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### ***Between Apartheid and Sustainable Democracy: Domestic Drivers and International Influences on Democratization in South Africa***

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UNIVERSITY OF  
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**Between Apartheid  
and Sustainable Democracy:  
Domestic Drivers and International Influences  
on Democratization in South Africa**

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## **Between Apartheid and Sustainable Democracy: Domestic Drivers and International Influences on Democratization in South Africa**

Since the celebrated “liberation” elections of April 26-27, 1994, South Africa features a fully functioning democratic system with a fairly representative parliament, a coherent executive branch led by an indirectly elected President, and an independent and sometimes assertive judiciary. Its civil society is vibrant, and its press is independent. Governance is guided by a broadly accepted constitutional settlement that was reached in 1996. *Prima facie*, South Africa's transition appears to be a success. However, the government is a dominant party regime (or de facto one-party state) with feeble parliamentary opposition; indeed, the African National Congress (ANC) increased its majority in the first two post-transition elections – 1999 and 2004 – winning with 69.68% of the popular vote in the ten-years-after-apartheid April 2004 poll. More recently, however, a series of governance crises -- among them the sudden resignation of President Thabo Mbeki in September 2008 and the naming of a caretaker administration under current president Kgalema Motlale -- combined with party proliferation presages a new era as the country moves toward possibly pivotal national elections on April 22, 2009.

As South Africa enters a new era of post-transition democracy, it faces an unimaginable, rolling health crisis falling life expectancy (from 63 to 57), increasing inequality and frustration within its black majority, continued and possibly mounting ethnic tensions, migration and refugee pressures, an anemic economy, a debilitating crime epidemic, political corruption, and a crisis of elite succession within the ruling ANC. Thus, all the indicators of a weak state and vulnerability to renewed or new violent conflict are present in South Africa today. Although it may be the strongest and most democratically institutionalized and economically developed state in Africa, South Africa faces fundamental social challenges that if not addressed, ameliorated, and managed may well create new tensions, undermine democracy, and a return to turbulence for this pivotal state in the region and on the world stage.

This paper explores the transition to majority-rule democracy in South Africa -- once a racially exclusive, white minority autocracy under the invidious system of *apartheid* (or racial segregation) -- and it evaluates the relationships between domestic drivers of democratization as an endogenous process and external influences to support the collapse of apartheid, a turbulent and bloody transition, and the still-incomplete consolidation of democracy in the last 15 years. Among the domestic variables triggering transition were an escalating cycle of revolt and repression that began in the mid-1950s and lasted through the 1980s that eroded white minority rule, insightful leadership and elite-driven pact-making, and a vibrant civil society that deepened transitional negotiations through direct social bargaining.

The principal international variables include the moral outcry over entrenched racial segregation that was the anti-apartheid movement, economic and cultural sanctions, informal international facilitation, external technical assistance, a United Nations Observer mission (UNOMSA, the United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa, 1992-1994), and light-touch mediation in the final hours of transition. Since 1994, the international donor community has worked to enable state capacity development, provided additional support to political parties, and has worked extensively to bolster civil society in critical areas such as accountability oversight, election monitoring, and in public opinion polling.

Interaction among domestic and international variables during the transitional phase were seen in the alignment of normative solidarity between the external and internal anti-apartheid movement, of a "ripe" moment for democratic transition that took global geopolitical (i.e., Cold War) tensions out of the equation, and a robust international engagement that left local actors essentially in control of the transition but that underpinned the efforts of moderates to negotiate a new social contract. The critical variables in transition were the close linkages of the Anti-Apartheid Movement with post-independence African regimes which helped set international agendas of condemnation, support of sympathetic Western governments and social movements within Western countries, and the endorsement of the ANC as "sole representative" at the UN together with the broader UN anti-apartheid framework. During the transition, the principal interactions included extensive international engagement with civil society and the conditional easing of the sanctions regime, technical assistance and direct support to key civil society organizations, and the deployment of UNOMSA, and sharing of lessons learned in critical areas such as constitution making and transitional justice. Since the transition, support has taken shape in more typical donor support to democratic governance through projects aimed at human rights education, parliamentary strengthening, participatory policy making, election management, support to judicial institution.

While South Africa has been described as a "miracle" transition, such rhetoric goes too far (Guelke 1999). Indeed, the transitional period was deeply difficult and brutally bloody, with some 16,000 dead in political violence during the heyday of regime transformation in the early 1990s. However, the South African protagonists negotiated through the violence and in the post-apartheid era political violence has dwindled to relatively low levels for nascent democratic regimes. Interestingly, South Africa -- once a candidate for external help to democratize -- now boasts a significant export capacity for democratic negotiation and dialogue, election management, and electoral observation. In this paper, I argue that normative pressure and persuasion has been the principal type of international-domestic interaction in South Africa. Still, consolidation of democracy in South Africa remains elusive : its democratic institutions face severe strain from deeply rooted social, economic, and political tensions – as well as regional spillovers and contagions – that threaten not just democracy, but also social peace. Thus, the task of international support to democratization in South Africa remains incomplete.

## **I. Apartheid's End: Internal Logics of Democratization in South Africa**

From 1948-1994, particularly, South Africa was ruled by white nationalists that implemented policies of systematic racial segregation known as *apartheid* (literally, separateness), depriving the black majority of dignity, citizenship, living wages, and access to land. Apartheid sparked an internal revolt from the disenfranchised black majority, embodied in the anti-apartheid struggle of the African National Congress (ANC) which rebelliously opposed the white minority state with non-racial nationalism and socialism. The regime responded with a period of repression and a regional policy of destabilizing its neighbors. South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s was a bellicose regional hegemonic power – an aggressive state that fomented civil war and political strife in Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique in order to keep its own internal opposition at bay. Apartheid's pernicious policies of racial segregation and regional conflict left deep social wounds throughout southern Africa that contribute to today's persistent social chasms along race and ethnic lines.

### *Apartheid as Autocracy*

From near the very beginning of rule by the Afrikaner-based National Party, which won white-minority elections in 1948 on a platform of racial segregation and nationalist revivalism -- South Africa was gripped by a bloody period of revolt, reform and repression. The National Party began to expand and more systematically implement policies of racial segregation. *Apartheid* — an extensive system of social segregation along putative race and ethnic lines, defined and enforced by the state — was implemented over a period of forty years (1948-1988) in an eventually futile attempt to prevent a rapidly modernizing South Africa from becoming a multiethnic society in which the majority black population would necessarily win the right to vote (Thompson 1990).

National Party apartheid social engineers tried to solve the problem of a black majority through the creation of a set of ten, territorially separated “homelands” in which the principal African ethnic groups would find nominal independence and citizenship. The homelands were created along ethnic lines reflected ten major linguistic groups of the black majority. Some of these homelands were presented to the international community as separate countries from South Africa but these were never recognized by outsiders and eventually the collapse of apartheid brought the collapse of the independent homeland farce as well. The grand apartheid scheme was brought to its fruition by the charismatic and controversial Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd (1958-1966); in 1961, South Africa left the British Commonwealth and declared an independent republic.

The myriad personal and structural injuries inflicted by apartheid precipitated a revolutionary backlash. In response to black exclusion and racial segregation, an African nationalist armed opposition arose to first reform and later to defeat the white minority regime through a revolution of national liberation. The ANC was formed in 1912, making it one of the oldest surviving political organizations in Africa. The ANC, which led the anti-apartheid movement, emulated the ideology and strategies of other liberationist movements in Africa, and it forged an enduring alliance with the South African Communist Party and other opponents of the regime. During the Cold War, the ANC received support from the Soviet Union although it was always a mostly African nationalist organization that has wary of the full embrace of internationalized communist ideology. Likewise, virulent black racial nationalism was also disavowed by the ANC; from the 1950s, especially, the ANC devoted itself to a “nonracial” ideology in response to the imposed racial and ethnic divisions of apartheid. Over time, the ANC has included many white, Asian and Coloured moderates.

Resistance to apartheid cruelty stimulated a wide anti-apartheid revolutionary struggle led mostly by the ANC. The ANC pursued nonviolent struggle until 1960 when its fight against apartheid turned revolutionary; the ANC allied itself with the South African Communist Party and eventually with the powerful internal trade unions (COSATU, the Congress of South African Trade Unions). Nelson Mandela, leader of the ANC, was sentenced to prison for sabotage in 1964 and imprisoned for 27 years. Defiance and nonviolent civil disobedience in the 1950s — particularly over the pass laws — gave way to armed struggle in 1960. From 1948 to late 1989, the conflict was characterized by a cycle of revolt and repression, exacerbated by the Cold War (South Africa was seen by the West as a pillar against communism), with escalating levels of state violence and anti-apartheid resistance. Anti-apartheid resistance featured strikes and other non-violent tactics and counter-regime violence in the armed struggle launched in 1960 and which continued intermittently during this period; the “Struggle” revolutionaries were committed by limited in the fact of a highly capable internal police state and a militarily superior military force.

Significant upsurges of rebellion occurred in 1960 (Sharpeville), 1976 (Soweto), and in the broad-based popular uprising of 1984 to 1989. Following feeble and ill-considered reforms that made minor changes to apartheid but left the system basically intact generated new frustrations over white minority rule. From 1984-1989, resistance against apartheid grew domestically and internationally. The trade unions under the banner of COSATU (Congress of South Africa Trade Unions) grew more assertive in defiance of apartheid and in pressing for wage increases and social services. The South Africa Council of Churches and many other local and national civil society groups defied authorities in massive protests; young militants made the townships “ungovernable.” An internal umbrella coalition called the United Democratic Front, allied with the ANC in exile, to pose a formidable challenge to regime. The international community began to impose ever-escalated sanctions, beginning with an arms boycott in 1977 (see regional and international relationships in Section III below) (Lodge 1983). The popular uprising reflected a still-prevalent political culture in South Africa around destabilizing “mass action.”

Violence in South Africa sharply escalated in the late 1980s. In the critical KwaZulu Natal homeland, putative home of the country’s largest ethnic group, the ANC was challenged by the breakaway IFP, a Zulu nationalist movement led by traditional leader Chief Mangosutho Buthelezi. Many viewed the IFP as a puppet of the regime, with its attacks on the ANC abetted by the apartheid police. Between 1984 and 1990, an estimated 5,500 died in political violence in South Africa in struggles between the anti-apartheid resistance and the police and in ANC-IFP faction fighting in Kwa-Zulu Natal that seriously escalated in 1988 and spread to the Johannesburg urban megalopolis. By that late 1980s, it appeared to even the most informed observers that South Africa was heading for all-out racial war coupled with Zulu-Xhosa faction-fighting among the black population (the Xhosa are the second largest black ethnic group and are prominent in the ANC). Despite having a control of the formal reins of power, a repressive police state, the largest army in Africa, and six nuclear weapons (since dismantled), the apartheid government could not control the streets. In the end, the apartheid state turned out to be outwardly appearing strong, but in reality was internally quite weak (du Toit 1995).

#### *A Turbulent Transition (1990-1994)*

South Africa witnessed a dramatic historical turn in the transition from apartheid to democracy that unfolded in the early 1990s, after decades of escalating tensions and violence. The “New South Africa” came into being because of three major factors: a sense of shared and common destiny, a high degree of inter-group economic interdependence, and the abject failure of grand apartheid’s attempts to territorialize and reify race and ethnicity (Sisk 1995). A confluence of events, including the end of the Cold War, yielded a moment “ripe” for the turn to negotiation in 1989. Peace talks began formally in February 1990, following an extensive period of pre-negotiation (1986 to 1990) in which politicians, businessmen and civil society leaders began to meet privately and explore solutions to the violence and to South Africa’s deep social problems of race and inequality. Among the causes of apartheid’s collapse were the inability of the white minority government to sustain the economy in a globalizing world; foreign sanctions and diplomatic incentives for change; and the inability of the state’s security apparatus to contain insurrection.

Initially, the talks that began in 1990 were bilateral — between the NP and ANC led by F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, respectively — but they eventually became more broadly based to include other parties such as Inkatha, homeland leaders, and other opposition parties. Perhaps the most important interim negotiated agreement was the first, known as the Groote Schuur “Minute” of May 1990. This first accord linked commitment to renunciation of the ANC’s armed

struggle with normalization of political freedoms, the return of exiles, the release of political prisoners and the eventual move to full enfranchisement and elections. The pact defined "nonracial democracy" in a united South Africa as the ultimate outcome of the talks. Subsequent pacts were reached in 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993.

The talks broadened in 1992 and 1993 to include white parties to the right of the NP (notably, the white right-wing Freedom Front). African opposition to the left of the ANC such as the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) at first opposed talks but also eventually were included in multiparty negotiation. All along, the process of negotiation was smoothed by small, moderate, bridge-building parties such as the Democratic Party (DP). Former homeland governments also participated in the multiparty talks, making the peace process eventually (and especially at the time of the April 1994 elections that ended apartheid), widely inclusive of all the major political forces in the country. This broad inclusion is pointed to as a key element in the success of the transitional negotiations.<sup>1</sup>

The transition was widely violent. Political violence was an endemic feature of the transitional period, to the extent where there was in South Africa during the transition an undeclared internal war. Some 16,000 persons lost their lives in political violence between 1990 and 1994. There were several crisis-inducing events that threatened the talks beginning in June 1990, just after the Groote Schuur pact. IFP-ANC faction fighting — mostly the youth wings — was extensive, especially in greater Johannesburg and the KwaZulu Natal region. In the first three months following the onset of formal NP-ANC talks, violence escalated rapidly; some 951 people died in the strife from June to August of 1990, for example. The epicenters of the violence were in KwaZulu-Natal, where the IFP and the ANC battled for control of the province. Much of the strife was centered on IFP-loyal migrant workers' hostels, which came into conflict with those in neighboring, informal township settlements that supported the ANC. While there were some ethnic overtones (Zulu-Xhosa), the violence was more party-political than ethnic, as illustrated by the within-group struggles among the Zulu in KwaZulu-Natal. Both parties organized self-defense units, which engaged in running battles with each other and with the police. The police were widely accused — and it was later proven — to be acting as a "third force" stoking the enmity by arming and aiding the IFP.<sup>2</sup>

**Table 1. Transitional Violence, 1990-1994**

<i>Year</i>	<i>KwaZulu-Natal</i>	<i>Entire South Africa</i>
1990	1811	3699
1991	1057	2706
1992	1427	3347
1993	1489	3794
1994	1464	2476
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,248</b>	<b>16,022</b>

Source: Adapted from Pierre du Toit, *South Africa's Brittle Peace: The Problem of Post-Settlement Violence* (Palgrave, 2001). Based on data compiled by the South Africa Institute of Race Relations.

<sup>1</sup> See Sisk (1995); for a counter-veiling interpretation of the transition as "conflict inducing," see Ottaway 1993. For a South African perspective, see Friedman 1993.


<sup>2</sup> See the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.



White right-wing militias and political parties; rogue elements of the South African Police and intelligence services; and members and often the leadership of the IFP, all openly rejected the NP-ANC agreements and fomented violence to bring down the peace process. Similarly, for much of the negotiations, outbidders (extremists) on the ANC's left, such as the PAC, rejected the talks, and members of its armed wing continued to wage a feeble armed struggle. Occasionally, PAC cadres carried out attacks as well. The violence often tracked major turning points in the negotiation process. Violence was used in the negotiations strategically: to derail the peace process, to prove political power and to destabilize and marginalize opponents (Sisk 2009). During this time a number of influential international scholars and specialists in mediation and dispute resolution systems design from non-governmental organizations were dispatched to run training programs and consult with community conflict handling to help mitigate the violence through direct monitoring, mediation, training and observation.

The April 1993 assassination of ANC and South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani by a white-right wing gunman failed to derail the talks despite widespread public protests. Efforts by white right-wingers to disrupt talks on an interim constitution in June 1993 failed to prevent the Interim Constitution from being sealed that month. Significantly, a white right-wing bombing campaign and an eleventh hour ANC-IFP shootout in downtown Johannesburg (the Shell House massacre) in the early months of 1994 failed to prevent the celebrated elections in April that brought Mandela to power and ended apartheid. Remarkably, the elections of April 1994 were remarkably quiet. (The table below reflects the levels of violence over time during the period of transition; this table draws on research presented in Sisk 2009).

**Table 2. Political Violence in South Africa's Turbulent Transition**



Source: South African Survey (1997) (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations), as reported in Guelke 2000: 241.

Much credit for the successful conclusion of the bloody transition goes to the ANC. The ANC leadership, particularly, changed its view and recognized that much of the violence was aimed at derailing its pursuit of power. The ANC's changed position was summed up by key negotiator Kader Asmal, who said in November 1993: "We cannot hold the peace process hostage to violence and to the will of violent men."<sup>3</sup> Thus, a settlement was clinched in June 1993 -- the Interim Constitution -- despite the ongoing strife on the street. This agreement was a quintessential political pact, or mutual security agreement, in which democratization occurs with the explicit protection of the interests of the incumbent regime and its military and security forces (Sisk 1995). Such pact-making and consensus seeking continued after the elections of 1994 and through the period of constitution making by the elected Constitutional Assembly (which also acted as an interim parliament) until the adoption of a permanent constitution and its eventual certification by the Constitutional Court in October 1996.

The linchpin feature of the 1993 interim constitution was the agreement by the ANC on a period of transitional power sharing with the former rulers and a pledge to ensure the jobs and livelihood of the civil service, South African Defense Force (SADF, now SANDF) and the police. The power-sharing pragmatism was backed up by political finesse, manifested by the ANC concessions of early 1994 to the right-wing Freedom Front and the IFP. These concessions to

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Sisk (1995): 243.

potential spoilers of the pact brought these parties into the Government of National Unity at the eleventh hour and averted a bloody showdown during the celebrated liberation elections of April 1994.<sup>4</sup>

**Table 3. The 1994 Liberation Election: Results**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Seats</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
African National Congress	312	63.7
National Party	99	20.2
Inkatha Freedom Party	48	9.8
Freedom Front	14	2.8
Democratic Party	10	2.0
Pan-Africanist Congress	5	1.0
African Christian Democratic Party	2	.04

#### *Democracy: 15 Years On*

Fifteen years of full enfranchisement and governance under the ANC has proven relatively peaceful, with political violence sharply diminished (although, as described below, criminal violence has sharply increased). The 1996 constitution was approved by a wide range of political parties and now enjoys virtually universal acceptance. The country survived the unexpected, early demise of the Government of National Unity when the National Party withdrew in May 1996. Today, the Democratic Alliance (DA), which once included the NP but now does not, is the Official Opposition party in parliament.

**Table 4. Post-Settlement Political Violence, 1994-2004**

<i>Year</i>	<i>KwaZulu-Natal</i>	<i>Entire South Africa</i>
1994	1,464	2,476
1995	684	1,044
1996	347	683
1997	226	470
1998	NA	353
1999	NA	650
2000	NA	20
2001	12	70
2002	7	57
2003	8	24
2004	NA	NA
<b>Total</b>		

Sources: Data for 1994-1997 and 1998 (entire) from Pierre du Toit, *South Africa's Brittle Peace*. For 1999-2001, from the Project Ploughshares Armed Conflicts Report, available at [www.ploughshares.ca/acr](http://www.ploughshares.ca/acr). For later years, compilation of news and human rights reports. (NA is "not available.")

<sup>4</sup> For an evaluation of the 1994 elections and the implications for democratization, see Reynolds 1994, Southall 1994 and Johnson and Schlemmer 1996.

Several factors have led to a marked decline in political violence in South Africa, especially in the troubled KwaZulu-Natal region. First is the true commitment of leadership to halt the party-political rivalry that fueled much of the strife; Mandela and subsequently Mbeki included Buthelezi in the first several post-apartheid governments. Thus, much of the earlier violence was transitional and much of it was the consequence of elite instigation. Second, after 1994, the police and military were under new command and became increasingly less predisposed to play an agent provocateur "third force" role. Third, the violence between 1990 and 1994 was partly a struggle for political territory — geographical areas from which parties could exclude their rivals. Today, there remain pockets of "no-go" areas but in general there has been significant progress in achieving open access for political campaigning.

The transitional Government of National Unity gave way in 1996 when the National Party found it uncomfortable to serve under a guiding ANC, and to be responsible for government policy, while at the same time serving as the official opposition in parliament. This led to the NP's unilateral withdrawal from the power-sharing government after the end of constitutional talks in 1996, but — remarkably — the collapse of power sharing in South Africa did not rattle markets or cause panic because the basic bargaining of political rights for economic stability was not threatened by the end of a grand coalition (Sisk and Stefes 2001).

South Africa's experience with democracy has been tested in the electoral arena on five occasions, all with good success in terms of yielding a free and fair election and a widely accepted result with generally low levels of political violence in subsequent polls. The country's elections are run by a professional Independent Electoral Commission which has proven highly capable in terms of electoral administration and in election-related dispute resolution. In the 2004 elections, there were reportedly two politically related deaths in the KwaZulu-Natal province, and local-level electoral contests can still generate small-scale violence.

**Table 5. South Africa's Post-Apartheid Elections**

1994	"Liberation Elections"; ANC wins 64 % of the vote
1996	First municipal/local elections
1999	Second national elections; ANC wins 66% of the vote
2000	Second municipal/local elections
2004	Third national elections; ANC wins 70% of the vote
2006	Third municipal/local elections

The 2004 National Assembly and Provincial Elections — the "tenth anniversary" of democracy elections — served principally to confirm the existing political order. The ANC's strong victory was expected as was its ability to surpass the critical two-thirds of seats in the National Assembly, which is the majority needed to make constitutional changes. 15.6 million valid votes were cast, representing 77% of eligible voters. Important fringe parties that represent communities with the capacity to disrupt stability were all included in the Assembly, which is an important outcome in terms of allowing for representation of all significant communities. Significantly, the ANC won in all of the country's nine provinces — including the Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal — which had previously been the domain of opposition parties (the NNP and the IFP, respectively).

- The ANC increased its majority slightly at the same time opinion polls showed dissatisfaction with President Thabo Mbeki, especially over his handling of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the Zimbabwe issue, and allegations of corruption against his deputy president.
- The dismal showing by the New National Party led party leaders to fold their tent and – in a true irony of history – most of the parliamentarians (including erstwhile "New NP" leader Marthinus van Schalkwyk) joined the ANC caucus while the remaining members crossed the floor to join the DA.
- New upstart parties such as the Independent Democrats led by former PAC cadre Patricia de Lille performed better than expected but still wield very little power in terms of a voting bloc in the Assembly. The IFP remained a force in KwaZulu-Natal but its appeal is limited to Zulu traditionalists and it does not appeal to a broad segment of the population.

**Table 6. 2004 National Assembly Election: Votes and Seats**

<i>Party</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Seats</i>
African National Congress (ANC)	10,878,251	69.68	279
Democratic Party/Alliance (DA)	1,931,201	12.37	50
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	1,088,664	6.97	28
United Democratic Movement (UDM)	355,717	2.28	9
Independent Democrats (ID)	269,765	1.73	7
New National Party (NNP)	257,824	1.65	7
African Christian Democrats (ACDP)	250,272	1.60	6
Freedom Front (FF/VF)	139,465	.89	4
United Christian Democrats (UCDP)	117,792	.75	3
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)	113,512	.73	3

#### *Evaluation: Between Consolidation and Conflict*

Despite the formal end of apartheid more than a decade ago, South Africa continues to struggle with racial and ethnic divisions, particularly around the still-troubled concept of race despite legislative and policy efforts to make apartheid-era divisions less salient. In public attitudes and popular discourse the language of race – such as “Black” economic empowerment or in the debate over the further integration of “white” sports such as rugby and cricket – remains a significant point of social differentiation and an ongoing root cause of conflict. At the same time, ethnic differences within the black community and along a number of other lines are also identifiable points of social conflict, such that race is embedded in other forms of identity that are at times equally salient (such as home language use).

While South African society has come a long way from its officially racist past, and the government has made considerable strides in redressing social inequalities along racial lines, policy debates are laced with allegations of privilege, of discrimination, or reverse discrimination, of minority grievances, and code words such as “transformation” that underscore the basic fact that South Africa remains a deeply divided society. The four principal racial divisions that were apartheid – African, white, “Coloured” and Asian – still permeate political discourse today. Most of the apartheid-era issues have been put in the past through the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. At present, economic policies such as Black Empowerment in public spending and affirmative action in the workplace dominate the agenda. In the future, failure to make progress in removing historical racial monopolies in property ownership, control

of the commanding heights of the economy, land, and in employment are likely to generate considerable political tension.

Because of the apartheid emphasis on deepening ethnic divisions, there remains a strong taboo against the exacerbation of ethnic tensions among the black majority. At the beginning of South Africa's transition, some capable and highly regarded scholars suggested that intra-African ethnic divisions would doom the transition and lead to a South Africa beset by divisions as strong as those in Bosnia and elsewhere. But, this prediction did not turn out and today South Africa remains relatively tolerant on the ethnic front with the stark exception of attitudes toward immigrants (especially Nigerians, Mozambicans, and Zimbabweans).<sup>5</sup>

At least 22 million South Africans, 57% of the population, live in poverty. Both absolute poverty and some of the highest rates of inequality in the world (relative deprivation) are strong root causes of conflict in South Africa. These conditions are certainly behind the crime pandemic, but they are also possible contributors to the renewal of political violence. Relative economic deprivation is in fact growing in scope, with widening inequality among the black community despite considerable gains in property ownership acquisition of skills, and enhanced opportunities for employment. High levels of unemployment and rapidly growing mortality rates from HIV/AIDS are both strong contributors to ostensibly growing economic problems that will be an important driver of conflict for years to come: both unemployment and the HIV pandemic contribute to rising dependency rates (the number of people living off of a single income).

Generally, the linkages between root causes and a sharp escalation of political violence or instability in South Africa are found in the complex interactions among poverty, inequality, and frustration and desperation in stressed township and city environments. Some areas see unemployment of up to 80%, with a weak informal economy providing barely subsistence living. The most imminent threat to the country lies in a large cadre of mobilized, disaffected youth in these areas who may cohere around politicized conflict groups – either party political, criminal, ethnic, or around new radicalized ideologies such as extreme African nationalism. Youth, mobilized by a neo-revolutionary mindset, may become very attractive to masses of dejected youth unless the government is somehow able to dramatically expand employment. As the country experiences leadership change within the ruling ANC, it is likely that many new such challenges may emerge.

The impact of AIDS-related sickness and death on conflict vulnerability and democratic consolidation has been the subject of considerable reflection in recent years, in part because South Africa has more HIV-infected people (5 million) than any other single country. The hypothesized relationships can be described as direct and indirect. Among direct consequences are HIV/AIDS orphans and AIDS in the military and police. Indirect consequences include diversion of public resources to fight the disease, the effects on economic performance, poverty, and the unequal effects on various population groups. The effect of AIDS on democratic consolidation are many, and they can be characterized as exacerbating the economic and social conditions that contribute to poverty and a lack of human development. The Stellenbosch-based Bureau for Economic Research has projected that by 2015, the total labor force may fall by 21% as a result of AIDS-related deaths. Care for the sick and their dependents will also create a serious and deep strain on government resources, making less money available for employment schemes, capital investments, land distribution, housing subsidies, and education as health care consumes an ever-growing portion of public resources.

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<sup>5</sup> Widespread anti-immigrant violence erupted in South Africa in May, 2008, leaving hundreds dead in the sporadic violence and thousands of immigrants were displaced in the conflict.

In September 2008, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Desmond Tutu repeated a warning he has made in recent years about mounting frustrations in South Africa: "'We're seeing a burgeoning in corruption, of many engaging in self-enrichment sprees whilst the gap between the rich and the poor widens so that we are sitting on a powder keg, a deeply worrying, volatile situation waiting to be ignited.'"<sup>6</sup> The comment reflecting a longstanding debate critical of the government for insufficiently addressing the plight of the very poor despite claims that poverty eradication is its top priority. Rapid political change in the early 1990s has not been accompanied by rapid social change; frustration is palpable among many South Africans, rich and poor alike, over a wide array of deep-seated social challenges. South Africa, now into its second decade after the end of apartheid, continues to face deep-rooted social challenges that are root causes of the current criminal violence and its political overtones: a reservoir of unemployed youth, deep socio-economic inequalities, rapid migration into informal settlements and community-level violence, rising HIV/AIDS mortality rates, continued racial and occasional ethnic tension, widespread material grievances over land, water, services, and wages, and spillovers of people and contagion of conflict and anti-democratic influences from bad neighbors such as Zimbabwe.

## **Part II. Applying Sanctions, Offering Incentives: External Influences**

International influences on South Africa's democratic transition were both direct and indirect and involved specific measures that contributed to the survival of the autocratic apartheid regimes, conditionalities for change as reflected in anti-apartheid divestment and other sanctions policies by Western regimes, diplomatic and multilateral engagement to backstop the transitional talks, and modest international mediation at several critical points in the process. In this section, I separate out the extensive international engagement with South Africa into phases in which external influences changed the environment and decision-making dynamic of apartheid-era elites and their supporters, and in particular the evolution of anti-apartheid sanctions. Then, I discuss ways in which the international community engaged in and supported the transitional period. Finally, I review the ways in post-apartheid democracy and governance engagement has sought to contribute to democratic consolidation.

### *The Internationalized Anti-Apartheid Campaign*

Normatively, as the world was moving progressively in the direction of individualized human rights in the second half of the 20th century, South Africa moved in the opposite direction; the anti-apartheid movement grew internationally commensurate with each new round of revolt and repression. International condemnation of South Africa grew with the rise of anti-colonial nationalist regimes in Africa<sup>7</sup> -- which helped put the issue on the international agenda -- together with a growing moral and religious movement that associated apartheid's policies with heretical interpretation of Christian religious doctrine (and which led to the ouster of the Dutch Reformed Church from the World Council of Churches in

The backdrop of international pressure in South Africa was set by the now-celebrated "Winds of Change" speech by British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan in Cape Town in early 1960; the

<sup>6</sup> "Tutu Slams African Leaders' Failings," *Cape Times*, 25 April 2008. At <http://www.capetimes.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=4372223>.

<sup>7</sup> See Ohlson and Stedman with Davies (1994: 39-52) on the relationship between decolonization and apartheid in South Africa.

UK was South Africa's principal foreign investor at the time and the message of post-colonial transition was sweeping Africa. Not long after, the Sharpeville massacre reinforced external voices against apartheid and the incident and violent police response -- captured in photos run in newspapers around the world -- prompted a global response. In April 1960, the United Nations Security Council passed the landmark resolution 134, which called "upon the Government of the Union of South Africa to initiate measures aimed about racial harmony based on equality... and to abandon its policies of apartheid and racial discrimination."<sup>8</sup> In the same year, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize to Albert Luthuli, a teacher and politician, for his outspoken and nonviolent opposition to apartheid and his consumer boycott campaign against South Africa exports (supported by newly independent African leaders such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania).

Also in 1960, the Anti-Apartheid Movement was founded in the United Kingdom to bring global advocacy of boycotting exports and advancing South Africa's exclusion and expulsion from international organizations and trade. In response to these pressures, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth, however this did not end the close relationship that increasingly global opposition to apartheid would have on the ultimate demise of the apartheid regime. International pressure against South Africa shifted the bright spotlight of the Olympic Games. Efforts to expel South Africa from the games emerged first in 1962 and the country was excluded from the 1964 Tokyo Games; South Africa's participation in global sport continued as an international issue into the 1968 Games in Mexico City. In addition to the sporting boycott, efforts were launched to extend an academic boycott and the cancellation of cultural exchanges.

A 1961 General Assembly Resolution first referenced apartheid as "repugnant." In 1962, the UN established the Special Committee Against Apartheid through a General Assembly Resolution; while the committee had little real leverage on South Africa, it was a moral crusade that ultimately undermined international support for country despite a lingering few Cold War-oriented allies (such as the U.S.) which saw the government as a bulwark against global communist expansion. While initial efforts to impose economic sanctions against South Africa found little support in Western governments, by the mid-1970s public mobilization for divestment in South Africa and for the imposition of sanctions grew steadily; after the 1976 Soweto incidents, pressure snowballed leading to a flurry of efforts internationally to isolate and punish the apartheid regime and specifically to call for expansion of the franchise. During this period, a few Western countries, notably Sweden, began to funnel aid directly to the ANC, trade unions, and South Africa civil society, reportedly investing \$400 million in support over the from the 1960s to 1994 (Landsberg 2000: 115).

A significant turning point in the pressures against South Africa unfolded in the wake of Soweto: by November 1977, UNSC Resolution imposed an arms embargo against the country, which further weakened the regime.<sup>9</sup> Although South Africa later developed an extensive domestic production capacity for weapons, the arms embargo was yet another stage in an escalating set of sanctions, condemnations, and repudiation of the apartheid regime. In response, South Africa began to consider halting reforms under the presidency of NP stalwart P.W. Botha, and in particular the 1983 "Tricameral Constitution" which slightly expanded the franchise to "Coloureds" and Asians yet continued to exclude the black majority; the late 1984 uprising began to be carried in media outlets worldwide, and sanctions pressure again picked up steam.<sup>10</sup> In

<sup>8</sup> The text of UNSC Resolution 134 is found at <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1960/scres60.htm>.

<sup>9</sup> For a concise summary on South Africa at the UN, see Esman 1995: 35-38).

<sup>10</sup> For a detailed account on sanctions and their effects on the white attitudes toward transition, see Price (22-246)



mid-October, 1984, the Norwegian Nobel Committee again raised the apartheid question on the international agenda when it named Archbishop Desmond Tutu the year's Nobel Peace Prize Laureate; in his December acceptance speech, Tutu sharply and criticized "constructive engagement" with the white-minority regime (then U.S. policy under the Reagan Administration) and the pressures on the white minority regime grew commensurately.

Perhaps the most significant turning point of international pressures on South Africa was the passage in 1986 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (P.L. 99-440) -- over the veto of President Ronald Reagan -- which sharply overturned the U.S. policies of constructive engagement, and which combined sanctions and threats of additional sanctions together with specific conditionality provisions for the regime's opening of negotiations to democratize. It required U.S. companies in South Africa to follow "Sullivan Code" non-discriminatory principles, prohibited new investments, limited export of critical materials, suspended air service between South Africa and the U.S. and prohibited oil exports, among many other punitive provisions. Specifically, the legislation called for the "the unbanning of groups willing to suspend terrorism and to participate in negotiations and a democratic process." Indeed, the late 1980s saw the anti-apartheid movement emerge as a truly internationalized social movement with political, economic, and cultural facets to the global outcry against the "total onslaught" and "state of emergency" conditions within the country. During this time, one of the most significant interventions was the role of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa, which the government was called to task for "in truth not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures" (Commonwealth Secretariat 1986: 132).<sup>11</sup>

The fall of the Berlin Wall in April 1989 and the end of the Cold War was felt at the tip of southern Africa. In addition to movement in South Africa's international relations through the signing of the agreements to resolve the Namibian question (the Quadrapartite Agreement, signed in Geneva in December 1988), the Cold War overlay that had so polarized the anti-apartheid debate through the 1950's-1980s withered away, changing the calculus of National Party elites and setting the stage for the negotiated transition to democracy. There is broad conclusion among scholars and analysts that the while the actual sanctions applied to South Africa were not sufficiently injurious to lead to regime change, the threat of additional sanctions and the psychological effects of the sports and cultural boycotts did in fact make a direct contribution to the dramatic political change that became the negotiated transition to democracy (Crawford and Klotz 1999).<sup>12</sup>

#### *External Assistance to the Transition*

International assistance to the transition in South Africa actually began well before the direct negotiations to democratize began. Indeed, there were a number of "track two" negotiation processes facilitated by outsiders that allowed for the initial, informal and unofficial dialogue between the ANC in exile and "insider partials" within South Africa beginning in 1985 and

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<sup>11</sup> See, too, *South Africa: Time Running Out. The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa* (1981).

<sup>12</sup> Waldmeir (1997: 134) notes that the effect of the sanctions on de Klerk's decision to inaugurate democratization talks with the ANC were both direct, in the increasing pressure of isolation and threat of escalating sanctions, and indirect, particularly in the influence of the business community which needed access to international markets, technology, and capital. On the cultural sanctions, Waldmeir observes "The while elite, which had ruled unchallenged as polecat of the world for decades already, was tiring of that dubious distinction."

lasting through to the return of exiles in 1990.<sup>13</sup> As a principal conditionality, sanctions against South Africa lasted until the dramatic un-banning of the ANC and other anti-apartheid parties, the release of Nelson Mandela, and the onset of direct negotiations over a phased transition to democracy.

The dramatic escalation of violence in mid-1990 and into 1991 and 1992, however, heightened the need for direct involvement in what was otherwise an essentially domestic process of political change. International non-governmental organizations put the spotlight on the political violence in South Africa and raised the need for external intervention to stem human rights abuses by security forces in the violence (Human Rights Watch 1991; Amnesty International 1992). After the escalation of violence in Boipatong in mid-1992, which caused the ANC to temporarily withdraw from talks, the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali dispatched Cyrus Vance as a Special Representative of the Secretary General on a fact-finding mission that was also aimed at keeping the talks on track. Vance met with the major political protagonists and essentially mediated among the players while talks were officially suspended (Rothchild 1997: 203).

Importantly, the Vance mission led to the deployment in August of 1992 of UNOMSA (United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa); approximately 60 UN personnel, augmented by observers from the Organization of African Unity, the European Union, and the Commonwealth (such that the total number of observers reached about 100). UNOMSA linked up with internal "National Peace Accord" structures in a way that continues to be an example of how international monitors can multiply the effect of their presence by linking up with internal dispute resolution processes.<sup>14</sup> As Peter Gastrow concludes, "Despite the continued existence of no-go areas, and despite ongoing high levels of intolerance, the peace structures, strengthened by the international observers, have helped spread the concepts of political pluralism and tolerance in South Africa" (Gastrow 1996: 74).

During the course of transition, there were myriad external pressures to negotiate and international engagement (but not direct intervention) in the negotiations was otherwise quite high. In donor assistance during the period, significant resources were channeled by all the major OECD countries and the European Union to South African civil society organizations.<sup>15</sup> This support was considerably successful in bolstering civil society organization such as IDASA (then Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa; today, Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa), the Black Sash, the Legal Resources Center, the Institute for Multiparty Democracy, the Center for Policy Studies, Center for Conflict Resolution, and many others.<sup>16</sup> Such donor assistance was sometimes controversial, for example the dispute of USAID's policies of specifically targeting support to black-led organizations within South Africa and minority-led

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<sup>13</sup> See Lieberfeld 2002 for analysis of these externally facilitated efforts.

<sup>14</sup> See Gastrow 1996 and Collin Marks 2000.

<sup>15</sup> For a detailed account of the donor support to South Africa during this period, see Landsberg 2004. Landsberg (2000: 115-120) describes various national donor support to civil society and argues that donors tended to focus on "elite" civil society and that donors include Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, and the German party foundations (Ebert Stiftung, Adenauer Stiftung, and the Hans Seidel Foundation. After 1994, the United Nations Development Program also began to directly fund South African civil society organizations.

<sup>16</sup> See the report of the Carnegie Commission on Deadly Conflict, *A House No Longer Divided: Progress and Prospects for Democratic Peace in South Africa* (1997); the Commission's work is archived at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/house/hsfr.htm>. Hearn (2000) has argued that support to civil society was a critical element in the success of the 1994 elections in South Africa. Landsberg (

organizations within the United States, or "reverse discrimination" as some critics called the approach.<sup>17</sup>

Two other areas of intervention during the talks deserve special mention. One was the widespread sharing of knowledge on alternative constitutional (or institutional) options through exchanges of scholars and through exposure to the South Africans of the debates on democratic institutions in deeply divided societies (to which many South African scholars contributed).<sup>18</sup> This information sharing -- while not always helpful, especially in a few instances of "technical assistance" that may have in fact inflamed differences between the local actors<sup>19</sup> -- was directly and exceptionally influential on debates about the relative merits of transitional and permanent power sharing.

The second engagement was again provided by the Norwegian Nobel Committee in October 1993 in its joint award of the Nobel Peace Prize to F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela. Indeed, this intervention at a very key moment in the talks (on the cusp of agreement on a transitional constitution and a specific timetable leading up to the 1994 elections) is an often overlooked aspect of international engagement during this period. The Committee, under the direction of Francis Sejersted, specifically used the prize to spur the further conclusion and implementation of agreements (as was also the case in prizes to protagonists in Northern Ireland and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) (Sejersted 1993). In accepting the Prize jointly in Oslo in December 2003, the key elites that drove the South African transition -- Mandela and de Klerk -- were internationally legitimated and reinforced.

As the 1994 elections loomed amid continuing political violence and the continued boycott threats of Inkatha promised a violent election, international engagement was further heightened in the run-up to this critical turning point in the democratization process. Perhaps most effective was quiet U.S. diplomacy that set the stage for the eventual inclusion of the IFP into the election process at the 11th hour. Close observers to the negotiations sensed that calls for international mediation were met with widespread skepticism from all but the IFP (a weaker party with ostensible interest in mediator entry to gain concessions from its stronger foe, principally the ANC). Both the government and the ANC were skeptical of international mediation, as then U.S. Ambassador to South Africa Princeton Lyman reports in his memoirs (Lyman 2002: 202-209). Finally, rather than allowing a Japanese mediator clearly advocated by the IFP, the ANC called for the involvement of two eminent persons on the world stage, Lord Carrington and Henry Kissinger.

With the IFP's vowing to spoil the poll and violence escalating in the closing months of the transition, eminent persons Lord Carrington and Henry Kissinger were eventually brought in to mediate between the NP, ANC, and IFP. The mediation attempt was an unqualified failure; after several days, the two left without agreement on their terms of reference; in reality, despite inviting Kissinger into the process, the ANC made the decision, Mandela and Ramphosa, made the decision that the mediation was off (affirming their skepticism that the mediation itself was a

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<sup>17</sup> See Lyman 1997: 282-282 for an account from the U.S. policymaker point-of-view. See Creative Associates International, Inc. *Program Evaluation: USAID/South Africa* (Washington D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, April 21, 1995) for a full review of the USAID program during the transitional period.

<sup>18</sup> Particularly the work of Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz, who proposed differing yet equally influential sets of detailed, contextualized proposals for a constitutional settlement in South Africa.

<sup>19</sup> Specifically, there were widespread concerns about the role of Mario Oriani-Ambrosini, an international constitutional "expert" who was seen as a hard-line advisor to IFP chief Buthelezi; see Lyman

last-minute effort for concessions principally by the IFP). A modest Kenyan professor — Washington Okumu — who was curiously part of the Carrington-Kissinger mission, stayed behind and brokered a last-minute accord on April 19 in which the IFP agreed to contest the poll and accept the settlement (Ohlson and Stedman with Davies: 63; Waldmeir 1997: 249-250.). But this was less mediation than face-saving by the IFP (and especially Buthelezi, who claims a religious insight in prayer with Okumu), which had been out-maneuvered in the negotiation and was threatened with political oblivion if it failed to contest the liberation April 26-28 elections. Hastily, poll workers literally pasted an IFP option at the bottom of the ballots for the landmark liberation poll. From Okumu's mediation, little was new with the exception of a promise for future mediation, a deal which ultimately which the ANC subsequently failed to abide by.<sup>20</sup>

The international effort to monitor South Africa's transitional elections were extensive. Over a period of some 18 months in the run up to the polls, some 2500 observers were eventually present to oversee the electoral process. International observers trained and assisted local official and unofficial (i.e., civil society) monitors, directly supported the capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission and Independent Mediation Commission, and in preparations for balloting and for counting and proclamation. While international observers did not echo the statement by the Independent Electoral Commission that the polls were "free and fair" -- indeed, many observers believe the final results were essentially negotiated -- they did endorse the polls as "reflecting the will of the people of South Africa."<sup>21</sup> The palpable irregularities in the poll and the ambiguous statements of the observer missions on the credibility of the elections reflected a conundrum over whether international observers should undermine local efforts to certify elections in the event that even imperfectly they are contributing to positive political change.

#### *Toward Democratic Consolidation in South Africa: External Support*

Dear Reader: This section is under research and development; the bullets below, however, give an overview of the areas to be researched and covered in this section. Research on these issues will take place in March-April 2009.

- Process Borrowing: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
- Support to Civil Society
- Support to Rule of Law, Criminal Justice, and Access to Justice
- Parliamentary Strengthening
- Support for Local Democracy
- Election Monitoring
- Human Rights Reporting

<sup>20</sup> In bringing Buthelezi on board at the last minute, the coordinated work of the United States, Britain, and Germany working together was essential. As former U.S. ambassador during the period, Princeton Lyman, relates: "The United States emerged as a principal actor in this period... With Britain and Germany, sharing assessments and ideas was critical. Both Britain and Germany had histories of support to Buthelezi and strong domestic constituencies on his side. It was important that we stay together." (Lyman 2002: 276).

<sup>21</sup> As quoted in Abink and Hesseling 2000: 53. [Dear Reader: Additional research is under way on this section].

## V. Conclusion: Socialization and Lesson Drawing

There is good reason, in hindsight, to reaffirm initial scholarly findings that the transition to democracy in South Africa was an essentially endogenous process of pact-making to exit a costly civil conflict. At the same time, clearly international influences did have an effect on this process and especially the calculus of the tyrannous apartheid regime as key elites contemplated a negotiated transition. Apartheid's fundamental repugnancies and the "total response" police-state actions from the 1960s to the 1980s brought international influence to bear to fundamentally reform. Thus, the international community had a direct impact on the onset of the transition, on helping the country through the difficult period of transition, and deepening democracy in into the post-apartheid era. Thus, even in this most celebrated of "internal settlements" to costly conflict through a democratization process cannot be seen as a sole endogenous process alone. In sum, the international community structured sanctions and incentives to leverage the apartheid regime into negotiation and it helped provide credible commitment through the negotiation period through direct support to civil society (which helped create social cohesion), by providing credible commitment through an observer mission, and in occasional direct mediation.

South Africa perhaps represents an ideal type case of "international socialization" in understanding international and domestic linkages in a democratization process. International engagement was prompted by a sharp divergence of norms between global processes and local conditions; as the world was becoming more attuned to universal human rights and to civil rights, South Africa was seeking to extend the color bar and suppress legitimate black majority demands for political voice and voting rights. Conversely, in adopting the Freedom Charter, the ANC and regime challengers closely reflected emerging international norms of multicultural nationalism and principles of non-discrimination and equal opportunity. Thus, the close resonance between the anti-apartheid movement in the international community and the regime's opposition was a central characteristic of international influences on democratization; in sum, both in South Africa and abroad, the transition to democracy was ultimately a shared goal of upending the racially exclusive and tyrannous apartheid state.

International engagement in support of democratic transition took both hard, coercive, and soft, or incentive-oriented, approaches. Through coercive measures outsiders contributed to the demise of the authoritarian regime and the onset of talks. Thereafter, engagement was primarily seen in terms of reassurance and persuasion, direct financial support to critical social organizations, technical assistance to key institutions, and in repeated election monitoring. In terms of learning, South Africa also represents an example in which domestic actors absorbed and adapted a wide range of experiences from abroad: from deliberations on constitutional models, to negotiation and bargaining concepts and approaches, to the institutional borrowing of the truth-and-reconciliation approach to transitional justice. In the final phase, too, international support to civil society has taken the form of financial support and capacity development in the critical areas of parliamentary processes, election management, rule of law and judicial strengthening, and support to institutions and processes of local democracy.

Evaluating the effects of international influence requires the separation of the democratization process into specific phases. Clearly, the case represents an example in which sanctions were generally proven to be an effective instrument in the demise of an authoritarian regime and the onset of a democratization process. Support to the transition is more mixed: while external engagement was critical in specific turning points or moments, the principal drivers of democratization were domestic. However, while the transitional period can be seen as successful -- especially when measured in the diminution of political violence -- consolidation of democracy remains elusive and new challenges appear on the immediate horizon.

South Africa in early 2009 finds itself at a turning point in its post-apartheid evolution. Two developments set the stage for the further evaluation of democracy's consolidation. One is the looming, likely presidency of ANC leader and former Deputy President Jacob Zuma; still under the cloud of corruption charges (having been fired by Mbeki over corruption allegations), Zuma's possible presidency raises doubts about whether the country may be headed for a newly radicalized ANC and a likely uncertain future under the populist icon.<sup>22</sup> Secondly, the further proliferation of the party system with the advent of a new political party led by former Mbeki loyalists within the ANC -- called Congress of the People, or COPE -- points to a rapidly changing party political and possibly electoral landscape in the forthcoming polls. Combined with staggering economic and social challenge, and still-developing institutions with sometimes weak capacities, the outcome of consolidated democracy in South Africa remains elusive. Consequently, demands for international engagement in contributing to democratic consolidation will continue well into the foreseeable future.

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<sup>22</sup> Jacob Zuma was Deputy President under Thabo Mbeki from 1999 to 2005, when he was fired by former President Thabo Mbeki for alleged corrupt practices. He was also later accused in a separate rape case, but was acquitted of the charges by the High Court in Johannesburg; he then resumed his role as Deputy Leader of the ANC and subsequently became President of the ANC following the decision by the High Court in September 2008 to throw out the case against Zuma; Mbeki subsequently resigned over allegations that he played a nefarious hand in seeking Zuma's conviction on corruption-related charges.

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