

The Paradox of Korean Globalization

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Introduction

Some months ago a Stanford freshman came to ask for help on his project on Korea. At the time, I thought he was a Korean American, given that his command of both English and Korean is excellent. To my surprise, I learned that he was educated until high school in Korea and had never been to the United States before coming to Stanford. He surprised me further when he told me about his high school, the Korean Minjok Leadership Academy (KMLA). Located in a remote area of Kwangwon province—arguably the more underdeveloped region in South Korea—KMLA aspires to be Korea’s version of Eton. The school’s goal is to produce Korea’s future leaders, and to instill in them a strong national identity (see its website at <http://www.minjok.hs.kr>). Fascinated by what he told me, I made a visit to his high school in fall 2002.

At KMLA, I was particularly interested to find that all of the school’s courses, except Korean language and history, are taught in English. Students are also required to use English outside the classroom, except on weekends. English is considered the necessary means to secure Korea’s position as a first-rate world nation, and it is therefore essential for future Korean leaders to master this global language (Kwak 2001). While teaching classes in English, however, KMLA strongly emphasizes the curriculum aimed at enhancing Korean national identity. This curriculum includes Confucian ethics, traditional music and sports, and rituals. For instance, every morning at 6am, students gather in front of a traditional Korean building, and bow deeply to their teachers, a ritual that a son is supposed to perform toward his parents every morning and evening to display his filial piety. Students are also required to practice at least one of three Korean traditional music or sports after the ritual. When I visited the school, I saw young students practicing on Korean drums. KMLA’s methods seem to be working: every year the school sends its best students to top American colleges. The Stanford freshman mentioned above is the product of such a new “experimental” Korean education.

KMLA exemplifies a larger trend that one can easily find in today's (South) Korea—the curious mixture of two seemingly contradictory forces, nationalism and globalization. Korea is a leading nation in its usage of high technology and telecommunications. More than half of Korea's 15 million households have broadband service, and more than 60 percent of Koreans carry cell phones. The country is so wired that a recent issue of *Business Week* called Korea “a nation of digital guinea pigs” (February 4, 2002). Koreans travel widely (in 2000, over 5.5 million Koreans went abroad), and many Koreans send their children (even precollege) overseas for education. Korea has seen an influx of foreign workers over the last decade and leading Korean companies such as Samsung and LG Electronics operate huge overseas business, sometimes with a greater number of employees outside than within the country. Good test scores in English (such as TOEIC) have become a most important criterion when applying for jobs in Korean companies, and there exists a growing interest in and debate over making English the nation's second official language. Seoul has become a global city, just like New York, London, Tokyo, or Paris.

Paradoxically, such extensive globalization has not weakened or removed Korean nationalism. The World Cup fever seen in summer 2002 indicates Koreans' pride and confidence in their ethnic nation. Millions of Koreans came out to the streets to cheer for their national soccer team, shouting such slogans as “*taehan min'guk*” (“Republic of Korea” or, literally, “the Great Han People's State”) and “*uri nun hana*” (“We are One”). After Korea's victory over Spain, which put them in a semifinal showdown with Germany, President Kim Dae Jung proclaimed the day to be “Korea's happiest day since Dangun (Tan'gun)—the god-king who, according to legend, founded the Korean nation” (*Asia Times Online*, June 25, 2002). Most Koreans do not question the racial purity and homogeneity of their nation, and believe strongly in a shared bloodline and a common ancestry. The current notion of citizenship is based on this racial conception of nationhood, as expressed in government policy toward overseas Koreans and foreign migrant workers inside Korea. In both Koreas, ethnic identity—or more precisely a sense of shared blood and ancestry—is still a defining feature of unification discourse and policy (Shin and Kim 2002).

How can we explain the coexistence of such seemingly contradictory trends? In evaluating Korea's globalization programs, Samuel Kim laments that “despite the rising globalization and globalism chorus, deep down Korea remains mired in the cocoon of exclusive cultural nationalism, [which] acts as a powerful and persistent constraint on the *seggyehwa* drive” (2000, pp. 263, 275). In his view, “no fundamental learning—no paradigm shift—has occurred in the course of Korea's *seggyehwa* drive, only situation-specific tactical adaptation” (2000, p. 275). Kim also labels the special law regarding overseas Koreans as a “hypernationalistic legislative sleight of hand [that] contradicts the spirit and letter of President Kim Dae Jung's professed globalism.” He is right that no paradigm shift has occurred, and that Koreans still appropriate globalization as a nationalist goal. Yet in contrast to his claim, Koreans see no inherent contradiction between nationalism and globalization. In fact, as discussed below, Koreans initiated and pursued globalization with a clear nationalistic agenda from the outset. Kim misses this important dimension of Koreans' thinking toward globalization.

In this chapter, I first offer a theoretical framework to explain coexistence of nationalism and globalization by considering two interrelated processes: 1) nationalist appropriation of globalization and 2) intensification of ethnic identity in reaction to globalization process. I then present empirical evidence to demonstrate how these processes have worked in Korean globalization at both official and popular levels.

Theoretical Issues

Recent debates on nationalism and globalization have centered on whether globalization will weaken the functional power of the nation state or whether global culture and cosmopolitan identity will replace ethnic and national culture and identity. In *The Borderless World*, for instance, Ohmae contends that the magnitude of cross-border activities in finance and industry has become so great that state's regulatory leverages have virtually disappeared. According to this view, while the boundaries between countries remain clear on a "political map", those boundaries have largely disappeared on a "competitive map", one that shows the real flows of financial and industrial activities. Through competition, imitation, and diffusion of best practices, trade, and capital mobility, globalization is said to produce "convergence" across nations, both in the structures of production and in the relations among economy, society, and state. Such interplay creates a highly integrated and homogeneous world economy (see Berger 1996 for a critical review of "convergence theory"). Similarly, Koizumi (1993) argues that to the extent that globalism is a fact of social life, there is no place for a sense of national identity based on one land, one language, or one race. The nation state, guided by nationalism as ideology or as emotion, has outlived its usefulness in maintaining world order. Just as modernization theorists and Marxists predicted the demise of nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s (see Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology*), proponents of globalization expect transnational forces of late modernity gradually to supersede nations and nationalism.

Such globalist arguments have met critical responses from scholars, activists, and policymakers alike (see Guillen 2001 for an extensive review of the debate over the nature and impact of globalization). Hirst and Thompson (1996) claim that the current level of internationalized activities is not unprecedented and that the nation state will not disappear, though it will have to change its functional role. In Wade's (1966) view, the demise of the nation state is "greatly exaggerated" and in Weiss's (1998) opinion it is no more than a "myth." Boyer (1996), too, sees the twenty-first century as the "epoch of nations" as the complex set of contradictory forces that are pushing simultaneously toward convergence and divergence remain far from a single best institutional design. Therefore, the globalization of culture would not necessarily promote its homogenization or entail a weakening of ethnic/ national identity/culture (Featherstone 1990). Instead, as Appadurai claims, while globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization, these are "absorbed into local political and cultural economies, only to be repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty, free enterprise, fundamentalism etc. in which the state plays an increasingly delicate role" (1990, p. 307). Crossnational studies also show that globalization has not eroded feelings of pride and attachment to the nation (see Evans and Kelley 2002). Further, as seen in the former Soviet empire and the "new" Germany, ethnic identity and nationalism are anything but dead—instead, these elements have critically shaped the social, political, and cultural landscapes of these countries. In this context, Anthony Smith does not exaggerate when he claims "In the era of globalization and transcendence, we find ourselves caught in a maelstrom of conflicts over political identities and ethnic fragmentation" (1995, p. 2).

How can this "paradox" be explained? While the current debate has centered on the question of whether global forces contradict national ones, an equally important but less investigated question is how to explain the present coexistence of both forces. Is this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon a temporary aberration or a lasting presence? In other words,

are ethnic and nationalist forces destined to pass away once they have run their course in each part of the globe? Or will ethnicity and nation remain essential for any conceivable new order? (See Smith 1995 for critical review of these contending views.)

Specifying the Interplay of Global and National Forces

Both proponents and critics support the premise that the nation state, nationalism, or national identity is antithetical to globalization. The proponents believe globalization will weaken the functional power of the nation state and the critics worry that it will disrupt ethnic or national identity. Despite their opposing views, they arrive at the same conclusion—globalization cannot coexist with nationalism. Yet we need to pay close attention to the interactive nature of this relationship. A nation state not only *reacts* to the harmful effects of globalization but also becomes *proactive* in maximizing what globalization has to offer. Globalization is a double-edged sword, a force that is both “civilizing” and “destructive” (see Guillen 2001). Thus it can be contended that 1) globalization, like other transnationalist forces, can be proactively appropriated for nationalist goals; and 2) globalization can intensify, rather than weaken, ethnic/national identity in reaction. These interrelated mechanisms can thus explain the current coexistence of national and global forces in many parts of the world.

1) *Nationalist appropriation of globalization*

While globalization produces pressures for “convergence,” its effects are indirect, mediated by domestic politics and policies. In particular, the state still plays a proactive role in shaping the globalization processes, accommodating global flows and turning them to their own national advantages. As Berger (1996) points out, “the internal constellation of political and economic forces” not only accommodates the externally pushed change but also actively pulls it in and shapes it. To be sure, some states remain content to play a “courtesan role” (see Mittleman 2000), but others go further, aggressively appropriating globalization for their particular nationalist agenda. We need to see states not simply as “passive pawns” but instead as entities that are adapting to or even appropriating globalization, whether out of necessity or desire” (Riain 2000, p. 205).

This kind of state effort to appropriate global forces for the national interest is not new. Modern East Asian history has shown that Japan, China, and Korea all sought to appropriate global forces of science, technology, and even the discourse of “civilization and enlightenment”—all originated from the West—for their own national use (Beasley 1990). “Western technology, Eastern spirit,” a highly popular slogan in early twentieth century East Asia, reflected Asians’ desires to appropriate Western technology and science, even as they faced the encroaching forces of global imperialism. This practice was known as “defensive modernization”, where modernization meant defending Asians’ own nations from Western aggression. The ultimate goal was therefore national sovereignty and independence, not modernization per se. The current discussion of making English the second official language in Japan and South Korea can also be understood in this context—as a global language (or the language of the Internet), English is considered a crucial instrument to enhance Korean and Japanese national competitiveness in a global market. It is precisely for this reason that KMLA teaches classes in English.

There are many other examples of nationalist appropriation of globalization. In one instance, Fidel V. Ramos, while he was president of the Philippines, argued that the state—far from being dead due to the forces of globalization—needed to actively and effectively maxi-

mize the potential benefits that globalization could bring to his nation. For Ramos, globalization was a fact of life. Thus, the state's main challenge was not to ignore or deny the presence of global forces but to "seize the opportunities that globalization presents, while minimizing the nation's vulnerability to its risks" (1998, p. 4). The then-leader of the Philippines stressed the state's role in "providing the rule of law needed to enforce market transactions and of helping mobilize the nation's resources for competitiveness in the global economy" (1998, p. 4). He made it clear that the Philippines needed to accommodate and appropriate the global forces for greater national goals.

What, then, motivates the state or its leaders to appropriate globalization for the nationalist goal? I suggest two factors, social Darwinism and an organic/collectivistic notion of nation/society, as most crucial. First, I contend that a social Darwinian understanding of the world promotes an instrumentalist understanding of globalization that in turn facilitates its nationalist appropriation. Just as during the height of imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, social Darwinian principles of competition and survival of the fittest have been identified as a major force of globalization. Mittleman argues that: "Today, competitiveness, or free-market competition, has been elevated to an ideology, and this icon represents an important element in the globalization matrix" (2000, p. 16). Moreover, the current competition is more intense than ever before. (see Harvey 1990). Seen from a social Darwinian perspective, therefore, globalization offers both opportunities and threats. It must be properly utilized for one's national interests to survive in this world of "hyper-competition."

Second, to the extent that nationalist appropriation is a collective response to threats (real or perceived) or opportunities associated with globalization, it is often facilitated when concepts of society and nation are organic, ethnic, and collectivistic. It has been shown that in times of crisis (e.g., immigration, foreign wars, terrorism), ethnic particularistic factors tend to overshadow the civic elements (see Kuizo 2002). Likewise, where globalization is viewed as a new form of dominance and threat, organic, ethnic, collectivistic notions of nation and society are likely to emerge, which in turn promote a nationalist appropriation of globalization. In particular, an organic notion of nation and society—based on common blood and ethnicity—produces an intensely felt sense of oneness, which enhances a highly collectivistic response to globalization.

2) *Intensification of ethnic/national identity*

Besides being appropriated for the national agenda, globalization can also awaken people to their own local/national culture. The very nationalism that globalization processes appear to threaten in fact reimagines and reforges itself, surviving in new circumstances dictated by transnational and global forces. In Anthony Smith's view, globalization, as with modernization, inevitably produces social and cultural disruption and only ethnic and national solidarity can fill the holes created by its processes. Chains of memory, myth, and symbol connect nations to their ethnic heritage; national identity satisfies the people's need for cultural fulfillment, rootedness, security, and fraternity. Global culture simply cannot offer "the qualities of collective faith, dignity, and hope that only a "religious surrogate, with its promise of a territorial culture and community across the generations, can provide" (Smith 1995, p. 160). National identity becomes more important as globalization proceeds.

Numerous policies and programs exist to revitalize national cultures and identities and to deal with globalization. Thailand offers a good illustration. In 1994, a campaign with the slogan "We Take Pride in Thai Culture" was launched nationwide using schools, cultural facilities, television, and other media to raise public awareness of Thai art and culture, Bud-

dhist history, and tradition. The campaign was extended until 1997 with a new name, “The Programme to Continue Thai Culture”, overseen by the Office of the National Culture Commission under the Ministry of Education (see Chittiwatanapong 1999). Besides such government efforts, globalization promotes reactionary movements to defend their own identity and culture. In the Philippines, for example, personalist Christian churches have attracted large followings. In short, globalization does not remove but rather facilitates a “renewal of historical forces”—a maze of religious royalties, ethnic identities, linguistic differences, and other forms of cultural expression.

The means of globalization, such as the Internet and electronic mail, do not simply promote a global culture. On the contrary, they can be highly useful in promoting ethnic/national consciousness and identity. As research on new social movements demonstrates, Internet and email have become major instruments for raising social and political consciousness and for mobilizing people to collective action. In the past, participation in collective struggles was crucial to raising collective consciousness (see E. P. Thompson), but today the Internet and email offer an important alternative. They also provide opportunities to rediscover one’s own culture and identity by offering comparative references. Just as one becomes more aware of one’s own culture and heritage by traveling overseas, exposure to other cultures through the Internet can enhance one’s cultural consciousness and allow one to compare “us” and “them.” This is particularly so, given that even when using a global technology (i.e., the Internet), most people still use their own *national* language to navigate the new (cyber)space. Ironically, the new communications regime based on web space, which is apparently an essential element of globalization, provides effective means to mobilize resources for national and local purposes and to construct a cultural framework of national and local identity.

Understanding Korean Globalization

Korea’s globalization can be understood in a similar way. Under the name of *segzehwa*, the Kim Young Sam government attempted a top-down reform of the Korean political economy to meet the rapidly changing conditions of the world economy. In the Sydney Declaration of 17 November 1994, Kim formally announced his government’s drive for globalization and set up the Globalization Promotion Committee (*segzehwa ch’ujin wiwônho*), or GPC. The GPC was headed by the prime minister and consisted of a set of committees on policy planning, administrative reform, educational reform, and science and technology (see Gills and Gills 2000). Korea’s globalization drive was initiated by the state, and *segzehwa* was kept as a name for Korean way of globalization.

In laying out his policy of *segzehwa*, President Kim put it in a historical context. First he reflected on Korea’s modern history, comparing what Korea faces today to “the challenge of similar revolutionary changes at the turn of this [twentieth] century” (Kim 1996, p. 9). Yet with only “a vague awareness of the need to pursue modernization,” he contends, Korea failed to reform and subsequently became a Japanese colony. Since the 1960s, Korea has been remarkably successful in its efforts to modernize and industrialize, but is not well equipped to meet the new challenge of globalization. His *segzehwa* policy is thus necessary “if Korea is to survive and thrive in this age of increasingly fierce borderless global competition” (Kim 1996, p. 15). While his globalization drive was downgraded as a “political cover” or “slogan” (Kang 2000) and criticized as a failure (Kim 2000), its main motivation seems clear—to increase national competitiveness in a rapidly globalizing world. In the post-Cold War era, globalization was viewed as a major force of external pressure and *segzehwa* reflected Ko-

rean policymakers' growing recognition of the need to enhance Korea's global competitiveness. Here we can clearly see the working of social Darwinian thinking in Korea's globalization drive and an instrumentalist treatment of globalization—that is, using globalization as a means of obtaining a competitive edge for the nation.

The Kim Dae Jung government accelerated Korea's globalization process using the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) demand for economic and social reform. While eschewing the use of *seggyehwa* as a name for Korean globalization, Kim Dae Jung's policy continued to facilitate economic liberalization. Furthermore, recognizing the strategic value of overseas Koreans, especially Korean Americans, the DJ Kim government promulgated a special law regarding overseas ethnic Koreans in 2000. In theory, the law's larger goal was to create a global Korean community, on the basis that 1) overseas Koreans still maintain a strong Korean ethnic identity; 2) globalization, especially through the Internet, would improve communication among Koreans inside and beyond the peninsula; and 3) the combination of the two could produce a new global Korean network. In practice, however, as the globalizing Korean economy demanded more professionals who could command English, the main target of this special law was Korean Americans. Ethnic Koreans in China and Russia were excluded in the law, because the Korean government feared it might open the door to unskilled ethnic Koreans from these countries. While Kim criticizes the law as a "hypernationalistic legislative sleight of hand [that] contradicts the spirit and letter of President Kim Dae Jung's professed globalism" (2000, p. 262), in my view, it demonstrates a careful, strategic, and instrumentalist use of globalization for Korea's collective national interests.¹

While being appropriated for the nationalist agenda, globalization has also prompted efforts to revitalize Korean culture and identity. Not only was *seggyehwa* kept as the word to describe the Korean way of globalization, but its policy also stressed the promotion of Korean culture and values. For instance, globalization underpinned by "Koreanization" is listed as one of the five "principal meanings" of *seggyehwa*. As President Kim explains: "Koreans cannot become global citizens without a good understanding of their own culture and tradition.... Koreans should march out into the world on the strength of their unique culture and traditional values. Only when the national identity is maintained and intrinsic national spirit upheld will Koreans be able to successfully globalize" (1996, p. 15). As part of its pursuit of Koreanized globalization, the YS Kim government sought to promote Korean studies (*han'gukhak*), both within and outside Korea.

During the last decade, Korea has seen a proliferation of festivals and events in various cities designed to enhance images and identities of each respective locality. The Andong Folk Festival, the Biennale of Kwangju, and Asian Film Festivals in Pusan are good examples of the current active promotion of regional identities (see Sallie Yea 2003). Andong is well known for its Confucian tradition and hosts a variety of folk festivals featuring "various historical and cultural heritages", from rituals and village compacts to games, music, and dances. In fall 2001, the city hosted an international Confucian cultural festival to commemorate the five hundredth anniversary of the birth of T'oegye, one of the best known Korean Confucianists. The Festival proclaimed that "Confucianism is an alternative to the spiritual and moral deterioration of the present day; a way to create a world in which respect and love are foremost." The festival was intended to "reexamine Confucian tradition that is at the center of our national culture and creatively apply it to the present day with a view to achieve cultural diversity." The festival featured a variety of cultural and artistic events, a Confucian culture exhibition, and an international aca-

demic conference (<http://www.confucianfestival.org>). Such activities further illustrate Koreans' efforts to defend their identities and cultures from the encroaching forces of globalization.

The Korean government has supported such folk festivals both directly and indirectly. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism recommends a number of folk festivals for tourists, whether they are Korean and foreign. The seventeen festivals that the Ministry recommended for the second half of 2002, for instance, featured kimchi, ginseng, ceramics, mask dance, martial arts, and traditional music, all supposedly representing Korea's cultural heritage and tradition (<http://www.kowiz.com>). The Korean state has not only appropriated globalization (*segye-hwa*) for the nationalist agenda but also promoted various programs to preserve Korean identity.

Statistical Evidence

To empirically assess nationalist appropriation of globalization in Korea, and the intensification of national identity as a result of globalization, I analyze two survey data. I first present specific hypotheses drawn from the theoretical discussion above, followed by data analysis.

1) Nationalist Appropriation of Globalization

Two elements are important here: 1) social Darwinism and 2) national and societal conceptions of globalization. As discussed above, to the extent that nationalist appropriation is a strategy to survive globalization in a world of "hyper-competition", we expect that: *the stronger one's social Darwinian understanding of the world, the more willingly one will embrace globalization*. In addition, insofar as nationalist appropriation is a collective effort to enhance national interests through globalization, we expect that: *the more organic/collectivistic one's view of nation/society, the more willingly one will embrace globalization*.

2) Intensification of National Identity

To assess the intensification of national identity as a result of globalization, I consider whether exposure to globalization enhances Koreans' sense of ethnic homogeneity. Due to historical experiences specified elsewhere (see Shin, Freda, and Yi 1999) Koreans came to believe that they share a single bloodline and thus belong to a unitary nation, an ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive collectivity. If means of globalization intensifies one's ethnic/national identity, we can expect that: *the stronger one's exposure to globalization, the stronger one's sense of ethnic homogeneity*.

Data, Measures, and Method

I use two datasets to test the above propositions. The first data come from my survey of "National Identity and Unification" conducted from October 11 to November 6, 2000 in South Korea. The second data derive from a national survey of "Korean National Network Community", conducted between November 15 and December 4, 1999. The first data set is used to evaluate whether globalization is being appropriated for the nationalist goal. The second is analyzed to determine whether globalization intensifies ethnic identity. Table 1 presents measures of key variables with their values of mean and standard deviations.

From the first data set: Two statements measure the strength of Social Darwinism: "The world is an arena of competition among nations" (*competition*) and "The survival of the

Table 1. Summary of Key Variables

Variable	Question (Scale)	Mean (S.D.)
Survey on National Identity and Unification in South Korea, 2000 (N=1003)		
<u>Independent variables</u>		
<i>Competition</i>	The world is an arena of competition among nations. (1=disagree, 2=middle, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree)	2.96 (.76)
<i>Survival</i>	The survival of the fittest is a major principle of contemporary world. (1=disagree, 2=middle, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree)	2.94 (.77)
<i>Blood</i>	Our nation has a single bloodline. (1=disagree, 2=agree, 3=strongly agree)	2.38 (.61)
<i>Collective</i>	In case of national crisis, national interests can be given priority over individual ones. (1=disagree, 2=middle, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree)	2.67 (.85)
<u>Dependent variables</u>		
<i>Culture</i>	English should be the second official language in Korea. (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=middle, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree)	3.40 (.98)
<u>Control variables</u>		
<i>Age</i>	Respondent's age	39.43 (12.91)
<i>Gender</i>	Respondent's gender (0=male, 1=female)	.50 (.50)
<i>Education</i>	Respondent's level of education (1=no formal education, 2=elementary, 3=junior high, 4=high school, 5=two year college, 6=college, 7=graduate school)	4.08 (1.29)
<i>Class</i>	Subjective class position (1=lower low, 2=upper low, 3=middle, 4=lower high, 5=upper high)	2.69 (.77)
<i>Income</i>	Respondent's household monthly income (1=less than .5 mil. won, 2=.5-1 mil., 3=1-1.5 mil., 4=1.5-2 mil., 5=2-3 mil., 6=3-4 mil., 7=4-5 mil., 8=over 5 mil.)	3.89 (1.36)
<i>Tour</i>	Whether have traveled overseas (0=no, 1=yes)	.26 (.44)

(Table 1 continued)

Variable	Question (Scale)	Mean (S.D.)
Survey on the Formation of Korean Network Community in 21st Century, 1999 (N=1000)		
<u>Independent variables</u>		
<i>Computer</i>	Proficiency in using computer in general. (1=not at all, 2=a little, 3=middle, 4=skilled, 5=very skilled)	2.53 (1.26)
<i>Internet</i>	Proficiency in using the internet (1=not at all, 2=a little, 3=middle, 4=skilled, 5=very skilled)	2.14 (1.25)
<i>E-mail</i>	Proficiency in using e-mail (1=not at all, 2=a little, 3=middle, 4=skilled, 5=very skilled)	1.98 (1.21)
<u>Dependent variable</u>		
<i>Ethnic Homogeneity</i>	Koreans are all brothers and sisters, regardless of political ideology or regional residence. (1=disagree, 2=middle, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree)	2.89 (.84)
<u>Control variables</u>		
<i>Age</i>	Respondent's age	39.36 (12.78)
<i>Gender</i>	Respondent's gender (0=male, 1=female)	.50 (.50)
<i>Education</i>	Respondent's level of education (1=no formal education, 2=elementary, 3=junior high, 4=high school, 5=two year college, 6=college, 7=graduate school)	4.35 (1.29)
<i>Class</i>	Class position (1=lower low, 2=upper low, 3=middle, 4=lower high, 5=upper high)	2.66 (.93)
<i>Income</i>	Respondent's household monthly income (1=lowest 10%, 2=highest 90%, 3= highest 80%, 4= highest 70%, 5= highest 60%, 6= highest 50%, 7= highest 40%, 8= highest 30%, 9= highest 20%, 10= highest 90%.)	4.38 (1.64)

fittest is a major principle of contemporary world” (*survival*). Two statements also measure Korean conception of nation and society: “Our nation has a single bloodline” (*Blood*) and “In case of national crisis, national interests can be given priority over individual ones.” (*Collective*) Views of globalization are measured by two questions: “It is good to acquire foreign language and culture from childhood” (*culture*) and “English should be the second official language (*English*).” Six variables serve as controls. In addition to the usual sociodemographic variables (age, gender, education, class, and income), I introduce as an additional control variable “whether one has an experience of traveling overseas.” (*Tour*)

From the second data set: I use levels of skills with computers, the Internet, and email as indicators of exposure to globalization. I measure strength of ethnic identity by “Koreans are brothers and sisters, regardless of political ideology or regional residence.” I also introduce age, gender, education, class, and income as control variables.

Because our variables are measured in ordinal scale, I use ordered logit regression (see Winship and Mare 1984 for discussion of this method) in my analysis.²

Findings

1) Nationalist appropriation of globalism

Table 2 presents South Koreans’ conception of nation/society, world, and globalization from the first dataset. Eighty-one percent of the respondents agree that “the world is an arena of competition among nations”, and 75 percent subscribe to a claim that “the survival of the fittest is a major principle of contemporary world.” Ninety-three percent of respondents “strongly agree” or “agree” that “Our nation has a single bloodline.” Sixty-four percent support that “in case of national crisis, national interests can be given priority over individual ones.” These findings clearly demonstrate that Koreans hold an organic/collectivistic view of their nation/society and understand the present world from a social Darwinian perspective.

With regard to Koreans’ view of globalization, 61 percent of respondents support that “It is good to acquire foreign language and culture from childhood”, and 54 percent agree with the contention that “English should be the second official language.” Taken together, these figures show that Koreans today hold a fairly receptive attitude toward globalization.

How, then, does a social Darwinian understanding of the world and an organic/collectivistic notion of nation/society affect South Koreans’ views of globalization? To answer this question, I ran ordered logit regression of two indicators of views of globalization (*culture* and *English*) on two measures of social Darwinism (*competition* and *survival*). Table 3 shows that both measures of social Darwinism have a positive and statistically significant impact on *culture*, but not on *English*.

Next, to evaluate the influence of organic/collectivistic notion of nation/society on Koreans’ attitude toward globalization, I regress two indicators of views of globalization (*culture* and *English*) on two measures of organic/collectivistic notion of nation/society (*blood* and *collective*). As presented in Table 3, both *blood* and *collective* have positive and statistically significant effect on both measures of globalism. These findings offer a strong evidence that organic/collectivistic notion of nation/society facilitates globalization.

Table 2. Views of Ethnic Identity, Social Darwinism, Collectivism, and Globalization

Question (Scale)	Strongly agree or agree
Survey on National Identity and Unification in South Korea, 2000 (N=1003)	
<u>On Social Darwinism</u>	
The world is an arena of competition among nations.	81%
The survival of the fittest is a major principle of contemporary world.	75%
<u>On Nation/Society</u>	
Our nation has a single bloodline.	93%
In case of national crisis, national interests can be given priority over individual ones.	64%
<u>On Globalization</u>	
It is good to acquire foreign languages or cultures from childhood.	61%
English should be the second official language in Korea.	54%
Survey on the Formation of Korean Network Community in 21st Century, 1999 (N=1000)	
<u>On Ethnic Homogeneity</u>	
Koreans are all brothers and sisters, regardless of political ideology or regional residence.	75%
<u>On Exposure to Globalization</u>	
Proficiency in using computer in general	56% (adequate or better)
Proficiency in using the internet	38% (adequate or better)
Proficiency in using e-mail	31% (adequate or better)

Table 3. Effects of Social Darwinism and Conception of Nation/Society on Globalization

Independent Variables	Unstandardized Coefficient (Standard Error)	
	Culture	English
<u>Social Darwinism</u>		
<i>Competition</i>	.34 (.08)**	.05 (.08)
<i>Survival</i>	.25 (.08)**	-.09 (.08)
<u>Nation/Society</u>		
<i>Blood</i>	.37 (.10)**	.19 (.10)*
<i>Collective</i>	.42 (.07)**	.17 (.07)**

** p<.01 * p<.05 (one-tailed test)

2) *Intensification of ethnic identity*

Table 2 presents levels of proficiency of various means of globalization and national identity from the second dataset. Fifty-six percent of the respondents say that their skills in using computers are adequate or better than adequate—the figures for the Internet and email proficiency are 38 percent and 31 percent, respectively.³ Koreans also hold a strong sense of ethnic identity, as 75 percent of the respondents agree that “Koreans are all brothers and sisters, regardless of political ideology or regional residence.” How, then, does Korean exposure to globalization affect their national identity? More specifically, does the use of computers, the Internet, and email weaken or strengthen Koreans’ sense of ethnic homogeneity?

Table 4 presents outcomes of ordered logit regression analysis. From the table it is clear that using computers, the Internet, or email all positively affect ethnic identity—coefficients for all three measures of globalization are positive and statistically significant at least at the level of .05. These findings demonstrate that exposure to globalization through new technology strengthens Koreans’ sense of ethnic homogeneity.

Table 4. Effects of Exposure to Globalization on Ethnic Homogeneity

Independent Variables	Unstandardized Coefficient (Standard Error)
	Ethnic Homogeneity
<u>Exposure to Globalization</u>	
<i>Computer</i>	.15 (.06)**
<i>Internet</i>	.14 (.06)*
<i>Email</i>	.11 (.06)*

** p<.01 * p<.05 (one-tailed test)

Conclusion and Discussion

This paper suggests that national and global forces do not necessarily contradict each other; rather, they are readily compatible. This is because 1) globalization can be appropriated for the nationalist goal, and 2) globalization can intensify, rather than weaken, national identity in reaction. Globalization presents both opportunities and threats, and a nation state becomes proactive in maximizing what globalization has to offer as well as reactive to its harmful effects. The Korean case as examined here lends empirical support to both propositions, at official and popular levels. The Korean government has indeed promoted globalization to enhance Korea's national competitiveness in a rapidly globalizing world and simultaneously sought to preserve and strengthen Korean national heritage and culture. Analyses of survey data likewise show that Koreans understand globalization from an instrumentalist view. Their exposure to the Internet and other means of globalization strengthens their sense of ethnic homogeneity.

That Koreans view globalization from an instrumentalist perspective (i.e., treating globalization as a means to achieve a competitive edge for the nation) can also be seen in their attitude toward the English language. While Koreans would support making English their *second* official language since it could enhance their national interests, they would not support making it their official language (replacing Korean). The latter option would threaten their national identity and is thus unacceptable. When I examined the effect that making English Korea's official language would have on Koreans' sense of ethnic homogeneity, I found the impact to be small. By contrast, the impact was significant in the case of making English the nation's second official language.

Though they are often associated with each other, it is important to separate national identity from national pride. Unlike its considerable effect on Koreans' sense of ethnic homogeneity, I found that exposure to globalization had little influence on national pride. This suggests that exposure to other societies and cultures—comparing “us” with “them”—can increase one's own national consciousness, but it does not necessarily lead to increased pride in one's own nation and culture. While the literature shows a tendency to equate national pride with identity (Evans and Kelley 2002), they are not the same, especially as far as globalization's impact is concerned.

Finally, my analysis suggests that a potential danger for authoritarianism exists in Korean globalization. A firm sense of the nation as organic, ethnic, and collectivistic can be tapped as a resource by the government in its drive for globalization. However, one must also be aware of the potential for authoritarianism latent in the process. For instance, the state might demand the sacrifice of individual civic rights in the name of globalization; some intellectuals in fact criticized the Kim government's *segyehwa* drive as a political cover to legitimize its top-down reform programs (not necessarily with popular consent). The promulgation of the special law that excludes (overseas) ethnic Koreans in China and Russia illustrates how the government pursued globalization in its own way, despite strong reservation from intellectuals and even against the constitution.

In conclusion, Korea's strong nationalist character is not a paradox but rather a major feature or “paradigm” of Korean globalization. There is no clear sign yet that either national or global forces will disappear in the near future. Instead, they will likely coexist in Korea, in relations both contentious and complementary. The current scholarship, which suggests that globalization and nationalism are antithetical or contradictory, requires a fresh perspective. The consequences of globalization—nationalist appropriation of globalism and intensifica-

tion of nationalism—are not, in fact, paradoxical; it would thus be wrong to expect a “paradigm shift.” Indeed, the close connection between globalization and national forces is a primary feature of the globalization processes currently under way in Korea and elsewhere.

Notes

¹ Such unequal treatment of ethnic Koreans was criticized by intellectuals and challenged in the court. Recently the Korean Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to exclude ethnic Koreans in Russia and China from the benefits of the special law.

² After linearity tests, I collapsed categories with few cases into one. For instance, the statement “Our nation has a single bloodline” had initially five categories, which I consolidated into three—strongly agree, agree, and others (neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree). Even so, only 7 percent fall into the last category.

³ These figures may not seem high, but given that computer and Internet use are relatively recent and their usage has grown rapidly since the survey was conducted, the figures for today would be much higher. For instance, the total PC communication population was 4.86 million in 1998 but jumped to 18.6 million by the end of 2001. Likewise, the Korea Internet Information Center estimates that Internet users were only 3.1 million in 1998. That number increased to 10.8 million in 1999 and to 22 million as of February 2001 (Korea Annual 2001, pp. 206). In terms of technology, these statistics show that globalization is unfolding very rapidly in Korea.

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