

# CDDRL

## WORKING PAPERS

Number 62  
June 2006

### *Pigs, Wolves and the Evolution of Post-Soviet Competitive Authoritarianism, 1992- 2005*

Lucan A. Way

Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law  
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies



This working paper was produced as part of CDDRL's ongoing programming on economic and political development in transitional states. Additional working papers appear on CDDRL's website: <http://cddrl.stanford.edu>.

Center on Democracy, Development,  
and The Rule of Law  
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies  
Stanford University  
Encina Hall  
Stanford, CA 94305  
Phone: 650-724-7197  
Fax: 650-724-2996  
<http://cddrl.stanford.edu/>

### **About the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)**

CDDRL was founded by a generous grant from the Bill and Flora Hewlett Foundation in October in 2002 as part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. The Center supports analytic studies, policy relevant research, training and outreach activities to assist developing countries in the design and implementation of policies to foster growth, democracy, and the rule of law.

### **About the Author**

**Lucan A. Way** is assistant professor of political science at Temple University and an academy scholar at the Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard University. He is currently working on two projects. The first is a book on the obstacles to authoritarian consolidation and regime trajectories in Belarus, Moldova, Russian, and Ukraine. The second is a co-authored book with Steven Levitsky on hybrid democratic-authoritarian regimes after the Cold War.

**PIGS, WOLVES AND THE EVOLUTION OF  
POST-SOVIET COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM, 1992-2005.**

Lucan A. Way<sup>1</sup>

University of Toronto

&

Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies,

University of Notre Dame

and

Steven Levitsky

Harvard University



Presented at the conference

*Waves and Troughs of Post Communist Transitions:*

*What Role for Domestic vs. External Variables?*

Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University

28 and 29 April 2006

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper represents an initial draft of the fifth chapter of *Competitive Authoritarianism: The Rise and Evolution of Post-Cold War Hybrid Regimes* by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. Particular gratitude is owed to Vladimir Gel'man, Taras Kuzio, Vladimir Solonari, Cory Welt, and Jonathan Wheatley for their assistance in putting together Figure 2.

This paper explores the sources of both autocratic breakdown and democratization in the context of the six post-Soviet countries that emerged as competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. By 2006, two patterns had emerged. First, in stark contrast to their counterparts in central Europe, competitive authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet overwhelmingly failed to democratize. Ukraine has been the only exception. Second, while some countries – Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine – had frequent autocratic breakdowns, others – Armenia, Russia, and to a lesser extent Belarus – demonstrated high degrees of autocratic stability.


To understand these outcomes, we synthesize domestic and international approaches into a three step argument (see Figure 1). First, where economic, social, political, and informational **linkage to the West** is strong – as in the Americas and Central Europe – Western pressure is likely to create democracies even in relatively inhospitable conditions. However, where linkage to the West is low, as in most of Africa, the former Soviet Union, and much of East Asia, international democratizing pressure was weaker. Consequently, few democracies emerged in the absence of a strong domestic push.

Among low linkage countries, autocratic stability is an outgrowth of **incumbent state and party capacity** and to a lesser extent the degree of a country's **Western leverage**. Where incumbents have access to relatively powerful states and/or strong governing parties – as in Armenia, Moldova under the Communists, and Russia under Putin – incumbent power is likely to remain relatively stable. By contrast, incumbents will generally be more vulnerable in the absence of such powerful institutions. In such cases, the degree of Western leverage – defined as governments' vulnerability to external democratizing pressure – is key. Where leverage was low due to strategic and/or economic importance (i.e. Russia under Yeltsin), or the strong support from a non-

Western global power (Belarus), even otherwise weak incumbents often survived. By contrast, where incumbent capacity was weak and leverage was high (as in Georgia, Moldova in the 1990s, and to a lesser extent Ukraine), autocratic incumbents were more likely to fall.

Recent studies of “colored revolutions” have mostly focused attention on the “good guys” – the movements and forces supporting autocratic breakdown and democratic change.<sup>2</sup> However, an analysis of regime trajectories among post-Soviet competitive authoritarian regimes demonstrates the need to pay greater attention to the relative strength of the autocratic “house” rather than simply the democratic wolves trying to blow the house down.

**FIGURE 1: COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME TRAJECTORIES**



**I. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION: LINKAGE AND LEVERAGE**

The international forces shaping post-Cold War regime outcomes can be understood in terms of two key dimensions: Western leverage and linkage. First, **western leverage** may

<sup>2</sup> Silitski’s work marks a notable exception.

be defined as governments' vulnerability to external democratizing pressure. Leverage is rooted in three factors. Perhaps the most important is the size and strength of countries' states and economies. Governments in weak states with small, aid-dependent economies (such as Georgia, Moldova and much of sub-Saharan Africa) are more vulnerable to external pressure than those in larger countries with substantial military and/or economic power (such as China, India, or Russia) (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 20, 47). Second, Western leverage may be limited by competing foreign policy objectives. In countries where Western powers have countervailing economic or strategic interests at stake, autocratic governments may ward off external demands for democracy by casting themselves—and regime stability—as the best means of protecting those interests (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 20; Crawford 2001: 211-227). Third, the degree of Western leverage is affected by the existence or not of countervailing (usually regional) powers that provide alternative sources of economic, military, and/or diplomatic support, thereby mitigating the impact of U.S. or European pressure. Russia, China, Japan, France, and South Africa all played this role at times during the post-Cold War period in the former Soviet Union, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa – using economic, diplomatic, and other assistance to buttress or bail out autocratic governments in neighboring (or in the case of France, former colonial) states. In Central Europe and the Americas, by contrast, no countervailing power (regional or otherwise) to the EU and the U.S. existed during the post-Cold War period. For countries in those regions, then, the EU and the U.S. were “the only game in town,” which heightened their vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure.

Leverage raised the cost of building and maintaining authoritarian regimes during the post-Cold War period. In externally vulnerable states, autocratic holdouts were frequent targets of Western democratizing pressure after 1990 (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 20; Crawford 2001: 210-227; Vachudova 2005). Western punitive action often triggered severe

fiscal crises, which, by eroding incumbents' capacity to distribute patronage and pay the salaries of civil servants and security personnel, seriously threatened regime survival. Thus, Western pressure has at times played a central role in toppling autocratic governments (Haiti, Panama, Serbia, Slovakia), forcing authoritarian regimes to liberalize (Kenya, Malawi, Nicaragua, Romania), deterring military coups (Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay), and rolling back coups or stolen elections (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Ukraine) (Pevehouse 2005; Vachudova 2005).

By itself, however, the use of leverage was rarely sufficient to bring democracy, for several reasons. First, outside the EU and its potential member states, Western powers employed leverage inconsistently during the post-Cold War period, allowing many autocrats to escape sanction (Stokke 1995; Crawford 2001). Even where Western powers exerted leverage, these efforts were limited in important ways. First, Western democracy promotion strategies (again, with the exception of EU membership conditionality) were markedly "electoralist" (Karl 1986), in that they focused on the holding of multiparty elections while often ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties (Diamond 1999: 55-56). Thus, while coups and other blatant acts of authoritarianism often triggered strong Western responses, "violations that are less spectacular yet systematic tend[ed] to be left aside" (Stokke 1995: 63). Second, Western pressure tended to ease up after the holding of elections, even if the elections did not result in democratization. During the mid-1990s, for example, autocratic governments in Kenya, Peru, Tanzania, and Zambia faced little external pressure after elections had been held. By itself, then, leverage is a blunt and often ineffective instrument of democracy promotion. Leverage by itself was often effective in forcing transitions from full-scale autocracy to competitive authoritarianism, but it was rarely sufficient to induce democratization.

## **Linkage to the West**

In turn, a second dimension of international influence – linkage – is key to understanding how external factors may generate full-scale democratization. We define linkage to the West as the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) between particular countries and the U.S., the EU, and Western-dominated multilateral institutions.<sup>3</sup>

Linkage is rooted in a variety of historical factors, including colonialism, military occupation, and geopolitical alliances. It is enhanced by capitalist development, which generally increases cross-border economic activity, communication, and travel, as well as by sustained periods of political and economic openness. However, the most important source of linkage is geographic proximity (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Brinks and Coppedge 2001: 11; Gleditsch 2002). Proximity “induces interdependence among states” and creates “opportunity for interaction” (Gleditsch 2002: 4-5). Countries in regions that are geographically proximate to the U.S. and the EU, such as Latin America and Central Europe, generally have closer economic ties, more extensive diplomatic contact, and higher cross-border flows of people, organizations, and information than countries in less proximate areas such as sub-Saharan Africa or the former Soviet Union.

Linkage contributed to democratization in three important ways during the post-Cold War period.<sup>4</sup> First, it heightened the international reverberation caused by autocratic abuse, thereby raising the cost of such abuse. Even relatively minor abuses are likely to trigger a response by international actors. Second, linkage created new domestic constituencies for

---

<sup>3</sup>This discussion draws heavily on the work of Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Laurence Whitehead (1996) and Geoffrey Pridham (1991).

<sup>4</sup>This argument is laid out in much greater detail in Levitsky and Way (2005; forthcoming).



democratic norm-abiding behavior. In a context of high linkage, businesspeople, technocrats, and lower level bureaucrats are likely to support democrats for fear of losing the widely dispersed benefits of Western ties. Third, linkage reshaped the domestic distribution of power and resources, strengthening democratic and opposition forces and weakening and isolating autocrats. Linkage often translates into large scale Western support for democratic opposition. In addition, in high linkage cases, the Western isolation has severe and broad-based consequences – thus making it a salient political issue that the opposition can use to its advantage. Thus, high linkage countries are likely to democratize even in the absence of a strong democratic push. By contrast, autocrats in low linkage countries are likely to face far fewer international constraints on their behavior. In these cases, domestic factors are likely to play a dominant role. These are the focus of the next section.

## **II: DOMESTIC SOURCES OF STABILITY: AUTOCRATIC STATE AND PARTY CAPACITY**

Recent studies of the “colored revolutions” and authoritarian breakdowns more generally have tended to focus on the “good guys” – the societal and other actors seeking to undermine autocrats. Thus, observers have usefully examined the dynamics of mass mobilization (Thompson and Kuntz 2004, 2005; Tucker 2005; Beissinger 2005), civil society (Kuzio 2005, Howard 2003, Fish 1995), regional contagion (Bunce 2005), and opposition unity (Howard and Roessler 2006).<sup>5</sup>

Yet, with some important exceptions (including the work of Eric McGlinchey and Vitali Silitski at this conference),<sup>6</sup> less attention has been paid to the capacity of autocrats to thwart challenges to their rule. To understand the problems that arise from an exclusive focus on the opposition, it is useful to recall the epic battle between the three

---

<sup>5</sup> Along similar lines, a great deal of attention has been paid to countries that have witnessed autocratic breakdowns such as Georgia and Ukraine while there has been much less examination of cases where opposition has failed. Thus, while at least four books have recently been or are about to be published on Georgia, there is almost nothing on neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan.

<sup>6</sup> See in particular McGlinchey 2003; Silitski 2006; Allina-Pisano 2005. See also mentions of this issue in Welt 2005; McFaul 2005a, Beissinger 2005.


pigs and the wolf. According to this revisionist account of the conflict, the pigs represent autocrats trying to build stable regimes while the wolf represents democratic forces attempting to blow the autocratic houses down. The important lesson is that similarly intense “huffing and puffing” brought down the houses of straw and stick, but had no effect on the one of brick. In other words, oppositions face profoundly different challenges depending on the strength of the autocratic house. First, some autocratic regimes are extremely weak and collapse in the face of even minimal opposition (Herbst 2001; Way 2002, 2005a). For example, in Georgia, where police had not been paid in three months, Eduard Shevardnadze abandoned the presidency in the face of “undersized” crowds, largely because he “no longer controlled the military and security forces” and was thus “too politically weak” to order repression (Mitchell 2004: 345, 348). Similarly, protests of just 5,000-10,000 toppled the regime in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 (Silitski 2005).<sup>7</sup> In addition, Jeffrey Herbst argues that it was “the weakness of African states rather than the strength of democratic opposition” that drove many transitions (Herbst 2001: 364). Other regimes, by contrast, have been built on more solid foundations. Backed by well financed states, strong coercive apparatuses, and/or cohesive ruling parties, such regimes have either survived serious opposition challenges or successfully beat back serious opposition before it could emerge (Slater 2004; Bellin 2004; Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2004). For example in 1996, the government of Armenia that had recently won a war with neighboring Azerbaijan, faced down crowds of up to 200,000 after manipulating an election that was widely viewed as stolen (Danielian 1996-1997). Finally, a strong coercive apparatus in Serbia under Milosevic was able to withstand large-scale protest in the early and mid 1990s but failed in 2000 after serious military defeat at the hands of NATO.

---

<sup>7</sup> For a similar analysis of Kyrgyzstan in the early 1990s, see McGlinchey 2003.

While often less photogenic and admittedly more difficult to gauge *a priori*, the strength of the autocratic house may be just as important – if not more important – in explaining regime outcomes than the power of the opposition. This is arguably particularly true among competitive authoritarian regimes generally (Levitsky and Way 2006) and post-Soviet cases in particular where opposition and civil society have generally been weak (Howard 2003). Indeed, as we see in Figure 2, below, the size and frequency of anti-incumbent mobilization has – with the critical exceptions of Armenia in the mid 1990s and Ukraine in the early 2000s – been relatively modest. Further, there seems to be a surprisingly weak correlation between opposition mobilization and autocratic instability. Thus, Armenia, which overall seems to have had the most mobilized opposition (*even in absolute terms*) has been very stable. By contrast, Moldova, which in the 1990s was among the least stable competitive authoritarian regimes, had very little opposition mobilization. Thus while opposition mobilization is obviously important, we clearly need to bring in other factors to understand autocratic failure.

**Figure 2: Opposition mobilization, 1992-2006**



### **Incumbent Capacity: The Organizational Bases of Authoritarian Stability**

To understand the strength of the autocratic house, our analysis focuses on two types of organization that are essential to autocratic survival: states and parties. Effective state and party organizations enhance incumbents' capacity to prevent elite defection, co-opt, repress, or deny resources to opponents, defuse or crack down on protest, win (or steal) elections, and maintain control over the legislative process. Where states and governing parties are strong, autocrats are often able to survive despite vigorous opposition challenges or, alternatively, to prevent a strong opposition from emerging in the first place. Where they are weak, incumbents may fall in the face of relatively weak opposition movements.

### *The State and Coercive Capacity*

As Vladimir Lenin long ago observed, military and police forces are “the chief instruments of state power” (1975: 52). Nevertheless, the role of coercive capacity has received relatively little attention in recent regime studies.<sup>8</sup> While most recent studies have focused on the role of the state in upholding democratic rule (cf. O’Donnell 1999; Bunce 2003; Holmes 1997), an earlier generation of scholarship made clear that strong states also enhance autocratic stability (Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1979). Whereas some state institutions check executive power and uphold a democratic rule of law, others provide key mechanisms to suppress opposition and maintain incumbent hegemony. *Authoritarian* state institutions—from security forces to local prefects to intelligence agencies to informal patronage and corruption networks—furnish governments with tools to monitor, co-opt, intimidate, and repress potential opponents, both in civil society and within the regime itself.<sup>9</sup>

We treat coercive capacity as central to authoritarian stability. A strong coercive apparatus enhances incumbents’ capacity to monitor, intimidate, and when necessary, repress opponents. The greater the incumbents’ capacity to crack down on opposition protest, or to prevent it from emerging in the first place, the greater are the prospects for stable authoritarianism. States may employ two broad types of coercion. *High intensity coercion* refers to highly visible (at home and abroad) acts of violence or abuse, usually involving well-known figures or large groups. This includes the large-scale violent repression of mass protest (e.g., the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in China), the assassination of major opposition figures, and the cancellation or outright theft of

---

<sup>8</sup>Recent exceptions include Thompson (2001); Brownlee (2002); Way (2002; 2005a, 2005b); Slater (2003); Bellin (2004), and Darden (forthcoming).

<sup>9</sup>A variety of other state agents—including local, finance, and educational officials—may also be used to both intimidate opposition and manipulate elections (Way 2006).

elections. Such acts are usually extraordinary measures aimed at thwarting an immediate and serious challenge to the regime.

*Low intensity coercion* involves less visible—but often more systematic—efforts to suppress opposition activity. These include police surveillance, harassment, and detention, grassroots intimidation campaigns, and various forms of electoral manipulation undertaken by paramilitaries, pro-government thugs, or local prefects, and various forms of “legal” harassment, such as selective investigation by tax or regulatory authorities and the use of libel or defamation lawsuits against independent media.<sup>10</sup> Whereas high intensity coercion is employed in response to large and imminent opposition challenges, low intensity coercion is often aimed at preventing such challenges from emerging in the first place. Low intensity coercion is often the key to preemption (Silitski 2006). Where opposition movements are so thoroughly beaten down that they do not pose a serious challenge, incumbents have little need to cancel elections or order police to fire on crowds.

In turn, coercive capacity may be measured along two dimensions: *scope* and *cohesion*. Scope refers to the effective reach—across territory and into society—of the state’s coercive apparatus. Scope is particularly important for low intensity coercion. Systematic surveillance harassment, and intimidation of opponents require an infrastructure capable of directing, coordinating, and supplying agents across the national territory.

Next, *cohesion* refers to the level of compliance *within* the state apparatus. For coercion to be effective, subordinates within the state must reliably follow their superiors’ commands. Where cohesion is high, incumbents can be confident that even

---

<sup>10</sup> For a useful description of low-intensity coercion in the Ukrainian context, see Allina-Pisano 2005.

highly controversial or illegal orders—such as firing on crowds of protesters, killing opposition leaders, or stealing elections—will be implemented systematically on the ground. Cohesion is particularly critical during periods of regime crisis, when incumbents must often employ high intensity coercion to retain power.

Variation in state cohesion is rooted in several factors. One is fiscal health (cf. Geddes 1999). Unpaid state officials are less likely to follow orders, especially high-risk orders such as repression or vote-stealing. However, material resources are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure cohesion. In Armenia, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, state apparatuses remained intact despite severe fiscal constraints – including a fifty percent decline of the economy in Armenia in 1991-1993. Indeed, incumbents who rely exclusively on material payoffs are often most vulnerable to insubordination during periods of crisis. Thus, although a minimum of fiscal health can be essential, the highest levels of cohesion are usually found where material payments are complemented by one of four alternative sources of cohesion. One is personal ties. As the literature on sultanistic regimes has shown, the appointment of family members and cronies to head army, police, intelligence, and other state agencies is often an important means of enhancing intra-regime trust and reducing the likelihood of elite defection (Snyder 1998). A second source of cohesion is shared ethnicity. Particularly in deeply divided societies (e.g., Guyana, Malaysia), autocrats have enhanced loyalty within security agencies by packing them with ethnic allies. Third, cohesion may be enhanced where state elites are bound by shared (usually nationalist or revolutionary) ideologies, as in Moldova, Nicaragua, and Serbia.<sup>11</sup> Finally, elite cohesion may be rooted in solidarity ties forged during periods of shared military struggle, such as war, revolution, or liberation

---

<sup>11</sup>Both Theda Skocpol (1979: 169) and Philip Selznick (1960) argue that ideology plays an important role in sustaining the cohesion of revolutionary leaderships.

movements. Thus, where top positions in the state are controlled by a generation of elites that won a war (Armenia) or led a successful insurgency (Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe), state actors are more likely to possess the cohesion, self-confidence and the “stomach” to use force.

### *State Power and Economic Control*

Discretionary state control over the economy may also enhance incumbent capacity to pre-empt or thwart opposition challenges (Dahl 1971: 48-61; Fish 2005; Greene 2005). In some cases, it may serve as a substitute for powerful coercive (as well as party) organizations. Incumbents’ economic power may be considered high when resources are concentrated in state hands *and* governments enjoy substantial discretionary power in allocating those resources. Economic resources are concentrated where the state maintains control over key means of production and finance, as in many partially reformed command economies (Fish 2005), or a large percentage of national income takes the form of rents controlled by the state, as in many mineral-based rentier states (Ross 2001). Rulers exert discretionary control where they can routinely use the tax system, the financial system, licensing, and government jobs and contracts, and other economic policy levers to punish opponents and reward allies.

By providing governments with tools to co-opt potential critics and punish dissent, discretionary state economic power starves oppositions of resources (Greene 2005). For political oppositions to be viable, they must have access to resources. Unless those resources are distributed equitably by the state, they must come from the private sector and civil society. Where states control most means of production or monopolize the main sources wealth, private sectors will be small and civil societies will be poor (Dahl 1971: 48-61; Fish 2005: 156-157; Greene 2005), leaving “no conceivable financial base for opposition” (Riker 1982: 7). Where vast discretionary power allow governments



to punish businesses in the economic arena for their behavior in the political arena, opposition parties, independent media, and other civil society groups will have few reliable channels of finance.

In extreme cases, then, discretionary economic power may at least partially substitute for strong state (as well as party) organizations in limiting elite defection and thwarting opposition challenges. Where the state's power of economic coercion is extensive, as in Belarus and Gabon, it may be so costly for elites to defect and so difficult for opposition forces to mobilize resources that incumbents go largely unchallenged even in the absence of strong state or party organizations (Way 2005a: 237).

#### *The Role of Party Organization*

*“Organization is everything. With a strong party, there is no need to worry about opposition.”*

-- Valerii Garev, functionary in Communist Party of Moldova<sup>12</sup>

Political party organization represents a second component of incumbent capacity. Much of the recent literature on political parties and regimes has focused on the relationship between parties and democracy (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kitschelt and Smyth 2002). Like states, however, strong parties may also serve as pillars of authoritarian rule.<sup>13</sup> As Barbara Geddes (1999) and Jason Brownlee (2004) have argued, governing parties help manage elite conflict, usually through the organization and distribution of patronage. Strong ruling parties “encourage continued cooperation over defection” (Brownlee 2004: 57), by providing institutional mechanisms to reward loyalists (with public posts, policy influence, and patronage resources), and by lengthening actors' time horizons through the offer of future opportunities for career

---

<sup>12</sup> Way interview, Chisinau, Moldova, 30 July 2004.

<sup>13</sup> See Zolberg (1966); Huntington (1968: 400-01), Huntington and Moore (1970); Widner (1992); Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2004); Smith (2005); Way 2005a.

advancement (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2004). In addition, strong parties enhance incumbents' capacity to manage the electoral process. First, they reduce the likelihood of challenges from within. Where high level insider defections occur, incumbents are more vulnerable to defeat. By providing mechanisms to manage elite conflict, strong parties help to limit such defections. Next, strong party organizations also help win elections. Elections in competitive authoritarian regimes are often hard fought contests. Winning them usually entails some mix of voter mobilization and fraud—both of which require organization. Mass parties provide an infrastructure for electoral mobilization, through large-scale clientelism, door-to-door campaigning, public rallies, and other means. Similarly, illicit electoral strategies such as ballot stuffing, vote buying, and other forms of fraud often require a considerable degree of coordination and discipline: a large number of lower level authorities across the territory must reliably carry out controversial orders and keep them secret.

In addition, parties are critical to controlling the legislature. First, they are more likely to win legislative elections. Presidents without strong parties (e.g., Soglo in Benin, Fujimori in Peru, Yeltsin in Russia; Kravchuk in Ukraine) have weaker coattails: they often fail to translate their own electoral success into legislative majorities. By contrast, where governing parties are strong (e.g., Malaysia, Tanzania, Mexico under the PRI), incumbent victories frequently generate solid legislative majorities. Second, strong parties help to maintain legislative control between elections. Strong parties offer incumbents a variety of mechanisms (patronage distribution, a valuable label, ideology or other sources of cohesion) that help keep legislative allies in line. Where governing parties are weak, legislative factions are more prone to internal division, rebellion, and defection. Such internal crises create opportunities for which opposition forces to gain

control of the legislature, which can lead to serious parliamentary challenges that result in the weakening (Benin, Malawi, Moldova, Ukraine), paralysis (Haiti, Russia 1992-3), or removal (Madagascar) of incumbent governments.

Finally, strong parties facilitate executive succession. Succession is a difficult challenge for most authoritarian regimes. Because they must worry about prosecution (for corruption or rights abuses) after leaving office, incumbents generally place a high value on finding a successor who will ensure their protection. This requires not only winning the election, but doing so with a candidate who can be trusted or controlled. Strong parties facilitate succession in several ways: they have a larger pool from which to draw strong candidates; they offer mechanisms to prevent the defection of losing aspirants; and they possess electoral capacity that is independent of the outgoing executive.

Like state coercive capacity, party strength may be measured in terms of scope and cohesion. Scope refers to the size of a party's infrastructure, or the degree to which it penetrates the national territory and society. Cohesion refers to incumbents' ability to secure the cooperation of partisan allies within the government, in the legislature, and at the local or regional level. Cohesion is crucial to preventing elite defection, particularly during periods of crisis, when the incumbent's grip on power is threatened.

Sources of cohesion vary. The most common—but also the weakest—source of cohesion is patronage. Parties based exclusively on short-term patronage ties are vulnerable to elite defection during periods of crisis. When economic crisis threatens incumbents' capacity to distribute patronage, or when incumbents appear politically weak and vulnerable to defeat, patronage-based parties often suffer massive defections. Although most parties rely on patronage, some benefit from additional sources of cohesion. One is personal ties. In charismatic parties (e.g., Fujimori's parties and

perhaps Banda's Malawi Congress Party), where cadres' political careers hinge almost entirely on their ties to the incumbent, cohesion is often high. Cohesion may also be enhanced by shared ethnicity (e.g., PNC in Guyana) or ideology (FSLN in Nicaragua, Socialist Party in Serbia, Communist Party in Moldova). Perhaps the most robust source of cohesion, however, is a shared history of struggle, particularly violent struggle (Smith 2005). Thus parties whose leadership emerged out of successful revolutionary or liberation movements (Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe) tend to be highly cohesive, at least while the founding generation survives.

In sum, post-Cold War competitive authoritarian regimes have been powerfully shaped by linkage, leverage, and incumbent state and party capacity. We make a three step argument:

First, high linkage cases such as those in the Americas and central and south eastern Europe should democratize due to overwhelming international pressure while most countries in low linkage areas of sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union should not democratize in the absence of a strong domestic push.

Second, among low linkage and high incumbent capacity cases, incumbent governments or their chosen successors should be able to remain in power – even if confronted by a highly mobilized opposition.

Third, the fate of incumbents in low linkage and low incumbent capacity cases should depend on whether they face high or low Western leverage. In low leverage cases, incumbents survive even without strong parties or states. By contrast, incumbents in high leverage and low incumbent capacity cases should fall more frequently – even in the face of relatively weak opposition.

## LINKAGE, INCUMBENT CAPACITY, LEVERAGE AND THE FATE OF POST-SOVIET COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM

*“Don’t you know how these Westerners are? They will make a fuss [about electoral fraud] for a few days, and then they will calm down and life will go on as usual.”*

-- Eduard Shevardnadze<sup>14</sup>

Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian non-democratic regimes in which democratic institutions exist and permit meaningful competition for power, but in which the political playing field is so heavily tilted in favor of incumbents that the regime cannot be labeled democratic (Levitsky and Way 2002). Six post-Soviet countries emerged as competitive authoritarian in 1992-1995. In the early 1990s, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine were all highly competitive in that viable opposition candidates were permitted to openly campaign and run in elections. At the same time, to varying degrees, leaders in each of these countries engaged in systematic (but limited) vote fraud, pressured journalists and limited opposition access to large audience media.

The trajectories of these regimes were shaped by a combination of international and domestic factors. First, as we see in Table 1, below, all of the post-Soviet cases have medium to low linkage. Linkage is on average higher than in Africa but lower than in the Americas or central and south-eastern Europe. Overall, Western democratizing pressure has been highly inconsistent and sporadic.<sup>15</sup> At most, Western intervention has helped tip the balance in favor of one side or the other –either in support of the incumbent as in Russia in 1993 (see below); or the opposition as in Ukraine in 2004. In no case has

---

<sup>14</sup> Quoted in Kuramidze and Wertsch (2005: 24)

<sup>15</sup> For example, following highly fraudulent elections in Armenia in 1996, the U.S. government strongly condemned fraud but a short while later recognized the government victory and continued aid (Mitiaev 1998: 119, 121).

Western intervention fundamentally altered the balance of power between opposition and incumbent – as occurred (in very different ways) in Serbia and Slovakia in the 1990s.

In the absence of overwhelming external democratizing pressures, democratization in the former Soviet Union has hinged on the presence of a strong domestic push. Unfortunately, such a push has been almost entirely absent. Civil society is weak (Howard 2003) and opposition mobilization has generally been underwhelming (see Figure 1 above). As a result, only one country – Ukraine – had democratized by early 2006.

**Table 1**

**Competitive Authoritarian Linkage Scores**

(Highest score=1; Lowest=0)

	<b>Linkage with EU/OAS</b>	<b>Linkage no EU/OAS</b>		<b>Linkage with EU/OAS</b>	<b>Linkage no EU/OAS</b>
<b>Africa</b>	<b>0.38</b>	<b>0.34</b>	<b>Americas</b>	<b>0.80</b>	<b>0.73</b>
Benin	0.13	0.16	DR	0.88	0.83
Cameroon	0.25	0.34	Guyana	0.81	0.75
Ethiopia	0.00	0.00	Haiti	0.56	0.42
Gabon	0.56	0.75	Mexico	0.88	0.83
Ghana	0.31	0.42	Nicaragua	0.75	0.67
Kenya	0.25	0.33	Peru	0.63	0.50
Madagascar	0.06	0.08	<b>C./S.E. Europe</b>	<b>0.81</b>	<b>0.75</b>
Malawi	0.13	0.17	Albania	0.63	0.50
Mali	0.06	0.08	Bulgaria	0.81	0.75
Mozambique	0.06	0.08	Croatia	0.88	0.84
Tanzania	0.06	0.08	Romania	0.75	0.67
Senegal	0.25	0.33	Macedonia	0.69	0.58
Zambia	0.13	0.17	Serbia	0.69	0.58
Zimbabwe	0.13	0.17	Slovakia	0.94	0.92
<b>Asia</b>	<b>0.28</b>	<b>0.38</b>	<b>FSU</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.53</b>
Cambodia	0.00	0.00	Armenia	0.38	0.50
Malaysia	0.56	0.75	Belarus	0.31	0.41
Taiwan	ND	ND	Georgia	0.25	0.33
			Moldova	0.31	0.42
			Russia	0.31	0.42
			Ukraine	0.31	0.42

Linkage is measured by four components: (1) extent of trade with the US and 15 EU member countries (exports/imports over GDP); (2) population movements as measured by the log of the yearly average travel (for all purposes, business, education, tourism) by country residents to the US and EU 1990-2000; (3) Communications ties are measured by per capita internet and cable access 1990-2000; (4) membership in the OAS or potential membership in the EU. Each of these components has been put into a 5 point scale relative to data for all non-Western countries in the world and added up and divided by the highest score so that the lowest score = 0 and the highest score=1. Scores are listed if the EU/OAS variable is omitted.

At the same time, post-Soviet regimes have diverged significantly in terms of autocratic stability. While Armenia, Belarus, Moldova under the Communists, and Russia have remained relatively stable, Georgia, Moldova in the 1990s, and Ukraine witnessed several autocratic breakdowns. We argue that differences in state and party capacity as well as Western leverage (see Table 2) help account for these diverging patterns. (Our indicators of linkage are described in Table 1; our indicators of incumbent capacity are described in the Appendix). First, weak states and parties in Georgia, Moldova in the 1990s, and Ukraine significantly facilitated (otherwise weak) opposition efforts to overthrow autocrats. By contrast, relatively strong states and/or parties in Armenia, Russia under Putin, Moldova in the 2000s and to a somewhat lesser extent Belarus under Lukashenka helped incumbents to either nip opposition challenges in the bud or (as in Armenia) face down powerful opposition mobilization. Next, low Western leverage in Belarus and Russia under Yeltsin helped otherwise relatively weak incumbents maintain power. The sections below discuss each case in detail. We first examine the cases of relative regime stability – Russia, Belarus, and Armenia – and then look at those that were less stable – Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (*Note: sections on Moldova and Ukraine to be provided in future versions*)

**Table 2**  
Competitive authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union

	Democratization	# autocratic failures	Linkage	Incumbent Capacity	Western Leverage
<b>Armenia (1992-2005)</b>	no	0	Med-Low	Med-High	Medium
<b>Belarus (1992-2005)</b>	no	1	Med-Low	Med-Low	Low
<b>Georgia (1995-2005)</b>	no	2	Med-Low	Med-Low	High
<b>Moldova (1992-2000)</b>	no	2	Med-Low	Low	High
<b>Moldova (2001-2005)</b>	no	0	Med-Low	Med-High	High
<b>Russia (1992-1999)</b>	no	0	Med-Low	Med-Low	Low
<b>Russia (2000-2005)</b>	no	0	Med-Low	Med-High	Low
<b>Ukraine (1992-2005)</b>	yes	2	Med-Low	Med-Low	Medium

(Indicators of linkage described in Table 1; indicators of incumbent capacity in the appendix. Leverage reflects either the size of the state and economy or the extent of Russian support for incumbents)

## **RUSSIA: THE EVOLUTION OF AUTOCRATIC ORGANIZATION**

State and party (dis)organization as well as the exceptional weakness of Western leverage shaped Russian regime evolution in important ways throughout the post Cold War era. First, weak state and party structures contributed to the emergence of serious opposition challenges in the 1990s. Yeltsin's regime only survived because of the West's weak leverage over Russia and because he was able to manipulate anti-Communist sentiment to his advantage. Later, more centralized and cohesive state and party structures under Putin contributed to greater political closure in the 2000s.

**Table 4:**  
**Russian incumbent capacity 1992-2005**

	<b>party</b>	<b>state</b>	<b>total</b>
<i>1992-93</i>	Low	Low	Low
<i>1994-99</i>	Low	Med-Low	Med-Low
<i>2000-05</i>	Medium	High	Med-High

### **Disorganization and Default Competition in the Early 1990s**

*“[Yeltsin] always came into politics not representing some kind of powerful group but himself personally”<sup>16</sup>*

*“Yeltsin did not build a state. He led a revolution for 10 years.”<sup>17</sup>*

The early 1990s witnessed extreme party and state weakness. First, organization at the top was almost non-existent. In 1991 the Communist Party was dismantled but not replaced by any new governing party. Like his counterparts in Moldova and Ukraine (but not in Armenia or Georgia), Yeltsin chose not to create a pro-Presidential party after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead, Yeltsin focused on cultivating relationships of “personal devotion” (*lichnaia predannost'*) among a relatively small group of officials

---

<sup>16</sup> Poptsov 2001: 107.

<sup>17</sup> Gleb Pavlovsky, quoted in Sleivyte 2004: 60.



and friends.<sup>18</sup> He sought to secure control over key institutions – such as security – by putting in place people with whom he was either personally close or who had shown loyalty to Yeltsin in the past (Korzhaikov 1997: 118).<sup>19</sup> At the same time Yeltsin, according to his own admission, had relatively few close allies when he came to Moscow (Morrison 1991: 51). As a result, early personnel decisions often involved a great deal of “chance”<sup>20</sup> and Yeltsin was often forced by circumstance to appoint officials whom he barely knew (Korzhaikov 1997: 118). Thus, while Yeltsin was given a tremendous opportunity in the early 1990s to staff the government and state with “his” people, he lacked the formal or informal organization to build reliable and loyal networks.

Simultaneously, state structures were extraordinarily weak. In the face of severe economic decline, salaries and almost all other budgetary commitments were severely under-funded by the central government. At the same time, fights with parliament generated a “war of laws” with the Presidency that opened up tremendous room for maneuver (as well as confusion) among lower level state officials (Bahry 2005; Kryshtanovskaia 2005: 122-3, 124-9). In the early 1990s, in turn, many republics and regions demanded greater autonomy and even separation from the Russian state (Kahn 2002; Stoner-Weiss 2001). There was also extremely widespread insubordination within the armed services as servicemen often did not receive pay while division at the top undermined the central hierarchy (Moran 1999; Herspring 1998). Thus Yegor Gaidar

---

<sup>18</sup> Numerous memoirs of those close to Yeltsin point to the President’s concern with cultivating and supporting this principle (Baturin et al. 2001: 255; Poptsov 2001: 107; Filatov 2001: 166; Korzhaikov 1997; Kostikov 1997: 271; see also Rutland 1998, 315).

<sup>19</sup> For example, Yeltsin chose Viktor Barannikov, a close personal associate with whom he frequently drank and vacationed, to run the security services (Waller 1994: 94; Mlechin 2002: 742, 746).

<sup>20</sup> Korzhaikov, for example argues that “Experts and political scientists create whole theories analyzing the mythical chains of Kremlin connections. .. But no theories explaining personnel decisions existed now or then. In 1991 and later, people easily fell into power and even more easily fell out of power. Not even the personal whims of Yeltsin... accounts for the choice of candidate. Everything hinged on chance” (Korzhaikov 1997: 123).

worried about a “dangerous vacuum in the administration of military and security structures” (Gaidar 1999: 124).

*The Early 1990s: Organizational Failure and Political Contestation*

While such state and party incapacity undermined both economic and political reform, it also generated important levels of contestation in the face of an extraordinarily weak civil society and nominal state monopoly over the economy and media. First, party weakness greatly enhanced contestation by facilitating defection of key Yeltsin allies. The importance of disorganization is most striking in Yeltsin’s failure to control the Congress of People’s Deputies in the early 1990s despite the fact that Yeltsin had successfully imposed his own chosen successor as its head (Filatov 2001: 170; Andrews 2002: 237). While the conflict between the president and legislature has often been portrayed as one between two relatively equal foes,<sup>21</sup> by almost any measure, Yeltsin had access to *far* greater power resources than the legislature: including nominal control over security (Mukhin 2002: 148);<sup>22</sup> regional appointments; all major TV stations,<sup>23</sup> KGB archives (Huskey 1999: 63);<sup>24</sup> industrial ministries, the Ministry of Finance, and Western aid. Thus, while most studies of the conflict emphasize Khasbulatov’s effective use of “broad patronage powers” (Filatov 2001: 204) to secure support of deputies<sup>25</sup>, Yeltsin had access – in principle at least – to much greater patronage resources than did Khasbulatov and should therefore have had a relatively easy time consolidating majority support.

---

<sup>21</sup> Parliament had much greater formal powers than it would after the introduction of Yeltsin’s 1993 constitution. Thus, parliament was in principle able to overrule Presidential decrees with a simple majority. In addition, the legislature retained the right to appoint the head of the Central Bank and the State Prosecutor.

<sup>22</sup> While Khasbulatov made various efforts to create a military force as well as vertical control over the regions (Filatov 2001: 168, 185; Baturin et al. 2001: 281), such endeavors never yielded significant success.

<sup>23</sup> Thus, Yeltsin had the capacity to go on TV when and where at will (cf. Baturin et al. 2001: 250, 291).

<sup>24</sup> These could be useful in obtaining *kompromat* against enemies.

<sup>25</sup> These included committee chairmanships and other paying jobs in Supreme Soviet, as well as cars, dachas, and special regional funds (Remington 1996: 121-123; Andrews 2002: 101)

The relative strength of the legislature in the early 1990s was rooted much less in the characteristics or power resources of the parliament itself than in the weakness of the executive branch. The absence of party-like organizational mechanisms and a weak state made it much harder for Yeltsin to harness his disproportionate access to power resources. Above all, the absence of a pro-presidential party or “party substitute” organization made it incredibly difficult to cope with dissension within the pro-Yeltsin camp. Losers in leadership battles could easily feel that they had been left completely in the cold and therefore had little reason not to move into opposition. Most momentously, of course, Ruslan Khasbulatov’s defection into the opposition seems to have been rooted in frustration that he was not chosen to be either Vice President or Prime Minister in 1991 (Filatov 2001: 171; Aron 2000: 497). The legislature’s increasing opposition to Yeltsin over the course of the early 1990s was rooted in the same dynamic. Thus, Aleksandr Sobyenin (1994: 188) contends that support for democrats fell dramatically because “a number of deputies felt themselves cut off or removed from power after the establishment of presidentialism.”<sup>26</sup> In the absence of an organization to structure career advancement, “personal devotion” (*lichnaia predanost’*) – rooted either in gratitude for past advancement or close personal relations – provided extraordinarily poor defense against defection in the highly dynamic transition environment.

High contestation and threats to regime stability in the early 1990s were also a direct outgrowth of state weakness. Weak vertical control generated default competition by making it impossible for Yeltsin to take full advantage of disproportionate administrative resources. First, disorganization within the executive branch facilitated

---

<sup>26</sup> Sergei Filatov, Yeltsin’s main liaison with the legislature in the early 1990s, presents a very similar picture. “A characteristic example,” he notes, “was Tatiana Koriagina. Not getting the position of deputy representative of the Supreme Soviet, she asked for a position in government, but did not receive anything. And then she was offended and saw corruption everywhere [within the Presidential administration]. It is possible cite tens of such examples” (Filatov 2001: 70).

greater legislative power. As Eugene Huskey (1999: 41) notes, “[t]he absence of loyal executive agencies prepared to implement the president’s will forced Yeltsin into frequent concessions and other political maneuvers to maintain his authority.” The stark divisions within the executive branch allowed the legislature to seek informal allies and play off different factions within the executive.<sup>27</sup>

Next, weak control over regional governments may have undermined efforts to control the electoral process in the early 1990s. Thus, observers have argued that in 1993 Yeltsin had to bargain extensively with regional officials in order to “guarantee” that the Constitution won (Izvestiia 4 May 1994: 4; Dunlop 1999; Sobianin and Sukhovol’skii 1995). Finally, police suppression of opposition and dissent in the early 1990s was highly ineffective and agencies of coercion were extremely unreliable. Yeltsin advisors complained that both the state prosecutor and the police were extremely passive in their efforts to suppress extremist groups.

It was strange that the President on several occasions gave orders to stop the extremist behavior, to close openly fascist publications. But after his orders, nothing changed ... he could not do anything. His strict orders to the power ministries ... did nothing but disturb the air” (Kostikov 1997: 115-116; see also Baturin et al. 2001: 265).

Thus, just as the state was ineffective in the early 1990s at collecting taxes, controlling corruption or providing basic public services, it also faced severe difficulties suppressing dissent. In this sense, the dynamic political competition of the early 1990s was a direct outgrowth of state incapacity.

---

<sup>27</sup> For example at parliament’s urging, the Russian Prosecutor Aleksandr Kazannik and Russian security director Nikolai Golushko permitted the immediate release of those imprisoned for events in 1991 and 1993 in the face of strenuous objections by Yeltsin (Kostikov 1997: 290-292; Mlechin 2002: 766; Filatov 2001: 342).

*Weak Western Leverage and the Puzzle of Coercive Compliance in October 1993:*

Descriptions of state weakness are puzzling in the context of Yeltsin ultimately successful suppression of parliament in 1993. Despite a general pattern of weak control, the President of course *was* ultimately able to gain the military's cooperation in bombing parliament. A close examination of this event is useful both because it demonstrates the types of obstacles leaders face in ordering high intensity coercion as well as how low Western leverage has been an important factor allowing leaders to overcome such obstacles.

First, the military initially resisted cooperating with Yeltsin in his fight against parliament<sup>28</sup> in large part because leaders feared taking responsibility for such a high risk venture.<sup>29</sup> Many of the same commanders involved in the 1993 events had recently felt betrayed by Gorbachev who had refused to take open responsibility for police actions in Vilnius in January 1991 (Way 2006). On the eve of the 1993 assault on parliament, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev resisted taking action until Yeltsin had given a written order that would make Yeltsin's complicity public. As Yeltsin describes it :

[Prime Minister] Chernomyrden asked, "Well now, does anyone have any fundamental objections [to the plan to storm the White House]? ... Grachev raised his hand and addressed me, "Boris Nikolaevich [Yeltsin], are you giving me sanction to use tanks in Moscow?" I looked at him in silence. At first he stared me right in the eye, then dropped his gaze. Chernomyrden, unable to contain himself, turned to Grachev. "Pavel Sergeevich [Grachev], what are you saying now? You've been assigned to command the operation. Why should the President decide what precise means you require for it!" Grachev mumbled in a hurt voice something to the effect that, of course, he could make the decision independently, but it was important to verify...

---

<sup>28</sup> Thus, despite repeated assurances, Grachev refrained from bringing troops into Moscow (Kulikov 2002: 160-170; Yeltsin 1994: 12, 272-278).

<sup>29</sup> Papers at the time played up such fears. Thus, *Rosiiskaia gazeta* wrote ominously that officers participating in the assault on parliament could "spend the rest of their life in prison after Russia revives constitutional government" (quoted in Kostikov 1997: 220).

I rose from my seat, asked everyone to work out the rest of the details without me, and said to Grachev, “I’ll send you a written order.” With that, I left the Kremlin. (Yeltsin 1994: 278)

Tensions created by the executive’s desire to let subordinates take open responsibility for determining the highly risky “precise means” required on one side and the Defense Minister’s desire to avoid taking independent responsibility for such action on the other are strikingly evident in this exchange.

In most cases over the last 15 years, politicians in Yeltsin’s position have not been willing to take on explicit responsibility for such actions for fear of negative international reaction. As a result, numerous efforts to use coercion have failed. However in this case, Yeltsin was able to draw on very real Western security concerns to gain the West’s active support for coercive action. The fact that opposition-Communist victory could have created severe security risks for Western governments made it relatively easy for Yeltsin to convince Western leaders to back the use of force. Thus, in March 1993, Yeltsin actively sought and obtained support from Helmut Kohl of Germany to use “extreme measures” to put down parliament. Kohl, in turn, sent a letter to several Western leaders calling on them to support Yeltsin (Baturin et al. 2001: 276; Yeltsin 1994: 135). Given Russia’s perceived dependence on the West at the time, such support was likely critical to Yeltsin’s willingness to give Grachev a written order – thus squaring the circle and facilitating the use of high intensity coercion.

### **Russia in the mid and late 1990s: The benefits and limits of “organizational outsourcing”**

Problems created by state and party weakness convinced the administration to adapt a new approach to strengthening Yeltsin’s support base. Instead of relying on highly atomized personal contacts or “*lichnaia predannost*”, Yeltsin sought to control the state, elections and to a lesser extent parliament through a system that can best be

described as “organizational outsourcing.” In essence Yeltsin “rented” organizational capacity from various outside formal and informal groups – oligarchic networks, regional governments, and political parties – who provided support at key moments. While such a strategy created much greater levels of political stability than in the early 1990s, it also generated extraordinarily unreliable allies, who defected *en-mass* in 1999.

First, major failures in direct autocratic administrative control in 1996<sup>30</sup> appear to have convinced Yeltsin to rely increasingly on semi-autonomous oligarchic groups to lead and organize his reelection effort (Hoffman 2002: 333; Solovei 1996: 342; Freeland 2000: 208). In particular, the “loans-for shares” arrangement—whereby a limited number of bankers received access to valuable economic properties in exchange for providing up front loans to the Russian government – was part of a political “pact” creating a small group of large scale property holders whose interests were tied directly to Yeltsin’s fate in the 1996 election.<sup>31</sup> This allowed Yeltsin to reduce state control over the economy in a way that provided him with important organizational bases of support. Such arrangements gave Yeltsin effective mechanisms to finance the campaign as well as key media support from NTV and ORT (Hoffman 2002: 348-350; Freeland 2000). “Without the support of Russian financial interests, it would have been extremely difficult for Yeltsin to have won the presidential election” (Johnson 2000, 183). In return for their support, oligarchic groups received key property rights and became increasingly powerful within the presidential administration in the mid and late 1990s (Kryshtanovskaia 2005: 333; Schroder 1999: 977-8).

---

<sup>30</sup> First, the initial use of administrative resources by Soskovets failed when he barely collected the million signatures required for candidate registration before the deadline – at the same time that the Communists managed to collect sufficient signatures two months ahead of time (Aron 1999, 580). Second, efforts to shut down parliament ran into serious trouble when the head of the police – Anatolii Kulikov – strongly resisted this action (Kulikov 2002: 394-402).

<sup>31</sup> In Yegor Gaidar’s words, “The loans-for shares created a political pact. They helped ensure that Zyuganov did not come to the Kremlin. It was a necessary pact” (quoted in Freeland 2000, 171). For detailed descriptions of the loans for shares, see Freeland 2000; Hoffman 2002, chapter 12.

A broadly similar pattern of organizational outsourcing is evident in center-regional relations in the mid 1990s. Thus, Yeltsin responded to most demands for greater regional autonomy by essentially trading regional autonomy for Russian territorial integrity and political support for Yeltsin (Huskey 2001: 114; Bahry 2005: 130; Shevtsova 1999: 157; Kahn 2002; Stoner-Weiss 2001). Thus, republican leaders who had opposed Yeltsin early on (Dunlop 1995: 199-200; McFaul and Petrov 1998: 175-181) now used significant administrative resources – including outright vote falsification—to support Yeltsin in 1996 (McFaul 1997: 47, 63, 70; Mlechin 2002: 760; Myagkov and Ordeshook 2001).

Finally, in contrast to 1992-93, the administration was no longer forced to buy off all deputies individually but could rely on a few relatively disciplined political structures. Thus, Yeltsin in the mid 1990s frequently paid off the largest and most cohesive parties – the Communists, and the Liberal Democratic Party – to pass key legislation.<sup>32</sup> The combination of increased political organization and large scale patronage made it possible – in stark contrast to 1992-93 – for the executive to gain temporary majorities at key moments.

While this strategy of organizational outsourcing allowed for greater control over the legislature and defeat of key opposition challenges, it proved untenable in the medium term. Dominated by highly opportunistic forces with weak organizational or other ties to the Kremlin, the ruling coalition was highly vulnerable to short-term perceptions of regime durability. Thus, a large number of powerful state actors and oligarchs abandoned Yeltsin in 1998-1999 even though they depended on the Kremlin for material support – a fact that should have made them extremely loyal.

---

<sup>32</sup> For example, to pass the 1997 budget, “circles close to the government’ channeled US\$ 27 million to the Communist and Liberal Democratic Parties” (Huskey 2001: 122)



First, weak ties between parliamentary organizations and the executive meant that erstwhile allies were extremely disloyal in the face of crisis. Thus, when Yeltsin appeared weak – as during the 1998 fiscal crisis – virtually all supporters abandoned him and Yeltsin was forced to appoint Yevgenii Primakov as Prime Minister (El’itsin 2000: 226). Next, major defections by state and regional actors in 1998-1999 significantly strengthened the opposition. By trading autonomy for political support in 1994-1996, Yeltsin made it significantly easier for state and other actors to defect. This defection became most directly manifested in the emergence of OVR alliance in 1999 that brought together Evgenii Primakov, Iurii Luzhkov and a significant number of regional leaders. The strong support of regional leaders for the opposition in the 1999 elections significantly undermined the Kremlin’s control over electoral manipulation. The result was what Steven Fish (2001) has referred to as “pluralism of falsification” whereby competing factions used vote manipulation in different regions to support their candidate (Myagkov et al. 2005: 96). Finally, 1998-1999 also witnessed the defection of a significant number of oligarchs who had backed the Kremlin in 1996.<sup>33</sup>

### **The Putin Era: State Building and the Security Services**

The obvious failures of the outsourcing strategy of organization led to the development of a fundamentally new approach to organization that began under Yeltsin and flowered under Putin. First, Yeltsin responded to state weakness by bringing in large numbers of security personnel – thereby grafting the “steal rod” of military discipline onto the state. This was followed by strenuous efforts by Putin to strengthen vertical control over regional governments. Second, in direct response to the perceived threat of

---

<sup>33</sup> First, business networks around Luzhkov – that included five major media groups – gave their backing to the opposition (Sakwa 2000). In addition, Gusinsky’s NTV that had strongly backed Yeltsin in 1996 came out against the Kremlin in 1999.

OVR, the Yeltsin administration created a single ruling party. Under Putin, these strategies – combined with Putin’s anti-democratic leanings and higher oil prices (Considine and Kerr 2002) – yielded both greater incumbent capacity and significantly reduced political competition.

Yeltsin’s concern over the rebellion of governors in 1999<sup>34</sup> led him to seek a new strategy of organization that involved embedding the military and security services directly into the state. Thus he promoted a more effective state hierarchy by creating a “steel rod that would strengthen the whole political structure of power.” (El’tsin 2000, 254). Bringing into the government people from the military and security services “accustomed to military discipline ... seemed like a quick and simple way of reviving functionally effective government power” (Kryshtanovskaia 2005: 267).

Given the difficulties of creating effective authoritative organization from scratch, the KGB offered Yeltsin a powerful solution to the problem of state building. The security services had the belief in hierarchy, organizational esprit de corp, sense of elite status and mission that made them in many ways ideally placed to be the “steel rod” that Yeltsin hoped would bring order to the Russian state (Way 2006). Thus, Yeltsin both sought a Prime Minister with a security background (Baturin et al.2001: 782; Mlechin 2002: 843) and brought a large number of security and military officials into the government and state as a whole (Krushtanovskaia 2005: 270).

Once in power, Putin took a fundamentally different approach to state and party organization than had Yeltsin. Relative to Russia’s first President, Putin is very much an “organization man.” Most importantly, Putin largely eliminated the “cadre meat-grinder” that had existed under Yeltsin. Putin has rarely fired personnel (Kryshtanovskaia 2005:

---

<sup>34</sup> He argued that the “[c]onflict between governors and President is extremely dangerous for the country ... Having seen in the fall [1998] crisis the weakness of executive power, the governors tried again and again to test its durability” (El’tsin 2000, 271-2).

236, 211) – thus reducing the problem alienating potentially powerful actors that had plagued Yeltsin. Putin has also sought to reestablish the center-regional vertical of power. He has attempted to consolidate regions via the introduction of seven “super regions,” centralized the budget, abolished the series of ad hoc agreements made with separate regions, and attempted to take back a number of agencies – including tax and police – from local control (Gel’man 2006; Petrov and Slider 2005). Putin has also significantly reduced the power of the Federation Council and eliminated its use as a venue for regional lobbying (Remington 2003) – a move that Yeltsin explicitly condoned (El’tsin 2000: 272).

Putin’s approach to political parties has also differed from Yeltsin’s. In direct response to the challenge posed by OVR, Yeltsin and then Putin promoted the creation of a single party (Hale 2004). While Yeltsin actively resisted identifying himself with a particular party, Putin has made a much greater effort to promote a single pro-Presidential party – Unity/Unified Russia. In 2000-2003 and in contrast to previous “parties of power,” Unity “rivalled the Communists” in voting discipline (Remington 2005: 36). As one Russian commentator noted, “nothing is decided in Okhotnyy Ryad now without the participation of Kremlin minders” (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, April 1, 2005).

#### *Organization and Regime closure*

In conjunction with increased oil prices, the new approach to state and party organization has significantly reduced threats to regime stability. First, Yeltsin’s solution to the problem of weak central control had the (probably unintended) consequence of bringing in officials who did not value openness. One of the few existing effective hierarchies in Russia (the KGB) was also obviously its least democratic. Thus Putin, in

contrast to Yeltsin<sup>35</sup>, could not tolerate criticism of his rule and shut down virtually all major independent media.

Second, given that so much regime contestation arose from state and party failure, the creation of more effective state and party hierarchies inevitably led to a reduction in competition. Indeed, most of the institutional reforms discussed above are not inherently undemocratic (cohesive ruling parties and centralized intergovernmental systems obviously exist in many established democracies). However in the absence of a strong civil society, such measures closed off key sources of pluralism. Thus a strong United Russia party “was the end of the independence of legislative power from the executive” (Kryshtanovskaia 2005: 253). A tighter ruling organization reduced the chances of high level elite defection that had previously provided an important source of dynamic change.

The creation of a more reliable central state hierarchy also has made it significantly easier for the President to squeeze potential sources of opposition – both from major economic actors as well as regional governments. In 2000–2003 Putin used his control over the security forces and courts to restrict the independence of the oligarchs—culminating in the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the seizure of Yukos. Further, in 2003, in contrast to 1999, the Kremlin controlled all national television stations as well as regional ones such as Moscow’s *TV Tsentr*. Relative to his counterparts in both Moldova and Ukraine, Putin was more successful at limiting oligarchs’ contributions to government sanctioned parties since 2000 (McFaul and Petrov 2004).

At the same time, while incumbent capacity is greater in Russia than in many other post-Soviet cases, certain aspects of the incumbent party organization and the de

---

<sup>35</sup> Boris Yeltsin’s close aids report that Yeltsin was willing to allow open criticism in the media “as long as the situation did not become mortally dangerous for him and his power” (Baturin et al. 2001: 504).

facto scope of state control over the economy create points of regime vulnerability. First, while Unified Russia is much more coherent than any previous governing party in Russia (or in Belarus or Ukraine), it includes a number of powerful officials with autonomous access to resources—most obviously Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov—who would be in a position to defect quickly from Putin should the president appear vulnerable. Further, given the large amount of oligarchic wealth in foreign bank accounts that the Russian government cannot control, it is not clear how effectively Putin could prevent businesses from giving resources to a credible opposition if such were to emerge.

**BELARUS:**

Belarus was relatively unstable in the early 1990s under Viacheslau Kebich but became increasingly stable and highly closed after Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in 1994. To an important extent, this pattern can be understood as a product of changing levels of state capacity as well as low Western leverage generated by extremely high levels of economic and political support from Russia.

**Table 5:**  
**Belarusian incumbent capacity 1992-2005**

	<b>party</b>	<b>state</b>	<b>total</b>
<i>1992-94</i>	Med-Low	Med-Low	Med-Low
<i>1995-2006</i>	Low	High	Medium

*Belarus under Kebich*

In the early 1990s, Belarus witnessed moderate political competition and political instability – culminating in incumbent turnover in 1994. While the governing elite remained much more intact in Belarus than in the neighboring republics, a weakly

institutionalized central state created a kind of de facto pluralism because no single leader was able to gain unquestioned dominance.

First, Kebich's weak control over the police and intelligence services strengthened his opponents. In the early 1990s, the Prime Minister faced a relatively autonomous police and KGB apparatus (Kharitonov 2003; *Narodnaia hazeta* 18 May 1991, p. 1) with strong competing ties to Moscow.<sup>36</sup> In addition, Kebich also faced problems controlling district governments and local enterprises. While *formally*, heads of regional governments until 1994 were chosen by popularly elected regional committees and could not be fired by the Prime Minister, there was a widespread *informal* practice of vetting potential heads with the PM before appointment.<sup>37</sup> Yet, this informal system of control was relatively weak and dependent on the voluntary cooperation of lower level officials.<sup>38</sup>

Weak state control directly contributed to instability in the early 1990s. First, the relatively autonomous nature of the KGB directly contributed to the rise of Lukashenka, then an unknown parliamentary deputy from a rural region. Lukashenka obtained key assistance from the KGB after he was chosen in 1993 to head a legislative commission to fight corruption. According to several KGB sources who spoke with the author, the head of the agency at the time fed Lukashenka with material aimed at undermining Kebich's reputation.<sup>39</sup> Partly as a result, Lukashenka gained wide renown as a fighter against corruption in the runup to the 1994 Presidential elections. While in early 1994 Kebich

---

<sup>36</sup> It was generally felt that – even though Belarus was an independent state – the head of the KGB could not be fired without Moscow's agreement.

<sup>37</sup> Author interview with Aleksandr Sosnov, former leader in Belarusian parliament, June 21, 2004, Minsk, Belarus.

<sup>38</sup> For example, an anti Kebich mayor of one large city was able to resist efforts by Kebich to fire her in early 1994 by simply refusing to resign in the face of pressure from the Council of Ministers. Author interview with Svetlana Gol'dade, former Mayor of Gomel, July 9, 2004, Gomel', Belarus.

<sup>39</sup> Author interview with Vladimir Alekseevich Reznikov, KGB official, July 13, 2004, Minsk, Belarus; Author interview with Sergei Anis'ko, former counter intelligence official, July 14, 2004, Minsk, Belarus

successfully replaced the heads of the police and KGB with loyalists (Kharitonov 2003), officials who worked in the KGB at that time report that many officers in the service continued to cooperate with Lukashenka during his campaign and that overall KGB support for Kebich was generally quite weak.<sup>40</sup>

In addition, relatively weak central control had a direct impact on Kebich's capacity to use administrative resources during the 1994 Presidential campaign against Lukashenka. While a great many local officials officially signed up as representatives of the Kebich campaign<sup>41</sup>, they often failed to support Kebich in practice. For example, the deputy mayor of Gomel' city recalled that pro-Kebich leaflets dropped off at the city council were never distributed because of widespread support for Stanislau Shushkevich.<sup>42</sup> Such weak de facto control by Kebich over regional governments meant that – despite the Prime Minister's apparently overwhelming resource advantage going into the 1994 election – little was done to support his candidacy.

### *Belarus under Lukashenka*

Ultimately, such administrative obstacles to electoral control were hardly insurmountable. Thus when Lukashenka came to power in 1994, he secured autocratic rule by installing loyalists in the KGB and establishing formal – rather than simply informal – control over local and regional governments.

Simultaneously, and in stark contrast to other cases in this paper, Lukashenka has maintained extremely tight control over the economy. Thus, he chose not to privatize the

---

<sup>40</sup> Author interview with Vladimir Alekseevich Reznikov, KGB official, July 13, 2004, Minsk, Belarus; Author interview with Sergei Anis'ko, former KGB official, July 14, 2004, Minsk, Belarus

<sup>41</sup> Author interview with Valerii Fadeev, former Council of Ministers official in charge of local government relations, June 28, 2004, Minsk, Belarus.

<sup>42</sup> Author interview with Aleksandr Kornienko, June 30, 2004, Minsk, Belarus. Another former local official from Mogilev reported that many from his region would “go to [the capital] and report to Kebich ‘we support you 100%’ – but then fail to do the most basic activities to support his candidacy” (Author interview with Vladimir Novosiad, July 8, 2004, Minsk, Belarus). Finally, a regional official from Gomel' province explained that while open rebellion was totally impossible, “it was always possible to smile but at the same time do nothing” (Author interview with Nikolai Voitenkov, head of Gomel province 1989-1994, July 9, 2004, Gomel', Belarus).

economy as the other leaders did in the mid and late 1990s. The state controls 80% of the economy and most citizens are on short-term employment contracts that give Lukashenka tremendous discretion to punish opposition activists at all levels throughout the country (Karol 2006). As one activist noted, “economics dictates politics.”<sup>43</sup> Such control has made it nearly impossible for opposition to gain assistance from business actors. As one observer noted, “in 2006, the probability of any high level economic official joining the opposition equated to zero” (Center for Political Education, Minsk 2006). The weakness of the private sector has deprived the opposition of a major source of funding. While in Ukraine “much of the funding for the opposition campaign came from local [business] patrons..., Belarus has no private businessmen remotely as wealthy as those in Ukraine (or Russia)” (Kudrytski 2005).

The Lukashenka regime has also benefited from the fact that Belarus “is more closely intertwined [with] Russia [than with] any other state in the former Soviet Union” (Sannikov 2002: 222). At a mass level, like the EU in Central Europe, Russia in Belarus in the mid 1990s was widely viewed as a key economic benefactor. Russian economic and political ties played a key role in the establishment and survival of Lukashenka’s autocratic regime. First, Soviet era ties between Belarus’s and Russia’s political elite were by most accounts key to Lukashenka’s efforts to subdue parliament in late 1996 (Way 2006). Second, Russian energy subsidies to Belarusian industry significantly cushioned the economic transition in Belarus – leaving Lukashenka more popular and less exposed to potential pressure from the West. Between the mid 1990s and the beginning of 2004, Belarusian industry paid just \$30 per thousand cubic meters of

---

<sup>43</sup> Way interview with Natasha Poliakova, opposition activist, Mogilev, Belarus, 17 March 2006. In the words of one commentator, “This state controlled corporation, Belarus Inc., is a multiline conglomerate with revenues of about US\$25 billion ... It employs over 4 million workers and controls the services, health-care and education sectors” (Karol 2006).



Russian natural gas – between one half and one third of the price paid by Ukrainian and Western companies (*Ukrainska Pravda* October 16, 2000; Silitski 2003). Economists have estimated that Russian subsidies to Belarusian industry account for about 20% of the country’s GDP (Aslund 2002: 182). Belarus’s relative economic isolation and capacity to rely on Russia for assistance have largely immunized Lukashenka from western democratizing pressures. As one commentator recently noted regarding EU frustrations in pushing for freer elections – “As long as Russia continues to support his regime economically, Lukashenka does not seem to care much about his isolation in the international arena” (Maksymiuk 2004b).

**ARMENIA:**

Armenia has also witnessed relative regime stability throughout the post-Soviet period. Although the country faced several waves of large-scale opposition mobilization as well as a debilitating economic blockade from Turkey and Azerbaijan, the executive was never overthrown by an outside challenger.<sup>44</sup> The key source of regime stability was a powerful coercive apparatus. At the same time, periodic challenges to authoritarian stability have come from the country’s relatively weak ruling party structures.

**Table 6:**

**Armenian incumbent capacity 1992-2005**

	<b>party</b>	<b>state</b>	<b>total</b>
<i>1992-98</i>	Medium	High	Med-High
<i>1998-2005</i>	Med-Low	High	Med-High

---

<sup>44</sup> President Levon Ter Petrosian left office in early 1998. However, he was replaced by allies from within the government.

*Strong state, weak party*

As in Georgia, 1989-1990 witnessed a severe breakdown in central state control in Armenia. The growing war in the Nagorno-Karabagh region was accompanied by the growth of paramilitaries not controlled by any state leader (de Waal 2003: 111)<sup>45</sup>. However, in stark contrast to his counterparts in Georgia, President Levon Ter Petrosian successfully subordinated these forces after one of them attacked the Yerevan headquarters of the ruling Armenian National Movement (ANM) in late August 1990 (Masih and Krikorian 1999: 20-22; Mitiaev 1998: 77-78; Goldenberg 1994: 144).<sup>46</sup> Subsequently the leadership was able to build a coercive apparatus that had both high cohesion and scope. Backed by a strong sense of national identity, the army was extremely successful in instituting the draft (Aves 1995: 223; Aves 1996), relatively well-funded – consuming at least 8-9% of GDP—and considered to have high esprit de corp (De Waal 2003, 257, 122). Finally, in stark contrast to the Georgian state, the Armenian central state maintained firm control over regional governments. Armenia's successful state building was partially a result of the fact that – in stark contrast to Georgia—the leadership maintained good relations with Russia and Russia gave important assistance to Armenian state building efforts.<sup>47</sup> Thus, Armenia won the war in Nagorno-Karabagh and captured 20% of Azerbaijani territory in 1992-1994.

At the same time, the ruling parties in Armenia have been relatively weak. The ANM grew out of a broad nationalist coalition that included nonconformist intelligentsia from the Communist era, younger activists, and figures from the Communist establishment (Aves

---

<sup>45</sup> In 1989 there were roughly 2,000 paramilitary fighters in Armenia (De Waal 2003: 111).

<sup>46</sup> One of the largest paramilitaries, the Armenian Army of Independence, agreed to lay down its arms to declare loyalty to the Ministry of Interior (De Waal 2003: 111). The war that had until then been spontaneously organized by volunteers became more systematically controlled by a centralized state apparatus (Aves 1996).

<sup>47</sup> The Armenian military was also strengthened with high levels of technical and material assistance from Russia (Fairbanks 1995; de Waal 2003: 162-163).

1996: 4). Throughout the early 1990s, major leaders of ANM broke off to form their own parties (Libaridian 1999: 10, 23-24; Masih and Krikorian 1999: 45-46). As Mark Malkasian (1996: 199) noted of the ANM in 1990, “The notion of party discipline was out of the question.” Under Kocharian, the ruling party became even weaker. Instead of ruling via a single party, Kocharian has operated through a coalition of three—often competing—parties.

### *Incumbent capacity and stability in Armenia*

The dynamics of political development in Armenia since 1991 have reflected the fact that the regime has on the one hand possessed a strong state apparatus that was able to put down frequent and strong protest but on the other hand a relatively weak ruling party that suffered from frequent elite defection. First, the war created a powerful and experienced coercive apparatus that became a key tool for the regime to beat back a highly mobilized opposition. As we see in Figure 1, above, the Armenian opposition was more mobilized *in absolute terms* than any other post-Soviet competitive authoritarian regime except for Ukraine in 2004 – despite the fact that Armenia has the smallest population of the six countries. Throughout the 1990s, the opposition regularly mobilized 50,000-100,000 protestors.<sup>48</sup> In the run-up to the 1996 presidential elections, the opposition united behind the former Minister of Defense, Vazgen Manukian. According to most accounts, Manukian forced Ter Petrosian into a run-off in the first round of the elections. However, the regime declared that the President had won the election outright (Danielian 1996-1997). Manukian responded by leading a demonstration of 150-200,000 (Danielian 1996-1997: 128) in front of the Central Election Committee and attacking parliament.

---

<sup>48</sup> In February 1993, 100,000 demonstrated for the resignation of Ter-Petrosian (Masikh and Krikorian 1999: vii; Mitiaev 1998, 86). Opposition demonstrations of roughly 50,000 also took place in July 1994 and June 1995 (Mitiaev 1998: 91, 101).

In stark contrast to its counterpart in Georgia in 2003, the government in Armenia was able to make effective use of both high and low intensity coercion to beat back this serious challenge to incumbent rule. With the active participation of the Minister of Defense himself (M. Danielian 1996-1997: 129), the military was able to quickly defuse the opposition in the next two days by shutting off access to the capital, arresting up to 250 oppositionists throughout Armenia and closing down all opposition party headquarters (Mkrtchian 1999; Bremmer and Welt 1997). A key tool of repression was Yerkrepah – the union of Karabagh veterans consisting of about 11,000 members (Zakarian 2005; Minasian 1999).

The military and police were similarly effective at beating back protests in 2003-2004. Protests erupted after fraudulent presidential elections in early 2003 – when between 25,000 and 100,000 demonstrated against Kocharian’s rule (Petrosian 2003; Fuller 2003a). Again in April 2004, the opposition orchestrated large scale demonstrations of about 10,000-25,000 against the regime in an effort to copy the success of Georgia’s Rose revolution (Hakobyan 2004a; Karapetian 2004). Yet, the opposition in Armenia faced a far more effective repressive apparatus than did its northern neighbor. In response to these demonstrations, pro regime thugs and the military ransacked opposition headquarters and carried out an extensive and effective program of arrests of hundreds of activists throughout the country. “[J]ust about everyone challenging the regime [was] on the police watch list” (Danielyan 2004). In addition, the regime – in stark contrast to the Kuchma government in 2004 (Way 2005b) – effectively blocked access into the capital during the demonstrations (Hakobyan 2004a; Danielyan 2004). Further, throughout the post-Soviet period, the regime demonstrated a capacity to preempt protests by conducting widespread “prophylactic” arrests of leaders before

protests take place that has significantly hindered opposition activity (Grigorian 2000; Stepanian and Kalantarian 2005).

At the same time, Armenia's relatively weak ruling party structure creates a potentially serious obstacle to autocratic consolidation. In the early and mid 1990s, defections from the ruling coalition generated the most serious opposition to the regime (Astourian 2000-2001: 49-50). Thus, in the 1996 Presidential elections the three main candidates had all been leaders of the Karabagh Committee. Under Kocharian, the ruling coalition has suffered even higher volatility and numerous near crises – particularly in 1998-1999 when he was challenged from within the government (cf. Fuller 1998; Simonian 2000; Danielyan 2004a; Grigorasian 2004). He continued to face a great deal of open dissent from within the government in the mid 2000s.<sup>49</sup> The weakness of parties and reliance on the security apparatus has meant that the government has had to use police harassment and open threats of prosecution to keep some parliamentarians in line (cf. Khachatrian 2006b)

#### **GEORGIA:**

In Georgia, relatively weak party and state structures have contributed to regime instability in the post-Cold War era. Thus, in 1992 and 2003, incumbents fell in the face of only moderately strong opposition challenges. At the same time, Georgia's weak linkage to the West has meant that autocratic breakdown has not resulted in full-scale democratization.

---

<sup>49</sup> For example, in response to relatively mild international reaction to electoral abuse in a November 2005 referendum, several members of the government and pro-government parliamentarians openly denounced the election as "undemocratic" and blamed other pro-government parties for the fraud. (Saghabalian 2005; Khachatrian 2005). Competing groups within the Presidential camp "do everything to boost their standing by discrediting each other" (Bedevian 2006). The government has also faced significant difficulty passing basic legislation (Khachatrian 2006a).

**Table 7:**

**Georgian incumbent capacity 1992-2005**

	<b>party</b>	<b>state</b>	<b>total</b>
<i>1990-1991</i>	Med-Low	Low	Low
<i>1995-2001</i>	Medium	Low	Med-Low
<i>2002-2003</i>	Low	Low	Low

**Weak state, weak party and failed autocracy under Gamsakhurdia**

Because of the extreme antagonism between Russia and Georgia's early state builders, Georgia had to essentially build the coercive state from scratch. The anti-Ossetian mobilization of Georgia's first president (Aves 1992: 166-172) meant that Georgian state building efforts ran into strong opposition from powerful forces in Moscow.<sup>50</sup> The "Georgian 'army' ...[consisted of] clannish paramilitaries before professional officers were able were able to organize a unified force" (Jones 1996, 36). Several significant forces – such as Jaba Ioseliani's *Mkhedrioni* (Knights), never even came under the nominal control of Gamsakhurdia. Thus, "government forces were just another militia, relying on the good will Gamsakhurdia's own supporters" (Wheatley dissertation: 135).

At the same time, Gamsakhurdia had an extremely weak ruling party organization on which to build his regime. The "Round Table" that won an overwhelming share of seats (155 of 250) to the Georgian Supreme Soviet in late 1990 was formed in an extremely ad hoc manner on the basis of self-appointed Gamsakhurdia supporters lacking particular ties to the leader (Aves 1992: 165-166; Slider 1997: 177).

---

<sup>50</sup> Pro Georgian paramilitaries were formed on the basis of various criminal gangs that marched to Ossetia to support the Georgian population that subsequently became the basis for the Georgian military.

### *Weak Incumbent Capacity and Autocratic Failure under Gamsakhurdia*

The combination of weak incumbent capacity and hostile relations with Russia effectively doomed Gamsakhurdia's autocracy building efforts in 1991. Thus, Wheatley writes that Gamsakhurdia's rapid downfall was a product less of his personality than

the fact that he had no institutionalised societal organisation to support him. ... His political future was dependent entirely on the day-to-day vicissitudes of public opinion and was not rooted in any stable social or political structure. Once public opinion began to slip away from him, he had no institutional levers to maintain his grip on power. (Wheatley 2004: 3)

Thus, the loosely organized Round Table bloc rapidly disintegrated in 1991 and many former supporters began calling for Gamsakhurdia's resignation.

Simultaneously, the already weak Georgian state had severely hemorrhaged by mid year. In August 1991, Kitovani broke with Gamsakhurdia after the president attempted to subordinate the force to the Soviet MVD and encamped outside of Tbilisi in the fall. Following the failed Soviet coup, emerging opposition to Gamsakhurdia organized demonstrations in Tbilisi and the capital became the site of fighting between pro and anti Gamsakhurdia military factions. Gamsakhurdia attempted to call martial law in late September 1991. However, on 21 December, Kitovani forces marched into the capital. Ioseliani, who had been in prison since February, was released and *Mkhedrioni* volunteers descended into Tbilisi. Finally, on January 6, 1992, Gamsakhurdia and his supporters were forced out of the bunker below the parliament building and escaped to Armenia. In the absence of a well-trained or loyal military and police force, Gamsakhurdia fell at the ends of a disorganized band of paramilitary forces within just over a year after coming to power.

### **Weak state and weak autocracy under Shevardnadze**

*“Under Shevardnadze ... they never created a state that was able to protect itself.”<sup>51</sup>*

Eduard Shevardnadze took nominal control of Georgia in 1992 and remained until he was forced out of power before the end of his second term in 2003. While he was much more successful at establishing a stable regime than Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze was like his predecessor unable to rely on high or low intensity coercion to maintain control. Thus, his regime ultimately collapsed in the face of relatively modest protest at the end of 2003.

In stark contrast to Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze actively sought accommodation with Russia and was gradually able to consolidate control over the various independent militias. By 1995, Shevardnadze had secured the (at least passive) loyalty of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Georgia had ceased to be a “chaosocracy” (Wheatley 2006: chapter 4). Nevertheless by almost any other measure, the Georgian state remained extremely weak throughout the post-Soviet period. Throughout the 1990s, Georgia was plagued by coup attempts, and assassination plots against Shevardnadze (Fuller 2003; Devdariani 2002; Welt 2000; Jones 1999; RFE/RL Newswire June 1, 2001). Relatedly, the state continued to face enormous budget shortfalls and was often unable to pay police for months on end (Fuller 1998a, 1998b; Devdariani 2003). Further, the Georgian central state confronted immense difficulty controlling regions despite the incredibly small size of the country. In addition to Abkhazia and Ossetia, brown areas included Pankisi Gorge, Ajaria and to a lesser extent Kodori Gorge and Mingrelia (Welt 2000).

Even with such a weak state at his disposal, Shevardnadze was able to hang onto power for a long time. In stark contrast to his counterparts Snegur in Moldova, and Yeltsin in Russia, Shevardnadze resisted early misgivings and decided to build a single,

---

<sup>51</sup> Aleksei Malashenko quoted in Karumidze and Wertsch 2005: 88.



relatively coherent ruling party – the Citizen’s Union of Georgia (CUG) – that more or less controlled parliament until 2001-2002.<sup>52</sup> Having been the Georgian Communist Party First Secretary 1972-1985, Shevardnadze was able to create an organization from a series of economic and political *nomenklatura* ties as well as members of the intelligentsia who saw Shevardnadze as key to ending the Georgian civil war (Wheatley 2006: chapter 4). The party made a significant effort to encompass the elite at all levels of society. Thus, mayors of towns and even heads of schools felt it was necessary to join the CUG (Wheatley 2006: 131).<sup>53</sup> At the same time, party cohesion was not extremely strong. The party was never more than a relatively loose coalition of highly diverse interests and “uneasy bedfellows” (Wheatley 2004; Jones 1999).

Simultaneously, opposition in Georgia was relatively weak. Like most other post-Communist countries (Howard 2003), Georgia had a relatively weak civil society that was highly dependent on foreign financing (Stefes 2005). While “civil society” groups were often considered powerful (cf. Mitchell 2004), their influence seems to have been rooted more in their ties to particular government officials rather than any autonomous organizing capacity (Wheatley 2006: 127).

*Weak State, Moderately Strong Party and the Collapse of the Shevardnadze Regime:*

The first stage of the collapse of the Shevardnadze regime occurred in 2001 with the hemorrhaging of the ruling CUG. By the late 1990s the party had suffered from “prominent defections and poor discipline” (Jones 1999, 2000: 53; Fuller 2001). After the successful 1999 parliamentary elections when the CUG gained over half of the seats in parliament, the party began to seriously disintegrate. In the spring and summer, the

---

<sup>52</sup> Shevardnadze also survived because he was widely viewed as key to preventing a return to chaosocracy.

<sup>53</sup> “According to figures obtained by the International Centre for Civic Culture, in 1999 the CUG had 112,000 members, of whom 35,000 were active.” (Wheatley 2006: 132).

group of younger so-called “reformers” within the party began openly criticizing Shevardnadze and charging various government ministers of corruption (Wheatley 2006: 103-106; Devdariani 2002). By the fall, the party suffered massive defections and, after Shevardnadze resigned, the party split apart permanently (RFE/RL Newsline 9 October 2001; Devdariani 2001). In particular, three formerly close allies of Shevardnadze emerged as major challengers: Nino Burdjanadze, Zurab Zhvania, and Mikheil Saakashvili. As members of Shevardnadze’s inner circle, each of these figures had gained political protection, resources, and name recognition that – given the country’s weak civil society – would have been extremely difficult from outside the regime (Stefes 2005). In this sense, the emergence of the opposition in Georgia is remarkably parallel to Ukraine where opposition to Kuchma also emerged from among close associates of Kuchma.<sup>54</sup>

In 2003, these figures all challenged a reformed ruling party in parliamentary elections. Following widespread falsification of the vote that appears to have resulted in lower results for opposition parties, the opposition led by Saakashvili called for mass demonstrations against the government. The subsequent success of these demonstrations would lead most observers to focus on the role of “people power” – a view actively promoted by the new regime that obviously has a direct interest in being viewed as the result of a popular revolt from below. However, most observers on the ground appear to agree that the demonstrations were “small” and “undersized” (Mitchell 2004, 345).<sup>55</sup>

Observers agree that the largest demonstration occurred on November 22 when the

---

<sup>54</sup> The dynamics within the opposition are also similar. Thus, both Zurab Zhvania and Viktor Yushchenko played the role of more moderate insiders who were closer to their presidents while Mikheil Saakashvili and Yulia Tymoshenko played the role of more radical figures less closely tied to the executive.

<sup>55</sup> Lincoln Mitchell, the head of NDI programs to train opposition in Georgia at the time, presumably has a direct interest in promoting the role of the opposition that he helped to train so this view is all the more striking. Attempts to organize a general strike failed (Wheatley 2006: chapter 6). Thus, for the first week or so following the elections, there were “500 to 5,000” demonstrators in front of parliament and “during most of the vigil there were considerably less [sic] than 5,000 people” (Mitchell 2004, 345). On November 14, the crowd reached 20,000.

opposition took over parliament. Most semi-objective accounts put that number of protestors in the “tens of thousands” (Karumidze and Wertsch 2005: 13; De Waal 2004), while Saakashvili himself gives a figure of 60,000 (Karumidze and Wertsch 2005: 25) and there is at least one estimate of 100,000.<sup>56</sup>

Regardless of the figures one accepts, the surrender of parliament and the fall of the regime seem to have been rooted less in the sheer numbers of protestors and much more in the weakness of Shevardnadze’s coercive apparatus. Thus, David Zurabishvili argues that incompetence made it possible for the opposition to take over parliament on November 22. “Thanks to typical Georgian negligence, no one was watching the sides of the entrance to the parliament. Only the police were there, but they couldn’t stop the demonstrators from going in. They stepped aside and let them through” (quoted in Karumidze and Wertsch 2005, 15). The reluctance of the police to intervene was at least partly rooted in the fact, in the words of the head of the Interior Ministry, they “had not been paid at that point for three months. So why should they have obeyed Shevardnadze?” (quoted in Karumidze and Wertsch 2005, 39). The next day, top level military and police officials abandoned Shevardnadze and he was forced to resign.<sup>57</sup> Thus, the Rose revolution had as much if not more to do with the weakness of the coercive state than with popular mobilization. As Lincoln Mitchell argues, “there was no institution strong enough to defend [Shevardnadze] when he faced somewhat modest demonstrations and very determined opposition leaders ... he became aware that he no longer controlled the military and security forces. Bloodshed was avoided largely because the president was too politically weak to command it” (Mitchell 2004, 343, 348).

---

<sup>56</sup> Liz Fuller (2003b) reports “20,000-30,000” protestors on November 22. Wheatley: 50-100,000. (2006: 159)

<sup>57</sup> Shevardnadze himself complained that “[t]he Georgian state apparatus did not stand up to the challenge before it” (quoted in Karumidze and Wertsch 2005, 29).

Comparing Georgia and Armenia, Richard Grigorian argued that “[t]he key difference ... lies in the power of the state, as the Georgian transition was marked by the cumulative effects of a loss of state authority and power and a devolution of power from the central government in Tbilisi to the increasingly assertive and restive regions, leaving a power vacuum” (quoted in Hakobyan 2004a).

### **After the Rose Revolution: A New Form of Autocracy?**

Once in power, Saakashvili immediately took measures to strengthen central state control. He increased Presidential power, jailed corrupt officials, radically reformed the traffic police, and subordinated a breakaway government in Ajaria that had remained largely outside central control throughout the Shevardnadze era (Stefes 2005).

However, as in Russia, “strengthening the state was accompanied by certain setbacks in democratic freedoms” (Nodia 2005: 1). Since early 2004, observers have noted systematic violations of democratic norms that make it impossible to label the new regime democratic. First, there has been systematic pressure on independent media: including tax raids of television stations critical of the government; prosecution of critical journalists, and pressures to cancel programs critical of Saakashvili (Fuller 2005; Corso 2006b; TOL 2004; Peuch 2004). In the 2005 “Reporters Without Borders” media freedom report, Georgia fell five places from 94<sup>th</sup> to 99<sup>th</sup> out of 167 countries surveued (Corso 2006a). In addition, Georgia continued to suffer important levels of electoral fraud.<sup>58</sup> State media during the March 2004 election campaign “showed a clear bias in its news broadcasts focusing overwhelmingly on the authorities and the parties supporting them.”<sup>59</sup> This continuation of competitive authoritarian rule may be partly a function of the West’s relatively mild

---

<sup>58</sup> Thus, the OSCE report on the repeat parliamentary elections held in March 2004 noted “irregularities observed during the tabulation of results, implausible voter turnout, the mishandling of some complaints and the selective cancellation of election results... The lack of political balance on election commissions remained a source of concern.” (ODIHR 2004).

<sup>59</sup> Finally, observers argue that Saakashvili has used anti-corruption law enforcement selectively – “arresting and punishing political enemies while leaving supporters untouched” (Devdariani 2004b; Corso 2004). In the spring of 2004, the OSCE noted “a noticeable increase” in human rights complaints since the inauguration of Saakashvili as president (quoted in van der Schriek 2004).

engagement with Georgia. Thus, despite these abuses, Saakashvili continues to be perceived as democratic by many international actors. Further, while Saakashvili was promised increased financial support, it is highly unlikely that Georgia will ever join the EU – providing few strong incentives for Saakashvili to moderate his behavior (Rochowanski 2004).

*Moldova and Ukraine to be added...*

## **CONCLUSION:**

This paper has argued that three sets of factors have powerfully shaped the trajectories of post-Soviet competitive authoritarian regimes. First, relatively weak linkage has meant that Western pressure has played a relatively peripheral role. At most – as in Ukraine in 2004 – Western actors have tipped the balance in favor of an already powerful opposition challenge. However, in no case has Western engagement successfully brought down a relatively powerful autocratic power (as it did in Serbia and Slovakia in the 1990s) or transform autocrats into democrats (as in Romania). Instead, post-Soviet democratization has been determined primarily by the strength of domestic democratic forces. Because such forces have generally been weak, few post-Soviet regimes have democratized.

Second, the stability of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes has been primarily determined by state and party strength. Where states and/or parties have been relatively strong – as in Armenia, Russia under Putin, and Moldova under the Communists – incumbent governments have generally managed to thwart opposition challenges and maintain power. Where states and parties have been weaker – as in Georgia, Moldova in the 1990s, Ukraine, Russia in the 1990s, and to a lesser extent Belarus – outcomes have been determined by the extent of Western leverage. Where Western leverage has been high – as in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine – incumbents have had a much harder time retaining power. In these cases (particularly Georgia and Moldova) relatively hostile relations with Russia have meant

that incumbents are less insulated from Western pressure. By contrast, where leverage has been low – as in Belarus and Russia – even relatively weak incumbents have managed to hang on.

Above all, this analysis demonstrates the need to pay much greater attention to the strength of autocratic regime structures and not just the power of democratic forces. With the important exception of Ukraine in 2004, the relative power of anti-autocratic mobilization does little to help us understand why some autocratic regimes have been more or less stable than others. Thus, in Armenia – where the opposition has been perhaps the most mobilized even in absolute terms – autocratic governments have successfully faced down opposition challenges. By contrast in Georgia and Moldova where the opposition has been relatively quiescent, autocrats have had a much harder time maintaining control.

This analysis further suggests that opposition strength is to at least some extent endogenous to incumbent capacity.<sup>60</sup> For example, where incumbents possess powerful instruments of physical and/or economic coercion, they may use them to systematically undermine opposition organization. Thus, systematic coercion may weaken opposition movements by making civic political participation so risky that all but the most die hard activists exit the public sphere. Thus, in Malaysia, Belarus, and Russia under Putin, effective low intensity coercion helped to deter strong opposition movements from emerging in the first place. Discretionary economic power may also be used to weaken or deter opposition movements. In Belarus, Gabon, and Russia, economic coercion and co-optation helped governments starve opposition movements nearly out of existence.

At the same time, incumbent weakness may contribute to opposition strength. In Georgia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Ukraine, and Zambia, much of the financial and

---

<sup>60</sup>Brownlee (2004) and Greene (2005) make similar arguments.

organizational muscle of successful opposition movements came not from “society” but from powerful political, economic, and military actors who defected—in some cases, just weeks or months before the transition—from the governing coalition. In many cases, defectors provided sources of finance or rural penetration that opposition forces could never have achieved on their own. In Ukraine, for example, much of the financial and organizational muscle of the Orange Revolution was provided by leading business “oligarchs” who had only recently defected from the Kuchma government. In addition, the main focus of protests – Viktor Yushchenko – had risen to preeminence as a strong Kuchma ally. In Georgia, as well, the main leadership of the opposition had recently been closely tied to Shevardnadze. In these cases, it was ultimately incumbent weakness, rather than opposition strength, per se, that drove transitions.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andrews, Josephine T. 2002. *When Majorities Fail: The Russian Parliament, 1990-1993* Cambridge University Press.
- Anjaparidze, Zaal. “GEORGIAN MEDIA SHACKLED AFTER ROSE REVOLUTION.” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*. July 29.
- Aron, Leon. 2000. *Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life*. St. Martin’s Press: New York.
- Aslund, Anders. 2002. “Is the Belarusian Economic Model Viable?” in A. Lewis ed. *The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels*. Federal Trust London, 173-184.
- Astourian, Stephan. 2000-2001. *From Ter-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia*. Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series Winter.
- Aves, Jonathan. 1995. “National Security and Military Issues in the Transcaucasus.” In V. Parrott ed. *State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*. 1995 M E Sharpe. 209-233.
- Aves, Jonathan. 1996. “Politics, Parties and Presidents in Transcaucasia.” *Caucasian Regional Studies* Issue 1. <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0101-02.htm>.
- Bahry, Donna. 2005. “The New Federalism and the Paradoxes of Regional Sovereignty in Russia.” *Comparative Politics* 37 no. 2 January, pp. 127-146.
- Baturin, Yu., A. Il’in, V. Kadatskii, V. Kostikov, M. Krasnov, A. Livshchits, K. Nikoforov, L. Pikhoia, G. Satarov. *Epokha El’tsina: ocherki politicheskoi istorii*. Moskva: Vagrius.
- Bedevian, Asghik. 2006. “Ruling Parties Pledge Continued Cooperation.” *RFE/RL Armenia Report* 6 February.
- Beissinger, Mark R. 2005. *Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions*. Madison, Wisconsin ms.

- Bellin, Eva. 2004. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36 (January).
- Bremmer, Ian and Cory Welt. 1997. "Armenia's New Autocrats." *Journal of Democracy* 8.3 77-91.
- Brinks, Daniel and Michael Coppedge. 2001. "Patterns of Diffusion in the Third Wave of Democracy." Paper delivered at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, August 30-September 2, 2001.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2004. "Durable Authoritarianism in an Age of Democracy" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2004).
- Bunatian, Heggine and Anna Saghalian. 2005. "Armenian Observers Slam 'Undemocratic' Referendum." *RFE/RL Armenia Report*. 29 November.
- Bunce, Valerie. 2003. "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience," *World Politics* 55 (January).
- Bunce, Valerie. 2005. keynote address at the Fisher Forum on Color Revolutions at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, [http://atlas-real.atlas.uiuc.edu:8080/ramgen/reec/reec-v-2005-1/smil/reec20050912\\_Valerie\\_Bunce.smil](http://atlas-real.atlas.uiuc.edu:8080/ramgen/reec/reec-v-2005-1/smil/reec20050912_Valerie_Bunce.smil).
- Center for Political Education, Minsk. 2006. *The Fading Pillars of Power in Belarus: 100 days of Milinkevich*. Pontis Foundation's Institute for Civic Diplomacy: Bratislava.
- Committee to Protect Journalists. 2001. "Georgia" at <http://www.cpj.org/attacks01/europe01/georgia.html>
- Committee to Protect Journalists. 2003. "Georgia" Accessed in November 2005 at <http://www.cpj.org/attacks03/europe03/georgia.html>.
- Considine, Jennifer I. and William A. Kerr. *The Russian Oil Economy*. Northampton: Edward Elgar.
- Corso, Molly. 2004. "CIVIL SOCIETY: GEORGIAN PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION." *Eurasianet*. 22 December.
- Corso, Molly. 2006a. "Georgia: Pressure to Report." *TRANSITIONS ONLINE*: 27 February.
- Corso, Molly. 2006b. "Georgia: Free Enough?" *Transitions Online*. 5 April.
- Crawford, Gordon. 2001. *Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality*. New York: Palgrave.
- Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Danielian, Mikael. 1996-1997. "Elections in Armenia: A Funeral for Democracy." *Uncaptive Minds* Vol. 9, nos 1-2, pp. 125-131.
- Danielyan, Emil. 2000. "Armenia: A Change in Leadership Without Political Reform," in P. Rutland ed. *OMRI Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: 1998* M. E. Sharpe.
- Danielyan, Emil. 1998. "Back to Political Standstill," in P. Rutland ed. *OMRI Annual Survey of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: 1997* M. E. Sharpe.
- Danielyan, Emil. 1998. "Ter-Petrosian Rigged 1996 Election, Fell Into 'Depression', Says Top Ally." *RFE/RL Armenia Report*. 30 December.
- Danielyan, Emil. 2004. "Armenian Ruling Coalition Beset by Renewed Infighting." *Transitions Online*. 10 - 16 February.
- Danielyan, Emil. 2004. "Armenia: A Dictator in the Making." *Transitions Online*. 24 June.
- Danielyan, Emil. 2004. "The state of democracy in Armenia." *Transitions Online*. July 7.



- Danielyan, Emil. 2006. "Armenia Clears Final Hurdle to Hefty U.S. Aid." *RFE/RL Armenia Report*. 8 March.
- de Waal, Thomas. 2003. *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through peace and War*. NYU press.
- de Waal, Thomas. 2004. "Caucasus After The Fall, Georgia After Shevardnadze." *The*

*Financial Times*, **July ??.**

- Devdariani, Jaba. 2001. "Zhvania Defuses Political Crisis: A symbolic victory by Georgia's united opposition points towards a lack of party discipline in the CUG." *CRS* No. 87, 18 June.
- Devdariani, Jaba. 2002. "Georgia: Stormy Year Breeds Uncertainty." *TOL*, 24 January.
- Devdariani, Jaba. 2003. **TOL 2002** 9 April 2003.
- Devdariani, Jaba. 2004a. "Georgia: The Year of Revolution." *Transitions Online*. 15 April.
- Devdariani, Jaba. 2004b. "GEORGIA'S ROSE REVOLUTION GRAPPLES WITH DILEMMA: DO ENDS JUSTIFY MEANS." *Eurasia Insight*. 26 October.
- Devdariani, Jaba. 2005. "Georgia: Rise and Fall of the Façade Democracy," *Demokratizatsiya* 12 (Winter): 79-115.
- Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Drakokhrust, Yuri and Dmitri Furman. 2002. "Belarus and Russia: The Game of Virtual Integration" in Balmaceda et al. eds. *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West*. HURI Press Cambridge, MA. pp. 232-255.
- Dunlop, John B. 1995. *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*. Princeton University Press.
- Dunlop, John. 1999. "Sifting through the Rubble of the Yeltsin Years." Jamestown Foundation Policy Papers.
- El'tsin, Boris. 2000. *Prezidentskii marafon*. Moscow: AST.
- European Institute for the Media. 1996. *Monitoring the Coverage of Elections in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan Media in the Transcaucasus*. Dusseldorf. 15 March 1996.
- Fairbanks, Charles H. Jr. 1995. "The Postcommunist Wars: Armed Forces and Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 6.4 (1995) 18-34.
- Filatov, Sergei. 2001. *Sovershenno nesekretno*. Vagrius: Moscow.
- Fish, M. Steven. 2001. "Authoritarianism Despite Elections: Russia in Light of Democratic Theory." Paper prepared for delivery at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30-September 2, 2001.
- Fish, M. Steven. 2005. *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Freeland, Chrystia. 2000. *Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism*. Crown Business: New York.
- Fuller, Liz. 1998. "Coup Attempt In Georgia." *RFE/RL Caucasus Report*. 20 October 1998, Volume 1, Number 34.
- Fuller, Liz. 1998. "How Serious Is Georgia's Financial Crisis?" *RFE/RL Caucasus report*: 30 October Volume 1, Number 35.
- Fuller, Liz. 1998. "Armenia: Things Fall Apart ..." *RFE/RL Caucasus Report* 30 October 1998, Volume 1, Number 35

- Fuller, Liz. 2001. "Georgia: PAPERING OVER THE CRACKS." *RFE/RL Endnote*. 25 April.
- Fuller, Liz. 2003a "ARMENIAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN KICKS OFF." *RFE RL Caucasus Report*. 27 January 2003, Volume 6, Number 4.
- Fuller, Liz. 2003b. "THOUSANDS PROTEST ARMENIAN ELECTION FALSIFICATION." Volume 7 Number 35 24 February.
- Fuller, Liz. 2003c. "Armenia: COLD FEET OR STEEL NERVES?" *RFE RL Caucasus Report*. 3 March 2003, Volume 6, Number 9.
- Fuller, Liz. 2003c. "Georgia: When Is a Coup Attempt not a coup attempt?" *RFE RL Caucasus Report*. 7 April Volume 6, Number 14.
- Fuller, Liz. 2003c. "SHEVARDNADZE'S RESIGNATION RESOLVES CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCK..." *RFE/RL Caucasus Report* 24 November 2003, Volume 6, Number 41.
- Fuller, Liz. 2005. " SOME GEORGIAN JOURNALISTS STILL FEEL LESS EQUAL THAN OTHERS" *RFE/RL Caucasus Report*. *Vol???*
- Gaidar, Yegor. 1999. *Days of Defeat and Victory*. University of Washington Press: Seattle.
- Geddes, Barbara. 2004. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research in Comparative Politics*. University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999).
- Gel'man, V. 2006. "Vozvrashchenie Leviafona? Politika Retsentralizatsii v sovremennoi Rossii." Ms.
- Gleditsch, Kristian. 2002. *All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization*. The University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor.
- Goldenberg, Suzanne. 1994. *Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder*. Zed Books London.
- Goldgeier, James and Michael McFaul. 2003. *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy towards Russia after the Cold War*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Greene, Ken. 2005. "Defeating Dominance: Opposition Party Building and Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective" ms. University of Texas, Austin.
- Grigorian, Mark. 1997. "ARMENIA'S 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION COVERAGE IN THE MEDIA." *Caucasian Regional Studies*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 1997. <http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0201-02.htm>
- Grigorian, Mark. 2000. "Armenian Political Upstart Arrested: An inglorious protest meeting in Yerevan could mark the end of Arkady Vardanian's brief political career." CRS No. 56, 3 November.
- Giragosian, Richard. 2002. "ARMENIAN MEDIA UNDER ASSAULT." *RFE/RL Endnote*. Thursday, 24 October Volume 6 Number 201.
- Giragosian, Richard. 2004. "Armenia 2003: Burdened by the Unresolved." *Transitions Online*. 15 April.
- Hakobyan, Anna. 2004a."Armenia: Authorities Hit Back as Opposition Campaign Mounts." 13 April TOL.
- Hakobyan, Anna. 2004b. Armenia's Opposition: Playing for Power. TOL. 30 April.
- Hale, Henry. 2004. "The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Party-System Development," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, v.12, no.2, Spring, pp.169-94.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 2001. "Political liberalization in Africa after ten years." *Comparative Politics*. 33, No. 3, pp. 357-375.

- Herspring, Dale. 1998. "Russia's Crumbling Military" *Current History*. October. pp. 325-328.
- Holmes, Stephen. 1997. "What Russia Teaches Us Now: How Weak States Threaten Freedom," *American Prospect* 8 (July 1–August 1).
- Hoffman, David.....**
- Howard, Marc. 2003. *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Howard, Marc and Philip G. Roessler. 2006. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 2.
- Hough, Jerry F. 1997. *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991*. Brookings Institute Press: Washington, DC.
- Huskey, Eugene. 1999. *Presidential Power in Russia*. M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, New York.
- Huskey, Eugene. 2001. "Putin Leadership and the center-periphery struggle: Putin's administrative reforms." in Brown and Shevtsova eds. *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia's Transition*. Carnegie Endowment. 2001, pp. 113-142.
- Johnson, Juliet. 2000. *A Fistful of Rubles: The Rise and Fall of the Russian Banking System*. Cornell: Ithaca.
- Jones, Stephen F. 1996. "Adventurers or Commanders? Civil Military Relations in Georgia Since Independence" in C. Danopolous and D. Zirker eds. *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States*. Westview. 1996.
- Jones, Stephen F. 1999. "Georgia: A Difficult Year." TOL 9 January 1999.
- Jones, Stephen F. 2000. "Democracy from Below? Interest Groups in Georgian Society" *Slavic Review* 59, No. 1 (spring 2000).
- Karapetian, Rita. 2004. Armenian President Cracks Down: Dozens are hurt or arrested in the centre of Yerevan as the Armenian opposition calls for the resignation of President Kocharian. CRS No. 227, 15-Apr-04.
- Karl, Terry Lynn. 1986. "Imposing Consent: Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador." In Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds. *Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-85*. La Jolla: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies.
- Karol, Siarhej. 2006. "The Belarusian Economic Model: A 21<sup>st</sup> Century Socialism?" RFE/RL Reports 13 March.
- Khaindrava, Ivlian. 2004. Comment: Georgia's Lucky President: In Mikheil Saakashvili's rapid ascent to power, he has not put a foot wrong – so far." CRS No. 241, 7 July.
- Khachatryan, Ruzanna. 2005. "Dashnaks 'Not Responsible for Referendum Fraud.'" *RFE/RL Armenia Report* 22 December.
- Khachatryan, Ruzanna. 2006a. "Parliament Fails to Elect New Human Rights Defender." *RFE/RL Armenia Report*. 8 February.
- Khachatryan, Ruzanna. 2006b. "Parliament Leaders Condemn 'Illegal' Police Actions Against MP." *RFE/RL Armenia Report*. 2 March.
- Khachatryan, Ruzanna. 2006c. "Opposition Party Says Office Closure Has Paralyzed Its Work." *RFE/RL Armenia Report* 24 March.
- Khutsidze, Nino. 2004. "Georgia: A Jarring Relationship No More" *Transitions Online*. 21 June.
- Knight, Amy. 2000. "The Enduring Legacy of the KGB in Russian Politics." *Problems of Post-Communism*, Jul/Aug2000, Vol. 47 Issue 4, 3-16.

- Kopstein, Jeffrey S. and David A. Reilly. 2000. "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World." *World Politics* 53, No. 1 (October): 1-37.
- Korzhakov, Aleksandr. 1997. *Boris El'tsin: Ot rassveta do zakata*. Interbuk: Moscow.
- Kostikov, Viacheslav. 1997. *Roman s prezidentom*. Moskva, Vagrius.
- Kozakavich, Michael Joseph. 1996. "Intelligence Agencies: The Skeleton in the Russian President's Closet." *Transition*. November pp. 14-18.
- Krickus, Richard. 1997. *Showdown: The Lithuanian Rebellion and the Breakup of the Soviet Empire*. Washington: Brassey's.
- Kryshtanovskaia, Ol'ga. 2005. *Anatomiia rossiiskoi elity*. Moskva: Zakharov.
- Kryshtanovskaya, Olga and Stephen White "Putin's Militocracy" *Post-Soviet Affairs*. vol. 19, No. 4 pp. 289-306.
- Kudrytski, Alyaksandr. 2005. "Belarus: Alyaksandr vs. Alyaksandr" *Transitions Online*. 10 October.
- Kulikov, Anatolii. 2002. *Tiazhelie zvezdy*. "Voina i Mir": Moscow.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. "Ukraine's Orange Revolution: THE OPPOSITION'S ROAD TO SUCCESS." *Journal of Democracy*. April. Pp. 117-130.
- Lenin, V. I. 1975. "The State and Revolution." in *The Lenin Anthology*. ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: Norton) pp.??.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April): 51-65.
- Libaridian, Gerard J. 1999. *The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking Since Independence*. Blue Crane Books Watertown MA.
- Maksymiuk, Jan. 2004a. "LUKASHENKA ANNOUNCES REFERENDUM TO EXTEND HIS RULE." *RFE/RL Belarus Ukraine report*. 9 September.
- Maksymiuk, Jan. 2004b. "EU WARNS AGAINST UNFAIR PRESIDENTIAL REFERENDUM -- BUT TO WHAT AVAIL?" *RFE/RL Belarus Ukraine report*. 15 September.
- Marples, David. 1998. *Belarus: A Denationalized Nation (Postcommunist States and Nations)*. Harwood Academic Publishers.
- Magdashian, Petr. 2001. "Armenia: The Teflon President: Opposition parties accuse Robert Kocharian of untold number of wrongdoings - to no avail." *CRS No. 100*, 5 October.
- Malkasian, Mark. 1996. "*Gha-ra-bagh!*" *The Emergence of the National Democratic Movement in Armenia*. Wayne State Press: Detroit.
- Masih, Joseph R. and Robert Krikorian. 1999. *Armenia at the Crossroads*. Harwood Academic Publishers.
- McFaul, Michael. 1997. *Russia's 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics*. Hoover Institute Press: Stanford, CA.
- McFaul, Michael. 2001. *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*. Cornell University Press.
- McFaul, Michael. 2002. "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World." *World Politics*. 54: 2.
- McFaul, Michael. 2005a. "Transitions from Postcommunism." *Journal of Democracy* 16.3 (July) 5-19

- McFaul, Michael. 2005b. "American Efforts at Promoting Regime Change in the Soviet Union and then Russia: Lessons Learned." APSA Washington DC 2-4 September 2005.
- McFaul, Michael and Nikolai Petrov. 1998. *Almanakh Rossii*. Carnegie: Moscow.
- McFaul, Michael and Nikolai Petrov "What the elections tell us" JoD 15.3 July 2004, pp. 20-31.
- McGlinchey, Eric M. 2003. "Paying for Patronage: Regime Change in Post-Soviet Central Asia" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2003)
- Minasian, Liana. 1999. "THE ROLE OF THE ARMY IN ARMENIA'S POLITICS." CRS, No. 5, 4 November.
- Mitchell, Lincoln. 2004. "Georgia's Rose Revolution" *Current History* vol. 103, pp. 342-8.
- Mitiaev, V. G. 1998. "Vnutripoliticheskie protsessy v nezavisimoi Armenii." in E. M. Kozhokina ed. *Armenia: Problemy Nezavisimogo Razvitiia*. Moscow: RISI. Pp. 73-138.
- Mkrtchian, Nerses. 1999. "The Place and the Role of Parliamentary Elections in the Process of Establishment of Democratic Practices in Armenia. The Peculiarities of the 1999 Parliamentary Elections." <http://www.forum.am/groups/pol/mat/17.doc>.
- Mlechin, Leonid. 2002. *KGB: Predsedateli organov gosbezopasnosti rassekrechenye sud'by*. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf.
- Moran, John P. 1999. "Praetorians or Professionals? Democratization and Military Intervention in Communist and Post-Communist Russia." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*. vol. 15, no. 2, June, pp. 41-68.
- Morrison, John. 1991. *Boris Yeltsin: From Bolshevik to Democrat*. Penguin: New York.
- Mukhin, A. 2002. *Kto est Mister Putin I kto s nim prishel?* Gnom I D. Moscow.
- Myagkov, Mikhail and Peter Ordeshook. 2001. "The Trail of votes in Russia's 1999 Duma and 2000 Presidential elections." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. 34, 353-70.
- Nelson, Joan M. and Stephanie J. Eglinton. 1992. *Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid?* Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council.
- Nesvetailova, Anastasia. 2002. "A Friend in Need... Or a Friend in Need? Russia and the Belarusian Economy." In A. Lewis ed. *The EU and Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels*. Federal Trust London, pp. 215-227.
- Nodia, Ghia. 2005. "Georgia 2004" in Karatnycky and Motyl eds. *Nations in Transit*. Freedom House: New York.
- ODIHR 2000a. *GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 31 OCTOBER & 14 NOVEMBER 1999 FINAL REPORT*. OSCE: Warsaw.
- ODIHR 2000b. *OSCE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 9 APRIL 2000 FINAL REPORT*. OSCE: Warsaw.
- ODIHR 2003. *GEORGIA: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2 November 2003 Election Observation Mission Report*. OSCE: Warsaw. Part 1.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1999. "Polyarchies and the (Un)rule of Law in Latin America: A Partial Conclusion." In Juan Mendez, O'Donnell, and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, eds. *The (Un)rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America*. pp: 303-338. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

- O'Neil, Philip. 2001. "Tbilisi Balancing Act: Shevardnadze is looking for a successor to maintain the balance of power between conservatives and reformers." CRS No. 105, 13 November.
- Ortung, Robert and Scott Parrish "?????" Transition, 2, 26 13 December 1996.
- Perepelitsa, Hrihoriy. 1999. "Belarusian-Russian Integration and Its Impact on the Security of Ukraine." in Garnett and Legvold eds. *Belarus at the Crossroads*. Carnegie Endowment 1999, pp. 81-103.
- Petrosian, Susanna. 2003. "Armenian Election Clash Looms: Government and opposition are set on a collision course following the disputed first round of Armenia's presidential election." CRS No.168, 27-Feb-03.
- Petrov, Nikolai and Darrell Slider. 2005. "Putin and the Regions." In D. Herspring ed. *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*. Rowman and Littlefield: Boulder, CO, pp. 237-258.
- Peuch, Jean-Christophe. 2004. GEORGIA: CRITICS SAY POLICE VIOLENCE, MEDIA INTIMIDATION ON THE RISE." Eurasia Insight. 20 February.
- Pevehouse, Jon C. 2005. *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Poptsov, Oleg. 2001. *Khronika vremen 'Tsaria Borisa' Rossiia, Kreml'*. Sovershenno Sekretno: Moscow.
- Pridham, Geoffrey, ed. 1991. *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- Remington, Thomas. 1996. "Menage a Trois: The End of Soviet Parliamentarism." In Jeffrey Hahn ed. *Democratization in Rusiia: The Development of Legislative Institutions*. M. E. Sharpe: Armonk, New York. pp. 106-140.
- Remington, Thomas. 2003. "Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federation Council since 2000." EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 55, No. 5, 667-691.
- Riker, William H. 1982. *Liberalism against Populism*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.
- Rochowanski, Almut. 2004. "EU EXTENDS COOPERATION WITH GEORGIA, BUT EXPRESSES CAUTION ON ACCESSION ISSUE." Eurasia Insight. 17 June.
- Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53, No. 3 (April): 325-361.
- Rutland, Peter. 1994. "Democracy and Nationalism in Armenia", Europe-Asia Studies, 46, no. 5 pp.???
- Ryabov, Andrei. 2004. "Legislative-Executive Relations." In McFaul, Petrov, and Ryabov eds. *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*. Carnegie Washington DC, pp. 83-104.
- Saghabalian, Anna. 2005. "Armenian Referendum Was Rigged, Says Government Official." *Liberty Armenia/RFE/RL* 28 December.
- Simonian, Hovann. 2000. "Armenia: Pessimistic Stability." *Transitions Online*. 15 January.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1996. "The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies." In Laurence Whitehead, ed. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schroder, Hans-Henning. 1999. "El'tsin and the Oligarchs: The Role of Financial Industrial Groups in Russian Politics Between 1993 and July 1998." *Europe-Asia Studies*. Vol. 51, no. 6, 957-988.

- Selznick, Philip. 1960. *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Shevtsova, Lilia. 1999. *Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Realities*. Carnegie: Washington, DC.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir. 2001. *A Normal Totalitarian Society: How the Soviet Union Functioned and How it Collapsed*. M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, NY.
- Silitski, Vitali. 2003a. "The Fall of the Patriarch?" *RFE/RL Belarus Ukraine Report*. 3 May.
- Silitski, Vitali. 2003b. "What are the Consequences of the Russian 'Gas Attack'?" *RFE/RL Belarus Ukraine Report*. 23 September.
- Silitski, Vitali. 2004. "DOES ARREST OF FORMER MINISTER SIGNAL A MAJOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGN?" *RFE/RL Belarus Ukraine Report*, 11 May.
- Silitski, Vitali. 2004b. "MINSK SIGNS GAS SUPPLY DEAL WITH GAZPROM" *RFE/RL Belarus Ukraine Report*. 15 June.
- Silitski, Vitali. 2006. "Contagion Deterred: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union (the Case of Belarus)" Presented at the conference, "Waves and Troughs of Post Communist Transitions: What Role for Domestic vs. External Variables?" Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University. 28 and 29 April.
- Slater, Dan. 2003. "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia." *Comparative Politics* 36, No. 1 (October): 81-101.
- Sleivyte, Janine. 2004. "Putin's Regime and Consolidation of the State" *Baltic Defense Review*. no. 12 vol. 2, pp. 60-74
- Slider, Darrell. 1997. "Democratization in Georgia." In K. Dawisha and B. Parrott, *Conflict, cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Cambridge. pp. 156-198.
- Snyder, Richard. 1998. "Path out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives." In Houchang E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds. *Sultanistic Regimes*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Sobyanin, Alexander. 1994. "Political Cleavages Among Russian Deputies." in T. Remington ed. *Parliaments in Transition*, Boulder, Westview Press, pp. 181-215.
- Sobianin, A. A. and V. G. Sukhovol'skii. 1995. *Demokratiia Ogranichennaia Fal'sifikatsiiami*. Moscow.
- Solovei, Valery. 1996. "Strategies of the main presidential candidates" *Demokratizatsiya* vol. 4, no. 3.
- Stefes, Christoph H. 2005? "Elites, Civil Society, and Foreign Assistance: Georgia's Rose Revolution in Comparative Perspective" **where published???**
- Stokke, Olav ed. 1995. *Aid and Political Conditionality*. London: Frank Cass/EADI.
- Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn. 2001. "W(h)ither the Central State? The Regional Sources of Russia's Stalled Reforms." Unpublished manuscript, Princeton University.
- Stepanian, Ruzanna and Karine Kalantarian. 2005. "More Activists Detained Ahead of Next Opposition Rally." *Liberty Armenia/RFE/RL* 7 December.
- Sukhanov, Lev. 1992. *Tri goda s El'tsinom: zapiski pervogo pomoshchnika*, Riga: Vaga.
- Talbott, Strobe. 2002. *Russia Hand*. New York: Knopf.
- Thompson, Mark R. 2001. "To shoot or Not to Shoot: Posttotalitarianism in China and Eastern Europe." *Comparative Politics*. October, pp. 63-83.
- Thompson, Mark R. and Philip Kuntz 2004. "Stolen Elections: the Case of the Serbian October," *Journal of Democracy* vol. 15, no. 4 (October), pp. 159-172.

- Thompson, Mark R. and Philip Kuntz. 2005. "More than Just the Final Straw: Stolen Elections as Revolutionary Triggers." Paper to be presented at the conference "Authoritarian Regimes: Conditions for Stability and Change" Swedish Institute, Istanbul, May 29-31.
- TOL. 2004. "Georgia: Georgia's Yeltsin?" *Transitions Online*. 29 March.
- Troxel, Tiffany A. 2003. *Parliamentary Power in Russia, 1994-2001* Palgrave New York.
- Tucker, Josh. 2005. "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and the "2nd Wave" of Post-Communist Democratic Revolutions" ms Princeton University.
- Vachudova, Milada. 2005. *Europe Undivided*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- van der Schriek, Daan. 2004. "SAKASHVILI'S FIRST 100 DAYS: BLOOM STILL ON REFORMS, BUT CRITICS VOICE CONCERN." *Eurasia Insight*. 10 May.
- Way, Lucan. 2002. "Pluralism by Default in Moldova." *Journal of Democracy* 13.4 (October) 127-141.
- Way, Lucan. 2005a. "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave." *World Politics*. 57, 2 (January) 231-261.
- Way, Lucan. 2005b. "Kuchma's Failed Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy*. 16, 2 (April), 131-145.
- Way, Lucan. 2006. "Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Political Competition in the Former Soviet Union." University of Toronto ms.
- Welt, Cory. 2000. "A Return to Eurasia" TOL 11 January.
- Welt, Cory. 2005. "Causes of the Rose Revolution and Lessons for Democracy Assistance." MSI/USAID, March.
- Whitehead, Laurence, ed. 1996a. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wheatley, Jonathan. 2004. "ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: THE CASE OF GEORGIA." Free University of Berlin.  
[http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/cscca/Publications/boi\\_jw\\_elections\\_and\\_democratic\\_governance.pdf](http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/cscca/Publications/boi_jw_elections_and_democratic_governance.pdf)
- Wheatley book
- Wheatley dissertation
- Yeltsin, Boris. 1994. *The Struggle for Russia*. Random House: New York.
- Zakarian, Armen. 2005 "ARMENIAN WAR VETERANS CREATE NEW UNION" *RFE/RL Caucasus Report*. 11 February.



## Appendix: Measuring Incumbent Capacity:

### Appendix: Measuring Incumbent Capacity:

#### **PARTY**

##### **Scope**

<i>High</i>	Extensive mass membership; organizational penetration into virtually all population centers, civil society
<i>Medium</i>	relatively low mass membership; organization in major population centers
<i>Low</i>	no mass membership; little or no organization outside of capital

##### **Cohesion**

<i>High</i>	Single party; organized patronage; "something else" (history of struggle, salient ideology, ethnicity)
<i>Medium</i>	organized patronage; single party; no "something else"
<i>Low</i>	little or no systematic patronage; no single party; no "something else"

#### **STATE**

##### **Scope**

<i>High</i>	Extensive, specialized and well funded and trained security and surveillance apparatus
<i>Medium</i>	Minimal security presence throughout country; no evidence of serious "brown areas"
<i>Low</i>	Extensive "brown areas"; serious underfunding for security apparatus;

##### **Cohesion**

<i>High</i>	Past history of successful conflict (war, revolution, counter-insurgency); ethnic, kin or other ties between incumbent and coercive apparatus
<i>Medium</i>	No open disobedience but no past success in conflict/ties
<i>Low</i>	Extensive and open insubordination by state officials (i.e. open rebellion; attempted coups, etc.)

##### **Discretionary economic control**

<i>High</i>	Little or no private sector; de facto centralized control over economy
<i>Medium</i>	Large private sector; but numerous informal and ad hoc levers of state intervention

*Low*

Large private sector; de facto protection of  
property rights

To come up with an overall incumbent capacity score, party and state capacity are each combined into separate scores and then added up into a single score.