

Markus Hadler, Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Lynn Chin (2007)

**Societal Determinants of National and European Identities. 1995 and 2003 in comparison.**

Working Paper, Forum on Contemporary Europe.

**Introduction**

For many centuries, Europe had been a battleground. Finally, after World War II, a number of European leaders came to the conclusion that closer economic and political cooperation of their countries could secure peace in the region. This consensus led to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 with six members, Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Since then the integration of European countries has progressed exponentially, engendering formal institutions such as the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. Currently, the European Union (EU) comprises already 27 member states.

Yet, Europe is a patchwork of many nations with strong national, regional, ethnical, and even religious identities. Thus, in spite of the institutional proliferation of symbols of a united Europe, the strength of a European identity at the individual level and its relations to other identities have been a matter of debate. Especially, since the formation of the EU, coupled with growing immigration to and within Europe (Quillian, 1995; McLaren, 2003) gave also rise to a resurgence of nativist political movements in spite of the efforts to promote a European identity.

Identities, their development, and their relation to each other are discussed within different disciplines. Their common denominator is that identities are seen as fluid, influenced by the context and dependent on the previous and expected identities. In this paper we are, thus, focusing on the effect of contextual variables at the country level on the individual affiliation to

Europe and the nation and the changes between 1995 and 2003. In a twin paper, we are focusing on the processes at the individual level and the relationship between different layers of identities.

### **Theory and Hypotheses**

The focus of this paper is to show that individual identifications with Europe and the nation depend on the wider contextual characteristics of the country people live in. How do typical theories see the relationship between different layers of identity?

In social psychology, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Brown, 2000) and Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, 1999) discuss how different levels of identity exist in different situations of social interaction. Higher levels of social identity can subsume lower subgroup levels of social identity, such that as one moves from a more personal sense of being to a more collective sense of being, the lower levels of identity lessen in salience (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Brown, 2000). On the other hand, political identities may conflict with each other, creating tensions between identities at different levels of social inclusiveness. Instead of a “build up” process, strong identification at one level might undermine other levels of identity. For instance, the classic psychological study of Fromm (1941) on authoritarianism suggested that detachment from primary relations, such as family or one’s local community, causes individuals to experience anxiety and fear, leading to strong identification with powerful state apparatus.

Sociologists have argued that social identities have a bottom-up structure, such that strong identification with social units at lower levels of categorization enhance higher level identities. In this conception, social identities are considered to be hierarchically ranked such that social identities wrap around individuals in layers of concentric “circles of identity” (111, Sahlins, 1989). In political sociology, classic work by de Tocqueville (2001) and modern work by Putnam

(2000) have both propounded the idea that civil society, or voluntary associations and organizations, play a vital part in the continuation and upholding of national democratic institutions.

Individual characteristics also exert an influence on the strength of identifications. First, minority status has most obvious implications for political identity. Many recent studies report that status differences between subgroups affect the extent to which members of different subgroups attach to the superordinate identity (Dovidio, et al. 1998; Kessler & Mummendey, 2001; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001; Devos & Banaji, 2005). In the national context, this means that the strength of individuals' national identification varies depending on the status of their sub-national identity groups. With regard to European identity, we can expect that, in general, minority identification is positively related to supranational identity since sub-national minority identity and supra-national "European" identity may both be oppositional to national identity.

Many empirical studies have reported attenuating effects of educational attainment on negative attitudes toward outgroups and chauvinistic identification with one's ingroup (Schuman et al. 1997; Vogt 1997; Krysan 2000; Hello et al. 2004; Hjerm 2001). While there is diversity in the alleged mechanisms through which education has an effect, all these studies expect that higher education leads to lower ethnocentrism. Applied to the European context, where European identity is touted as the cosmopolitan category that ought to overcome nationalistic tendencies, this means that the educated population ought to be more likely to identify with Europe and less likely to have strong attachment to their nation.

Class background might also have an impact on individuals' attitudes toward ingroup-outgroup distinctions. Research on ethnic and racial competition has pointed out that ethnic antagonism is more likely when different ethnic groups are in competition for limited resources

(Bobo 1988; Olzak 1994; Quillian 1995; 1996). According to this research, lower class individuals are more likely to hold competitive relations with other ethnic groups, such as ethnic minorities and immigrants, and therefore are more likely to hold antagonistic views toward outgroups and strong identification with their own ingroup. In the context of EU expansion, this implies that people who are well-off are more likely to accept the supra-national European identity.

### *Macro-level Institutional Factors*

Individuals are embedded in a social context and this context shapes identities. There are general, world wide trends such as an increasing modernization and globalization and more specific European developments such as the breakdown of the communism system and the ongoing European integration.

First, the economic wealth of a nation shapes a national value system and renders certain identity orientations more likely for its nationals. A prominent theoretical perspective on individuals' values in developed economies, Inglehart's theory of post materialism, maintains that post materialist values, characterized as a preference for more open cosmopolitan views over self-interested nationalistic outlooks, are more prevalent in advanced industrial societies (Inglehart 1998: 420). Rosegger and Haller (2003) showed that inhabitants of affluent nations prefer modern functional-communicative aspects of national identity while those of less affluent societies prefer traditional aspects. Further, it is also necessary to consider the impact of an EU policy on redistribution of wealth, which makes wealthier countries pay more to the EU than they receive back from the EU, while poorer EU countries receive more monetary benefits than they pay out. This policy benefits poor countries at the expense of rich countries, possibly reducing EU identification and increasing nationalistic sentiment among richer nations while enhancing

EU identity and curbing national identity among poorer ones. These two lines of argument lead to two competing hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 1a: The more developed a country is, the more individuals in that nation will identify with the European Union and the less with the nation.*

*Hypothesis 2b: The more developed a country is, the less individuals in that nation will identify with the European Union and the more with the nation.*

Second, the world society approach asserts that nation-states, organizations, and individuals all over the world acquire rationalized progressive inclinations to the extent they are linked to international society (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer et al., 1997; Ramirez et al. 1997; Frank et al., 2000; Schofer & Hironaka, 2005; Tsutsui & Wotipka 2005). International norms, or “the script”, tend to feature cosmopolitan ideals, progressive norms, and scientific principles, and spread themselves to the world through international associations. Thus, individuals in a country that has greater linkage to international society would be more strongly influenced by these international norms. Applying this idea to the realm of political identity, exposure to international norms would lead individuals to favor cosmopolitan identity, the EU, over particularistic one, the nation.

*Hypothesis 2: The greater the country's linkage to international society, the greater EU identity and the lesser national identity the individuals in the country will exhibit.*

More specifically to the EU context, exposure to the EU apparatus should lead individuals to internalize European identity. The EU itself actively promotes a European consciousness through substantive changes such as introduction of a common currency, the Euro, and symbolic ones such as a common flag (Risse, 2003; Kaelberer, 2004). EU expansion has been a gradual process: old members, such as West Germany, have had close to fifty years of membership, while

newer members, such as Hungary, have had less than five years of membership. From a neo-institutionalist point of view, we can expect that subjective affiliation to Europe would be stronger, the longer a country has been a member of the EU.

*Hypothesis 3: The longer a nation's membership duration with the EU, the more strongly individuals in that nation will identify with the European Union.*

Finally, the political history of the nation will shape the political culture and hence political identity of individuals. The breakdown of the communism system in the late 1980s, early 1990s has easily been the most important political event in Europe in the past few decades. This historic event eventually transformed former communist nations into democracies. How does this transition affect political identity of citizens of these nations? There are competing predictions. First, institutionalist logic would predict that post-communist countries may identify less with the EU because they lacked prior institutional ties to the European Union. This trend might continue to date, as post-communist countries still have less EU-affiliated offices and agencies than Western European nations. On the other hand, post-communist nations reap greater financial benefit by joining the EU than other European nations. It is a policy of the European Union to send economic aid to poor regions, defined as falling below 70% of the average wealth. Most of these poor regions lie within post-communist nations, enabling them to gain greater economic benefit from EU monetary aid. Furthermore, entry into the EU confers legitimacy on post-communist nations as new budding capitalist democracies that are part of the "European" society. This would suggest that people in post-communist nations are more likely to identify with the EU. This provides another set of competing hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 4a: Individuals in post-communist nations are less likely to identify with the European Union.*

*Hypothesis 4b: Individuals in post-communist nations are more likely to identify with the European Union.*

## **Research Methods**

We test these hypotheses against data sets compiled by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). In 1995 and 2003, the ISSP used a “National Identity” module, focusing specifically on individuals’ political identities. We use the ISSP data from all the European countries in which the survey was conducted for *both* of these two years. Thus, our data set consists of 33,265 individual cases from fifteen countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East Germany, West Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.<sup>1</sup> We employ a three level model with countries as the level three unit, years as the level two unit, and individuals as the level one unit (see Duncan et al. 1996; Subramanian et al. 2003 for this setup).

### *Individual Level Variables:*

Our analyses focus on individual attachment to one’s geographical/political unit. We drew our key geographical identity variables from the following questions in the ISSP: “How close do you feel to your” town, region, country, and Europe? The response categories were “very close”, “close”, “not very close”, “not close at all”, and “can’t choose”. We excluded the last response category and reverse-coded the originally assigned values so that higher values denote higher levels of attachment to the respective unit. Our analyses use the levels of subjective identification with the country and with Europe as dependent variables. *From these questions, we create our three dependent variables:* 1) identification with the nation 2) identification with Europe, and 3) the relative identification with the nation compared with that of Europe. The last variable takes

---

<sup>1</sup> The ISSP continues to separate East and West Germany for data collection, which enhances our ability to test the hypothesis about post-communist states.

the difference between the degree of identification with Europe with that of the nation. Higher positive scores indicate respondents' stronger identification with Europe relative to their identification with their nation, while lower negative scores indicate individuals' stronger attachment to their nation controlling for their attachment to Europe. The other two identification variables, those with the town and with the region, constitute independent variables in our analyses.

We mention the other individual level variables only briefly, since we are focusing on the impact of the macro level variables. Those individual-level independent variables include minority status, education, class, gender, age, income, citizenship, party affiliation, and size of hometown.

#### *National Level Variables*

Our three-level hierarchical regression analyses include national level indicators at level three. GDP (in K's of Euros) was taken from the webpage of the European Statistic ([europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/](http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/)) to measure national prosperity. Linkage to the international community was measured by the total number of INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) and IGO (International Governmental Organizations) in a country. This information was taken from the Yearbooks of International Organizations (Union of International Associations 1996, 2004). In addition, the duration of the membership was considered as well. This variable subtracts the year of the survey from the actual year of accession. For Norway the hypothetical accession year 2010 was assumed. Finally, a dummy variable indicates whether a country is a former communist state (1) or not (0).



## **Results**

Table 1 shows the mean level of identification with the nation and with Europe for each of the fifteen nations in our data. It lists the national mean for 1995 and 2003, and as well as the change between the two years. It also displays each nation's accession year to the European Union or one of EU's predecessors (e.g. European Economic Community). The overall trend from 1995 to 2003 is a drop in both national and EU affiliation, especially the EU identity. In addition we observe a trend of convergence to the middle in terms of European identity with the exception of Latvia. Such convergence is also visible for national identity. This convergence is also depicted in the decreasing standard errors that can be found in Table 1.

**Table 1: National and European Affiliation in 1995 and 2003 (national mean values)**

Year of Access.	Country	Affiliation to Country (1=not all, 4=very close)			Affiliation to Europe (1=not all, 4=very close)		
		1995	2003	Change	1995	2003	Change
	<b>Norway (NO)</b>	3.45	3.32	-0.14	2.71	2.72	0.01
1958	<b>Germany-West (G-W)</b>	3.01	3.07	0.06	2.61	2.69	0.08
1973	<b>Great Britain (GB)</b>	2.86	3.08	0.22	1.90	1.97	0.07
1973	<b>Ireland (IE)</b>	3.45	3.45	0.01	2.37	2.41	0.04
1986	<b>Spain (ES)</b>	3.29	3.33	0.03	2.72	2.90	0.18
1991	<b>Germany-East (G-E)</b>	3.07	3.02	-0.05	2.62	2.61	-0.01
1995	<b>Austria (AT)</b>	3.46	3.52	0.06	2.91	2.95	0.04
1995	<b>Sweden (SE)</b>	3.14	3.26	0.12	2.31	2.54	0.22
2004	<b>Hungary (HU)</b>	3.75	3.72	-0.04	3.68	3.58	-0.10
2004	<b>Czech Republic (CZ)</b>	3.38	3.27	-0.10	3.06	2.87	-0.19
2004	<b>Slovenia (SI)</b>	3.41	3.40	-0.01	2.87	2.78	-0.09
2004	<b>Poland (PL)</b>	3.48	3.37	-0.11	2.94	2.79	-0.16
2004	<b>Latvia (LV)</b>	3.25	3.04	-0.21	2.18	1.84	-0.34
2004	<b>Slovak Republic (SK)</b>	3.28	3.28	0.00	3.00	2.81	-0.20
2007	<b>Bulgaria (BG)</b>	3.62	3.59	-0.03	3.41	2.95	-0.46
	<b>Mean Value</b>	3.33	3.31	-0.01	2.75	2.69	-0.06
	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	0.23	0.21		0.46	0.41	

With respect to national identity, individuals in Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and Austria exhibited the strongest levels of affiliation with national identity, while those in Great Britain, East and West Germany, and Sweden displayed the lowest level of national identity in 1995. In

2003, while Hungarians, Bulgarians and Austrians continued to hold strong levels of national identity, Polish identification with national identity declined. Latvia and Norway also went through erosion of national identity, while individuals in Great Britain and Sweden experienced average growth in national identification. Overall, most of the countries that saw decline of national identity between 1995 and 2003 were post-communist nations, Norway being the only exception.

We observe similar patterns for identification with Europe as well. In 1995, Hungarians and Bulgarians felt the closest to Europe followed by the Czechs and Slovaks. British, Latvians, and Swedes displayed the least attachment to Europe in 1995. In 2003, Hungarians and Bulgarians continued to profess strong attachment to European identity, while Latvians and British were the least Europe-oriented. The most noticeable overall trends are the marked decline in the average attachment to Europe among post-communist nations (except in East Germany) and the growth in European identity among Western European nations (particularly, Sweden and Spain) between 1995 and 2003.

Examination of some specific cases might help put these numbers into context. The Euro-skepticism of the British is well known. Therefore, it is not surprising that they rank the lowest in European identity.<sup>2</sup> And although British mean identification with Europe has increased in the eight years since 1995, Great Britain, nonetheless, has been an EU member since 1973 and might have been expected to express higher levels of European identification. In Norway, politicians made an effort to join the European Union but the public voted down bids for accession twice, once in 1972 and then again in 1995, both by slim margins. In our table, Norwegians showed a rather strong affiliation to the nation, but just an average affiliation to Europe in 1995. It is also

---

<sup>2</sup> However, it is also interesting that the affiliation to the country is also rather low in Great Britain. This suggests that the British may have other sources of political identification than the nation or Europe, or that the British do not tend to profess such strong affiliations to political units in general.

not surprising that Austrians also voted for EU membership in 1995, a time in which they exhibited the highest level of European identity among west European nations in the year. On the other hand, in the same year, the Swedes voted for accession despite their weaker identification with Europe than most other countries in the dataset. Taken together, these cases suggest that professed identification with Europe by the public and the political decision to join the EU may be correlated, but the effect is not necessarily as strong as might be expected, at least for Western European nations.

In post-communist Europe both affiliations to the country and to Europe decreased from 1995 to 2003. Possibly, the data captured the early excitement and hope that followed the end of communism in 1995 as well as the disappointment that followed when people's lives did not improve by 2003, even when one's nation had already become an EU member.<sup>3</sup> This suggests that perhaps the longer the duration of EU membership does not necessarily increase affiliation with European identity in post communist countries.

### Multilevel analyses

Next, we conducted a multi-level linear regression analyses to examine these issues more systematically. Table 2 shows the effect of different individual level characteristics on geographic attachment. Three different models are presented in Table 2, one model for each dependent variable. Model 1 shows the effects of possible determinants of group identity on affiliation to the nation; Model 2 shows their effects on affiliation to Europe; and Model 3 shows their effects on the relative attachment to Europe over one's nation. However, we will not discuss this table in detail due to the limitation of space.

---

<sup>3</sup> Latvia is an extreme case with weak identification with Europe getting even weaker over time. This might be due to the large Russian minority (about a third of the respondents), for whom Russia is probably closer to heart than Europe.

**Table 2: Determinants of geographical identification (micro level of hierarchical regression)**

	Model 1: NATIONAL			Model 2: EUROPE			Model 3: NATION_EUROPE		
	B	Low-high SE	BETA	B	Low-high SE	BETA	B	SE	BETA
Constant	-0.32***	0.05	0.00	-1.51***	0.11	0.00	-1.08***	0.10	0.00
Female	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.04***	0.01	0.02	0.03***	0.01	0.02
Age (young-old)	0.01***	0.00	0.08	0.01*	0.01	-0.01	-0.01***	0.00	-0.03
Education missing	-0.06***	0.02	-0.03	0.27***	0.03	0.10	0.27***	0.03	0.10
Education (low-high)	-0.01**	0.00	-0.01	0.02***	0.00	0.11	0.02***	0.00	0.10
Resp Income Missing	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
Resp Income (low-high)	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.03	0.03***	0.01	0.02
Party Affiliation None	0.03***	0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.05***	0.02	-0.02
Party Affiliation (left-right)	0.02***	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.02
Living Area (urban-rural)	-0.02***	0.00	-0.02	-0.03***	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
Ethnic_Majority									
Ethnic_Minortiy	-0.17***	0.01	-0.07	0.12***	0.02	0.04	0.22***	0.02	0.07
Rel Denom Majority									
Rel Denom None	-0.07***	0.01	-0.04	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.07***	0.02	0.03
Rel Denom Minority	-0.02*	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.04**	0.02	0.01
Ethnic closeness (none-cl)	0.16***	0.01	0.22	0.03***	0.01	0.03	-0.08***	0.01	-0.09
Citizen_none	-0.14***	0.02	-0.04	0.15***	0.03	0.03	0.22***	0.03	0.05
Affiliation Town (none-cl)	0.12***	0.01	0.13	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.09***	0.01	-0.07
Affiliation Region (none-cl)	0.26***	0.01	0.29	0.16***	0.01	0.14	-0.04***	0.01	-0.03
Affiliation Country (none-cl)				0.37***	0.01	0.28			
Affiliation Europe (none-cl)	0.21***	0.00	0.27						

Employment Status and frequency of church visits were included as well. They are not significant by large and thus not shown.

### *Macro Institutional Effects*

Once the micro level part of the model was specified, our macro level indicators were introduced in the model. Table 3 summarizes the effects of country level factors on national and European identities. We examine the effects of the level of national prosperity, linkage to international society, the duration of the EU membership, and history of a communist past on national and European identification. In order to deal with multi-collinearity, we entered each macro level indicator separately to the full micro level models in Models A to D, and subsequently introduced interaction terms in Models E to G.

**Table 3: Determinants of geographical identification (macro-level of hierarchical regression)**

	Model 1: NATIONAL			Model 2: EUROPE			Model 3: NATION_EUROPE (nat-eur)		
	B	Low-high SE	BETA	B	Low-high SE	BETA	B	SE	BETA
Model A: POSTCOM	0.050	0.061	0.03	0.237	0.168	0.11	0.173	0.160	0.09
Model B: GNP	-0.005**	0.002	-0.06	-0.007	0.004	0.07	-0.003	0.004	-0.03
Model C1: IGO (LN)	-0.015	0.010	-0.02	-0.042**	0.019	0.04	-0.029	0.019	-0.03
Model C2: NGO (LN)	-0.006	0.007	0.02	-0.026	0.014	0.07	-0.012	0.016	-0.05
Model D: YEARS in EU	-0.004**	0.001	-0.07	-0.009**	0.003	-0.13	-0.005	0.003	-0.08
<u>Interactions with Postcom</u>									
Model E:									
GNP in Postcom. Countries	-0.008**	0.003	-0.06	-0.014**	0.006	-0.08	-0.007	0.006	-0.04
GNP in non PC	-0.003	0.003	-0.05	-0.001	0.005	-0.02	0.001	0.005	0.01
Postcommunism itself	0.072	0.081	0.05	0.362	0.213	0.18	0.271	0.210	0.13
Model F1:									
IGO (LN) in PC	-0.017	0.013	0.06	-0.069**	0.020	-0.17	-0.050**	0.021	-0.12
IGO in non PC	-0.011	0.016	0.04	0.003	0.025	0.01	0.007	0.026	0.02
Postcommunism itself	-0.073	0.118	0.05	0.587**	0.235	0.29	0.449	0.235	0.22
Model F2:									
NGO (LN) in PC	-0.004	0.008	-0.01	-0.026	0.014	-0.07	-0.022	0.014	-0.06
NGO in non PC	-0.021	0.030	-0.14	0.038	0.055	0.19	0.042	0.053	0.21
Postcommunism itself	-0.129	0.260	-0.08	0.523	0.492	0.26	0.498	0.470	0.25
Model G:									
Years in EU in PC	-0.006	0.003	-0.03	-0.017	0.006	-0.07	-0.011**	0.005	-0.05
Years in EU in non PC	-0.003	0.002	-0.05	-0.001	0.005	-0.02	0.001	0.005	0.01
Postcommunism itself	-0.016	0.060	-0.01	0.161	0.181	0.08	0.140	0.178	0.07

Models A through D show that the level of economic development decreases national identity, that linkage to international society in terms of IGO presence decreases European identity, and that the length of EU membership reduces not only national identity but also European identity. These effects of international linkage and EU membership on European identity are quite surprising. Since we know from Table 1 that post-communist nations exhibit distinct patterns of European identity different from Western European nations and that they have had less exposure to the EU and to international society in general, we suspect that these effects might hold stronger among post-communist countries. The results clearly bear out our suspicions.

The bottom of Table 3, Models E through G, presents the various models that take into account the communist history of a nation. These models are more elaborated at the macro level

and show that our macro level factors are important only in the post-communist countries. In other European countries both the national and the European affiliation appear independent from most national factors analyzed above. The level of economic development has an effect on political identity only in communist countries. Economic development reduces both national and European identity for post-communist nations. Our analyses found that the wealthier a post-communist country, the lower its inhabitants' affiliation with the nation and the greater the decrease in the national affiliation of its inhabitants from 1995 to 2003. Wealthier post-communist countries were less likely to feel close to the European Union.

Also, only among post-communist nations does higher degree of international linkage reduce European identity significantly. The presence of international organizations had an unexpected impact on European affiliation. The more international organizational institutions present in a nation, the more people held higher levels of national pride than EU affiliation. These results suggest that post-communist nations are following two different tracks with respect to globalization. They have one track which leads to becoming part of the general global society and another track which leads to Europeanization. This might explain why higher degree of linkage to general international society actually conflicts with the development of European identity in post-communist nations.

Finally, years in the EU undermines both national and European identity, but again, only in post-communist nations. These results indicate that post-communist nations with longer EU membership turn out individuals who become less nationalistic and less European-oriented over time. Indeed, individuals from post-communist nations which held longer official tenure as EU members had less feelings of attachment to the EU. Perhaps this effect is a result of disillusionment with the EU that many of them experienced when living conditions did not

drastically improve in Eastern Europe when they entered the capitalist democratic European society. However, relatively, the longer a post-communist country has been a member of the EU, the lower the affiliation one's national identity relative to European identity.

**Table 4: Model fit at the country, time, and individual level (variance and SE)**

	Empty Model	Model with Individual level indicators only		Model with individual and macro indicators	
	Var (SE)	Var (SE)	Expl. Var.	Var (SE)	Expl. Var.
National identification (N=32405)	C: 39.89(15.59) T: 5.03(2.01) I: 476.02(3.74)	C: 13.09(5.25) T: 2.07(0.89) I: 310.43(2.64)	67% 66% 37%	C: 8.63(3.55) T: 1.75(0.78) I: 310.51(2.64)	78% 77% 38%
Europe identification (N=30684)	C: 161.08(62.2) T: 17.3(6.61) I: 685.80 (5.54)	C: 112.50(42.97) T: 9.49(3.71) I: 561.1(4.78)	30% 32% 21%	C: 99.17(37.25) T: 5.03(2.08) I: 561.12(4.48)	38% 42% 23%
Nation-Europe-dimension (N=27603)	C: 74.82(2.93) T: 9.74(3.83) I: 728.43(5.89)	C: 97.84(37.30) T: 7.62(3.73) I: 694.28(5.91)	-31%* -24%* 2%	C: 94.44(35.59) T: 5.26(2.23) I: 694.29(5.91)	-26%* -18%* 2%

C=Country, T=Time, I=Individual Level; \*The introduction of micro level parameters increases the differences between countries and between time points. The variance, thus, increases at the macro level and the explained variances are negative.

Finally, we consider the fit of our different models for each dependent variable (see Table 4). The reference model in hierarchical modeling is the empty model. This model shows the variances at our three different levels of analysis when no explanatory variables are included in the models. The highest level of analysis is the country level. The middle level is time. The lowest level of analysis is the individual level. As for national identity, the empty model shows a variance of 39.89 with a standard error of 15.59 at the country level. Over time, at level two, the variance is 5.03 and 476 at the individual level. All subsequent models are compared with these values in order to judge the model's fit. The introduction of individual level variables reduces the variances at all three levels of analysis. For national identification, the country level variance is reduced from 39.89 to 13.09, the over time variance decreases from 5.03 to 2.07 and the variance at the individual level is lowered from 476.02 to 310.43. Once macro variables are included, the national and the variance over time are further diminished. The country level is reduced from 13.09 to 8.63 and the over time variance from 2.07 to 1.75. The individual level remains about

the same. However, this is different for the model where the dependent variable is the relative preference for European attachment over national attachment. Here, the introduction of micro variables results in a higher variance at the national level. However, one has to consider all three variance terms simultaneously in order to appraise the model fit. Since the individual variance goes down substantially, the model fit is better in spite of the larger national variance. Overall, our models are able to explain about 38% of the variance for the national identification and about 23% for the European identification. The relative preference for Europe over the nation on the other hand, is only poorly explained by our models. A reason could be that this dimension is only weakly correlated with other identity dimensions such as ethnic group or regional identification - variables that are essential for national and European affiliation.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

How do these results stack up against the hypotheses proposed in the theoretical discussion? Hypotheses 1a and 1b posed competing hypotheses about the effect of the level of economic development. The results in Model B show partial support for Hypothesis 1a: economic development reduces national identity. However, the interaction models in Model E demonstrate that this effect applies primarily to post-communist nations. Furthermore, in post-communist nations, economic development reduces European identity. These results suggest that as post-communist nations develop economically, individuals become freed from national attachment, as the post-materialist argument would predict, and grow less dependent on economic aid and political legitimacy that the EU confers on them, thus exhibiting less of European identity. Thus, our results suggest national wealth doesn't have differential effects on national versus European identification.



Hypothesis 2 reflects the world society approach and posits that international linkage would lead to greater identification with Europe and reduced national identity. Model C shows a contradictory result: international linkage reduces European identity. In Model F, we find, once again, the effect hold only among post-communist nations. This suggests that post-communist nations face two paths to global integration after the fall of communism: one is the path to Europeanization and the other the path to broader globalization. If post-communist nations take the latter path and increase participation in international organization activities, it reduces their European identity perhaps because the salience of a global international identity conflicts with mere continental affiliation. In addition, the USA and the NATO are often important partners for the post communist countries. An example is the Poland's support of the US intervention in Iraq.

Hypothesis 3 proposed that longer durations of EU membership would lead to greater identification with Europe. Surprisingly, the results in Model D show the complete opposite: the length of EU membership reduces European, as well as national, identity. Again, Model G tests the interaction effect with post-communist status, and finds that the effect holds only for post-communist nations. Among post-communist nations, the closer they came to the accession to the EU, the more disillusioned they become of Europeanization, and the less attachment they have toward Europe. This finding speaks to the undelivered promise of EU membership for these nations.

The arguments about post-communist status, summarized in Hypotheses 4a and 4b, did not find any direct support, as the effects in Model A are insignificant. However, as the examination of interaction effects above indicates, post-communist nations have distinct political dynamics with Europe, leading to unique effects on individuals' identification with Europe. As mentioned above, one of the reasons for this may be that people in these countries had overblown

expectations in 1995 about the benefits of entrance to the European community. For example, even after joining the EU, many restrictions still constrained inhabitants of Eastern European countries. Residents of former communist nations still do not have the same freedoms in labor migration. In addition, farmers received lower subsidies than expected. Thus, it is likely that a few years after the breakdown of communism, disillusionment and disappointment in the power and ability to bring positive change factored in bringing down the mean level of attachment to the EU as well as towards one's newly democratic and capitalist nation. Here, we have to bear in mind that the breakdown of the communism system is a specific historic setting; these arguments ought to be examined in a broader worldwide perspective, and over a longer period of time.

Finally, all of these results must be qualified. The effects we found occurred in a very specific situational time and place. Europe in the mid-1990s to early 2000s was a special case where many interesting things were occurring simultaneously. First, there was an environmental push to create a superordinate geographical identity and an institutionalized organization working to try build up this entity. Second, there had been a recent major political and economic transformation for many European nations as their states transitioned from being communist to becoming democratic capitalist nations. Third, there was a high level of immigration to and between European countries which heralded an increasingly large nativist nationalistic backlash against the newcomers. These factors are all highly potent and quite naturally affected the interrelationship between the different levels and bases of identity. Future studies should test to see whether these results hold in different contexts of institutional change. In particular, we think it is necessary to next test whether or not the relationship found here between different levels of geographical identity hold in nations which did not undergo drastic economic and political transformations. It is also necessary to test whether the interrelationship between geographical

identity with the identities pertaining to different social bases, such as being part of a minority ethnic or religious group, in nations that have higher levels of multicultural mixing (such as Australia, Canada, and the US) as well as in those where diversity is relatively low (such as Saudi Arabia or Japan).

## I References

- Bobo, L. 1988.. Group conflict, prejudice, and the paradox of contemporary racial attitudes. In P. A. Katz & D. A. Taylor Eds., *Eliminating racism. Profiles in controversy* pp. 85–114.. New York: Plenum.
- Boli, John and George M. Thomas. 1997. "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization." *American Sociological Review* 62:171-190.
- Brewer, M.B. & Gardner, W. 1996. "Who is this 'We'? Levels of Collective Identity and Self Representations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 71: 83-93.
- Brown, R. 2000. "Social Identity Theory: past achievements, current problems and future challenges." *European Journal of Social Psychology*. 30:745-778.
- Devos, T., Banaji, M.R. 2005. "American=White." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 88: 447-466.
- Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L., Validzic, A. 1998. "Intergroup Bias: Status, Differentiation, and a Common In-Group Identity." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 75: 109-120.
- Duncan, C., Kelyvn J., and G. Moon. 1996. "Health-related behavior in Context: A multilevel modeling approach". *Social Science & Medicine* 42:817-830.
- Frank, D.J., Hironaka, A., & Schofer, E. 2000. "The Nation-State and the Natural Environment over the Twentieth Century." *American Sociological Review*. 65: 96-116.
- Fromm, E. 1941. *Escape From Freedom*. NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Inglehart, R. (1998) *Modernisierung und Postmodernisierung. Kultureller, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Wandel in 43 Gesellschaften*. Campus: Frankfurt.
- Hello, E., Scheepers, P., Vermulst, A. and Gerris, J. M. 2004. 'Association between Educational Attainments and Ethnic Distance in Young Adults', *Acta Sociologica* 47: 253–75.
- Hjerm, Mikael. 2001. 'Education, Xenophobia and Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27: 37–60.
- Hyman, H. H., & Wright, C. R. 1979.. *Education's lasting influence on values*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Kaelberer, M. (2004) *The euro and European identity: symbols, power and the politics of European monetary union*. *Review of international Studies*, 30, 161-178.
- Kessler, T. & Mummendey, A. 2001. "Is There Any Scapegoat Around? Determinants of Intergroup Conflicts at Different Categorization Levels." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 81: 1090-1102.
- Krysan, M. 2000. 'Prejudice, Politics and Public Opinion: Understanding the Source of Racial Policy Attitudes', *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 135–68.
- McLaren, L.M., 2003. "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants." *Social Forces* 81:909-936.

- Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-State." *American Journal of Sociology* 103:144-181.
- Olzak, Susan. 1994. *Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford University Press.
- Putnam, R. 2000. *Bowling Alone: Civic Disengagement in America*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Quillian, L. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti Immigrant Racial Prejudice in Europe." *ASR* 60: 586-611.
- Quillian, L. 1996. "Group Threat and Regional Change in Attitudes Toward African-Americans." *American Journal of Sociology* 102: 816-60.
- Ramirez, Francisco O., Y. Soysal, and S. Shanahan. 1997. "The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National Acquisition of Women's Suffrage Rights, 1890 to 1990." *American Sociological Review* 62:735-745.
- Risse, T. (2003) The Euro between national and European identity. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10, 487-505.
- Rosegger, R. & Haller, M. 2003. "Concepts of National Identity in Western and Eastern Europe.", *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 28, 28-54.
- Sahlins, P. 1989. *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Schofer, E. & Hironaka, A. 2005. "The Effects of World Society on Environmental Protection Outcomes." *Social Forces*: 25-47.
- Schuman, H., Steeh, C., Bobo, L., & Krysan, M. 1997. *Racial attitudes in America. Trends and interpretations rev. ed...* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sidanius, J. & Petrocik, J.R. 2001. "Communal and National Identity in a Multiethnic State: A comparison of three perspectives." Ed. by R.D. Ashmore, L. Jussim, & D. Wilder. *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution*. Oxford: University Press: 101-129.
- Smith, A. W. 1981. Racial tolerance as a function of group position. *American Sociological Review*, 46, 558-573.
- Smith, A. W. 1985. Cohorts, education, and the evolution of tolerance. *Social Science Research*, 14, 205-225.
- Subramanian, S. V., Kelvin J., and C. Duncan. 2003. "Multilevel Methods for Public Health Research." Pp. 65-111 in *Neighborhoods and Health*, edited by I. Kawachi and L. F. Berkman. New York: Oxford. University Press.
- Tajfel, H, Turner, J.C. 1986. "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior." Chapter 1, 7-24 *Psychology of Intergroup Behavior*. Ed. S. Worchel & W. Austin. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Tocqueville, A. 2001. *Democracy in America*. New York: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Tsutsui, K. & Wotipka, C.M. 2005. "Global Civil Society and the International Human Rights Movement: Citizen Participation in Human Rights International Nongovernmental Organizations." *Social Forces* 83:587-620.
- Turner, J.C., 1985. "Social Categorization and the Self-Concept: A social cognitive theory of group behavior." *Advances in Group Processes* 2: 77-122.
- Turner, J.C. 1999. "Some Current Issues in Research on Social Identity and Self-Categorization Theories" 6-34. *Social Identity* ed. Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje.
- Union of International Associations (1996, 2004) *Yearbook of International Organizations 1999-2000 Volume 2*. Munich: K.G. Saur.
- Vogt, P. W. 1997. *Tolerance and education. Learning to live with diversity and difference*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.