


*The Rise of Duterte: A  
Populist Revolt Against  
Elite Democracy*

Richard Heydarian

# Outline

- Populism in Emerging Market Democracies
- Duterteismo: Understanding the Man of the Hour
- Resentment: Populism in Power
- Rise of Illiberal Democracy



“Stalin's rule also reveals how, on extremely rare occasions, a **single individual's decisions** can radically transform an entire country's political and socioeconomic structures, with global repercussions...how individuals, great and small, are both enabled and constrained by the relative standing of their state vis-à-vis others, the nature of domestic institutions, the grip of ideas, the historical conjuncture (war or peace; depression or boom), and the actions or inactions of others.” – Stephen Kotkin, “Stalin: Paradox of Power.”

# STALIN

**STEPHEN  
KOTKIN**

# Analytical Framework

- *Distinction between Longue durée* (long-term structural shifts), on the one hand, and what **François Simiand** called *histoire événementielle* (ephemeral changes driven by daily events), on the other
- As **Antonio Gramsci** warned in the Prison Notebook, “[a] common error in historico-political analysis consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural.”

# Democracy under Siege

- **Degeneration:** Plato's cyclical movement from short-lived ideal democracy to entrenched oligarchy and, on the back of popular mobilization and elite paralysis, sudden explosion of demagoguery.
- Reflecting on his country's transmogrification in the opening decades of the twentieth century, the Italian Marxist thinker **Antonio Gramsci** lamented how the "*the old [order] is dying and the new cannot be born,*" warning how "*in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms [begin to] appear.*"
- **Mutation:** As early as mid-1990s, **Fareed Zakaria** observed how, "*just as nations across the world have become comfortable with many variations of capitalism, they could well adopt and sustain **varied forms of democracy.***" This means, "*Western liberal democracy might prove to be not the final destination on the democratic road, but just one of many possible exits.*"

# Political Decay and Democracy Fatigue

- In fact, as **Samuel Huntington (1968)** himself warned in the mid-twentieth century, “[i]nstead of a trend toward competitiveness and democracy, there has been an ‘**erosion of democracy**’ and a tendency to [lapse into] autocratic...regimes.”
- The “**aspiration-institutionalization gap**”: For Huntington, the fragility of democratic institutions had something to do with the “**decay of the administrative organization** *inherited from the colonial era and a weakening and disruption of the political organizations developed during the struggle for independence.*”

# Modernization and Mass Politics

- **Hannah Arendt** concept of “Mass Society” The large collection of marginalized, disaffected individuals who, “*are not held together by a consciousness of common interest*” and “*lack that specific class articulateness,*” thus, unable to meaningfully participate in mainstream politics as active and empowered citizens.
- Demagogues, as **Friedrich Nietzsche** would put it, find a particularly receptive audience among “men of *ressentiment,*” who are stuck in a “whole tremulous realm of subterranean revenge” and “inexhaustible and insatiable” in their “outbursts against the fortunate and happy [elite].”


# Populist Backlash as Double-Movement

- What **Karl Polanyi** termed as “double-movement”, a situation where a befuddled society desperately “protect[s] itself against the perils inherent” of rapid modernization and market-driven growth;
- *Strongman syndrome*: The **search for certainty in single-minded, decisive leaders**, who aren’t hobbled by institutional checks and democratic paralysis and promise shortcuts to complex social maladies.



**FIGURE 0.1 GLOBAL SURVEY OF SHARE OF CITIZENS PREFERRING A STRONG LEADER  
“WHO DOES NOT HAVE TO BOTHER WITH ELECTIONS”**

*Percentage of respondents answering that “a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” is a “good” (shift from European and World Values Surveys Wave 3 [1995-97] to Wave 6 [2010-14]).*



Source: European and World Values Survey; Mounk & Foa 2017; Journal of Democracy.


# **“Trouble in Paradise”**

# PH recent success story

- **Serendipitous convergence of 5 factors:**
  1. Advent of post-recession QE and inflow of “hot money” into EM;
  2. Descent of BRICS and tier-1 EMs, placing spotlight on tier-2 Ems;
  3. Denouement of macro-prudential reforms, beginning in mid-200s;
  4. Political stability brought about by Aquino’s administration;
  5. Resilience of remittances and dynamism of services sectors (i.e., BPO, retail, real estate);

Figure 1.1 **PHILIPPINE ECONOMY FROM MARCOS TO AQUINO (1972-2015)**

GDP YEAR-ON-YEAR GROWTH RATE (at constant 2000 prices)



# Curious case of the Philippines: Why NOT Duterte?

- Rapid GDP growth under reformist president Benigno Aquino
- Yet, extreme concentration of wealth: **40 families took home 76 percent of newly-created growth**
- Oligarchic capture: Studies show that around **178 political dynasties dominate 73 out of a total of 81 provinces** in the country; *political dynasties* occupy vast majority of elected **legislative positions (70%)**, an astonishing number even when compared to Argentina (10%) and Mexico (40%).
- A “**protest vote**” was long in the making.

- “[People] will tolerate poverty, enslavement, barbarism, but they will not endure aristocracy,” **Alexis de Tocqueville**, *Democracy in America*.



- **“Politics of the future will be the art of stirring up the masses”** – N. Bonoparte



# Hybrid Populism





# What is populism?

- Benjamin Moffitt explains in his book “The **Global Rise of Populism**”: It is ultimately a “style”, with heavy reliance on “bad manners” to project authenticity;
- Jan-Werner Müller in “**What is Populism**” (2016: 1) : “Populists claim that they and they alone speak in the name of what they tend to call the ‘real people’ or the ‘silent majority’. This claim to a moral monopoly of representation has two consequences that are immediately deleterious for democracy. Populists accuse all other political contenders of being illegitimate.”
- Laclau: “Populism relies on **empty signifiers**”; left-wing vs. right-wing populism.
- **Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser argue that populism is “an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism. It criticizes the exclusion of important issues from the political agenda by the elites and calls for their repoliticization.,,**
- Overlapping with **fascism**, but not necessarily the same, though interesting to look at **Umberto Eco’s** “Ur-Fascism”.
- Randy David (2016) described the phenomenon of “**Dutertismo**”

# “Inclusive” Populism: Atin To Pre

- **Strongest among the ABC class:** AB, who seek law and order for better business environment, while C and upper-Ds, the ‘aspirational middle class’, who resent ‘glass ceiling’ of mobility and worry about basic safety (moderate-to-high elasticity in political leaning, particularly the NCR-Luzon area)
- **“Populist” charisma:** Folksy persona, informality, anti-elitist rhetoric, accessibility, and perceived “political outsider” image.
- **Strongman:** Limited respect for institutions of checks and balances, micro-manager (still ‘mayor’ mode), and openly threatening regime change;
- **Key strength:** Perceived as non-corrupt, decisive and single-minded, and a radical “change” from usual mold of national politicians (“*Iba Siya*”); effective and systematic discrediting of alternative politicians (“*Oligarchy/Dilaw/Elitista/Trapo/Salita Lang, Walang Gawa*”).

# The Three Duterte's


- **The Showman:** Similar to other emerging market populists such as Hugo Chavez, he can hold long-winding, humor-laded, laid back, and entertaining speeches; cuss words interpreted as 'authenticity' (e.g., *Aló Presidente* and *Gikan Sa Masa, Para Sa Masa*).
- **Dirty Harry:** Effective deployment of 'penal populism': I maybe an SOB, but I am your SOB against the real forces of evil (i.e., criminals, drugs users, oligarchy, imperialist powers); strong appeal among evangelists, aspirational and upper middle classes, and anti-crime groups.
- **The Machiavelli:** Knows how to get things done, mobilize support and build coalitions, ensure loyalty, and combine the Fox (charm) and the Lion (strength) to win over people. Never lost an election in life, won all by a landslide!



# The Arc of Populism

- Past decade has seen the rise of populists and/or strongmen around emerging market democracies
- **Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkey)** – Former mayor of Istanbul, who won landslide elections on the back of decisive brand of leadership, mobilizing the priousunderclass and emerging middle class against the laic, Westernized elite;
- **Narendra Mod I (India):** Former governor of booming Gujarat state, who a landslide elections in India by harnessing Hindu nationalism, anti-elitist rhetoric, and touting his decisive, non-corrupt brand of leadership.
- **Joko Widodo (Indonesia):** Former mayor of small city of Solo, and shortly governor of Jakarta, who won on the back of massive middle class, youth mobilization based on the promise of nationalism, economic protectionism, social justice (redistributive policies) and departure from the national oligarchy;

# Duterte's Art of the Deal: Sub-Altern Realism



# The Filipino Gorbachev

**Alexander Wendt** (1992) argued that sometimes decisive and visionary leaders, as in Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s, can have a decisive impact on the direction of a state's foreign policy. Any “exceptional, conscious choosing [by a state] to transform or transcend [its traditional] roles,” continues, entails the following preconditions:

*First, there must be a reason to think of oneself in novel terms. This would most likely stem from the **presence of new social situations that can- not be managed in terms of pre-existing self-conceptions.** Second, the expected costs of intentional role change – the **sanctions imposed by others with whom one interacted in previous roles – cannot be greater than its rewards.** When these conditions are present, actors can engage in self- reflection and practice specifically designed to transform their identities and interests and this ‘change the games’ in which they are embedded.*

# 5 Drivers of Strategic Recalibration

- 1.) Wholesale rejection of American-leaning elite
- 2.) “Authoritarianization” and concentration of executive power
- 3.) American strategic ambivalence
- 4.) Chinese art of the deal
- 5.) Personalization of foreign policy – “I, me, and myself” as *raison d'état*



# Domestic Politics

- Bloody crackdown on suspected drug dealers
- Open intimidation of liberal media and civil society
- Breakdown in peace negotiation with communists, and gradual exit of progressive cabinet members
- Rehabilitation of the Marcoses
- “Dutertenomics”: Neo-liberal economics, with focus on infrastructure development
- Specter of IS in Mindanao and the Bangsamoro question

# SATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN ITS CAMPAIGN AGAINST ILLEGAL DRUGS, SEP AND DEC 2016




\*% Satisfied minus % Dissatisfied correctly rounded.  
 Note: % Refused is not shown.

Q139: Maaari po bang pakisabi ninyo kung gaano kayo nasisiyahan o hindi nasisiyahan sa kasalukuyang kampanya ng ADMINISTRASYON laban sa illegal na droga. Kayo ba ay... (SHOWCARD) LUBOS NA NASISIYAHAN, MEDYO NASISIYAHAN, HINDI TIYAK KUNG NASISIYAHAN O HINDI, MEDYO HINDI NASISIYAHAN, O LUBOS NA HINDI NASISIYAHAN?


# IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING ILLEGAL DRUG TRADE SUSPECTS ALIVE, SEP 2016

**Q: In the police's fulfillment of their duty in the campaign against illegal drugs, in your opinion, how important is it that they arrest suspects allegedly involved in the illegal drug trade alive?**



Q151. Sa pagtupad ng kapulisan ng kanilang tungkulin sa kampanya laban sa illegal na droga, sa inyong palagay, gaano ka-importante na mahuli nila nang buhay ang mga taong pinaghihinalaang di-umano'y kasabwat sa bentahan ng illegal na droga? Ito po ba ay... (SHOWCARD) [TALAGANG IMPORTANTE, MEDYO IMPORTANTE, MEDYO HINDI IMPORTANTE, TALAGANG HINDI IMPORTANTE]

Figure 3.3 **PUBLIC CONCERN OF PREVALENCE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS (DECEMBER 2016)**



Note: Seriousness of the extra-judicial killings or EJK problem in the present administration.

## Table 3.2 **MOST URGENT NATIONAL CONCERNS**

December 2016 and March 2017 / Philippines

(Multiple Response Allowed / In Percent)

<b>National Concerns</b>	<b>Dec16</b>	<b>Mar17</b>	<b>Change*</b>
Improving / Increasing the pay of workers	45	43	- 2
Controlling inflation	34	41	+ 7
Creating more jobs	31	39	+ 8
Fighting graft and corruption in government	31	31	0
Fighting criminality	33	28	- 5
Reducing the poverty of many Filipinos	33	27	- 6
Increasing peace in the country	23	18	- 5
Enforcing the law on all, whether influential or ordinary people	17	16	- 1
Stopping the destruction and abuse of our environment	11	15	+ 4
Controlling fast population growth	8	11	+ 3
Reducing the amount of taxes paid	12	11	- 1
Protecting the welfare of OFWs	10	8	- 2
Defending the integrity of Philippine territory against foreigners	6	6	0
Preparing to face any kind of terrorism	4	3	- 1
Changing the Constitution	4	3	- 1

**Table 3.1 AWARENESS AND TRUST RATINGS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL / REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

December 2016 and March 2017 / Philippines  
(In Percent)

Countries / Organizations		Aware	Base: Aware of country / organization						Don't Know / Refused
			TRUST			DISTRUST			
			Total	A great deal of trust	A fair amount of trust	Total	Not too much trust	No trust at all	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)	Mar 17	100	79	29	50	20	16	4	0.4
	Dec 16	100	76	24	52	23	21	2	1
JAPAN	Mar 17	100	75	20	54	25	21	4	0.5
	Dec 16	99	70	17	53	29	24	5	1
AUSTRALIA	Mar 17	98	69	12	57	30	24	6	1
	Dec 16	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
GREAT BRITAIN / UNITED KINGDOM (UK)	Mar 17	95	53	9	44	44	35	9	3
	Dec 16	93	39	5	34	55	42	13	6
RUSSIA	Mar 17	96	42	7	35	56	36	20	2
	Dec 16	95	38	5	33	58	41	17	4
CHINA	Mar 17	99	37	5	31	63	35	28	0.4
	Dec 16	98	38	7	30	61	39	22	1
UNITED NATIONS (UN)	Mar 17	98	82	22	59	17	14	3	1
	Dec 16	98	74	18	56	25	21	3	1
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)	Mar 17	97	81	22	59	19	16	3	1
	Dec 16	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

## AGREEMENT / DISAGREEMENT WITH TEST STATEMENT:

***"Candidly speaking, it may be necessary now to have martial law to solve the many crises of the nation."***

December 6 - 11, 2016 / Philippines

(In Percent / BY LOCATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASS)

<i>Base: Total Interviews, 100%</i>								
TEST STATEMENT:								
<i>"Candidly speaking, it may be necessary now to have martial law to solve the many crises of the nation."</i>	LOCATION					CLASS		
	RP	BAL				ABC	D	E
		NCR	LUZ	VIS	MIN			
<b>AGREE</b>	12	7	13	15	11	9	12	14
Very much agree	2	0	1	4	2	0	2	1
Agree	10	7	12	11	9	9	10	13
<b>MAY AGREE/MAY DISAGREE</b>	14	12	13	20	14	16	12	19
<b>DISAGREE</b>	74	81	74	65	75	75	76	67
Disagree	44	57	49	36	35	41	46	40
Very much disagree	29	24	25	29	40	34	29	27

BABASAHIN KO NGAYON SA INYO ANG ILANG MGA PANGUNGUSAP. PAKISABI LAMANG KUNG KAYO AY (SHOWCARD) SA BAWAT ISA SA MGA PANGUNGUSAP NA ITO?

Q49. SA TOTOO LANG, MAAARING KAILANGAN NGAYON NA MAGKAROON NG BATAS MILITAR O MARTIAL LAW PARA MALUTAS ANG MARAMING KRISIS NG BANSA.

Note: Figures may not add up to 100% due to rounding off or to Don't Know and Refuse responses.


# NET TRUST RATINGS OF THE AFP AND PNP: PHILIPPINES, SEP 1988 TO APR 2016



\* NET trust = % Much trust minus Little trust correctly rounded.



## 2017-2022 PIP Infrastructure Investment Targets by Mode of Implementation



	GAA / GOCCs	ODA	PPP	Others	Total
Investment Target (PhP M)	4,705,065	1,101,487	1,270,050	48,734	7,125,336
US\$ billion	94.5	22.12	25.50	0.98	143.01

# Conclusion: *Sub-Optimal Equilibrium*

- Economic growth robust, with DOF and BSP maintaining policy competence, but **greater volatility** in **investment sentiment and policy predictability**;
- Opportunity cost: **Foregone investments** by Western counterparts, particularly EU.;
- **M & M factor**: Duterte maintain **robust levels of popularity** (neither counter-historical nor inelastic inequality), but discover **limits of his unilateral decision-making power** on key policies (i.e., SCS; communists rebels; US and counter-terrorism, war on drugs) as aura of invincibility is gradually shattered;
- **Weakening of institutions**, from law enforcement to judiciary and legislative, giving way to **proto-authoritarian system**;
- Specter of **Putin-style crackdown** on free-liberal media
- Opposition weakened, lack of central **leadership and appealing narrative**

# The Duterte Effect: Asian Values 2.0

- The resurgence of ASEAN-style authoritarianism;
- Spread of Duterte-style “drug war” (i.e., Indonesia)
- Rejection of human rights as “Western” values, alien to the region;
- Defiance of the external intervention with sound and fury, including cuss and rejection of EU aid.