyang joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. Later in the 1980s, the United States began to take serious notice of what the North Koreans were doing and became concerned that they were trying to develop nuclear weapons.

Finally, in 1993, at the beginning of the Clinton administration, we raised our concerns with the North Koreans and soon began to negotiate with them to try to bring about an end to their nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang maintained throughout the negotiations that it was trying to develop nuclear energy but was not seeking a nuclear weapons capability. These negotiations were the first sustained diplomatic contact we had had with North Korea since the end of the Korean War. In October 1994, after several months of difficult negotiations that included a good amount of brinkmanship by the North Koreans and a dramatic intervention by former President Jimmy Carter, the United States and the DPRK concluded

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This second Payne Distinguished Lecture by Ambassador Bosworth also constituted the keynote speech at the sixth annual Koret workshop, entitled "Engaging North Korea: Projects, Challenges, and Prospects," and delivered on February 21, 2014. Shorenstein APARC's Korea Program hosts the annual Koret workshops, which are made possible through the generous support of the Koret Foundation.

an agreement known as the Agreed Framework. (Many of the negotiations for the Agreed Framework took place in Geneva, Switzerland, and it is thus sometimes referred to as the "Geneva agreement.")

Under this agreement, Pyongyang agreed to first freeze and then dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In return, the United States, supported very importantly by the Republic of Korea and Japan, agreed to provide the North with two 1,000-megawatt light water reactors, as well as heavy fuel oil to help meet the country's energy needs until the reactors were completed. Also importantly, we agreed to engage politically with North Korea, including establishing a diplomatic presence in each other's capitals.

Unfortunately, almost immediately after the Agreed Framework was signed, it became a political orphan. As you may recall, the Republicans gained control of the House and the Senate in the midterm elections of November 1994. To say that there was not much enthusiasm for the Agreed Framework in the Republican-controlled Congress would be classic understatement.

The Agreed Framework: Implementation and Collapse

The conclusion of the Agreed Framework marked the beginning of my personal involvement in Korean Peninsula affairs. At this point, I had been out of government for several years, following my time in Manila as ambassador in the mid-1980s during the Reagan Administration. Much to my surprise, Robert "Bob" Gallucci, who had negotiated the Agreed Framework, asked me to take on the task of creating and then running the small international organization that would oversee the implementation of the Agreed Framework and of being the organization's formal interface with North Korea. I knew little about North Korea and the mission was clearly challenging, but after some reflection and discussion with my wife, Chris, I agreed.

In early 1995, we launched the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In the beginning, the KEDO board had three members: the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. Later, the European Union became the fourth principal member. Several other countries, mostly in Asia, affiliated themselves with KEDO. They provided additional political weight and some limited funding.

I was KEDO's executive director. Working with two deputy directors, one South Korean and one Japanese, both of whom were seconded from their respective foreign ministries, we set up the organization in New York City. (North Korean diplomats were already stationed in New York, to

represent their country at the United Nations.) We started with nothing except the portion of the Agreed Framework in which the role of KEDO was outlined. We rented office space in Manhattan and began recruiting a small staff.

We then undertook our first interaction with the North Koreans, the negotiation of the so-called Supply Agreement. The Framework itself was exactly and only that—a framework. It set forth basic principles but it left open fundamental aspects of what we were going to do and how. As noted above, we were to build two 1,000-megawatt light water nuclear reactors in North Korea. We were also committed to provide Pyongyang with a large quantity of heavy fuel oil. The latter was theoretically calculated to replace the energy that North Korea would have generated had it continued to build its own nuclear reactors, work on which had been suspended under the Framework.

It is important to remember what a dramatic diplomatic step this was, for the United States and our partners of course, but even more so for North Korea. For the United States, it was the first sustained diplomatic engagement we had had, ever, with the DPRK. For North Korea, it was also among the first sustained substantive contacts it ever had had with the three KEDO countries, countries with which Pyongyang had a history of extreme antagonism.

The reality was that the Clinton administration had no prospect of getting a KEDO appropriation bill through the Republican-controlled Congress.

Just nurturing these relationships at the level of KEDO was a challenge. Also, we had no money; at least, the United States had no money for KEDO. Fortunately, the Republic of Korea and Japan were committed to providing financial support to fund the light water reactor construction. The United States provided very little beyond its share of KEDO's administrative costs. The U.S. Congress appropriated no funds to purchase the heavy fuel oil we were committed to provide to the North Koreans. The Clinton administration did reprogram a limited amount of funding from other accounts to buy some fuel oil, but KEDO literally had to beg and borrow money from the rest of the world to meet the fuel oil obligation. The reality was that the administration had no prospect of getting a KEDO appropriation bill through the Republican-controlled Congress.

Nonetheless, we did move forward. We concluded the Supply Agreement and began negotiating the operating protocols that were to be the framework for our interaction with the DPRK. We also began the process of constructing the reactors. From 1994, when the Geneva agreement was signed, until the end of 2002, when it fell apart during the George W. Bush administration's first term, we enjoyed eight years in which North Korea produced no plutonium.

I'm going to take some shortcuts here. I'm not going to go through the entire history of those eight years. But it is important to note that had North Korea continued on the track it had been on before the Agreed Framework was concluded, it is reliably estimated it could have produced enough plutonium for several dozen nuclear weapons. Some have questioned the worth of the Agreed Framework, but I would argue strongly that the fact that North Korea did not manufacture those dozens of nuclear weapons was itself well worth the cost, political and financial, of the Geneva agreement.

However, we know now and suspected then that Pyongyang was hedging. It had almost certainly begun working on enriching uranium as an alternative to producing plutonium as a source of fissile material to make nuclear weapons. I'm not going to go into why the Agreed Framework collapsed, because most of the people in this room already have their own view of that question. But when it did collapse, the North Koreans promptly restarted their 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon and again began to produce plutonium.

So why did the North Koreans hedge on the Agreed Framework by pursuing a uranium enrichment program? In other words, why did they cheat? The answer is fairly simple. They were driven by their long years of suspicion—some would say paranoia—about the United States. I became convinced by my dealings with the North Koreans while I was at KEDO that the non-nuclear aspects of the Agreed Framework—movement toward a more normal, less hostile political relationship with Washington—were more important to them than the reactors we had agreed to build.

In North Korean eyes, however, there was little sign that Washington saw the situation in those broader terms. The U.S. government was neither willing nor able to move to a new phase in relations with Pyongyang. Indeed, a cynical but not unrealistic narrative was that the United States saw the Agreed Framework primarily as a means of coping with the problem of North Korea until the Pyongyang regime collapsed, something many regarded as almost certain at the time. There were even those who argued

that KEDO's mission was not to build nuclear reactors but to act as though we were building nuclear reactors. In other words, there was no need to hurry with reactor construction.

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People ask me if there was ever a time when I was optimistic about the U.S.-DPRK relationship. My answer is yes. In late 1998, while I was ambassador in Seoul, former Secretary of Defense William J. "Bill" Perry, now here at Stanford University, was appointed as President Clinton's special envoy to deal with the North Korea situation. Under him, we began working with Japan and South Korea to bring about a normalization of relationships with the North.

But most importantly, Kim Dae-jung was elected president of South Korea in December 1997. He embarked upon his so-called Sunshine Policy toward the North, a bold attempt to begin to change fundamentally the structure of North-South relations. After careful consideration, the Clinton administration decided to support President Kim's initiative. We needed to ensure that our strategy remained in harmony with that of our ally South Korea. We also felt cautious optimism that perhaps there was an opportunity to begin to change the half century of confrontation on the Korean Peninsula.

After extensive consultation, Bill Perry visited Pyongyang in the summer of 1999. We hoped his discussions there would open serious engagement with North Korea. While we initially had some difficulty interpreting the complex signals coming from Secretary Perry's North Korean interlocutors, it soon became clear that the North Koreans had their own reasons for wanting to move down a path of engagement with both us and Seoul. Perry's trip was followed in June of 2000 by Kim Dae-jung's historic visit to Pyongyang for the first-ever inter-Korean summit. That, in turn, contributed to a visit by Kim Jong Il's senior military envoy to Washington in October and, later the same month, Secretary of State Madeline Albright's visit to Pyongyang. Kim Jong Il invited President Clinton to visit Pyongyang, and I know the president seriously considered going. With the American presidential election taking place the following month, however, the Clinton administration ran out of time.

All this seemingly positive movement was short-lived. The sense of optimism and promise dissipated abruptly after George W. Bush was inaugurated as president in January 2001. In March 2001, President Kim visited Washington to discuss North Korea policy with the new president. But President Bush made it clear that his administration not only did not endorse the Sunshine Policy but in fact considered the Agreed Framework to have been a massive mistake. President Bush believed President Kim to be hopelessly naïve in his attempts to build a different kind of relationship with the North. A series of seemingly inexorable events ensued. By the end of 2002, the Agreed Framework had collapsed, KEDO was being dismantled, and the North Koreans had restarted their nuclear weapons programs at Yongbyon.

President Bush made it clear that his administration not only did not endorse the Sunshine Policy but in fact considered the Agreed Framework to have been a massive mistake.

As a result, China became acutely concerned about the trend of developments on the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps reflecting its growing role in the region, Beijing decided to become more involved diplomatically. With Washington's acquiescence, indeed encouragement, China in 2003 led the creation of the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral effort hosted and chaired by Beijing to find a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. (The participants are the PRC, the United States, North and South Korea, Japan, and Russia.) After many sessions, the six parties announced agreement on the Joint Statement of September 2005, establishing a framework for further negotiations.

The Joint Statement set forth four important goals:

- the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;
- the negotiation of a peace treaty to replace the Korean War armistice agreement of 1953;
- the provision of economic and energy assistance to North Korea; and,
- the establishment of diplomatic relations among all the countries concerned (the PRC and Russia have diplomatic relations with South Korea, but the United States, South Korea, and Japan still do not have diplomatic relations with North Korea).

The Joint Statement was a significant accomplishment and remains the only agreed agenda with North Korea for negotiations. In the years

immediately following, sporadic progress was made toward the realization of its goals. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was able to resume inspection of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and the North Koreans began to dismantle the 5-megawatt reactor there. Even while the Six-Party Talks were underway, however, the North Koreans continued to pursue their nuclear weapons program, and in 2006 they conducted their first test of a nuclear device. They also continued to work on their ballistic missile program. By 2008 it was clear that the Six-Party Talks had run out of momentum.

Service with the Obama Administration

In 2009, as the Obama administration came into office, I agreed to serve as its Special Representative for North Korea Policy to try to rejuvenate diplomatic engagement with North Korea. I was not naïve about what might be possible. Mistrust and suspicions were deeply rooted on all sides, and it was clear that progress would not come easily. But I believe there was a genuine willingness on the part of the new president to engage diplomatically and politically with North Korea, not only through a reinvigorated Six-Party Talks process but also on a bilateral basis. The North Koreans, however, did not reciprocate. They soon greeted President Obama with a test of another long-range missile, in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions.

By coincidence, I was in Pyongyang in late January 2009 as a member of a "Track II" (private-sector) initiative. The incoming U.S. administration had not yet asked me to take on any role regarding North Korea. We had dinner with the DPRK vice foreign minister Kim Kye Gwan, long his country's principal negotiator in both the Six-Party Talks and bilaterally with the United States. He confirmed that Pyongyang was preparing a long-range missile test. My colleagues and I reacted strongly. We predicted that the Obama administration would have no choice but to condemn any such test. We also warned that it would seriously prejudice President Obama's effort to open dialogue with the North. Shrugging, Kim responded, "That's a military matter; I have no authority [about it]."

Only weeks later, after I had been appointed Special Representative, North Korea did indeed conduct another long-range missile test. The United States responded by leading an effort to have the UN Security Council pass another resolution condemning such tests. Soon thereafter, the North Koreans conducted their second test of a nuclear device.

I remain puzzled by the North Korean refusal to accept what I believe could have been the beginning of a less hostile relationship with the

United States. Some have speculated that the regime sacrificed better relations with Washington to its need to solidify domestic support in advance of an anticipated leadership transition. (Kim Jong Il's health was not good; he apparently suffered a serious stroke in the fall of 2008.) That transition eventually did take place, in December 2011, when Kim Jong Il died and his third son, Kim Jong Un, succeeded him.

After several rounds of consultations with officials of the countries participating in the Six-Party Talks and contacts with the North Koreans themselves, I went to Pyongyang in December 2009. We had what we thought were fairly constructive talks, and I came back to Washington hopeful that that we could start a new process of engagement and reinvigorate the Six-Party process. We began to take steps to invite Kim Kye Gwan to New York for a round of talks as a stepping-stone to reconvening the Six-Party Talks.

In March 2010, however, the North sank a South Korean Navy corvette, the *Cheonan*. No warning was given, and forty-six South Korean sailors were lost. Why the North Koreans attacked the ROK ship is still not clear, but it seems to have been another round in the long-standing inter-Korean territorial dispute in the West (Yellow) Sea. It may also have been related to the regime's desire to appear strong for the leadership transition.

In any case, the *Cheonan* sinking interrupted the diplomatic process, and later that year the North shelled a South Korean island in the West Sea, killing four people. Thus, it wasn't until August 2011 that I had another meeting with my North Korean counterpart Kim Kye Gwan. Convening this time in New York, we again began to work toward the restart of formal dialogue and the resumption of Six-Party Talks. The New York meeting was followed by a session in Geneva in October 2011, which ultimately produced the so-called Leap Day Agreement in February 2012.

By the time of the Geneva meeting, though, I had decided to retire as the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy. I had spent two and a half years back in government on a half-time basis, and the travel to East Asia and back and forth between Boston and Washington had begun to take a toll. I stepped down in October 2011 and was succeeded as Special Representative by Glyn Davies, a very experienced and talented career Foreign Service Officer. It was time for me to return to being a full-time dean of the Fletcher School.

Under the Leap Day Agreement, the North Koreans made a number of commitments that we had been discussing with them for some months. They agreed to a moratorium on their missile and nuclear tests and to

allow IAEA inspectors to come into Yongbyon to examine the nuclear facilities. The IAEA inspection was particularly important, because in 2010, Stanford's own Dr. Siegfried S. "Sig" Hecker, who is here with us this afternoon, had visited North Korea. To everyone's surprise, he was shown what appeared to be a functioning centrifuge program for the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

North Korean production of HEU was potentially a fundamental change in the nuclear standoff. In contrast to the production of plutonium in a nuclear reactor, which is what the North Koreans had been doing at Yongbyon and which is virtually impossible to do without being detected, HEU manufacture can be done in relatively small and dispersed facilities and thus can be hidden. Verifiable inspection, one of the essential requirements of a meaningful denuclearization agreement, would therefore be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish. Having IAEA inspectors at Yongbyon would have given us the opportunity to learn important new information about what the North was doing.

Just weeks after the announcement of the Leap Day Agreement, however, the deal collapsed. There has been a great deal of confusion about what went wrong. Soon after the agreement was concluded, the North Koreans announced that they were going to launch a space vehicle. The United States responded that it would regard such a launch as a long-range missile test, something prohibited under the Leap Day Agreement. In fact, Ambassador Davies had warned the North Korean negotiators during their final talks on the deal that any long-range missile test, even one to launch a space vehicle, would violate the agreement. Nevertheless, the DPRK ignored the U.S. warning. Their first launch after the agreement failed to place a satellite vehicle into space, but they tried again in December and this time succeeded. The Leap Day Agreement was dead.

The North Korea Problem Now

As in 2009, the North Koreans followed the 2012 missile launch with a nuclear test, apparently a more successful test in terms of yield than the ones they conducted in 2006 and 2009. So we are now pretty much back to where we were several years ago. All evidence is that the North Koreans are proceeding with both their nuclear weapons program and their long-range missile development efforts. At the moment, there are no U.S. negotiations underway with the North Koreans. In fact, the United States has not had any official negotiations with the North Koreans since February 2012.

There have, however, been some Track II contacts with North Koreans involving non-official Americans and North Korean officials. I myself participated in some of those conversations last fall in Berlin and London. In those talks as well as publicly, the North Koreans said that they are prepared to return to the Six-Party Talks on an unconditional basis and that everything—including their nuclear weapons program—would be on the table. The United States, however, says it is not prepared to do that absent some demonstration by the North Koreans that they are serious about negotiating an end to their nuclear weapons program.

The United States seems to have little appetite for direct engagement with the North Koreans now. I certainly understand that. Negotiating with the Pyongyang regime has to be one of the most frustrating diplomatic enterprises ever. To its credit, the Obama administration did make a good-faith effort to engage with the North Koreans in its first term. But the collapse of the Leap Day Agreement has drained away whatever U.S. willingness might have existed for bilateral engagement with the North Koreans or, for that matter, engagement with the North Koreans in the Six-Party process.

Some observers had hoped that we might see a positive change in North Korean behavior as a result of the leadership transition when Kim Jong Il died in 2011 and his son Kim Jong Un took over. Some other observers expected that the leadership transition might fail and that the survival of the regime itself would be in question. Neither occurred. North Korea has continued to behave as before, and by all external signs the regime remains solidly in place. I think therefore that we have to engage with Pyongyang, as difficult and unpleasant as that may be.

Negotiating with the Pyongyang regime has to be one of the most frustrating diplomatic enterprises ever.

With the collapse of our bilateral engagement with North Korea, we now seem to be relying on China to solve the North Korean problem. There have been extensive and intensive discussions between the United States and China over the last twelve months or more. These have taken place on a government-to-government basis, including the U.S.-China summit discussions at Sunnylands, and also in Track II channels. But nothing has really been accomplished. Notwithstanding Chinese urgings to the North Koreans, Pyongyang continues its nuclear weapons program. Indeed, the North Koreans can now say with credibility that they have nuclear weapons and should therefore be treated as a nuclear weapons state.

My own view, based on extensive conversations with Chinese officials when I was Special Representative, frequently over late-night drinks in Beijing, is that this is probably an even more difficult problem for China than it is for the United States. I have no doubt that China would prefer a world in which North Korea did not have nuclear weapons. The costs for China of a nuclear North Korea are high. There is the potential for further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region; China's inability to influence what many consider to be its client-state in Pyongyang hurts Chinese prestige; and there are also costs in terms of China's relationship with the United States. I think that China understands that as North Korea continues its nuclear program there will be growing strains on the Chinese-American relationship.

That being said, I don't see much prospect of the Chinese doing much more than they already are to try to bring North Korea back to a path of denuclearization. The Chinese don't want North Korea to have nuclear weapons, but they also don't want to risk a North Korean collapse. I don't think it is concern about a potential refugee problem in the event of chaos in North Korea that determines Chinese policy. I think it is rather the prospect of waking up some morning and finding a unified Korea on their northern border with a military relationship with the United States. That would be a shift in what some used to call the "correlation of forces," one in a very negative direction for the Chinese, and they're not prepared to contemplate it. There are significant limits, therefore, on the pressures, both political and economic, that Beijing is willing to put on Pyongyang. There is also a great diversity of views over what to do about North Korea within the Chinese establishment. The Chinese military has one set of views. The Chinese civilian leadership and the party have another set. These don't always converge.

I don't think it is . . . a potential refugee problem . . . in North Korea that determines Chinese policy. . . . It is rather the prospect of . . . a unified Korea on their northern border with a military relationship with the United States.

As for other countries involved in this diplomatic conundrum, it is South Korea that is, in my view, the key country. In the long term, it is perhaps even more important than the United States. It is inconceivable to me that the United States can pursue any strategy toward North Korea with which South Korea is not in complete agreement. South Korea is of course

the country most at risk from the North in terms of its security. Moreover, in the final analysis, any lasting progress on North Korea will require very substantial economic resources to help North Korea address its economic problems. Those resources will come only from South Korea, not from the United States or Japan or even China.

The South Koreans, however, continue to suffer from what has long plagued their efforts to deal with the North: a deep division within their society over how to handle the North Korea problem. Do they try to find a framework for engagement with the North, such as Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy? Or do they continue to rely on military deterrence and a strategy of squeezing North Korea until it either changes its position or collapses? As we've seen over the last three presidential administrations in South Korea, neither of these approaches seems to be sustainable for more than a few years at a time in terms of public support.

Meanwhile, North Korea continues to behave in a very dangerous and provocative manner. It remains a major problem for the South in particular as well as a great source of potential instability within the region. President Park appears to be still in the process of formulating her own approach toward the North. Her *trustpolitik* approach is perhaps a start, but it is clearly not a complete position.

There are at the moment—I don't want to overstate this because we've all been disappointed in the past—some hints of a possible warming in the North-South relationship. North-South family reunions are underway even today as we meet. These reunions always bring warm feelings, but they directly involve only a tiny fraction of the populations, and Pyongyang has customarily used them in a very cynical fashion. There has also been some indication of South Korean corporate interest in improving the North's infrastructure and perhaps even in devising ways to do joint projects. Representatives of the South Korean firms Korail, POSCO, and Hyundai recently visited North Korea. I don't know much about their visit or what their discussions may have entailed. Nonetheless, it is a somewhat encouraging development.

I've already spoken about China's position. I would just mention Japan and Russia briefly. Japan continues to be strongly opposed to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, but its diplomacy toward North Korea has been frozen for several years because of a preoccupation with the Japanese abductees. (These are the Japanese citizens whom the North Koreans kidnapped from Japan many years ago and about whom a full accounting has never been made.) There are currently rumors of renewed Japanese efforts with the North Koreans on the subject of the abductees.

To continue to demand that the North Koreans somehow demonstrate that they are prepared to negotiate seriously about an end to their nuclear weapons program before we will again talk with them means that we are likely to do nothing.

Given recent history and my own experience with Japan's concerns about the issue, I would guess that those rumors are probably correct. So far, however, they have not manifested themselves in any significant shift in Japan's policy or position.

Russia is the other country participating in the Six-Party Talks. The Russians seem to have two chief objectives. First, they want to maintain a seat at the table with regard to Northeast Asia; they don't want to be left out. Second, they have huge interests in the potential Korean demand for their energy resources. In the long term and under the right circumstances, it is clear: the Russians hope to sell energy to South Korea. They would also like to sell energy to North Korea, if some way could be found for them to be paid for it.

What Is to Be Done?

So what do we do? Let me put forward a couple of ideas. I would not describe them as all that new nor as revolutionary. But I do think that, sooner or later, we're going to have to go down a different path than the one we are now on.

First, I think it is dangerous not to talk to the North Koreans. I know that the Obama administration's foreign policy plate is full, even overflowing, with Iran, Syria, Ukraine, and other crises. As I indicated, I detect no U.S. desire to re-engage with North Korea. What, then, are possible alternatives to where we now find ourselves?

I am very much of the view that to continue to demand that the North Koreans somehow demonstrate that they are prepared to negotiate seriously about an end to their nuclear weapons program before we will again talk with them means that we are likely to do nothing. North Korea will only continue to move ahead with its development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

I don't want to be overly dramatic or apocalyptic in my predictions, but at some point those two development efforts will demonstrably result in North Korea having the capacity to threaten directly much of East Asia, including U.S. assets and allies in the region, with nuclear attack. Conceivably, North Korea one day may even be capable of threatening

U.S. territory. From my own experience in government, I believe that some people would argue that this would constitute such an acute, even existential threat, that no administration in the United States could simply do nothing. Thus, at some point, whether it is this year, next year, or ten years from now, the United States would have to do something.

So, what would a different approach look like? Let me emphasize that, while we should not expect a North Korean commitment to denuclearization to come easily or early, we cannot simply give up on it. It is too fundamental a position for us regionally and globally. How, in the end, we deal with North Korea's nuclear aspirations obviously will have an effect on our strategy toward Iran and our global non-proliferation efforts. But neither do I think that we can demand North Korean capitulation on the issue as a precondition to engagement on the full range of issues at stake.

I believe our strategy and our initial goals should start with Dr. Hecker's "three no's."[1] First, we should begin by trying to ensure that North Korea does not build any more nuclear weapons. We don't know exactly how many they have now; they undoubtedly have more than they

Denuclearization must remain our ultimate goal, but we will have to get there in stages.

did a few years ago, but probably not more than a dozen yet. Second, we do not want North Korea to develop better nuclear weapons, which means that we do not want them to continue testing. Third, we of course want no export of North Korean nuclear weapons and no proliferation of their nuclear technology.

I think those "three no's" are achievable, albeit not easily. We had made a good start toward them in the Leap Day Agreement, especially in the freeze on further nuclear and missile testing and in the stationing of IAEA inspectors at Yongbyon. Denuclearization must remain our ultimate goal, but we will have to get there in stages. I hate to use the phrase "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement" of their nuclear program—because it became such a test of political faith—but in effect that's what we're really looking for. The question is how to get there and what we must do in the meantime.

1 "No more bombs, no better bombs (which means preventing further nuclear testing), and no export, in return for one yes—our willingness to seriously address North Korea's fundamental insecurity." Siegfried S. Hecker, "Redefining Denuclearization in North Korea," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 20, 2010, http://thebulletin.org/redefining-denuclearization-north-korea-0.

We should go back to the joint statement of 2005 and use it as our starting point. It has four areas of action: denuclearization, energy and economic assistance, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the replacement of the armistice of 1953 with a peace treaty. The last, negotiation of a peace treaty, is an extremely difficult diplomatic undertaking even to contemplate. All these years later, the armistice is firmly embedded in our thinking and on the peninsula. But, ultimately, if we want to ensure stability on the Korean Peninsula, we have to replace the armistice.

Right now, we are in a very vulnerable position in which, at any moment, the actions of some fishermen in the West Sea could touch off a conflict. Both sides are locked into a kind of "I dare you" stance. Without meaning to, we could find ourselves involved in an accidental conflict that escalates within the region. That would be disastrous. It's the kind of thing that can only be addressed in the long term by replacing the armistice. In the meantime, however, there are perhaps things we could do to lower the level of risk in the West Sea itself.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea, the fourth leg of the joint statement of 2005, is obviously crucial to a more stable environment in the region.

In addition, we need to do a number of things to try to build more economic self-interest on the part of North Korea in stability on the peninsula. Many such options are impossible to contemplate in the current political environment, so we need to change that first. This is not a status quo situation. None of these things are going to work if we do not make progress on them all. Supporting special economic zones in the North may well be the first step in this direction. Assisting North Korea with some infrastructure projects would also make a lot of sense. I think there is no alternative but that South Korea subsidize much of this sort of investment. President Park has said that reunification would be a "jackpot" for Koreans and their neighbors. I think that a pronounced lowering of tensions on the Korean Peninsula would make for a quite impressive jackpot itself.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea, the fourth leg of the joint statement of 2005, is obviously crucial to a more stable environment in the region. North and South Korea should have diplomatic relations. The United States should also have diplomatic relations with North Korea. Many other changes should be made. Our objective should not be to mollify or buy off North Korea. It should be—and this

is without prejudice to the eventual reunification of the Korean Peninsula—to give the North Koreans a demonstrable stake in the stability of the region and in their relationships with their neighbors. We need to create for North Korea the prospect of an alternative future, an alternative to nuclear weapons. The best way to do that is through an expansion of trade and foreign direct investment, including infrastructure projects that tie North Korea into the dense web of interdependence in which the other countries of Northeast Asia already find themselves.

Absent some dramatic sudden political change in North Korea, which I don't think is a reasonable assumption on which to base policy, the alternative to the policy approach I have outlined here is for the United States to allow the current situation to continue. In that case, as I have explained, North Korea's two lines of development, of its nuclear weapons and missiles, will intersect. This will allow Pyongyang to credibly threaten the United States and its allies with nuclear attack. But probably even before that actually happens, we will be faced with a threat, the nature and scale of which will demand action by whatever administration is in Washington.

The United States in Asia

The Role of Our Alliances and Their Management

U.S. involvement in East Asia is complex and multidimensional. Its major features include trade and investment, immigration, education, and tourism. Access to the American market was crucial to Asia's economic success in past decades and remains important for all Asians as well as for American consumers. American workers and companies have become increasingly dependent on access to the Asian market. The United States has benefited greatly from Asian immigration for many years; Asian Americans constitute one of the most dynamic and successful segments of the American population. The movement of students and faculty from Asia to the United States has increased exponentially, as the case of Stanford University demonstrates. Such academic exchange has made an enormous contribution to Asian modernization, and it has also become vital for the many American institutions that rely on Asian tuition. Asian tourism has become a major source of income for the United States as a whole and especially for certain cities and regions. U.S. tourism to Asia has been smaller in scale but has contributed significantly to the modernization and growth of the Asian tourism sector.

Underpinning these layers of interaction and mutual benefit between East Asia and the United States is the security dimension of the trans-Pacific relationship. The United States has kept its forces deployed in the Western Pacific and East Asia continuously since the end of World War II. Indeed, if we take into account our deployment in the Philippines, we have been a military or security presence in East Asia since the end of the nineteenth century. Even now, in the early twenty-first century, our military bases and deployments in Japan and South Korea, together with

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the regional presence of the Seventh Fleet, constitute visible evidence of U.S. interest and engagement in East Asia.

The United States has five security treaty alliances with Asian countries, including the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, but we have bases and permanent deployments of personnel in only two. Those are the Republic of Korea and Japan, and it is on them that I will focus here. It is noteworthy that all of our security alliances are bilateral, in contrast to Europe, where we continue to operate largely within the multilateral framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In Asia we have a kind of "hub and spokes" set of security commitments and arrangements, with the United States serving as the hub and our allies as the spokes. These arrangements were established separately and, to some extent, haphazardly.

Our security alliances with the Republic of Korea and Japan were both products of the Korean War. In Korea, in the aftermath of the Armistice Agreement that ended combat on the peninsula in 1953, we faced an obvious need for a continuing military presence due to the ongoing threat from North Korea. We thus signed a security treaty with Seoul later the same year. In regard to Japan, our use of that country as a vital logistics base during the Korean War and our obviously enduring need for an anchor point in the Western Pacific as part of our so-called containment policy against the Soviet Union led us to conclude a peace treaty with Tokyo in 1951 and a bilateral security treaty the following year. For many years, many regarded the security treaty with Japan as important primarily in support of U.S. security efforts elsewhere in Asia rather than for the security of Japan itself. That has of course been changing in recent years as a result of developments in the regional context of East Asia.

A Changing Regional Context

Today, more than twenty years after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, our alliances with Korea and Japan exist in a very different Asia from that in which we initially put them in place.

Asia has been transformed economically and, in many ways, politically. The PRC and Japan are now the second- and third-largest economies in the world. Strong, sustained economic growth has created a large and growing middle class in the region, resulting in a doubling of the middle class globally.

Asian economies have integrated to a remarkable extent. Private sectors, not governments, have led the process. Transnational companies have

created pan-Asian production networks, making goods for consumption within Asia as well as for export to the rest of the world.

Asia has also been "urbanized," with nearly 50 percent of the population expected to be living in cities within the next decade.

Economic growth and urbanization have resulted in transnational, trans-Asian problems beyond the capacity of individual governments to solve, of which air pollution is perhaps the most apparent, even vivid example.

The security environment in Asia has also changed dramatically. In contrast to the Cold War, threats to security are, for the most part, no longer seen as coming from outside the region. Rather, threats to national security and regional stability are seen as coming from within the region. The threat from North Korea remains an unfortunate constant, but it has become a regional and even global concern as a consequence of that country pursuing both a nuclear weapons capability and a missile program.

Apart from the issue of North Korea, Asia is home to myriad long-standing territorial disputes and simmering resentments rooted in history and fueled by nationalism. Potentially, these could lead to destabilizing behavior, even conflict. Overarching all of this is the uncertainty generated by the historic rise of China.

For the United States, China's rise is an entirely new phenomenon. Our existence as a state is recent by Asian standards, and it has corresponded with a hundred years or more of Chinese weakness. For the rest of Asia, however, the need to coexist with a strong, powerful China is rooted in history, and Asians' collective memories include times when they needed to accommodate themselves to China's preferences.

The Critical Importance of Alliance Management

The United States will remain a country with deep interests and involvement in Asia. Our trade, our foreign direct investment, our cultural diversity (with an increasingly prominent Asian dimension), and our history all dictate that we remain closely involved in and attuned to Asia.

As a manifestation of our Asian interests and involvement, the Obama administration is attempting to implement what has been variously described as a "pivot" to or "rebalancing" toward Asia. Unfortunately, this attempted branding of U.S. strategy seems to have generated more confusion than clarity about U.S. intentions. No doubt it is meant to convey an emphasis away from our focus on Southwest Asia, especially Iraq and Afghanistan, and an increased attention to East Asia. The reality, however, is that even as we have withdrawn military forces from Iraq and

are winding down our involvement in Afghanistan, we continue to have important interests in those countries and the rest of the region, including Arab-Israeli issues and of course Iran. Also, a reduction in our military commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan will not result in an increase of resources to any appreciable degree in East Asia, nor should it. In fact, as we have seen recently, we will reduce the size of our military overall, including the amount of money we spend on it.

The pivot to Asia has also been interpreted by some as part of an effort to respond to the rise of China and even as the beginning of a concerted effort to "contain" China. We should certainly take account of the greatly changed landscape of East Asia brought about by China's rise, but the notion that we are trying or should try to "contain" China is pure nonsense. China is not the former Soviet Union. It is also not containable

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For the rest of Asia the need to coexist with a strong, powerful China is rooted in history, and Asians' collective memories include times when they needed to accommodate themselves to China's preferences.

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by us or by any combination of countries. China also has far too many points of interconnection with the United States and the rest of the world to be dealt with through a policy of containment. Instead, we must deal with a rising China through a combination of cooperation and competition, continuing to draw the country into regional and global frameworks of cooperation while managing our competition with it in a reasonable fashion.

In any event, no matter how one describes U.S. policy, it is clear that our alliances, especially those with Korea and Japan, will be crucial to our future engagement in Asia. We must thus nurture them carefully.

We must manage each alliance at what one might call a micro level. In the case of both Japan and Korea, it is obvious that managing relationships between the host civilian society and a U.S., i.e., foreign, military presence requires constant attention, a tending of the garden. The U.S. Congress and an attentive public will always insist that our military personnel stationed in a foreign country as the result of agreement between our government and the government of that country enjoy some measure of immunity from foreign prosecution.

The extent to which U.S. military personnel are immune from the application of host-country law is governed by Status of Forces Agree-

ments (SOFAs), negotiated legal arrangements that we have in place in virtually every country in which we have stationed forces. By their very nature, SOFAs tend to be regarded as symbols of a loss of sovereignty by the host government. We must start with the assumption that local citizens generally do not welcome the presence of foreign military forces in their country. In Japan, the presence of the American military is to some extent a reminder of the country's defeat in World War II. (This is of course not the whole story. For example, the U.S. military played an important role in rescue and other humanitarian operations in Japan after the 2011 tsunami, a response most Japanese deeply appreciated.) As for Korea, we should remember that it has been home to foreign military presences for more than a century.

Moreover, in neither Korea nor Japan does the U.S. military just sit in place. There is constant interaction, both due to official operations and privately by off-duty personnel, with the resulting opportunities for frictions with host-country citizens. Also, our military doctrine requires that our forces always maintain a high state of readiness, and readiness requires training. Training often requires moving around outside bases and that occasionally results in accidents involving host-country citizens. The accident in Korea in 2002 in which two Korean schoolgirls were crushed to death by a U.S. military vehicle was an all too vivid example; it resulted in a major crisis in the overall U.S.-Korea relationship.

Furthermore, the host country views interaction between members of U.S. Forces, especially young males, and host-country women with trepidation and even concern. In both South Korea and Japan, we are dealing

The notion that we are trying or should try to "contain" China is pure nonsense. China is not the former Soviet Union. It is also not containable by us or by any combination of countries.

with vibrant democracies in which the concerns of their publics inevitably—and appropriately—are reflected in the positions of their officials when SOFA agreements are renegotiated. Host country public pressure for SOFA revision increases whenever serious incidents occur involving U.S. military personnel, and the occasional SOFA renegotiation is always an anxious time.

At the same time, alliance management also must take place at what one might call the macro level, that is, by the host government and the U.S. government. Fundamentally, a U.S. alliance cannot remain healthy unless both the U.S. government and the host government can each make a con-

vincing case that the alliance advances its national interest. Not surprisingly, as host governments, Japan and Korea expect that their respective interests and policies and those of the United States will mostly converge. Generally, those expectations have been met.

But there are occasional problems. With South Korea, for example, there were differences of analysis and policy between Seoul and Washington over how to deal with North Korea in the period from 2001 to 2003. And looking a bit into the future, one can foresee difficulty in the U.S.-Japan relationship should Tokyo's dispute with Beijing over the status of the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands escalate. While the U.S. government does not take a position on which country has sovereignty over the islands, it has already declared they are subject to the provisions of the U.S.-Japan security treaty because they are under Japanese administration.

To reiterate, U.S. alliances with Japan and Korea require close, careful, and constant management. This must take place both at the micro level of interactions between U.S. military personnel and host country nationals, and at the macro level of managing government and public expectations of what the security alliance implies for how the United States would respond to various situations.

The Conundrum of ROK-Japan Relations

It requires no great insight to observe that the South Korean–Japanese relationship is presently fraught. The issues arise from differing interpretations of history, especially Japanese colonial rule over Korea and its immediate aftermath, and a related territorial dispute over some rocks in the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Note that in a posture of impartiality, I refrained from naming the islands and the sea in which they are located, as Korea and Japan disagree about the names of both.

Something I experienced nearly two decades ago vividly underlined for me the importance that the two countries attach to these issues. At the peak of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, when the United States was frantically working to help shore up the Korean financial structure, the ROK foreign minister summoned me to his office. But it was not about saving his country's economy; it was to register his country's protest over a communication issued by Japan that Koreans regarded as an effort to take advantage of the crisis to gain some marginal advantage in the dispute over the rocks.

I do not mean to trivialize these controversies. The issues of history are real and they have defied the search for a mutually acceptable solution. For the United States, the territorial dispute between Korea and Japan is

perhaps the easier to handle. We have decades of experience helping to manage territorial disputes between our southern neighbors. We also have our own experience with history issues. Witness the very different versions of history about our frequent interventions, political and military, in many of the countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean.

While visiting Seoul just last week, I was nonplussed to find that the war of words with Japan had supplanted the question of North Korea as the subject of top interest to the Korean media and public. Not surprisingly, the question of whether and how the United States should involve itself in the dispute between its two close allies was a topic of conversation in Seoul and thus also in the United States.

The Korea-Japan history disputes constitute an obviously difficult issue for the United States. On the one hand, I suspect that all American officials involved in U.S. relations with Asia have their own personal views, formed by where they have served, what their experiences have been, and a general though not universal American tendency, because of our own history, to sympathize with the colonized in the colonial experience. On the other hand, it is important to note that we had our own experience as colonizers, in the Philippines. While the overall result may have been positive, we have, in our own history, glossed over some episodes of which we are indeed ashamed.

In any event, the U.S. government will continue to be wary, and correctly so, of getting involved in the Korean-Japanese disputes much beyond offering general expressions of hope and expectation that the two countries will not allow these disputes to threaten their ability to work together with us on issues of regional security and development.

In preparing for this talk, I came across an early example of a U.S. attempt to help the Republic of Korea and Japan to overcome the legacy of history. In 1951, in the heat of the Korean War, the United States arranged for the first bilateral meeting between Korean and Japanese officials during the war. The Korean delegate, Kim Young Shik, opened the meeting by demanding an apology from Japan for its colonial rule of Korea. The meeting fell apart.

In 1953, shortly after the Korean War ended, the United States arranged for another meeting between the two sides in Tokyo. The Japanese negotiator, Kanichiro Kubota, told the Korean delegation that the United States had violated international law in liberating Korea and establishing the Republic of Korea before concluding a peace treaty with Japan. The result had been the redistribution of Japanese-held properties in Korea to Koreans and the forcible repatriation of Japanese nationals from Korea.

Kubota added that Koreans should be grateful for all the improvements Japan had made to their country during the colonial period; its "compulsory" occupation of Korea had been beneficial to the Korean people. The meeting fell apart, and no further talks were held between the two governments for another five years.

One hopes that some progress toward better communication has been made between Japan and Korea over the last several decades, but one can understand the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the United States to get directly engaged again.

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The Payne Lectureship is named after Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, brothers who gained an appreciation for global problems through their international business operations. Their descendants endowed the annual lecture series at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community today and to increase support for informed international cooperation. The Payne Distinguished Lecturer is chosen for his or her international reputation as a leader, with an emphasis on visionary thinking; a broad, practical grasp of a given field; and the capacity to clearly articulate an important perspective on the global community and its challenges.

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

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