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The Origins of Authoritarianism in Pakistan

Sumit Ganguly

Introduction

What ails the Pakistani polity? Since its emergence from the detritus of the British Indian Empire in 1947, it has witnessed four military coups (1958, 1969, 1978 and 1999), long periods of political instability and a persistent inability to consolidate democratic institutions. It also witnessed the loss of a significant portion of its territory (East Pakistan) in 1971 following the brutal suppression of an indigenous uprising in the aftermath of which some ten million individuals sought refuge in India. The flight of the refugees to India and the failure to reach a political resolution to the crisis precipitated Indian military intervention and culminated in the creation of the new state of Bangladesh.ⁱ

Pakistan's inability to sustain a transition to democracy is especially puzzling given that India too emerged from the collapse of British rule in South Asia. In marked contrast to Pakistan, it has only experienced a brief bout of authoritarian rule (1975-1977) and has managed to consolidate democracy even though the quality of its democratic institutions and their performance may leave much to be desired.ⁱⁱ

Yet like India, there were a number of features of Pakistan's colonial inheritance that may have predisposed it toward democracy. It was the beneficiary of a professional civil service, a military officer corps who had been exposed to British traditions of civil-military relations, a political party, the Muslim League, that

had managed to garner substantial support amongst the Muslim population of British India and had the experience electoral politics.

On the other hand, it had also inherited a very substantial landowning class in the Punjab that was quite hostile toward democratic norms and institutions.ⁱⁱⁱ Furthermore, was sandbagged with areas where British colonial administrative structures had not fully and successfully penetrated. Consequently, these regions, most notably along its northwest frontier posed important challenges for governance.^{iv} Finally, it also had a more daunting task of resettlement of refugees as it was the state that chose to break away from the British Indian Empire.

While India had been the beneficiary of many of the same advantages of Pakistan its post-independence leadership had confronted the tasks of extreme linguistic diversity, vast cleavages of caste and class and the need to integrate some 500 odd “princely states”, many of whom were quite recalcitrant, into the Indian Union.^v Yet its leadership succeeded in addressing these tasks with remarkable skill, a minimum of coercion and succeeded in forging a democratic state.^{vi}

A number of scholars have proffered important explanations for Pakistan’s failure to make a successful transition to democracy. This essay will argue that all the extant explanations are, at best, partial and incomplete. It will then demonstrate that the roots of Pakistan’s propensity toward authoritarianism must be sought in the ideology, organization and mobilization strategy of the movement for the creation of Pakistan.

Alternative Explanations

There is a small but important corpus of scholarship on the origins and evolution of the Pakistani state. Most of these studies seek to explain why democratic institutions and norms failed to take root in Pakistan. One of the earliest works on the subject suggests that the failure must be traced to the extraordinary challenges of state construction in the aftermath of the partition of the subcontinent and the intransigence of the elitist civil service toward the messiness of democratic procedures.^{vii} Another careful historical analysis similarly attributes the destruction of Pakistan's nascent democratic institutions to the predilections of a small group of extremely powerful bureaucrats who had little regard for democratic processes.^{viii} A historian of some note has offered a markedly different explanation for the emergence and consolidation of military rule in Pakistan. This explanation, briefly stated, holds that Pakistan turned toward authoritarianism largely because of India's unwillingness to share military and civilian resources with Pakistan, a perceived existential threat from its more powerful neighbor in its early years, and the military's willingness to adumbrate and exploit this threat.^{ix} A scholar of Marxist orientation has concluded that democracy failed to take root in Pakistan principally because of the emergence of an early and infelicitous nexus between the bureaucracy and the military establishment. As he has written,

In Pakistan two facts stand out in sharp relief in its 25 year history. One is the dominant position of the bureaucratic-military oligarchy in the state; it has been in effective command of state power not, as is commonly believed, after the coup d'etat of October 1958 but, in fact, from the inception of the new state.^x

Another scholar has argued that Pakistan's authoritarian propensity can be traced to a lack of interest in democracy on the part of its landowning classes, its military establishment, its religious authorities and its civil service.^{xi}

A final argument can be found in the work of a noted historian of colonial India. He argues that the roots of Pakistan's authoritarianism can be traced to recruitment practices of Pakistani military from the dominant state of the Punjab which it had inherited from the British colonial era.^{xii}

The Limits of Extant Explanations

None of these arguments and explanations is bereft of analytic merit. For example, Jalal is correct in asserting that Indian authorities did act in a most niggardly fashion when it came to the division of the assets of the British Indian Empire. Similarly, there is little question that Cohen, McGrath and Sayeed are correct in their assessments of the elitism of the Pakistani civil service.

Nevertheless, none of their explanations are entirely satisfactory. All of them yield valuable insights but fail to provide a complete explanation. The limitations of their arguments are spelled out below.

With the possible exception of Alavi, none of the authors explain how certain social classes, came to dominate Pakistan's political system.^{xiii} Instead they simply assert their existence and underscore their importance. Nor do the authors adequately explain why the various entities that they have identified were so deeply antithetical toward democratic procedures and institutions. Finally, they also fail to explain why countervailing institutions within the Pakistani state proved

so inadequate in exercising some oversight and control over the military establishment.

In fairness, at least one author, provides some clues toward explaining the puzzle of institutional weakness. As McGrath has written:

Each (Muslim) League member was free to create his own image of what Pakistan would be. But the advantage that Jinnah's tactics served in the national movement was a disadvantage when the League faced the question of operating a national state. Pakistan came into existence lacking any social or economic policy which League members could agree to implement.^{xiv}

Even this explanation, however, still begs a question. Why had the Muslim League failed to develop a programmatic agenda for the new state? After all, the organization had been founded in 1906, forty-one years prior to the formation of the Pakistani state. Surely over the course of four decades the organization should have been able to fashion some ideas and principles for democratic self-government?^{xv}

Finally, Dewey's analysis of the dominance of a militarized Punjab in Pakistan's politics and the concomitant role of the military has considerable merit. However, it still fails to answer a critical question. Why was Pakistan's civilian leadership so utterly incapable of keeping the military at bay? India, albeit in considerably smaller measure, confronted the same issue when it had to transform a colonial army that had loyally served the British into a nationalist entity answerable to elected civilian authority.^{xvi}

Toward An Alternative Explanation

A more complete explanation must focus on the ideological foundations of the Pakistani state. To that end, one needs to examine the origins and evolution of Muslim separatism in British India toward the latter half of the nineteenth

century.^{xvii} The cultural, social and political impact of British colonialism on Indian religious and cultural mores was considerable.^{xviii} However, the elites of few communities felt as dislocated as the Muslims of British India. The reasons underlying this sense of displacement can be easily identified. Prior to the advent of the East India Company and the subsequent imposition of British colonial power, a Muslim elite had enjoyed extraordinary political power in the Mughal Empire. This sense of displacement would be used to considerable effect to forge the vision of a unified, monolithic Muslim nation. As one scholar has cogently stated:

The real significance of this identity lay in the ostensibly special status of Muslims that was seen to rest above all on their pre-eminent claim to power. It flowed from the experience of Muslim dominance in India...^{xix}

The British conquest and domination of India, especially after the successful (and brutal) suppression of the first major uprising against the British imperial presence in 1857, dramatically reduced their standing and privileges within Indian society. Even prior to this particular tragedy, Muslim religious revivalism was already under way. A noted Muslim scholar, Shah Waliullah (1703-62), had lamented the steady decline of the Mughal Empire and had sought to forge a pristine vision of Islam in an attempt to revive the stature of Muslims in the waning days of the empire. ^{xx}

Along with Muslim revivalism, India had also witnessed movements for Hindu revivalism and reform. Some segments of the Hindu community sought to reform and revive Hinduism while others embraced elements of British liberal values, mores and customs.^{xxi} Most importantly, they started to appropriate ideas of representative government from the British and sought to forge similar institutions

in India. Such efforts were, at best, fitful and incremental and confined to an Anglicized elite. Nevertheless, this quest did culminate in the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885. It should be underscored, however, that the initial founders of the movement did come from diverse religious communities and included two Christians and two Parsis.^{xxii}

Despite the diverse social composition of the leadership of the INC, its quest for the creation of representative institutions contributed to growing misgivings on the part of key Muslim intellectuals. They feared, that in the absence of suitable institutional guarantees, the principles of universal franchise would place the Muslims of India at an intrinsic disadvantage. Few individuals made this argument with as much force as the Muslim intellectual and founder of the noted Aligarh Muslim University, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan.^{xxiii} As he wrote:

Let us first first of all that we have universal suffrage as in America and that everybody, chamars and all have votes. And first suppose that all Mahomedan electors vote for a Mahomedan electors suppose vote for one Mahomedan member and that all Hindu electors for a Hindu memberIt is certain that the Hindu member will have four times as many because their population will have four times as many ...and now count how many votes the Muslim member will have and how many the Hindu. ...and now how can the Mahomedan guard his interests? It will be like a game of dice in which one man had four dice and the other only one.^{xxiv}

Furthermore, in another tract he argued that:

The Muhammadans are not the aborigines of this country. They came in the train of former conquerors and gradually domesticated themselves in India. They were therefore all dependent on service, and on account of this increased difficulty in obtaining the same, they, far more than the Hindoos, were put to much inconvenience and misery.^{xxv}

The elitism of his views and his idiosyncratic perspective on the origins and status of the Muslim community in India requires little comment. However, it is

important to underscore that these views were emblematic of much of the Muslim separatist leadership. Indeed as will be demonstrated later in this essay, the class composition of the Muslim League and its principal supporters in the United Provinces did little to modify the anti-democratic ethos of the separatist movement. As a noted Indian historian has commented:

The main communal argument against democracy was that it would lead to majority rule which would in effect mean the majority 'community's' domination over the minority. Muslim communalists put forward this argument on an all India scale in the name of preventing Hindus from exercising effective power and permanent domination over Muslims, who would remain a permanent minority, while Hindu communalists repeated it almost verbatim in the provinces where Muslims constituted the majority.^{xxvi}

Obviously the possibility of being politically marginalized with the advent of democratic and representative institutions caused much anxiety in minds of the Muslim leadership in the late nineteenth century. What further galvanized the Muslim leadership was the decision of the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, to reverse his decision to partition the state of Bengal after widespread opposition from the Bengali Hindu community. The precise reasons for the proposed partition of Bengal are beyond the scope of this discussion. Suffice to say that it was not purely a matter of administrative convenience and nor was it solely a devious imperial plot to sow discord amongst Hindus and Muslims. Instead it was an amalgam of motives that animated British colonial authorities. Unfortunately, segments of the Muslim elite accepted the British propaganda that they would be beneficiaries of this partition and thereby its annulment in 1911, following mass agitation in Bengal, caused a further rift with the Hindu population.^{xxvii}

In the meanwhile, the growing concern about the status of the Muslims in India culminated in the creation of the Muslim League in 1906. It is important to highlight, however, that the League did not initially endorse a separatist agenda. Its primary concern, as expressed at its founding, was to “protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Musalmans of India”.^{xxviii} In the aftermath of its formation, the British faced with growing political discontent in various parts of India made a small concession toward the principle of self-government under the aegis of the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909. However, simultaneously, they also conceded the demand from elements within the Muslim community for the creation of separate electorates.^{xxix} This concession, invariably, had the effect of bolstering the notion, already prevalent in some quarters that the Muslims of India constituted a monolithic, primordial nation. Such a conception of nationhood was hardly conducive to the development of liberal-democratic norms or institutions.^{xxx}

The Mobilization Strategy and Organization of the Muslim League

Throughout the struggle for independence, the Muslim League remained a mostly elitist organization. The slow growth of representative institutions in India, initially under the aegis of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919 and then under the Government of India Act of 1935, did little to contribute to changes within the internal structure and organization of the Muslim League. Even a sympathetic observer of the League has written:

Its lack of success in becoming a dynamic organization was mainly because of its leadership in the past had been composed of “careerists” ---professional politicians

who lacked mass political appeal and some of whom felt no particular dedication to their cause. Convenience rather than conviction, governed their politics. ^{xxxix}

Indeed its performance in the 1937 elections showed its limited popularity even within significant segments of the Muslim community. In this election, which led to the creation of provincial legislatures, the League only managed to win a mere 109 of the 482 seats that had been allocated to Muslims in the eleven provinces of British India. Only in the Muslim minority provinces where it managed to cast itself as the guarantor of the rights of Muslims did it perform well. The Congress, in stark contrast, had contested 1,161 seats and had won as many as 716. Overall, Congress secured a clear majority in six provinces and emerged as the largest single party in three others.^{xxxix} Congress' success, in large part reflected its successful transformation into a mass-based political party during the early part of the twentieth century.^{xxxix} That said, Congress' ability to make significant inroads into the Muslim community was still limited. It had contested 58 out of a possible 482 Muslims seats and won only 26.^{xxxix}

Congress ministries resigned en masse in 1939 when Britain committed India to the war effort without prior consultation with the country's elected representatives. Furthermore, Congress demanded that Britain commit itself to full Indian independence at the conclusion of the war. The British authorities proved unwilling to meet this demand and most Congress leaders were incarcerated.

Instead it can be argued that:

Both for countering the Congress demand and dividing Indian opinion and response and for maintaining normal administration in as many provinces as possible,

reliance was placed on the Muslim League whose politics and demands were counterposed to nationalist politics and demands.^{xxxv}

As the Congress leaders languished in prison during much of the war years, the League, under the charismatic leadership of Mohammed Ali Jinnah was able to resort to the populist refrain that the departure of the British would invariably result in Hindu domination. As the League, with the complicity of the British authorities, articulated this position, it did little to alter its internal composition and organization. Even as it acquired mass support through fanning the fears of Indian Muslims about the prospects of Hindu perfidy, it did little to encourage democratic practices within the party. Indeed as one scholar has argued with some force, any Muslim leader, who dared challenge Jinnah's role as the "sole spokesman" of the Muslims met a harsh fate:

Those who challenged it were ruthlessly suppressed. They included Muslims who had thrown in their lot with Congress (so-called 'nationalist Muslims') and strongly resisted Jinnah's idea of equating the civilizational unity of Muslims with Indian Muslim nationhood.^{xxxvi}

Despite these limitations how did the League succeed in turning the tide against the Congress in the 1946 elections? In this election, barely a decade later, it won 75 percent of the total Muslim vote as opposed to 4.4 percent in 1937.^{xxxvii} Obviously, in part, its success can be attributed to Jinnah's extremely deft use of the appeals to religious nationalism. However, this is not an entirely complete or satisfactory explanation for the League's dramatic change of fortunes.

Jinnah's ability to mobilize significant segments of the Muslim community behind the League was not solely based upon his oratory. His command of Urdu or even Gujarati was limited. Instead it was the League's single minded focus on the

potential plight of Muslims in a predominantly Hindu polity that stirred Muslim misgivings. As one historian of Islam in modern India has written:

If the Hindus, with the little power that they were given in provincial governments, could wreak such horror on the helpless Muslims, what they would inflict in an independent India might well be imagined. Helps to imagining it were profusely distributed by the League. It was suggested that in a united India the strong, ferocious, Hindu-dominated centre, in its policy of crushing or exterminating Islam, would impose upon the Muslims a foreign language, an alien and caste-ridden social system, an infidel and rather barbarous culture; and of course, would place 'foreigners' in charge of administering these evils and in all posts of authority.^{xxxviii}

Obviously this form of propaganda contributed to the ability of the League to dramatically alter its fortunes in the 1946 elections. It helped Jinnah to paper over the significant differences of education, social class and sectarian cleavages amongst Indian Muslims. Through his determined characterization of Muslims as a monolithic community facing the possibility of imminent Hindu domination and oppression he succeeded in bringing substantial numbers of Muslims within the fold of the League. In this endeavor, he managed to enlist the support of a range of groups and individuals extending from well-heeled rural gentry to religious authorities whom he had previously shunned.^{xxxix} Simultaneously, the League evinced utter contempt for Muslims who had chosen to organize under the banners of Congress, the Khudai Khidmatgars (popularly known as the 'Red Shirts' in the North-West Frontier Province) or the Unionist Party in the Punjab.^{xl} Indeed the League played a critical part in the collapse of the Unionist coalition ministry in the Punjab under Khizr Hyat Khan.^{xli}

In significant part, the electoral success of the League also reflected Congress' failure to adequately reassure Muslims that their interests would be protected in a post-independence India.^{xlii} Congress though a party founded on the principles of civic nationalism nevertheless felt compelled on occasion to make common cause with wealthy and politically significant local notables because of electoral exigencies. Worse still, as an umbrella organization, it did have within its midst a number of individuals and factions who had little interest in and commitment to secular values. Not surprisingly, they remained antithetical to Muslim interests and concerns.^{xliii} As a consequence the party could not entirely reassure segments of the Muslim community that their interests would be adequately protected in a post-independence political order. This failure significantly helped Jinnah as he sought to exploit the genuine misgivings of the Muslims about their future in a post-British, independent India.

Despite the success of this strategy in ensuring the allegiance of significant numbers of Muslims to the League, it nevertheless failed to articulate a vision of the political order that would constitute the Pakistani state.^{xliv} This lack of attention to the features and characteristics of the future state would have significantly adverse consequences for independent Pakistan. When faced with a plethora of social, political and economic challenges, the League and its leadership, especially after Jinnah's early demise, proved to be singularly incapable of coping with them. This incapacity to provide effective governance provided the opportunity for an elitist civil service and an undemocratic military to fashion an alliance of convenience to squelch the anemic democratic state. Only they, the key members of

the two communities concluded, were capable of dealing with the tasks of maintaining political order and preserving the state. The following quotation from Iskander Mirza, a Minister for the Interior, exemplifies the outlook of the senior echelons of the bureaucracy about the rough and tumble features of democratic politics.^{xlv}

They (illiterate peasants) elect crooks and scalawags who promise the moon. The scalawags make a mess of everything, and then I have to clean up the mess. Democracy required education, tradition, breeding, and pride in your ability to do something well.^{xlvi}

The question of a political vision for the new state was also closely linked to the internal organization and support base of the League. Despite its success in mobilizing significant numbers of Muslims to support its platform in the 1946 election, its internal structure remained largely unrepresentative of the extraordinary diversity of British India's Muslim population. The principals within the League were drawn from the landed gentry of the United Provinces (later the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh).

In the Aftermath of Partition

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to deal with the question of the partition of British India and its impact on the two nascent states of India and Pakistan. There is a vast literature on the subject and it encompasses important debates about its sources and consequences.^{xlvii} Suffice to say that the partition had dire consequences for both the emergent states of India and Pakistan. Its haste and lack of organization resulted in the deaths of over a million individuals and the displacement of at least seven million in each direction.^{xlviii} Consequently, the tasks

of state construction were considerably more demanding.^{xlix} Unfortunately, there was little in the ideology, social background, internal organization of the Muslim League that had equipped it for the formidable challenges of state construction. Confronted with the task of building a new state with a significant Hindu religious minority in East Pakistan, deep sectarian divisions within the Muslim community and substantial linguistic diversity, the leadership, especially after Jinnah's untimely demise in 1948, found itself hopelessly unequal to the tasks at hand.

As one noted historian of Pakistan has written:

Opportunist converts could jump off the League bandwagon as quickly as they had scrambled on board it. Jinnah's untimely death compounded the problems brought by mounting factionalism within Punjab and the revival of traditional opponents in the Frontier and Sind. By 1956 the League was in rapid decline, whilst its organizational weaknesses had not prevented the birth of Pakistan, it was to severely jeopardize the task of nation-building.¹

Finally, their prior lack of experience with democratic practices and norms seemed to make them far more prone toward continuing with the institutional legacies of the British raj. Their initial institutional choices provide useful clues about how the state's future would unfold. In turn, these institutional choices, which reflected the preferences of the Pakistani leadership, further bolstered the drift toward an authoritarian political order. Specifically, Pakistan chose to base its initial constitution on the Government of India Act of 1935. The central features of this act have been aptly characterized as follows:

The 1935 act provided for responsible government at the provincial level but reserved veto power for governors. It also contained the principle of diarchy for the central government, which was operating at the time of partition in the form of an "interim government". The 1947 Indian Independence Act not only established fully responsible government at the center but also conferred emergency powers on the

governor general, which led to the emergence of what has been described as the “viceregal system” in Pakistan.^{li}

The powers that were vested in the position of the governor-general provided the basis for a highly centralized state. Consequently, the constitution of 1956, though notionally democratic, laid the foundations for a mostly unitary state with little power devolved to the provinces. This constitutional arrangement, as is well known, lasted all of two years as the military dismissed the new regime in 1958. However, even prior to the military coup of 1958, for all practical purposes the death knell for Pakistan’s incipient democratic institutions had already been rung as early as 1954, with Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed’s dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and imposition of a state of emergency.^{lii} A pliant Supreme Court had granted its imprimatur to these decisions invoking “the doctrine of state necessity”.

These early choices that culminated in military rule helped forge a political culture that did little or nothing to dismantle the feudal features of parts of the Pakistani state, bolstered the role of the civil service and above all the military. Once embarked on this path of constitutional and political development that viewed mass political participation with both disdain and distaste, it became exceedingly difficult for the state to instill a democratic political ethos and to reinforce democratic and participatory institutions.^{liii}

Conclusions:

One may well ask why well after sixty years of independence that the political culture of the late 1940s has not undergone a transformation. The fear of Hindu domination came to a close with the creation of Pakistan. Post-partition

challenges, though formidable, were over time addressed. The political elite should have realized the dangers of excessive centralization and structural inequities from the break-up of the country in 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh. Additionally, the country has held successful elections and so there should be considerable yearning for consolidation of democracy. Finally, the military, which was quite elitist in orientation, is now more representative of the country's diversity.

Unfortunately, other misgivings and social forces have come to the fore. The fear Muslims has been replaced by a fear of India. Though post-partition challenges were successfully addressed, a host of other came to besiege the state. Linguistic differences wracked the country, the question of the proper role of religion in politics was never resolved and problems of population growth and economic inequities continued to dog the country. Politically, despite the existence of a viable constitutional structure for the emergence of democratic institutions the central features of the constitution still reflect the centralizing propensities of the 1935 Government of India Act. Furthermore, despite periodic support for democracy, the country's experience of democratic politics has been far from exemplary. Finally, the military though more diverse is now a less westernized institution and actively hostile toward the rough and tumble of democratic politics.

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Harrison Wagner for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. All errors of fact and interpretation are necessarily mine.

ENDNOTES

ⁱ Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis: India-Pakistan-Bangla Desh* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975); also see Hasan Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994)

ⁱⁱ Sumit Ganguly, "Assessing the Quality of Democracy in Bangladesh and India," in Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, eds. *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); for a variety of perspectives see Atul Kohli, ed. *The Success of India's Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); also see James Manor, "How and Why Liberal and Representative Politics Emerged in India," *Political Studies*, 38:1, March 1990, 20-38.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh, *The Partition of India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)

^{iv} Ainslie T. Embree, *Pakistan's Western Borderlands: The Transformation of a Political Order* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1979)

^v Ian Copland, *The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917-1947* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

^{vi} Ramachandra Guha, *India Since Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2007)

^{vii} Khalid bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1967)

^{viii} Allen McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996)

^{ix} Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

^x Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review*, 1:74, July-August, 1972.

^{xi} Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2007)

^{xii} See Clive Dewey, "The Rural Roots of Pakistani Militarism," in D.A. Low ed. *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); on the militarization of the Punjab under British colonial rule see Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State: Military, Government and Society in the Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005)

^{xiii} Alavi, given his Marxist orientation, argues that they were the legatees of British colonialism.

^{xiv} McGrath, 1996, p.53.

^{xv} It should be noted, however, that the concept of Pakistani statehood had not been formally articulated until the Lahore session of the Muslim League in 1940. On the other hand, it should also be underscored that even thereafter there was little effort to define, 'Whether or not Pakistan was to be democratic, socialist, feudal, in the

British Empire, riddled with native states, and so forth, are questions which the League adamantly refused to answer.” Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1946), p.259.

^{xvi} For an analysis of India’s civil-military relations after independence see Sumit Ganguly, “From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil: The Army in Contemporary India,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 26:1-2, 1991, 11-26; for a useful comparative perspective see Veena Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India* (New Delhi Sage Publications, 1991)

^{xvii} Two of the standard accounts are Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) and Francis Robinson, *Separatism Amongst the Indian Muslims: The Politics’ of the United Provinces Muslims, 1860-1923* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974)

^{xviii} Tapan Raychaudhuri, *Perceptions, Emotions, Sensibilities: Essays on India’s Colonial and Post-Colonial Experiences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)

^{xix} Farzana Shaikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p.15.

^{xx} See the trenchant discussion in Bimal Prasad, *The Foundations of Muslim Nationalism*, Volume One. (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001)

^{xxi} Other elements of the Hindu elite pursued various revivalist as well as reform movements. See for example, Gwilym Beckerlegge, ed. *Colonialism, Modernity and Reform Movements in South Asia* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008)

^{xxii} I am grateful to Jonah Blank, an anthropologist of modern India, for bringing this to my attention.

^{xxiii} For a sympathetic discussion of the ideas of Sir Sayyid, see Hafeez Malik, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980)

^{xxiv} As quoted in Hardy, 1972.

^{xxv} Syed Ahmed Khan, *The Causes of the India Revolt*. (With an Introduction by Francis Robinson) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)

^{xxvi} Bipan Chandra, *Communalism in Modern India* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1984), p.91.

^{xxvii} For a considered discussion see Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India, 1885-1947* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1985)

^{xxviii} As quoted in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947*, Volume :One (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1969), p.1.

^{xxix} Sarkar, 1985.

^{xxx} One scholar, in fact, has argued that Islamic ideology, with its emphasis on communal consensus is antithetical to liberal-democratic conceptions of political representation. Furthermore, she contends that the roots of Muslim separatism and the demand for Pakistan can be traced to the ideological basis of the movement. For a cogent statement of this argument see the discussion in Farzana Shaikh, “Muslims and Political representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan,” in Mushirul Hasan, ed. *India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993); also see Farzana Shaikh, “Islam and the Quest for

Democracy in Pakistan,” *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 24:1, 1986, 74-92.

xxxvi Z.H. Zaidi, “Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-47,” in C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright, ed. *The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970, p.246.

xxxvii S.R. Mehrotra, “The Congress and the Partition of India,” in Philips and Wainwright, eds. 1970, p.189.

xxxviii Gopal Krishna, “The Development of the Indian National Congress as a mass Organization, 1918-1923,” *Journal of Asian Studies*, 25:3, May 1966, 413-430; in fairness, it must be noted that Congress failed to win few reserved Muslim seats. In Bengal, Fazlul Haq’s Krishak Proja Party (“farmer people’s party”), which was both opposed to zamindars (rural landlords) and Hindus, won most of them.

xxxix Talbot and Singh, 2009.

xl Chandra, 1984, p.259.

xli Shaikh, 2009, p.39.

xlii Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North-West and North-East India 1937-47* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988)

xliiii Smith, 1946.

xliiii For a detailed discussion of this mobilization strategy see Mushirul Hasan, *Legacy of a Divided Nation: India’s Muslims Since Independence* (London: Hurst and Company, 1997)

xliv Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (London: Hurst and Company, 1998)

xlv D.N. Panigrahi, *India’s Partition: The Story of Imperialism in Retreat* (London: Routledge, 2004); for a wider discussion of the politics of the Punjab in the waning years of British rule see David Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)

xlvi In effect, it represented an important “commitment problem”. For a discussion of the “commitment problem” and the consequences that can ensue in conditions of uncertainty in ethnically plural states see James Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds. *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); on Congress’ failure to adequately address the concerns of Muslims see Mushirul Hasan, “The Muslim Mass Contacts Campaign: Analysis of a Strategy of Political Mobilization,” in Mushirul Hasan ed. *India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993)

xlvii See the excellent discussion of this subject in Hasan, “Introduction”, 1993.

xlviii It is possible to anticipate one likely objection to this argument. Namely, according to one prominent historian, Ayesha Jalal, Jinnah had not intended to create a separate state until toward the end of British rule. Consequently, it could be argued that he and his colleagues had had little opportunity to draw up appropriate blueprints for this nascent state. Jalal’s argument about Jinnah’s strategy and its unintended consequences is spelled out in Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)

^{xlv} It should also be noted that Mirza had been previously commissioned in the British Indian Army and was the first Indian graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.

^{xlvi} As quoted in Khalid bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967)

^{xlvii} A small sub-set of that literature consists of the following: S.R. Mehrotra, *Toward India's Freedom and Partition* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978); Anita Inder Singh, *The Origins of the Partition of India: 1936-1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987); Mushirul Hasan, *India Partitioned: The Other Face of Freedom* (New Delhi: Lotus Collection, 1995); Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Narendra Singh Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition* (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2005); Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Alex von Tenzelman, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire* (London: Picador, 2008)

^{xlviii} Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1997, 76:1.

^{xlix} Some of them are discussed in Khalid bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968)

^l Talbot, 1988, p.113.

^{li} Mohammed Waseem, "Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy," *Asian Survey*, July 1992, 32:7, 617-634.

^{lii} For a thoughtful discussion of the military's rationale for the coup see Mazhar Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The parallel state* (London: Routledge, 2008)

^{liii} For the classic statement on path dependence see Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)