The Domestic Context of the Alliances: The Politics of Tokyo

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The Domestic Context of the Alliances: Tokyo Domestic Politics

Akihiko Tanaka

It is now almost a cliché to say that domestic politics and foreign policy are closely connected.[1] Yet however trite this expression, nonetheless it is true. Japan's international behavior and particularly its security policy cannot be fully understood without analyzing its domestic politics. In post–World War II Japan, security policy has been the dominant theme of domestic politics and source of ideological divide.[2]

Once one starts to take domestic conditions into account, however, one is immediately reminded of the fact that no ready-made theories exist. Traditional decision-making "models" such as Graham Allison's "organization process" model or the "bureaucratic politics" model are limited to offering some useful concepts, categories, and heuristic hypotheses. The recently more popular "two-level games" approach remains in the same theoretical state; that is, it too is limited to offering useful concepts such as "win-sets" and some tentative hypotheses.[3]

This paper is informed by no path-breaking theoretical ideas. I would like to offer a fairly straightforward attempt to describe and, hopefully, explain the impact of Japan's domestic politics on the alliance between Japan and the United States. My theoretical categories are quite mundane: actors with their preferences and their power resources, issues, and emerging patterns of politics. Essentially, my analysis is reduced to the following three questions. First, who are the relevant political actors in Japan that affect the alliance with the United States? What are their policy preferences with respect to the U.S. alliance? What resources does each actor utilize when it interacts with the others? Second, what are the domestic political issues with regard to the Japan-U.S. alliance? What aspects of the alliance become political issues that excite domestic politics? Third, what kind of pattern of politics emerges out of the interaction of various actors on various issues?[4]

Actors[5]

Prime Ministers[6]

The prime minister is the head of Japan's government. There is no question about his importance in alliance policy as well as any other national or international policy. But he is not as independent as the U.S. president. As the Japanese Constitution stipulates, "Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet," not in a prime minister. Contrast this with the U.S. Constitution, which says that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States." Thus, it is the Cabinet, not the prime minister, that is tasked to "conduct affairs of state," "manage foreign affairs," "conclude treaties," and perform other functions; "The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet." This stipulation has been interpreted to mean that Cabinet decisions must be unanimous; if one member of the Cabinet dissents, he is able to stop a measure that the prime minister wants to adopt.[7]

The prime minister under the current Constitution, however, is more powerful than the prime minister under the Meiji Constitution; he has the power to appoint and dismiss the ministers of state who constitute the Cabinet. Theoretically, this capability could enable the prime minister to be all-powerful, since anyone in the Cabinet who does not follow the prime minister's opinions can be dismissed. The principle of unanimity of Cabinet decisions could always be realized legally as long as the prime minister is willing to dismiss members of the Cabinet who do not follow him. In practice, however, this power is not easy to use.[8] First, the Constitution stipulates that the majority of Cabinet members be selected from the members of the Diet. In practice, almost all members are selected from the members of the Diet. In the case of the Obuchi Cabinet that was established in early August, 1998, of the twenty-one members of the Cabinet everyone except Taichi Sakaiya, director general of the Economic Planning Agency, is either a representative or a councilor. Even if they are dismissed as ministers of state, they retain their positions as representatives or councilors; their dismissal could have immediate political repercussions in the Diet, on which the Cabinet depends for the passage of various bills. They are not like members of the Cabinet in the United States, whom the president can select and dismiss mostly on the basis of merit. The prime minister could dismiss Cabinet members more easily if he were by far the most powerful leader in the ruling party, which theoretically he should be. There is nothing legal to prevent him from assuming such power in the ruling party. But in practice the presidents of the Liberal Democratic Party have never achieved such overwhelming power over individual Diet members. The support of the current president, though useful, has never been crucial for Diet members' election campaigns. Though Britain has a parliamentary system, British prime ministers have more power over the members of the parliament of the ruling party.[9]

These limitations sometimes create the impression that the prime minister is not at all important. In a coalition government, the limitations become far more significant. The plight of Tomiichi Murayama is a case in point. Murayama, a left-wing leader of the Social Democratic Party of Japan, immediately after his most unexpected assumption of the prime minister's position in July 1994 had to declare that he considered the Self-Defense Forces constitutional and that he strongly adhered to the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. If a prime minister from the Social Democratic Party, which had been insisting that the SDF were unconstitutional and waging strong opposition to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, changes his

position in order to maintain his Cabinet, certainly the role of prime minister is terribly limited.[10]

In addition to these legal as well as political constraints, there are organizational constraints. The size of the prime minister's support staff has long been regarded as small (179 in total). The most important figure in his support staff is the chief Cabinet secretary, usually selected from the same faction as the prime minister (in the case of the LDP government), who is charged with coordinating policies and politics between the government and the ruling and opposition parties. Some previous chief Cabinet secretaries were influential in foreign policy and alliance relations, for example Masaharu Gotoda,[11] but this post is filled mainly with consideration for domestic political reasons. There are two deputy chief Cabinet secretaries: one selected from the ranks of experienced career civil servants and the other from the fairly young and promising politicians of the ruling party. The deputy chief Cabinet secretary is regarded as the highest-ranking position in the entire Japanese bureaucracy and often represents the "continuity" of the Japanese government. For example, in the 1990s Japan has had seven prime ministers, but only two administrative deputy chief Cabinet secretaries: Nobuo Ishihara and Teijiro Furukawa. Ishihara served seven prime ministers as deputy chief Cabinet secretary from November 1987 to February 1995.[12] Like chief Cabinet secretaries, deputy chief Cabinet secretaries are essentially specialists in domestic affairs; most of them have been bureaucrats of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Health and Welfare, and National Police Agency (i.e., ministries and agencies descended from the prewar *Naimu-sho*—Ministry of Internal Affairs). But as the most senior and experienced civil servant, the administrative deputy chief Cabinet secretary could be critical in coordinating policies related to the management of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Closer to day-to-day affairs, prime ministers are supported by "political secretaries" in charge of prime ministers' activities as "politicians," that is, management of their contacts with other politicians as well as their constituencies; and four policy-related "secretaries" seconded from the four important ministries: the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Ministry of Police, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). They are generally those bureaucrats between the rank of division head (*kacho*) and deputy director general of a bureau (*shingikan*). Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto appointed a "secretary" seconded from MITI, Kenji Eda, as his "political secretary"; Eda acted more as an immediate policy adviser to Hashimoto than as an intermediary between Hashimoto and other politicians. Prime Minister Obuchi appointed Toshitaka Furukawa, his longtime Diet "secretary," as his "political secretary."[13] In 1996, it was decided that up to three posts of advisor to the prime minister would be created. Yukio Okamoto, a prominent diplomat-turned-consultant, was appointed as an advisor specially tasked to deal with the Okinawa base issues.

The prime minister's Secretariat (*Naikaku Kanbo*) is the organization tasked to support prime ministers' general activities. As a result of criticism of the Cabinet Secretariat for being weak in coordinating policies, especially foreign and security policies, new offices were created in 1986: the Councilor's Office for External Affairs (*Gaisei Shingi Shitu*) and the Office of Security Affairs (*Anzen Hosho Shitsu*). The head of the former has always been selected from senior MOFA officials, roughly the rank of director general of bureaus; the latter from the Defense Agency, about the same rank as the former. The head of the Councilor's Office for External Affairs, however, has often been charged with carrying out foreign-policy-related measures that involve other ministries, such as the "comfort women" issue, Okinawa base issues, overseas development assistance, and economic friction arising from government procurement. In other words, except in the case of the Okinawa base issues, the Councilor's

Office for External Affairs does not deal directly with alliance management. The Office of Security Affairs is the secretariat of the Security Council, which makes basic decisions on Japan's security policy such as the revision of the National Defense Program Outline and the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. In addition to its function as secretariat of the Security Council, the Office of Security Affairs is now charged with crisis management under the leadership of the Cabinet crisis management officer (*Naikaku Kiki Kanrikan*), a post created after the Peru hostage crisis; the name of the office was changed to the Office of Security Affairs and Crisis Management (*Naikaku Anzen Hosho Kiki Kanri Shitsu*).[14] The Cabinet Intelligence and Investigation Office has existed since 1952 under various names and is obligated to provide necessary information to prime ministers; its head is usually selected from senior Police officials. A Cabinet Information Integration Center was created within the office in 1996 mainly to facilitate information collection in times of crisis. The Councilor's Office for External Affairs is essentially a MOFA branch in the Cabinet and the Office of Security Affairs a Japan Defense Agency branch. In this sense, it is doubtful that prime ministers utilize these offices much for their own policy initiatives and coordination independent of their respective ministries.

Despite these constraints, however, the prime minister is the single most important individual in Japan's domestic politics and in the management of the Japan-U.S. alliance. First, there is no political actor other than the prime minister able to mobilize resources of multiple ministries for common objectives. To the extent that management of the alliance requires involvement of various ministries, the prime minister's leadership is essential. Second, when there is opposition or reluctance on the part of important ministries and agencies, the prime minister is the only person able to make a decision. For example, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone decided to increase Japan's defense budget despite the reluctance of the Finance Ministry. According to Nakasone's diary entry of December 30, 1982, "Defense budget was troubled. I ordered Mr. Yamaguchi, Director General of the Budget Bureau, to make a 6.5 percent increase. He showed reluctance but I ordered them to revise [their plan]. He looked stiff and pale but I pushed him."[15] Third, in a negative fashion, a prime minister's passive attitude toward the alliance can cause alliance relations to lose sight of their direction. In 1982, when Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki virtually retracted the statement of "alliance relations" (*domei kankei*) by saying that the "alliance relations" did not have "military implications," he caused tremendous confusion in the relations between the two countries. But the person who resigned to take responsibility for the "confusion" was the then foreign minister Masayoshi Ito, rather than the prime minister who revealed his ignorance of or lack of interest in the alliance. Prime ministers can make a difference both positively and negatively.

Still, various incidents in the mid-1990s, including the Korean peninsula crisis of 1994, the Kobe earthquake, the urban terrorism of Aum Shinrikyo, and the Peru hostage crisis, led to charges that Cabinet decision-making is deficient and hobbles the prime minister's leadership. Based on the recommendation of the Administrative Reform Council issued in late 1997, the Diet passed in March 1998 the Basic Law for the Reform of Central Government Ministries and Agencies, which calls for strengthening the power of the prime minister and the functions of the Cabinet Secretariat in addition to reducing the number of ministries and agencies. If all necessary implementing bills are passed (they are expected to pass the Diet in 1999), the prime minister will be given explicit legal authority to propose basic policies to the Cabinet meeting and more flexibility in staffing the Cabinet Secretariat. The new system is planned to take effect on January 1, 2001.

The Bureaucracy

The reverse of the relative weakness of the prime minister is the relative strength and independence of the bureaucracy. Relevant ministries and agencies in the discussion of the Japan-U.S. alliance include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Agency, Cabinet Legislation Bureau, Finance Ministry, and MITI.

It used to be the case that the Japan-U.S. alliance was virtually dominated by the Security Division of the North American Bureau. Not just alliance management but security policy in general was made by this single division, said a Foreign Ministry official in a boastful moment. In this view, the Defense Agency was regarded as merely an implementing agency for the Self-Defense Forces. The decline of the Security Division began in the mid-1970s, when the first National Defense Program Outline and Japan-U.S. Guidelines for Defense Cooperation were put forth.[16] Serious thinking about defense planning within the context of changing international relations was beginning in the Defense Agency roughly at the time of defense vice ministers Takuya Kubo and Ko Maruyama.

However, it was in the 1990s when bureaucratic decision-making concerning the Japan-U.S. alliance expanded its arena. In 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was partially reorganized and a Foreign Policy Bureau (*Sogo Gaiko Seisaku Kyoku*) created. It is responsible for "the planning of basic and middle- or long-term foreign policy from wider points of view and the coordination of policies formulated by other bureaus. Special emphasis will be put on national security issues and issues related to the United Nations."[17] The center of alliance policy is still the North American Bureau and its Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division. But the emergence of the Foreign Policy Bureau seems to have created an environment within the ministry to discuss alliance issues in a wider perspective.

In the Defense Agency, some significant changes have been taking place, including an increase in the number of bureaucrats and SDF officials who have significant overseas experience. An increasing number of JDA and SDF officials have received graduate education in the United States, creating a basis on which the agency can communicate more directly not only with the Pentagon but with a wide audience in the United States.[18]

In analyzing Japan's security policy, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau should not be overlooked.[19] It is responsible for providing legal opinions on various matters to government agencies and judging the legal consistency and constitutionality of laws and treaties that the Cabinet proposes to the Diet. This office provides the most authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. Obviously, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of any constitutional disputes. But in many instances involving security issues, the Supreme Court is reluctant to produce its own judgment because of the "highly political nature" of the issues. As a result, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is virtually the single most important legal actor in any decision-making in Japan.

Particularly relevant to the Japan-U.S. alliance is its interpretation of the constitutionality of the right of collective self-defense. This issue will be discussed in more detail later. Suffice it here to point out that whenever the issue of the right of collective self-defense arises, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is nearly automatically involved. The head of this bureau is generally a career civil servant. Therefore the prime minister, theoretically speaking, can dismiss him if he does not offer interpretations pleasing to the prime minister. But the postwar custom has been such that it is more difficult for prime ministers to intervene in appointments to posts occupied by career civil servants. Furthermore, the power of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau resides in its highly meticulous pursuit of legal consistency; a frivolous change of a

certain part of a constitutional interpretation may destroy the entire structure of the government interpretation. The prime minister who orders the Legislation Bureau to change a part of the government interpretation does so at the risk of a major confusion in the Diet; inconsistency of legal interpretation is the single easiest pretext for the opposition to stall an entire Diet session.

Other ministries can be very important in alliance management. MOF is crucial if anything monetary is involved. MITI is important if trade relations are implicated and if major procurement of weapons is involved. The other ministries and agencies rarely appear in the game of alliance politics. But as the discussion of the new defense guidelines indicates, virtually all ministries and agencies have something to do with the alliance in the event of an emergency as well as in case of contingencies in "areas surrounding Japan" that affect Japan's security.

Finally, a few words on the roles of politicians in the bureaucracy, that is the roles of ministers (*daijin*) and state secretaries (*seimu jikan*). The post of foreign minister is regarded as one of the most important of Cabinet posts. The post of director general of the Defense Agency (Defense Minister) has long been considered a rather minor post for a fairly inexperienced middle-level politician. Although there are some signs that more importance is being attached to the office of Defense Minister, no clear indication is as yet evident. One of the more important developments over the last few years was the elevation of the position of state secretaries for foreign affairs. *Seimu jikan* was translated as "parliamentary vice minister" in contrast to *jimu jikan*, administrative vice minister. *Jimu jikan*, as everyone familiar with Japan's bureaucracy knows, is the highest-ranking position among career civil servants in a ministry and hence is regarded as the substantively most powerful figure in the ministry, more powerful in many instances than the minister. In contrast with the power of *jimu jikan*, *seimu jikan* is often likened to an appendix, which exists but performs no particular function. Until quite recently, most *seimu jikan* posts were filled by fairly junior politicians. But the appointment of Masahiko Komura as *seimu jikan* for foreign affairs during the Hashimoto Cabinet was a departure from the norm. Komura had served as a director general of the Science and Technology Agency, a minister of state position. In order to accommodate such a big shot (*omono*), the MOFA changed the English translation of *seimu jikan* to "state secretary for foreign affairs" to indicate that this post is almost equivalent to a member of the Cabinet. The same pattern was followed in the current Obuchi Cabinet. Nobutaka Machimura, former education minister and a prime minister hopeful, was appointed state secretary for foreign affairs. And for that matter, when Obuchi became prime minister, Komura took Obuchi's position to become foreign minister. Furthermore, a second state minister for foreign affairs was added, reflecting another new tendency. In the past, each ministry had only one *seimu jikan*; now, under the Obuchi administration, MOFA and MOF have two *seimu jikan*. The second state secretary, Keizo Takemi, seems to follow the previous pattern because he is a first-term councilor. But Takemi is well known for his foreign-policy expertise, as his previous career was professor of international politics at Tokai University. These new developments in the position of *seimu jikan* clearly show that at least people like Komura, Machimura, and Takemi are no longer dismissed as simple "appendixes." How much influence they wield remains to be seen, however.

The proposed reforms under the auspices of the Basic Law for the Reform of Central Government Ministries and Agencies are in line with the move to strengthen the positions of political appointees in the bureaucracy. Instead of *seimu jikan*, the current government bill proposes to create three posts of *fuku daijin* (deputy ministers) and three posts of *seimukan* (political officers) in the Foreign Ministry. How the titles of these posts will be translated into

English is yet to be finalized ("deputy ministers" and "political officers" are my direct translations). But *fuku daijin* are conceived of as posts comparable to British "ministers not in the Cabinet" and *seimukan* as posts comparable to previous *seimu jikan,* posts for junior politicians. In any case, once this plan is realized, seven political appointees will be sent to the Foreign Ministry, which could have significant implications for decision-making. With the seven political appointees at the higher echelon of the ministry, it will be more difficult for career diplomats to dominate decision-making. How this new system will work out remains to be seen.

Parties

Since the collapse of the so-called 1955 year system in 1993, politics in Japan have been in flux. The only political parties that have so far survived the last five years and maintained their party identities are the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP). The Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) is no longer the previous Socialist Party. Morihiro Hosokawa's New Party of Japan no longer exists. Nor does the grand coalition of Ichiro Ozawa, the New Frontier Party. Currently the largest opposition party is the Democratic Party of Japan, which was formed quite hastily in March 1998 to join the previous Democratic Party of Naoto Kan and Yukio Hatoyama with various splinter groups of the former New Frontier Party. In the House of Councilors election in July 1998, the Democratic Party gained the most while the LDP could not maintain its previous seats.

Table 1

Strength of Political Parties in the Diet		
	Lower House (as of July 28, 1998)	Upper House (as of July 27, 1998)
Liberal Democratic Party	263	106
Democratic Party of Japan	92	55
Peace and Reform Network	47	—
Liberal Party	40	12
Japanese Communist Party	26	23
Social Democratic Party	14	14
Komei	—	24
Others	16	18
Vacancies	2	0
MEMBERSHIP	500	252

In terms of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the Communist Party has the clearest policy: it wants to abolish the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. What is unclear in the JCP's policy, as in the case of the policy of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which insisted on an "unarmed neutrality," is the security policy of Japan after the abolishment of the U.S. alliance. The party documents released before the July Upper House election promised that "along with the abolishment of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty," the Communist Party "will make a fundamental arms reduction of the SDF and get rid of the SDF's dependence on the United States. We will make sure that SDF staff follow the Constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people and adhere to political neutrality as civil servants. After a national consensus is formed, we will implement Article 9 completely and dissolve the SDF."[20] What is unclear, of course, is what the Communists do after the dissolution of the SDF.

Virtually all other important parties support the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Now that the SDPJ and the LDP have parted as coalition partners, the SDPJ has begun to show characteristics similar to those it had before the Murayama Cabinet. But still its "Basic Principles and Policy Agenda," released before the Upper House election, declares that the SDPJ will "contribute to building confidence among countries of the Asia-Pacific region and develop a mutually interdependent framework for Asia, whilst maintaining the Security Treaty with the USA."[21] The Democratic Party, the biggest winner in the Upper House election, is more straightforward; its "Basic Policies" states that "We will continue to place the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security at the center of our national security policy."[22] Komei, a descendant of the previous Komeito, may hold a swing position in the Upper House because of the defeat of the LDP in the July election. Its exact security policy is not clear but its Priority Policies released in December 1994 admit that "the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is contributing to the peace and stability of Japan and in the Asia-Pacific region and it should be maintained in the future."[23] In late 1998, it renamed itself again to become Komeito and joined with the Lower House's Peace and Reform Network, another descendant of the previous Komeito. (The political arms of the Sokagakkai, a Buddhist sect, originally grouped in Komeito and disbanded in 1994 for political convenience, have now regrouped under the same name.) The small Liberal Party headed by Ichiro Ozawa is clearly in support of the Japan-U.S. alliance; its basic policy stresses the necessity of improving "the operations of the Japan-U.S. alliance based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty."[24]

The LDP's support of the Japan-U.S. alliance is obvious; the LDP led Japan's foreign and security policy for most of the time since the formation of the alliance. Concerning the significance of the alliance in the post–Cold War era, the LDP produced a detailed report in March 1996, prepared by its Security Research Council, entitled "The Current Importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements." It lists justifications for the existence of the alliance: first, the alliance is "indispensable to Japan's security" because of the "unpredictable and uncertain" situation surrounding Japan after the end of the Cold War. "The Japan-U.S. security arrangements have become more indispensable to Japan than to the United States as the danger of all-out confrontation against the former Soviet Union has been drastically decreased with the end of the U.S.-Soviet conflict."[25] Second, the report argues that the alliance is "indispensable for the peace and stability in the Far East and Asia Pacific region." Third, the report points out the "indispensability" of the alliance for "Japanese diplomacy" because the alliance forms the "basis" of sound Japan-U.S. relations.

When it comes to concrete problems and issues, however, the political parties generally in support of the alliance, including even the LDP, show potentially significant differences. One possible area of difference is the scope and degree of Japan's cooperation with the U.S. mili-

tary in case of contingencies other than attacks on Japan. No political parties openly advocate the revision of the government interpretation of the Constitution with respect to the collective self-defense right. But there are quite a few LDP members who suggest it is necessary to change the government interpretation so that Japan can resort to a full range of self-defense options, whether collective or individual, as stipulated in the UN charter (Section 51) and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In their opinion, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to cooperate meaningfully with the U.S. military in such contingencies without changing the government's interpretation of the constitutionality of the collective self-defense right. The LDP is not at all unanimous on this issue, however. Quite a few influential LDP leaders such as Kiichi Miyazawa and Masaharu Gotoda do not support the revision. They are reluctant to expand the scope of cooperation with the United States.

Contrary to the image widely held in Japan and abroad, Ozawa's Liberal Party argues that the only occasion on which Japan should use military forces is if Japan is attacked by military forces and that Japan "should not resort to the threat or use of forces in other circumstances even under the justifications of the right to self-defense, whether individual or collective."[26] The Democratic Party upholds the necessity of adhering to the same principles that have governed postwar security policy, "such as an exclusively defensive military doctrine, no exercise of the right of collective self-defense, the Three Non-nuclear Principles, no use of force abroad, and civilian control."[27] Komeito shares a similar view with the Democrats. In a way, these three opposition parties are quite conservative in their security and alliance policies. The general impression, however, is that the Liberal Party would be most supportive of the alliance in the event of an emergency; it is hard to judge how much solidarity exists in the Democratic Party, as there is a wide disparity of views between former LDP members and former JSP members within the current Democratic Party.

The focus of party politics surrounding the Japan-U.S. alliance in 1999 was the fate of the implementing bills of the Japan-U.S. Guidelines. Since the LDP did not have a majority in the Upper House, it needed other parties' support to pass any bill. In early January, the LDP struck a deal with the Liberal Party to form a coalition government. This was a move to strengthen the LDP's position for maneuvers in the Diet but was insufficient to secure passage of bills in the Upper House because the LDP and Liberal Party combined still did not reach a majority there. The LDP courted Komeito by cooperating to realize policies that Komeito desired in areas other than defense[28] and agreed to accept some amendments of the implementing bills of the guidelines that Komeito demanded. In the end, the LDP, the Liberal Party, and Komeito joined forces to pass the bills in the Diet in May 1999. The Democratic Party opposed one of the three bills, the bill addressing "situations in areas surrounding Japan," mainly because it did not agree with the LDP/Liberal/Komeito on the role of the Diet.

The Media

The media participate in the domestic politics of the Japan-U.S. alliance in at least two ways: as distributors of opinions and as reporters of significant events. In terms of opinion, newspapers play the most important role in domestic politics. Currently, no major newspapers oppose outright the Japan-U.S. security relationship. However, as is well known, opinions among them differ. Generally speaking, the *Yomiuri*, *Nikkei*, and *Sankei* are more supportive of strengthening and widening the scope of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, while the *Mainichi* and *Asahi* are reluctant. Most noteworthy was the *Yomiuri's* campaign to revise the Constitution; in 1994 it published a proposal to revise the current Constitution, including Article 9. Its

proposed revision did not change the first paragraph of the current Article 9, which renounces the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes, but it explicitly admits that Japan can have means of self-defense. Furthermore, in 1995 the newspaper proposed an Outline of Comprehensive Security Policy which declares that Japan, as a sovereign nation, "has and can resort to individual and collective self-defense."[29]

Asahi, on the other hand, has consistently opposed revision of Article 9. It argues that Article 9 has contributed to "the postwar framework in which the nation does not attach privileged values to the military" and that revising it "runs against the trend of the times, doing more harm than good." *Asahi* also admits that despite Article 9, Japan has the right of self-defense, but it argues that the Constitution prohibits the exercise of this right. In this respect, *Asahi's* constitutional interpretation is virtually the same as that of the LDP government. But it calls for a reduction in the level of SDF forces as well as a review of the operations of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Although rearranging the Japan-U.S. security system should be accomplished gradually, concedes *Asahi*, "there are several measures to be immediately implemented"; they include reduction and removal of bases in Okinawa, review of "Japan-U.S. joint operations created under the assumption of the Cold War," and putting deployment and postures of the U.S. armed forces on the agenda of such multilateral frameworks as the ARF. [30]

Reporting of potentially significant events is the area where the television media seem to have more a more immediate impact on domestic politics than the print media. The influence of nightly news shows was especially notable after the Okinawa rape incident of September 1995. Since such influential anchorpersons as Hiroshi Kume and Tetsuya Chikushi revealed opinions quite similar to those of *Asahi*, the sentiment to show sympathy with Okinawans became quite strong.

Public Opinion

Public opinion has been quite supportive of the Japan-U.S. alliance for the last two decades. As Figure 1 indicates, in comparison with the late 1960s the number of Japanese who support the current combination, SDF and reliance on the U.S. alliance, increased in the 1980s and has continued to be high into the 1990s. The most recent poll, conducted in February 1997, indicated that 68.1 percent of the people support the current formula while 7.1 percent prefer a unilateral defense without alliance and 7.9 percent prefer reduced self-dense without alliance. This is much stronger support than in the later 1960s and early 1970s, when the current formula was supported only by about 41 percent while self-defense without alliance was supported by 11 percent and reduced defense without alliance by 16 percent.

A similar pattern can be seen in Figure 2; in February 1997, 69.4 percent considered the Japan-U.S. security arrangements to be either "valuable" or "more or less valuable." However, this figure indicates some recent trends that cannot be seen in Figure 1; it seems that what may be called "strong support" as opposed to "weak support" has declined since the mid-1980s. In the early 1980s, those who considered the alliance "valuable" numbered 30–34 percent while in the late 1990s this figure declined to 26 percent. The percentage of "weak support" as measured by those who responded "more or less valuable" increased from 35–38 percent in the early 1980s to 40–44 percent in the late 1990s. This tendency is consistent with the above discussion of the attitudes of the political parties. Virtually all political parties except the JCP support the current Japanese security arrangement: a lightly armed SDF and dependence on the alliance with the United States. But the intensity of support for the alli-

Figure 1: How to Protect Japan's Security



Figure 2: Value of the Security Treaty



ance is not as high, especially among the opposition parties. In this sense, the political parties reflect the public's attitude fairly accurately.

In comparison with the attitudes of the U.S. public, however, there is a clear divergence of views which may pose serious problems between the two countries. A Yomiuri/Gallup poll conducted in November 1997 shows clear contrasting expectations between the two peoples (see appendix).[31] Asked what help Japan should provide the United States "in the event that a war or conflict were to break out in the area neighboring Japan," both Japanese and Americans agree that Japan should "rescue nonmilitary personnel and aid refugees" and "provide medical aid to wounded American soldiers," but there are several areas in which their views differ. Thirty-nine percent of Americans want Japan to "participate in front-line operations" while only 2.3 percent of Japanese say that they should. Thirty-three percent of Americans want the Japanese to "supply arms and ammunition" while only 4.4 percent of Japanese say they should. Forty-three percent of Americans want the Japanese to "refuel American warships and aircraft" while 11.2 percent of Japanese say they should.

Asked what Japan should do if the limitations imposed by the Japanese Constitution hinder the cooperation in the event of a war or conflict neighboring Japan, 31 percent of Americans say that Japan's Constitution should be revised while 41.5 percent of Japanese answer that Japan's cooperation should be limited "in accordance with the current interpretation of Japan's Constitution." Only 26.1 percent of Japanese say that Japan should revise its Constitution if necessary.

Local Governments

Actors that have not been examined extensively in the study of Japan-U.S. security relations are local governments, especially those that accommodate U.S. bases. In general, however, as Purnendra Jain argues, "in most cases of public policies and other political decisions in Japan, local government is no longer completely subsidiary to national government; instead it acts either as a challenger or a supporter to the national government depending upon circumstances."[32] As an example of "challenger," Jain discusses the case of Zushi city in Kanagawa prefecture. When the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (*Boei Shisetsucho*) informed the Kanagawa prefecture that the former site of the Ikego ammunition depot would be the site of a housing complex for U.S. forces, a citizens group launched a serious opposition effort that would involve the city, the prefecture, and the national government. The case of Zushi indicates that the management of facilities used by the U.S. forces can give rise to complex politics.

A much more complex issue, obviously, is the case of Okinawa. The Okinawa prefectural government has played a very active role in domestic politics involving the base issues there, much more active than any previous Okinawa prefectural government and any other prefectural government in Japan. One of the smallest prefectures in terms of area, population, per capita income, and many other measures, Okinawa became an important actor in the domestic politics surrounding the Japan-U.S. alliance because of its history as well as its geopolitical location. History has imparted to Okinawa many unique characteristics. Before it was annexed by Japan in 1879, Ryukyu had maintained dual suzerain relations with Japan (through Satsuma-han) and Qing, and it had developed a distinct culture. During the Second World War, it was the only area in Japan where land warfare took place, with tremendous civilian deaths and casualties. After the war it was occupied and administered by the United States until it was returned to Japan in 1972. Even after the reversion to Japan, Okinawa has been

the prefecture where U.S. military bases are concentrated, for strategic reasons. In terms of area, Okinawa accommodates 75 percent of U.S. facilities in Japan. From this history and these strategic circumstances, it is only natural that special sentiments have emerged in Okinawa: the feeling that the Okinawans have unfairly been victimized and made to sacrifice for the rest of Japan.

The Okinawa prefectural government had failed to show its political clout until September 1995, when the rape incident shocked the entire country. Governor Masahide Ota, who had long been frustrated by the central government's lack of action on the prospect of reduction of U.S. bases in Okinawa, took advantage of this circumstance and succeeded in presenting the Okinawan grievances in the national media. After the incident, Ota had a special relationship with Prime Minister Hashimoto that no other prefectural governor could possibly enjoy. His meetings with Hashimoto were televised and reported as if they were international summit meetings. At times the Okinawa government acted as if it were almost an independent state, for example when Governor Ota visited the United States. Hashimoto made special efforts to realize one of Ota's urgent requests, relocation of the Futenma air base. He persuaded the United States to agree to remove the Futenma air base to a floating offshore facility. When the central government wanted to locate the offshore facility off the coast of Nago, Okinawa prefecture, the citizens of Nago, in an nonbinding referendum, rejected the idea. Governor Ota said that he would respect the Nago citizens' will and hence make it impossible to realize Hashimoto's plan. (Construction of an offshore facility requires the approval of the prefectural government.) Hashimoto believed that when he formed a plan to remove the Futenma air base, Ota should have understood that an offshore facility somewhere in Okinawa was clearly a possibility, and that Ota had given him at least tacit approval. The Futenma issue was completely stalled afterwards.[33]

Keiichi Inamine's victory in Okinawa's gubernatorial election of November 1998 introduced a new turn of events. The victory of Inamine, a businessman and conservative candidate supported by the LDP, was surprising to many but indicates some frustration on behalf of Okinawans over Ota's confrontational approach toward the central government. Though Inamine is not supportive of the previous government's proposal of an offshore base as a replacement of the Futenma base, he could be flexible as to other alternatives. To show its welcome to Governor Inamine, the Obuchi government made a surprise decision in April 1999 to locate the site of the 2000 G-8 summit in Nago, Okinawa.

Issues

Issues that represent the U.S.-Japan alliance in Japanese domestic politics have included the U.S. bases, nuclear weapons, and the legal issues surrounding the interpretation of the constitutional right to collective self-defense. The former two issues have brought about mass demonstrations and protest movements. Since President Bush declared the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. navy ships in 1991, the nuclear weapons issue has practically been dormant. The base issue is still quite important, most prominently in the form of the Okinawa base problems. The legal issues surrounding the collective self-defense right have always affected the alliance but have become more visible recently as actual operational cooperation between Japan and the United States in case of contingencies has become more likely.

U.S. Bases

When the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty became effective in 1952, the United States had 2,824 facilities throughout Japan (excluding Okinawa) occupying 1,352 square kilometers with 260,000 military personnel. Though the U.S. military presence was reduced radically during the 1950s and 1970s, various problems and incidents occurred. Most prominent were the Uchinada incident of 1952–1953, the Sunagawa incident of 1955, and the "Girard case" in 1957. The Uchinada incident was a clash between police and residents of Uchinada near Kanazawa who opposed the use of the Uchinada coast for firing exercises. The Sunagawa incident was a clash between police, residents, and other protesters opposing the expansion of the Tachikawa air base in western Tokyo. More than a thousand people were injured in the Sunagawa incident. The Girard case was a shocking incident in 1957; a Specialist 3rd Class, William S. Girard, killed a Japanese woman in the Somagahara maneuver area in Gunma prefecture who was engaged in salvaging expended cartridge cases. All of these incidents increased anti-base sentiments in Japan and were one of the reasons Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi became serious about revising the security treaty agreed to in 1951; many Japanese felt that the security treaty was an "unequal treaty" that allowed the United States to use bases in Japan without obligating Washington to protect Japan. Kishi was quoted to have said after reading the security treaty, "In this way, [Japan is] like a Manchukuo."[34]

In the 1970s and 1980s, as the number of U.S. military facilities in Japan other than Okinawa greatly declined, base issues were not very visible with the exception of the Zushi case described earlier and objections to the noise caused by night-landing exercises on the Atsugi air base. Though both were serious for the people concerned, they did not arouse national political sentiments as did the base-related incidents of the 1950s.

By far the biggest base problem now exists in Okinawa. Although the number of U.S. facilities in Okinawa declined from eighty-three in 1972 to thirty-seven in 1996, the area that these thirty-seven facilities occupy (235 square km) is not much less than that occupied by the previous eighty-three (278 square km). In the rest of Japan, U.S. facilities have decreased by 60 percent in terms of area; in Okinawa, by 16 percent. As a result, 75 percent of U.S. facilities in terms of area are in Okinawa. Furthermore, only 33 percent of the land occupied by U.S. facilities in Okinawa is owned by the central government, while 91 percent of the land occupied by U.S. facilities in the rest of Japan is. There are more than 32,000 landlords, a minority of whom, some 3,000, are extremely vocal in their opposition to the continued use of their land for U.S. bases.

The rape incident in September 1995 fulfilled a comparable function to the Girard case; it aroused strong anti-base sentiments and triggered an assortment of political responses. Shortly after the incident occurred, the view that the Japan-U.S. alliance was obsolete suddenly gained power. Timely and proper apologies by the U.S. government were helpful in preventing this emotional reaction from getting out of hand. As was expected, Prime Minister Murayama was sympathetic to the anti-base movement. Somewhat ironically, the fact that the SDPJ was in the government also contributed to preventing the emotional outbursts in Okinawa from spreading throughout Japan. Had the SDPJ been in the opposition, it might have launched strong anti-base and anti-AMPO movements not just in Okinawa but elsewhere. Prime Minister Hashimoto and Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama attached great importance to the Okinawa problem. Hashimoto made extra efforts to show his sympathy with the Okinawans by persuading the U.S. government to agree in April 1996 to relinquish the Futenma air base in five to seven years (on the condition that Japan find a facility elsewhere to fulfill similar

functions), immediately before President Clinton's visit to Japan. A Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas (SACO) was established to plan future reduction of bases in Okinawa. Its final report, released in December 1996, recommended that eleven facilities and approximately five thousand hectares be scheduled for reversion.[35]

Landlords who do not accept continued leases have presented a complicated problem.[36] The leases of some three thousand opposing landlords were due to expire in May 1997, and under the then viable Special Law Governing Land for Armed Forces Stationed in Japan, their continued use by the United States was to become "illegal" if no new legal mechanism was created. Because the Social Democrats were sympathetic to these landlords and opposed revision of the law, the LDP persuaded the then largest opposition party, the New Frontier Party, to agree to the LDP proposal. In the end, a new law to extend the leases for the bases was approved overwhelmingly with the support of the LDP, the New Frontier Party, the then Democratic Party, and Sakigake.

Now that the lease issue is legally resolved, the major issue surrounding Okinawa is the possible return of Futenma air base. As described in the section above, the offshore facility that Prime Minister Hashimoto promoted was defeated by referendum in Ginowan city, where Futenma is located, in late 1997. A further twist was the victory of Keiichi Inamine in the Okinawa gubernatorial election; as mentioned above, Inamine seems more flexible than his predecessor, Ota. Nevertheless, the problem continues to persist.

Nuclear Issues

Another aspect of Japan-U.S. security relations that has dominated newspaper headlines is U.S. nuclear weapons. Given Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is natural that many Japanese have special sentiments toward anything nuclear. These sentiments were amplified by the *Daigo Fukuryumaru* incident of 1954. *Daigo Fukuryumaru*, a fishing vessel operating in the South Pacific, was victimized by nuclear fallout from the American hydrogen bomb experiment. When Japan and the United States revised the security treaty in 1960, it was agreed that "Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment . . . shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan." According to Japanese sources, "major changes in the deployment" is meant to include introduction of nuclear bombs and medium- and long-range missiles. Since then, virtually every time that an American vessel capable of carrying nuclear weapons has entered a Japanese port, doubts have been raised in the media that the vessel was not carrying nuclear weapons. The Japanese government response was that because the United States did not consult Japan prior to the vessels' arrival, which was required if nuclear weapons were present, the Japanese government could not but believe that the vessels did not carry nuclear weapons. During these periods, however, the United States maintained a NCND (neither confirm nor deny) policy with respect to the naval vessels, and thus it was unrealistic for it to offer prior consultation. Furthermore, it seems unrealistic that U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons removed them just before entering Japanese ports. Doubts persisted at least until President Bush's declaration in 1991 that the United States would remove all tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels.

Legal/Constitutional Issues

One of the major characteristics of Japan's security policy debates is their highly legalistic nature; this is partly because Japan has never been engaged in actual combat or war in the postwar period and partly because of the nature of the Japanese Constitution. I will not repeat all of the legal issues surrounding Article 9, but I need to point out that various interpretations the Japanese government devised were the result of domestic politics. One of the early compromises struck in 1954–55 among politicians from the former Liberal Party, the former Kaishin Party, and bureaucrats of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau was the interpretation of the collective self-defense right, which says that because Japan is a sovereign state it has the sovereign right to self-defense, both individual and collective, but that because of the limitations imposed by Article 9 it cannot exercise this right.[37] Those who oppose this interpretation often point out that there should be no such thing as a right that one can possess but not exercise.

The language of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was a result of this interpretation. The Japanese negotiators insisted that they could not agree to language that might imply Japan's possible exercise of collective self-defense. However, at the time the security treaty was revised in 1960, to ask if and to what extent Japan would cooperate with the U.S. military in cases other than direct aggression against Japan was a highly theoretical exercise; Japan lacked the capability even if it wished to do so.

For that matter, even a framework for cooperation in case of an armed attack on Japan did not exist until 1978, when the first Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation were agreed upon. The guidelines created a mechanism for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to cope with an attack on Japan, based on which various joint exercises and communication efforts have been prepared. In fact, the 1978 guidelines created a category of "Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan" and stipulated that "The Government of Japan and the United States will conduct studies in advance on the scope and modalities of facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces by Japan . . ."[38] But these studies were never seriously undertaken until the mid-1990s. Some observers argue that the Foreign Ministry, tasked to conduct the studies, never took steps to begin them for fear of arousing domestic political disputes over the limitations imposed by the government interpretations of the collective self-defense right.[39]

The Korean peninsula crisis of 1994 revealed the inadequacy of Japan's legal and operational frameworks for cooperation with the United States in the event of contingencies surrounding Japan. According to the interpretation of the right of collective self-defense put forth by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, any Japanese action that is "deemed inseparable from military action" is unconstitutional. No one was clear, however, about what constitutes an action "deemed inseparable from military action." At one time during the Korean crisis, probably because he felt that this constitutional interpretation was too restrictive, then foreign minister Koji Kakizawa sounded out the possibility of revising this interpretation. In the face of a strong negative response from the media and opposition parties, however, he backed down.

Fortunately, no hostilities materialized then. But it became clear that Japan was not ready to engage in meaningful cooperation with the United States in contingencies other than direct attack on Japan. This was the genesis of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation that would be agreed to in September 1997. As the political process of devising the new

guidelines demonstrated, the most crucial issues are legal and constitutional rather than strategic and operational; what is allowed under the Constitution is the focus of political debate rather than what should be done strategically or operationally.[40]

Conclusion

How do Japan's domestic politics affect the Japan-U.S. alliance? Generally speaking, they determine the boundaries of political actions that are needed to operate the alliance under normal circumstances. Maintaining the government's interpretation of the right of collective self-defense is one element of such boundaries. This interpretation is shared by most important political actors, although what it actually means may be different from actor to actor. To that extent, current domestic politics do not seem to allow any open breach from this interpretation. Though there are influential political actors who argue for a departure from this interpretation, the previous patterns indicate that they will not gain the upper hand under most circumstances. Yasuhiro Nakasone, who now argues for the abolition of this interpretation, did not raise the issue when he was in power.

In many ways, this consensus has been solidified by domestic politics since 1993. Before the change in domestic politics in the 1990s, both the Socialists and the Communists denied the basic framework of Japan's security policy, including the Japan-U.S. alliance. Now the power of the SDJP is irremediably weakened; all other political parties except the JCP are in support of the Japan-U.S. alliance. But this grand consensus is a soft support of the alliance between Tokyo and Washington; it is predicated on the constitutional interpretation of the collective self-defense right. This situation seems consistent with current public opinion as indicated by polls.

This boundary has some room for expansion and contraction, however. The prime minister's preferences and initiatives can affect this. Within the bureaucracy, the more the power of the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Agency, as opposed to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, increases, the more the boundary expands. Among political parties, generalizations are difficult. Both the LDP and the Democratic Party have members in favor of expansion and against expansion.

The history of domestic politics in Japan concerning the Japan-U.S. alliance indicates that accidents often trigger new political processes. The rape incident in Okinawa in September 1995 was a case in point. A similar accident, especially in Okinawa, could start another round of domestic upheaval, which could pose tremendous difficulties to alliance relations.

On the other hand, however, because domestic support for the alliance is high, albeit soft, well-prepared and careful joint works to increase cooperation could in the end have a high probability of gaining domestic political approval. The processes of drafting the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security and of revising the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation may be regarded as examples of this. *Asahi* criticized the joint declaration as tantamount to revising the alliance along the lines of the 1960 revision. Yet the joint declaration aroused no visible or large-scale political protests, let alone the huge mass movement the 1960 revision brought about. The revision of the guidelines can also be regarded as a success. In comparison with the new guidelines, the original guidelines were created, in a way, more bureaucratically; they did not attract much political attention in the 1970s. The new guidelines were prepared in a more open environment. Even with this, they have generally been accepted by the public.

This optimism, however, should be tempered by the general tendency of domestic politics in Japan (and every other country): delays and postponements are always attractive options when there are other important issues. Resolution of problems that may stand in the way of other pressing issues can easily be shelved. The deliberation over the implementing bills of the guidelines was a case in point. In order to pass needed economic bills, then the pressing issue, the government judged it necessary to postpone other controversial bills, such as those related to the guidelines. It is therefore fortunate that once the economic bills were passed in the Diet no other pressing bills emerged before the bills concerning implementation of the guidelines were deliberated and passed in May 1999.

Appendix: Yomiuri/Gallup Poll

Here is a list of some things Japan might do to support the United States' effort to defend Japan, in the event that a war or conflict were to break out in the area neighboring Japan. Please indicate which activities you think Japan should undertake, if any, to support the United States in defending Japan. You may choose as many options as you like.

	Japanese	American
Offer use of its civil airports and naval ports	20.0	51
Pay for the cost of U.S. military operations	17.9	42
Rescue nonmilitary personnel and aid refugees	53.7	42
Provide medical aid to wounded American soldiers	48.9	55
Supply and exchange military information with the U.S.	9.9	47
Supply water and other daily necessities to U.S. forces	37.2	51
Refuel American warships and aircraft	11.2	43
Provide maintenance and repair of American warships and aircraft	8.6	35
Supply arms and ammunition	4.4	33
Conduct minesweeping operations	15.3	35
Inspect suspicious transport vessels	3.4	38
Participate in front-line operations	2.3	39
Japan should not do anything	9.9	3
OTHER (vol.)	0.1	1
DON'T KNOW/REFUSED	8.2	22

Next we'd like you to think about the extent to which the Japanese military should get involved in assisting the U.S. military, if a war or conflict were to break out in the area neighboring Japan. Which of the positions on this card do you agree with most?

	Japanese	American
The Japanese military should stay within its own territory, including its water and airspace, and not go beyond that point	52.7	21
Japanese military activity should extend into overseas waters and airspace, as long as there are no hostilities in those waters	10.1	14
Japanese military activity should extend up to the hostile country's territories, including that country's waters and airspace, providing those actual areas are free of hostilities	4.8	13
Japanese military activity should extend into areas where hostilities are actually taking place	5.9	27
Japan's military should not assist the U.S. military in any way	9.1	5
DON'T KNOW/REFUSED	17.4	25

In the event that a war or conflict should break out in the area neighboring Japan, Japanese military cooperation with the U.S. would be limited due to Japan's Constitution. Which of the following ways to deal with this do you agree with most?

	Japanese	American
Japan's Constitution should be revised to allow for greater military cooperation with the U.S.	26.1	31
The Japanese government should change its interpretation of its Constitution to allow for a greater military cooperation, without actually changing the Constitution	13.9	22
Japan's military cooperation should be limited in accordance with the current interpretation of Japan's Constitution	41.5	15
Japan's military should not cooperate with the United States	10.8	4
DON'T KNOW/REFUSED	7.7	28

If a military conflict took place on the Korean peninsula (in North and South Korea), and if the United States took military action there, in which of the ways shown on this card do you feel Japan should deal with the situation?

	Japanese	American
Japan should join the U.S. military action	4.2	30
Japan should not get directly involved military but should extend logistical support to the U.S., such as providing U.S. forces with supplies and refueling U.S. warships and aircraft	65.0	42
Japan's military should not cooperate with the United States	23.5	6
DON'T KNOW/REFUSED	7.3	22

Notes

[1] For example, in his first speech to the Diet Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi began his remarks on diplomatic affairs by saying that "Domestic and foreign policy are two sides of the same coin." http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/980810-143diet.html.

[2] For a narrative that describes the intricate relationship between domestic politics and security politics in postwar Japan, see Akihiko Tanaka, *Anzen hosho: sengo 50 nen no mosaku* (Security: 50-year exploration in postwar Japan) (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1997); and Hideo Otake, *Nihon no boei to kokunai seiji* (Japan's defense and domestic politics) (Tokyo: Sanichi shobo, 1983).

[3] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971); Peter B. Evans, Harold K Jacobson, and Robert D. Puttnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[4] Some of the previous works on Japan's security policy and Japan-U.S. security relations that pay detailed attention to domestic factors include Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* (Armonk, N.J.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993); Roger Buckley, *U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Tanaka, op. cit.

[5] A concise description of the institutional setting of Japan's foreign policy is given in Kent E. Calder, "The Institutions of Japanese Foreign Policy," in Richard L. Grant, ed., *The Process of Japanese Foreign Policy* (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 1–24. It does not discuss the roles of politicians including prime ministers, however.

[6] For a general discussion of the role and power of prime ministers, see Tomohito Shida, *Soridaijin no kenryoku to shidoryoku* (Power and leadership of prime ministers) (Tokyo: Toyo keizai shinposha, 1994).

[7] In practice, this type of revelation of dissent rarely takes place in Cabinet meetings. In practice the Cabinet meeting is a ritual in which all members of the Cabinet sign documents already agreed upon in the vice ministers meeting that has already taken place; very little discussion occurs during the Cabinet meeting. According to Naoto Kan, a leader of the Democratic Party and a Health and Welfare minister in the Hashimoto Cabinet, the average length of Cabinet meetings was ten to fifteen minutes. Since the Hosokawa Cabinet, formal Cabinet meetings have generally been followed by a *kakuryo kondankai* (chat meeting of Cabinet members), which allows "free discussion." But this chat meeting also ends within ten to fifteen minutes, according to Kan. Naoto Kan, *Daijin* (Ministers) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1998), 25–30. Vice ministers' meetings, in turn, are virtually rituals themselves, held to give unanimous consent to decisions already worked out by the relevant ministries, according to Nobuto Ishihara. See Takashi Mikuriya and Akio Watanabe, eds., *Shusho kantei no ketsudan: naikaku fukukanbochokan Ishihara Nobuo no 2600 nichi* (Decisions at the prime minister's residence: 2,600 days of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara) (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1997), 230–231.

[8] A concise explanation is given by Nobuo Ishihara, "Naikaku no shikumi to shusho no kengen" (Mechanism of Cabinets and power of prime ministers) in Yomiuri Shimbunsha,

ed., *Naikaku gyosei kiko: Kaikaku e no teigen* (Yomiuri proposal for restructuring the Cabinet and administrative system) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1996), 103–117.

[9] For a concise comparison of British politics and Japanese politics, see Jiro Yamaguchi, *Igirisu no seiji Nihon no seiji* (British politics and Japanese politics) (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 1998).

[10] Murayama gives a candid recollection of his tenure as prime minister in Tomiichi Murayama, *Sojano* (Well, let's see) (Tokyo: Dai-san shokann, 1998).

[11] For Gotoda's career and experiences as chief Cabinet secretary, see Masaharu Gotoda, *Seiji towa nanika* (What Is Politics?) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988); Masaharu Gotoda, *Naikaku kango chokan* (Chief cabinet secretary) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1989); Masaharu Gotoda, *Jo to ri: Gotoda Masaharu kaikoroku* (Sentiment and reason: Memoir of Masaharu Gotoda) (2 vols.) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1998).

[12] Tomiichi Murayama describes Ishihara as an "owner of the prime minister's residence" (*kantei no nushi*) (Murayama, op. cit., 81). Ishihara's long tenure is exceptional, however; the tenure of previous deputy chief Cabinet secretaries was much shorter. But since the late 1970s their tenure has been longer than that of most prime ministers. For Ishihara's career and experiences, see Nobuo Ishihara, *Kantei 2668 nichi: Seisakukettei no butaiura* (2,668 days in the prime minister's residence: Backstage of decision-making) (Tokyo: NHK shuppan, 1995); and Mikuriya and Watanabe, op. cit.

[13] "Shusho hishokan" (Prime minister's secretaries), *Nihon keizai shimbun*, August 17, 1998.

[14] *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Evening Edition), April 7, 1998; *Yomiuri Shimubun* (Morning Edition), April 9, 1998.

[15] Sekai Heiwa Kenkyujo, ed., *Nakasone naikakushi: Shiryo-hen* (History of the Nakasone Cabinet: Documents and materials) (Tokyo: Sekai heiwa kenkyujo, 1995).

[16] Koji Murata's study reveals that the Foreign Ministry was not particularly supportive when the Defense Agency attempted to start the negotiations that led eventually to the original guidelines of 1978. Koji Murata, "Boei seisaku no tenkai" (Development of defense policy) in *The Annuals of the Japanese Political Science Association*, 1997, 79–95.

[17] http://www2.nttca.com:8010/infomofa/about/hq/org.html.

[18] Toshiyuki Shikata, retired general and professor at Teikyo University, points out that because internationally minded bureaucrats and SDF officials have similar experiences abroad, often attending the same universities and research institutes, "psychological barriers" that had long existed among bureaucrats of the MOFA and the JDA and officials in the SDF "virtually disappeared." Toshiuki Shikata, "Nichibei boei kyoryoku no tame no shishin (gaidorain) kaitei no keii" (The process of revising the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation) in Gikosesaku kettei yoin kenkyukai, ed., *Nihon no gaikoseisaku kettei yoin* (Factors of Japan's foreign policy decision-making) (Tokyo: PHP kenkyujo, 1999), 207.

[19] Not much has been written about the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. The exception is Akira Nakamura, *Sengo seiji ni yureta kenpo 9 jo* (Article 9 of the Constitution moved by postwar politics) (Tokyo: Chuo keizai sha, 1996).

[20] http://www.jcp.or.jp/Kenkai/Seisaku/98san-pol.html. The Communist Party's official "program" as amended in 1994 stipulates: "The party fights for abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and all other treaties and agreements which undermine national sovereignty, and for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Japan and the complete removal of U.S. military bases. The party demands and fights for a policy to ensure a peaceful and neutral Japan,

which will abrogate Japan's military alliance with the United States and take part in no military alliances but establish friendly relations with all countries. The party fights for the genuine independence of Japan, including abrogation of the articles of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which undermine Japan's sovereignty. The party makes peaceful diplomatic efforts to get the reversion of Habomai, Shikotan and all the Chishima Islands to Japan." http://www.jcp.or.jp/Jcpdata/Koryo/e-koryo.html.

[21] http://www.omnics.co.jp/politics/SDPJ/cong64/basicprinE.html.

[22] http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policies.html.

[23] http://www.komei.or.jp/tou/sei7.htm.

[24] http://www.jiyuto.or.jp/s4/s4_2e.htm#c4.

[25] http://www.jimin.or.jp/jimin/saisin96/saisin-07.html. The quoted sentence was not translated in the LDP's English translation of the report as found at the same Internet address.

[26] http://www.jiyuto.or.jp/s4/s4_2e.htm#c4.

[27] http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policies.html.

[28] A typical political compromise that the LDP made to court Komeito was to agree with the issuing of the consumer "vouchers" ostensibly to stimulate consumption: a pet project upon which Komeito had been insisting. This policy did not make sense in normal economic theory but was very clever politically.

[29] *This Is Yomiuri: Nihonkoku kenpo no subete* (Everything about the Japanese Constitution) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun, May 1997), 419.

[30] Ibid., 475–497.

[31] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 24, 1997.

[32] Purnendra Jain, "Subsidiary, Supporter or Challenger? Local-National Relations in Japan," *Local Government Studies* 19, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 264.

[33] Much more detailed analysis is needed to understand Okinawa politics; for example, the decision-making system of the prefectural government in the Ota administration, conditions of political parties, roles of the media in Okinawa, ideological conditions, roles of intellectuals, and other political culture. Prefectural governments are generally more "presidential" than the central government. But the Ota government seems more "presidential" than that of any other prefecture; the highest-ranking aides surrounding Ota are mostly political appointees rather than career civil servants. The political parties in Okinawa are quite distinct from the national political parties, though there are some fixed relations. The print media is dominated by two Okinawan newspapers, *Ryukyu Shimpo* and *Okinawa Times*. The national newspaper with the largest circulation (still fewer than a thousand copies) in Okinawa is the *Akahata*, the JCP's paper. Ideologically, the power of postwar "progressive" forces is still quite strong. The role of intellectuals, especially the professors of Ryukyu University, seems arguably more important than the role of intellectuals nationally. Governor Ota used to be a professor at Ryukyu University. The political culture of Okinawa has yet to be studied very carefully. No *Chrysanthemum and the Sword* or *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* has been written for Okinawa.

[34] Masataka Kosaka, *Saisho Yoshida Shigeru* (Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron, 1968), 121. For general backround of the base issues and the process of revision of the Security Treaty, see Tanaka, op. cit., 166–172. A detailed account is given by Akihisa Hara, *Sengo Nihon to kokusai seiji; Anpo kaitei no seiji rikigaku* (Postwar Japan and interna-

tional politics: Political dynamics of the revision of the Security Treaty) (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1988).

[35] For a detailed account of this process, see Yoichi Funabashi, *Domei Hyoryu* (Drift of the alliance) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997).

[36] For this complicated process, see for example Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1997–1998*, 104–105.

[37] Tanaka, op. cit., 177–185.

[38] *Defense of Japan 1989* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1989), 284.

[39] According to Murata, op. cit., it was not the sole fault of MOFA that Japan was not taking significant concrete measures regarding U.S.-Japan defense cooperation; many other ministries involved in this process were reluctant.

[40] The almost futile attempt to define "shuhen jitai"/"situations in areas surrounding Japan" is another example of the legalistic nature of Japanese domestic politics concerning the alliance.

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