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
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WINTER ISSUE

2009

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

FSI Director Coit D. “Chip” Blacker, the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies, opens FSI’s fourth annual international conference, noting “After a grueling 22-month campaign, change truly has come to the United States with the election of Barack Obama as this country’s 44th president.”




Displaying the cover of the German news magazine Der Spiegel, calling Barack Obama “The President of the World,” Stanford President Emeritus and constitutional law expert Gerhard Casper discusses U.S. standing in the world and the challenge of restoring global confidence in U.S. leadership.

TRANSITIONS 2009

Freeman Spogli Institute’s Fourth

Annual International Conference

On November 13, 2008, FSI convened its fourth annual international conference, *Transitions 2009*. Coming on the heels of the U.S. presidential election, the conference gave distinguished Stanford faculty, outside experts, and practitioners a platform to advance policy recommendations and discuss the abundant opportunities for change offered



by the election of Barack Obama as the new U.S. president and historic transitions abroad. A by-invitation audience of 370, including Stanford scholars and alumni, policymakers, diplomats, and leaders from business, medicine, and law, engaged in animated day-long debate and discussion about domestic and foreign policy priorities.

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Addressing “U.S. Transition 2009,” featuring Chip Blacker, Gerhard Casper, Alan Garber, and Stephen Krasner, physician and economist Garber discusses the crisis in health care financing and reform prospects, advising that rationalizing payment for care is “the single most important and difficult thing we can do.”



Delivering the keynote address, “Beyond the West?” Timothy Garton Ash, professor of European studies at Oxford and Hoover Institution senior fellow, discusses the challenges of a multipolar world, noting, “This is a story more of the rise of the rest than of the fall of the West.”



Brookings’ Carlos Pascual, NYU’s Bruce Jones, and FSI’s Stephen Stedman, directors of Managing Global Insecurity, release their groundbreaking “Plan for Action” seeking to mobilize more effective action against transnational threats and build the political support networks needed for revitalization of international institutions.

(PHOTOS: STEVE CASTILLO)

Our Daily Bread

Without Public Investment, the Food Crisis Will Only Get Worse

FSE DIRECTOR ROSAMOND NAYLOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR WALTER FALCON DISCUSS THE FOOD CRISIS
IN A LEAD ARTICLE IN THE SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2008 ISSUE OF *BOSTON REVIEW*

DURING THE 18 MONTHS AFTER JANUARY 2007, cereal prices doubled, setting off a world food crisis. In the United States, rising food prices have been a pocketbook annoyance. Most Americans can opt to buy lower-priced sources of calories and proteins and eat out less frequently. But for nearly half of the world's population—the 2.5 billion people who live on less than \$2 per day—rising costs mean fewer meals, smaller portions, stunted children, and higher infant mortality rates. The price explosion has produced, in short, a crisis of *food security*, defined by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as the physical and economic access to the food necessary for a healthy and productive life. And it has meant a sharp setback to decades-long efforts to reduce poverty in poor countries.

The current situation is quite unlike the food crises of 1966 and 1973. It is not the result of a significant drop in food supply caused by bad weather, pests, or policy changes in the former Soviet Union. Rather, it is fundamentally a demand-driven story of “success.” Rising incomes, especially in China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil, have increased demand for diversified diets that include more meat and vegetable oils. Against this background of growing income and demand, increased global consumption of biofuels and the American and European quest for energy self-sufficiency have added further strains to the agricultural system. At the same time,

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's assessment that biofuels were 3 percent of the problem completely lacks credibility, and the International Food Policy Research Center's estimate of 30 percent may also be too low. What happens to future corn and vegetable oil prices, and therefore to the entire structure of food prices, is dependent primarily on the price of oil and on whether the new biofuel mandates for ethanol in the United States and biodiesel in Europe are imposed or rescinded.

The price of oil, in particular, is a fundamental factor in the overall equation. In a world of \$50-per-barrel oil, growth in biofuels would have been more limited, with a much smaller spillover onto food prices. But the links that have emerged between agricultural and energy sectors will shape future investments and the well-being of farmers and consumers worldwide.

Misguided domestic policies serving particular groups of constituents in a wide range of countries are also driving the crisis. Export bans on food in response to populist pressures are likely to yield small and short-lived gains, while producing large and long-term damage to low-income consumers in other countries. The food system is indeed global, yet the principal actors are national governments, not international agencies. The latter can help with solutions, but fundamental improvements require more enlightened national policies.

“What we are witnessing is not a natural disaster—a silent tsunami or a perfect storm. ... [The food crisis] is a man-made catastrophe, and as such must be fixed by people.” ROBERT ZOELICK, *THE WORLD BANK* (JULY 1, 2008)

As Zoelick's passage in this essay implies, much of the current crisis could have been avoided and can be fixed over time. Individuals, national governments, and international institutions took agriculture for granted for 20 years, and their neglect has now caught up with the world. Fortunately, high food prices and the resulting political upheaval have induced national governments and such international institutions as the World Bank to pledge greater investments in agricultural development. Unfortunately, these pledges only came as a response to widespread malnutrition among the world's poorest households.

In response to rising demand and higher prices, some new sources of supply are emerging, including soybean expansion in Brazil and oil palm expansion in Indonesia. However, the environmental impacts of such expansion, particularly when it involves clearing tropical rainforests, are potentially serious. Similarly, efforts to increase crop yields in existing agricultural areas are leading to greater fertilizer inputs and losses to the surrounding environment. The trade-offs between agricultural productivity and environmental sustainability,

particularly in an era of climate change, appear to be more extreme than ever before.

The current food crisis has different origins than previous global food crises and will require different solutions. It also differs from famines in isolated geographic areas for which food aid and other palliatives can provide quick fixes. The present situation is instead reflected in higher infant mortality and poverty rates over a much wider geography. Given the underlying pressures of growing population, increasing global incomes, and the search for oil substitutes, leaders in both the public and private sectors in developed and developing nations need to be serious about expanded agricultural investments and improved food policies. Otherwise, the current situation will only get worse, especially for the 40 percent of the world's population that is already living so close to the edge. ■



neglected investments in productivity-improving agricultural technology—along with a weak U.S. dollar, excessive speculation, and misguided government policies in both developed and developing countries—have exacerbated the situation. Climate change also looms ominously over the entire global food system.

In short, an array of agricultural, economic, and political connections among commodities and across nations are now working together to the detriment of the world's food-insecure people.

* * *

The complexity of the food crisis across commodities, space, and time makes it difficult to give a precise statement of causes. That said, the direct and indirect effects of increased ethanol production in response to rising oil prices seem to have pushed an already tight food system (with weak investment in innovation) over the edge.

(PHOTO: MARSHALL BURKE)

Better Health, Lower Cost: Can Innovation Save Health Reform?

ON SEPTEMBER 16, 2008, FSI'S CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY (CHP) AND CENTER FOR PRIMARY CARE AND OUTCOMES RESEARCH (PCOR) hosted a unique conference at Stanford University, *Better Health, Lower Cost: Can Innovation Save Health Reform?* in honor of their 10th anniversary.

The conference provided a West Coast forum to discuss how and whether innovation in health care delivery, payment incentives, and technology could play a pivotal role in improving access to high-quality health care globally. The ties between innovation and health care expenditures were explored as speakers discussed the domestic and developing world contexts. The conference had significant participation from Silicon Valley and Bay Area entrepreneurs, venture capital and investment banking executives, leaders of the biotech and high-tech industries, provider and insurance executives, as well as academics, students, and policymakers.

Moderated by Matt Miller, senior advisor, McKinsey & Company, the conference included a prominent group of speakers from three constituencies—the private sector, philanthropy, and the policy community. Delivering the luncheon address, CHP/PCOR Director Alan Garber noted that while he originally wanted the title of his talk to be “How to make deep cuts in health care expenditures,” it eventually became “Reduced growth in health care expenditures,” reflecting the challenge of reducing health care costs. Dr. Garber presented data on how health care expenditures in the United States are extremely high, even assuming value for money, and discussed a number of controversial approaches to reducing health care expenditures. These include understanding comparative effectiveness of alternatives for diagnosis and treatment, aligning payment incentives (paying doctors and hospitals for improving outcomes), creating health insurance markets that everyone could buy from, and limiting the health insurance tax exclusion. He summed up the key steps for reducing expenditure growth as 1) better financing and payment and 2) better information.

In his keynote address, Peter Orszag, former director of the Congressional Budget Office and current director of the Office of Management and Budget, emphasized that “health care costs are the key to our fiscal future,” yet there seem “to be substantial inefficiencies in the health system.” He also warned that “just as economics ignored psychology to its peril for too long ... too much of health care policy and medical science is making the same mistake.”

In other conference highlights, Plenary I addressed “Innovation in Health Care in the United States” with talks by George C. Halvorson from the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Gail R. Wilensky from Project Hope, and Brook Byers from Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers. Halvorson pointed to development of “systematic data-rich patient-focused care [and] caregivers who are connected with each other for the care of individual patients.” “We need electronic medical records [and] we need care tracking not isolated care silos,” he said. Gail Wilensky argued that the “use of better information and better incentives [is] a way to help us learn smarter, to practice smarter, and learn how to spend smarter.” Brook Byers represented “innovators on the product side from the private sector.” He emphasized the importance of genes, noting that new molecular diagnostic tests linking an individual’s genetic variation of a disease to a specific “medication response profile” is truly “individualized medicine,” with the potential to reduce costs.

Plenary II on “Imperatives for U.S. Health Care Reform: the Next Four Years” included talks by Mark Smith from the California HealthCare Foundation, Stirling Bryan from the University of Vancouver, and Arnold Milstein from the Pacific Business Group on Health. All three speakers offered approaches for making health care more affordable. Bryan discussed using cost-effectiveness analysis as an approach to setting limits on treatment spending. As an example, he cited the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), a special health authority in England that “makes coverage decisions and reimbursement decisions in relation to new and existing health-care technologies.” Milstein relayed what “employers who are leaders in pursuit of more cost-effective care are thinking,” arguing that to make health care more affordable to an average American family we have to “vastly speed up translational efficiency in the U.S. health-care delivery system,” meaning shortening the average length of time between the discovery of a better, cheaper way of delivering care and institutionalizing it in the industry. The “answer to affordability of health care for people in this country has to be to some extent the reorganization of the delivery system,” Smith said. One approach to this is the development of tools that would “allow less skilled people to do the work of formerly more skilled people.”

Plenary III on “Sustaining Innovation in the Developing World” included talks by John C. Martin, chairman and CEO of Gilead Sciences, Inc., Melinda Moree from Moree Consulting, and Paul Wise, the Richard E. Behrman Professor in Child Health and CHP/PCOR core faculty member. John Martin discussed an innovative and successful approach to making HIV drugs accessible to developing countries, advising that we “license the manufacturing technology to some Indian generics, teach them how to manufacture a drug, and let them compete without restriction in this [drug] market so that there will be economic competition.” Melinda Moree conveyed her experiences with public-private partnerships, noting that there have been some successes with this approach to tackling diseases such as malaria, TB, and HIV in the developing worlds, but the one major failure has been the inability “to attract the pre-profit large biotech companies.” As a physician working in developing countries, Paul Wise offered a “perspective of desperation.” His plea was that people expand their thinking about innovation not just by talking about it, but by extending “notions of innovation into delivery systems.” Through “more creative innovation, directed at the implementation of new expanding efficiency,” he argued, “we will be able to respond effectively and more urgently to the recognition that ... the struggle for innovation and the struggle for justice will forever be inextricably linked.” ■



Celebrating a 10th Anniversary

CHP and PCOR were established in 1998 as a focus for health policy and outcomes research for Stanford University. Operating under the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Stanford School of Medicine, the centers produce sophisticated research and timely information to help guide health policy and improve clinical practice. For more information on the centers’ work or to view the conference video, please visit the centers’ website at <http://healthpolicy.stanford.edu> or contact Vandana Sundaram, assistant director for research, at sund@stanford.edu.

TOP TO BOTTOM: ALAIN ENTHOVEN, MARRINER S. ECCLES PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MANAGEMENT (LEFT), KEYNOTE SPEAKER PETER R. ORSZAG, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE AND CURRENT DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AND PHYSICIAN AND ECONOMIST ALAN GARBER, CHP/PCOR DIRECTOR, DISCUSS HEALTH CARE REFORM; LENNY MENDONCA MBA '87, DIRECTOR OF MCKINSEY & COMPANY, INC. AND CHAIRMAN OF THE MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, POSES A QUESTION DURING THE CONFERENCE; JOHN C. MARTIN, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, GILEAD SCIENCES, INC. (LEFT), MELINDA MOREE, GLOBAL HEALTH CONSULTANT, AND STANFORD PHYSICIAN PAUL H. WISE, THE RICHARD E. BEHRMAN PROFESSOR IN CHILD HEALTH AND CHP/PCOR CORE FACULTY MEMBER, DISCUSS THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF HEALTH CARE INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. (PHOTOS: STEVE CASTILLO)

Documents Detail Iranian Training of Iraqi Militias

BY DAN STOBER

AN ARMY TERRORISM EXPERT AND AN AFFILIATE AT THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION has released 85 pages of once-secret documents that provide an insider's account of how Iranian military and Lebanese Hezbollah forces train Iraqi Shiite militants to kill U.S. soldiers.

The documents—summaries of interviews with captured Iraqi fighters—were chilling to read, said Col. Joseph Felter, a Special Forces veteran and former director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. His Army colleagues have been “on the receiving end of this,” he said. Felter, a national security affairs fellow at the Hoover

Institution, presented his findings during an October 9 CISAC social science seminar titled “The Enemy of my Enemy is Iran: Iranian Influence in Iraq.”

Iran has denied the training, but Felter says the newly declassified interviews help make a compelling case. The documents are the most detailed descriptions yet released of Iranian-sponsored paramilitary training and provision of military

aid to militants in Iraq. The intelligence documents summarize 28 interrogations of detainees captured in Iraq from mid-2007 to mid-2008 and describe the sometimes tedious path followed by the trainees. The recruits often complained about the poor quality of the training, while instructors from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force admonished some of them for being slackers.

One detainee described crossing the border into Iran legally with other Iraqi militants, then taking a taxi-bus to the city of Ahvaz, where they stayed in a house near a traffic circle that featured a large statue of a teapot in its center. After one night in Ahvaz, they flew to Tehran and were driven directly to a training camp, where they arrived after midnight.

After a day of rest, they began their training with pistols on a soccer field. “The trainees were not happy with the training and were constantly joking around and slacking off,” according to one of the intelligence reports. By day 19 of one Iraqi militant's account of his training, the Iranian instructors had advanced to the teaching of tactics for attacking U.S. convoys with roadside bombs.

After another 10 days of training, the Iraqi militia members learned a new trick: a roadside bomb left in an obvious place, with no attempt at concealment. The Iranian cadres explained that a visible bomb still serves a tactical purpose. It can prevent enemy forces from entering an area or divert them to a different route, where an ambush waits.

The Iraqis and their Iranian hosts sometimes squabbled, even though both groups are Shiite Muslims with a shared enemy—the U.S. soldiers in Iraq. The Arab Iraqis complained that their Persian instructors looked down on them and treated them without respect.

There were better relations, apparently, when the instructors were Lebanese members of Hezbollah who provided training to Iraqi militants, both in Iran and Lebanon.

One detainee told his U.S. interrogator that he began his journey to participate in Iranian-sponsored paramilitary training by falsely telling his family he was leaving to guard religious shrines in Iraq. Instead he rendezvoused with 11 other trainees in a garage in Amarah, a city in southeastern Iraq near the Iranian border. Some then traveled to Iran by bus, while others were taken in a rowboat through the marshes near the border, then flown to Tehran.

Select trainees were eventually flown from Tehran to Damascus, Syria, and driven from the airport to the Lebanese border in curtained

vehicles. On a hill across the border, two dark-colored Chevrolet Suburbans awaited them.

“They switched vehicles twice. The roads had a lot of curves, and several of detainee's associates got car sick and vomited in the vehicles,” according to one of the declassified intelligence documents.

But despite Iran's provision of lethal aid, Felter said the Iranian government's overarching goal is to gain political, not military, influence in neighboring Iraq. Political ties between the two countries are extensive, ranging from personal relationships to historical Shiite connections, charity aid, economic development, and commercial trade.

“They have influence in the Iraqi political system to a remarkable degree. They've really got their hooks in,” said Felter, who received his PhD in political science from Stanford.

American leaders increasingly recognize the importance of responding to Iran's strategy with a strategy of their own, based on a detailed, nuanced understanding of a complicated situation rather than the latest roadside bombing, Felter said.

Iraqi militants who have participated in Iranian-sponsored training insist that it is designed primarily to evict Coalition Forces from Iraq—not to stoke the kind of sectarian warfare that rocked Iraq in 2006 and early 2007, according to Felter.

Felter and his co-author, Brian Fishman, quote from an interrogation with a member of an Iranian-trained network known as the Special Group Criminals: “Iran does not care about the fight between Shi'a and al-Qaeda. Iran just wants to force Coalition Forces out of Iraq because Iran is afraid Coalition Forces will use Iraq as a base for an attack in the future. Iran is training people to fight Coalition Forces, not al-Qaeda.”

Felter notes that in 2004, when Najaf seemed headed toward chaos, “Iran intervened and took strong steps to ensure the continued viability of the electoral political process.” Iran would like to see a weakly federated Iraq strong enough to prevent chaos or a Sunni power grab while still giving Iranian leaders a chance to have serious influence in the Shiite-dominated and oil rich region of southern Iraq, Felter said.

Importantly, Felter points out, “The United States and Iran are not engaged in a zero-sum game in Iraq. Both countries want greater stability and democracy, as well as a reduction of U.S. troops. Neither Washington nor Tehran wants a hostile relationship that could lead to unnecessary conflict.” These mutual interests are shared by Iraqis as well and, according to Felter, could provide groundwork for potential future cooperation and for compromises in which all sides' interests are better met than with the status quo.

Perhaps paradoxically, Iran may have less influence in Iraq once U.S. forces have gone home, Felter said. At that point, Iraqi Shiite militants will no longer share a common enemy with Iran, and Iraqi nationalism may rise to the forefront, thus exacerbating age-old rifts and animosities between Iraqi Arabs and their Persian neighbors.

Felter's paper, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and ‘Other Means,’” can be found along with the supporting intelligence documents at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Iran_Iraq.asp. ■


A VERSION OF THIS ARTICLE WAS FIRST PUBLISHED IN *STANFORD REPORT* ON OCT. 22, 2008.

TOP PHOTO: JOSEPH FELTER AND BRIAN FISHMAN IN IRAQ. THEY CO-AUTHORED THE REPORT “IRANIAN STRATEGY IN IRAQ: POLITICS AND ‘OTHER MEANS.’” (COURTESY OF JOSEPH FELTER); BOTTOM PHOTO: HOOVER NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FELLOW AND CISAC AFFILIATE COL. JOSEPH FELTER PRESENTS ONCE-SECRET INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS ON IRANIAN-SPONSORED PARAMILITARY TRAINING AND AID TO MILITANTS IN IRAQ.



Divided Lenses: Film and War Memories in Asia

BY DANIEL SNEIDER



FEW FIGURES IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE can match the iconic status of Clint Eastwood. As an actor and a film director, Eastwood is one of those rare artists whose work has helped define how Americans see themselves. With a vitality that belies his age, 78, Eastwood directed two major films this year, starring in one of them, *Gran Torino*.

Amidst the crush of his work, the Hollywood star graciously came to Stanford in early December, at the invitation of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, to talk about his work on a pair of 2006 films about the World War II battle of Iwo Jima. Appearing on the stage of a packed Cubberly Auditorium following the screening

of one of those films, *Letters from Iwo Jima*, Eastwood discussed his unusual decision to film the same battle from two very different perspectives—that of the American soldiers and, in *Letters*, from the viewpoint of the doomed Japanese defenders.

The event was the culmination of Divided Lenses: Film and War Memories in Asia, a film series that aired and discussed contemporary films about the wartime era in Asia from China, South Korea, Japan, and the United States. The series led up to an academic conference, convened by Shorenstein APARC, of leading scholars to discuss the role of film, and more broadly popular culture, in the formation of historical memory in China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States about the 1931–1951 wartime period, ranging from the treatment of Japanese colonialism to the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War, the Korean War, and the post-war settlement. Film offers an invaluable lens for understanding the changes in historical perception over the decades since the end of the war. And it provides another means of comparing how each nation created separate, and often conflicting, understandings of the past that have become a source of conflict today.

In his classic film, *Rashomon*, the Japanese director Kurosawa Akira explored how different observers of the same set of events can arrive at conflicting versions of the truth about what actually occurred. The psychological insight of this masterpiece

became known as the “*Rashomon* Effect.” Eastwood’s pair of Iwo Jima films capture this effect, and the message of *Divided Lenses*, perfectly.

Divided Lenses is the second phase of the *Divided Memories and Reconciliation* project, a multiyear research effort that began with a groundbreaking comparative study of the high school history textbooks of China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States regarding the wartime period. The project hopes to promote reconciliation through mutual understanding of how each society shapes its view of the past.

Following an international conference, held at Stanford in February 2008, workshops were held in Asia to present and discuss the project results on textbooks. In September and October, workshops took place in Taiwan, in association with the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies (CAPAS) at Academia Sinica; in Seoul, in association with the Northeast Asia History Foundation; and in Tokyo, at the Center for Pacific and American Studies at the University of Tokyo. Stanford researchers also presented their work to editors and reporters from the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, which had earlier published an important series of articles on the issue of war responsibility in Japan. The *Yomiuri*, the world’s largest daily newspaper with a circulation of more than 14 million copies a day, subsequently devoted significant space in both its English and Japanese editions to the project and its results.

The *Divided Memories and Reconciliation* project continues to enjoy the ongoing support of important donors, including the Northeast Asia History Foundation of Korea, the U.S.-Japan Foundation, and the Taiwan Democracy Foundation. ■



DIVIDED LENSES FILM CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 5, 2008, BECHTEL CONFERENCE CENTER, ENCINA HALL.



An edited excerpt from the conversation on stage between director **Clint Eastwood** and **Professor Robert Brent Toplin**, from the University of North Carolina, Wilmington.

TOPLIN: This film is part of a companion set—*Flags of our Fathers* and *Letters from Iwo Jima*—that offer two very different perspectives on the same battle. *Flags of our Fathers* is about three soldiers who raised the flag at Iwo Jima. It is about the American story. The Japanese soldiers in that film are seen only briefly. Yet in this film the Americans for the most part are these fleeting images, warriors rushing across the screen, and it’s the Japanese figures that we get to know. They’re differentiated; they’re people with real personalities; they’re human beings, which is something quite different from our usual, Hollywood-made war movie. Were you thinking, when you first made this movie, of doing the two different movies? Was *Rashomon* on your mind?

EASTWOOD: I was preparing *Flags of our Fathers*. We’d bought the book and that story was pretty much a true story about the men who raised the flag on Mount Suribachi, the most famous photograph of World War II. ... So we were doing that story and I went to Iwo Jima. I got permission from the Japanese government to go down there and look at it and they gave me a wonderful

tour. There’s not much to see there—second prize would be two weeks in Iwo Jima—but it’s very interesting historically when you think about the battle because they dug into the mountain and created this defense. I was wondering who is the man—General Kuribayashi—who thought of all this and what was he about. So I called a friend of mine in Japan and I said are there any books on this fellow Kuribayashi. And he said, yes there is but it is in Japanese and a very small book of letters he had written home to his wife and daughter in 1929 when he was working here in America.

So I thought I would like to learn what he was thinking, what’s it like to be sent to an island, being told you’re not coming back. And for all of his people, all of his troops, you’re just going to go there and defend against this massive armada that’s going to come and you’re not going to have any chance. Most of them were just kids and they all had the same feelings about their families and missing their families as American troops did and so I thought, wouldn’t be wonderful to tell their side of it as well.

TOPLIN: What was the reaction in Japan to the film?

EASTWOOD: Reviewers liked it very much. The interesting thing for me was when I brought these actors over—because we shot on Iwo but we also shot up in Barstow in a silver mine there. ... A lot of them didn’t speak any English at all but I found out by talking to them, through the interpreters and the ones who did speak English, [that] none of them knew about the battle of Iwo Jima. All that stuff had been erased out of their books in school so it was not common knowledge for younger people...


Getting to the part of how they received it, they received it very well. The picture was very, very successful, especially in Japan. The reviewers liked it—it was given their Oscar for the best foreign film of the year and the only thing foreign about it was me.

A FULL AUDIO AND VIDEO RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION WITH EASTWOOD IS AVAILABLE ON THE APARC.STANFORD.EDU WEBSITE. (PHOTO: ROD SEARCEY)

America, Europe, and the Global Struggle for Democracy

BY AMICHAH MAGEN

SPANISH SOLDIERS OF THE EU PEACEKEEPING FORCE EUFOR IN BOSNIA STAND GUARD DURING THE CEREMONY MARKING THE CHANGE OF COMMAND IN THE BUTMIR MILITARY CAMP NEAR SARAJEVO DECEMBER 4, 2008. (REUTERS/DANILO KRSTANOVIC, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA)



IS THE UNITED STATES ALONE in struggling to promote political and economic freedom around the globe? It certainly feels that way at times. In June 2004, President Bush tried to leverage the U.S. chairmanship of the G-8 summit to launch the centerpiece of the administration's "forward strategy of freedom" for the post-9/11, post-Saddam Middle East. Well before G-8 leaders convened in Sea Island, Ga., however, the Europeans leaked a draft of Bush's proposal for a Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) to the Arabic newspaper *Al-Hayat* and demanded far-reaching revisions as a condition for their support. Eventually, the G-8 did inaugurate what it dubbed the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative, but in a much diluted format from the one originally envisaged by the White House.

On both sides of the Atlantic, the Sea Island debacle seemed to confirm what Robert Kagan had observed two years earlier—that "on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand one another less and less." Indeed, in the years following the opening of the Iraq War, the issue of democracy promotion in the Middle East and beyond has, for many, become the focus of a new trans-Atlantic divide. The perception that Americans alone value global democracy and are prepared to shoulder the heavy burden involved in its promotion—while "Metrosexual Europe" urges caution and seeks stability over change—has infected elite discourses and distorted policy deliberations. "Never," opines commentator Michael Ignatieff, "has America been more alone in spreading democracy's promise."

That conclusion would be enormously depressing if it were true. But it is not. Both Americans and Europeans now share the central liberal insight, as the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) put it, "In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system." Three years prior to the 2006 NSS, the first European Security Strategy (ESS)—formulated by Javier Solana and adopted unanimously by the heads of state of the European Union (EU)—articulated an essentially identical vision for a democratic world order and the policy recipe for getting there. "The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundations," the ESS declared. "The best protection for our society is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law, and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order."

At the national European level too, the governments of the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have all elevated the promotion of good governance and democracy abroad as foreign policy priorities. Even the formerly communist countries and newest member states of the EU—notably the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—possess their own democracy promotion policies. It is Poland, for instance, that is now pushing hard for further NATO and EU expansion as a means of anchoring Ukraine in the democratic West.

Measuring spending on democracy assistance programs is notoriously difficult, but there is little doubt that—even if we discount American expenditures on post-conflict state building in Iraq and the enormous financial resources expended by Europe in support of EU enlargement—democracy assistance spending has grown substantially over the past decade, on both sides of the Atlantic.

U.S. government funds allocated specifically to democracy promotion abroad rose from an average of \$125 million a year in the 1990s to nearly \$1 billion per annum

under the Bush administration. In addition, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created in 2004, now maintains assistance compacts with 16 countries, totaling \$5.6 billion in commitments. Eligibility for MCC funding requires demonstrable state performance in fighting corruption, strengthening civil liberties and the rule of law, and encouraging economic freedom.

A parallel trend has emerged in Europe. Beginning with scant involvement in the 1980s, the EU countries now dedicate roughly \$1.3 billion per year directly to programs promoting good governance and democracy around the globe. Like the American MCC, the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), launched in 2006, seeks to tie the award of substantial financial incentives to demonstrated commitments on the part of recipients to specified political, regulatory, and economic reforms. For the period 2007–13 (the six-year budgetary cycle of the European Union), approximately €12 billion is earmarked to supporting reforms in ENPI-recipient countries that include Armenia, Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine.

Significant variations *do* exist in how Americans and Europeans think about democracy promotion and pursue it in practice. Yet these disparities have more to do with differences in the two continents' geographic location, historical experiences, and military capabilities, than with a trans-Atlantic values gap. Americans too make robust use of international and regional organizations—NATO, the WTO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS)—to embed countries in the liberal international order constructed under U.S. leadership over the past six decades. And just as America is not all Mars, Europe is not all Venus. True, Europeans could do more in Afghanistan and Iraq, but elsewhere, it is they that are carrying a growing share of the burden of policing the world's trouble spots. Since the late 1990s, in fact, either the EU collectively or a European government has taken the lead in armed operations to restore order and establish representative government in Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Elsewhere, Americans and Europeans have displayed striking congruence in policies. Spearheaded by the United States and France, in September 2004 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 ordered the removal of Syria's military from Lebanon, the disarming of all Lebanese militias (including Hezbollah), and the holding of free and fair elections. After Syrian troops withdrew in May 2005, Britain, France, and the United States worked closely to dislodge Syria's residual presence from Lebanon.

Europeans and Americans have also been united by failure: Both allowed Egypt's Hosni Mubarak to renege on his February 2005 promise to allow opposition candidates to run against him in presidential elections later that year.

Against a background of mounting challenges to the fortunes of freedom—from radical Islam and a resurgent, authoritarian Russia to the more diffuse dangers of soaring food prices and financial crises that threaten to unravel vulnerable democracies—the two central pillars of Western democratic power must alter the terms of their conversation about democracy promotion. Instead of accusing one another of imperialism or impotence, Americans and Europeans need to ask themselves and each other: How can we work better together to ensure the preservation and expansion of freedom both within and outside the trans-Atlantic community? ■

THIS ESSAY DRAWS ON AMICHAH MAGEN AND MICHAEL MCFAY'S INTRODUCTION TO A NEW VOLUME ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION, *AMERICAN VERSUS EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION* (NEW YORK: PALGRAVE, 2009) EDITED BY AMICHAH MAGEN, MICHAEL MCFAY, AND THOMAS RISSE. AN EXPANDED VERSION OF THIS ESSAY APPEARED IN THE *HOOVER DIGEST* IN JANUARY 2009. MAGEN IS ALSO THE EDITOR, WITH LEONARDO MORLINO, OF THE RECENTLY RELEASED *INTERNATIONAL ACTORS, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW: ANCHORING DEMOCRACY?* (ROUTLEDGE, 2008).

Two Bears in One Lair?

The Balance of Power Between Putin and Medvedev

EXCERPT FROM *CURRENT HISTORY*, OCTOBER 2008
BY KATHRYN STONER-WEISS

WHEN RUSSIAN FORCES Poured INTO SOUTH OSSETIA ON AUGUST 8, 2008, the first Russian political leader on the scene was (former) president and (former and current) prime minister, Vladimir V. Putin. He flew directly from the opening ceremonies of the Olympic games in Beijing to take personal command of the developing political and military crisis. Notably absent from the front lines was the constitutional head of the Russian armed forces, its current president, and Putin protégé Dmitri Medvedev. On August 7, there might have been a small amount of doubt about who is really running Russia, but only a day later the answer was indisputable and a surprise to no one inside or outside of Russia: Vladimir Putin is still very much in charge of his country.

A POLITICAL TRANSITION WITHOUT CHANGE

When Putin first picked Medvedev as his successor, it seemed the best of other more conservative, anti-western choices. In his speeches, Medvedev said many of the “right” things. He was economically liberal, he talked about enhancing Russia’s democracy and rule of law, he was young, spoke some English, and liked Western rock—in particular, Deep Purple. He seemed a kinder, gentler version of Putin. So far, though, he has shown himself to be a member of Putin’s team, but not the captain himself.

Medvedev was elected in March 2008 in the most highly managed political event in Russia’s post-communist history. Nominated in December 2007, shortly after Putin led his party—Unity—to an overwhelming victory, Medvedev announced his intention to run for the presidency only if Putin would serve as his prime minister should he win. No measure was spared in ensuring Medvedev’s resounding victory on March 2, 2008. Huge billboards picturing Putin and Medvedev walking shoulder to shoulder into Russia’s evidently glorious future loomed over city squares.

When Medvedev was inaugurated in May 2008 and Putin moved to the office of prime minister on the same day (effectively stepping sideways, not down, from the presidency), the division of responsibility between the two men seemed murky. The constitution makes the Russian Federation a strongly presidential republic (the president appoints the prime minister and can fire him at will; can dissolve parliament and call new elections; and can rule by decree on all things except the federal budget), but Putin makes an unusually powerful prime minister. A year after the presidential election, the actual balance of power between Russia’s new president and prime minister is clear. Despite some liberal rhetoric, Medvedev never intended to forge a path distinct from Putin’s for Russia. Medvedev’s Russia is Putin’s Russia.

PUTIN’S PRESIDENTIAL LEGACY

When Vladimir Putin assumed power, as prime minister in August 1999 and as president in May 2000, he inherited an imperfect, unruly, and largely unconsolidated democracy. Despite its significant shortcomings, the post-Soviet system forged by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, was undoubtedly freer than what it became in eight years under President Putin. By 2005 with significant rollbacks of electoral rights, by most metrics Russia could no longer be considered a democracy at all. Since 2006, Freedom House has ranked Russia annually as “not free”—putting it in the same category as the autocracies of Central Asia and Europe’s last dictatorship, Belarus.

On the bright side, although Russians live in a country that is now less free, they are undeniably richer. Russia posted its first year of post-Soviet growth in 1999 (a year *before* Putin became president), and GDP has grown at an average annual rate of about 6 percent since then. This has meant a doubling of the Russian standard of living over the past 10 years. Putin credited himself and his economic policies for this resurgence of the Russian economy. Correlation, however, does not mean causation. It is far from clear that any of his policies (beyond perhaps the creation of an oil stabilization fund) played a significant role in causing that growth. The fact that Russia is one of the world’s largest oil and gas exporters, at a time when oil prices hit all time highs, undoubtedly had something to do with Russia’s boom.

While the quality of Russian democracy declined sharply under Putin’s leadership, and the economy grew, so too did negative policy outcomes like crime rates and



RUSSIA’S PRESIDENT DMITRI MEDVEDEV (RIGHT) AND PRIME MINISTER VLADIMIR PUTIN CONFER DURING THE VICTORY DAY MILITARY PARADE IN MOSCOW, MAY 9, 2008. (REUTERS/GRIGORY DUKOR)

corruption, which rose according to Transparency International. Russian life expectancy decreased and deaths due to preventable disease increased due to a poor public health system. Because his administration tightly monitored the media and because life is still better for most Russians now than a decade ago, President Putin remained hugely popular at the end of his presidential tenure. Some doubted whether (or why) he would vacate the Kremlin. Now we know he didn’t really.

INFLUENCING RUSSIA’S POLITICAL TEAM

Vladimir Putin once intimated that he had a “moral” responsibility to rule his country, and to reestablish it as a great power, thereby undoing the shame of the collapse of the Soviet Union—something he decried as the “greatest tragedy of the twentieth century.” Clearly Putin intends to see Russia reemerge as the great power it once was. The financial crisis that started in 2008 has curtailed this plan, but if (and when) oil and gas prices resurge, Putin’s Russia will continue its drive toward becoming a dominant economic power on the back of Russia’s position as an oil and gas exporter. This mission is so crucial that evidently Putin cannot entrust it to his protégé Dmitri Medvedev alone. Putin feels he must personally oversee Russia’s transformation.

What, if anything, can and should a new American president do? First, the United States has very little leverage over a re-emergent, undemocratic, and increasingly aggressive Russia. (A gas dependent Europe has even less.) Although we have lost much leverage in dealing with Putin (and Medvedev), the new administration still has opportunities to influence Russia. A policy of constructive engagement will work better in furthering U.S. interests than confrontation or isolation. Like America, Russia has interests, not friends.

Second, Russia’s interests have changed since the end of the Cold War. Although it remains the only country in the world that can effectively wipe out Washington in under 30 minutes with a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile, Russia is now far more interested in delivering oil and gas to world markets, than bombs to the U.S. capital. Russian business needs international investors or the country will become just another resource-cursed autocracy. But international investors will be hesitant to put their money into an increasingly unpredictable legal environment. The new administration can pressure Russia to enforce its laws on behalf of U.S. and European investors—a tactic we have not tried so far.

Third, in an interview in advance of the G-8 meeting in June 2008, Medvedev repeatedly signaled his intention to establish Russia as a dominant global economic power. To do this, he needs to keep Russia in the G-8 and to secure its prospective membership in the WTO. If it is to be one of the world’s great economies and democracies, it has to act like one. The United States and Europe have a clear interest in encouraging the revival of a vibrant, independent Russian civil society and free media so that they can hold their own government to account and encourage an opening of the political system.

Fourth, President Obama needs to work on rebuilding international alliances. Europe has deep interests in seeing Russia friendly, stable, and prosperous. Should Russia become aggressive with Poland or other new members of NATO in the former Soviet sphere of influence, Europe will bear the brunt of a flow of refugees. Germany is exceedingly dependent on Russian natural gas for its energy. Like the United States, Germany and Europe need to develop alternative sources of energy so that Russia’s resources play a smaller role in the global economy.

Finally, believing the Cold War was over and that we had won, the U.S. government divested from the business of hosting exchanges with Russian private citizens and students. Investment in Russian language training and U.S. exchange programs decreased dramatically over the last 10 years. With Russia a resurgent world power, this too must change. The best way to promote positive change in Russia is through exposure to the best aspects of free American and European societies. ■

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TRANSITION

FSI's Fourth Annual International Conference

BY JUDITH PAULUS

"AFTER A GRUELING 22-MONTH CAMPAIGN, CHANGE TRULY HAS COME TO THE UNITED STATES with the election of Barack Obama as this country's 44th president," said FSI Director Coit D. Blacker, the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies, in convening FSI's fourth annual international conference, *Transitions 2009*, on November 13, 2008. "Rarely," he noted, "has a president faced such a daunting array of challenges: two wars, a planet in peril, a battered image abroad, the worst financial crisis in 75 years, the need to restore the strength and resilience of the U.S. economy, and not least the ever-present threat of terrorism."

Blacker chaired Plenary I, "U.S. Transition 2009: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?" examining key policy challenges, priorities, and prospects for the new president. "How grievous are the wounds that the rule of law has sustained over the past seven and one-half years?" Blacker asked. Displaying the cover of the German news magazine *Der Spiegel*, with Barack Obama as "The President of the World: What He Wants to Do and Won't Be Able to Do," Stanford President Emeritus Gerhard Casper acknowledged the enthusiastic response of foreign leaders and opinion makers to Obama's election and the promise of change. Yet formidable challenges to U.S. standing and leadership remain.

Explained Casper, the Peter and Helen Bing Professor in Undergraduate Education and professor of law, "The fundamental problem is this: We have played the role of schoolmaster to the world throughout much of the post-

World War II period. What has happened especially in the last eight years is that much of our standing to give advice on how to do *anything* has been diminished. Both the values we *practice*—as distinguished from those we *preach*—and our competence have been questioned so deeply by so many, that the challenge to restore a measure of confidence will be considerable."

Despite U.S. advocacy of the rule of law, due process, and human rights, Casper said, "We have just lived through the most *extraordinary* claims to unbound

"We have just lived through the most extraordinary claims to unbound power since the days of Richard Nixon." GERHARD CASPER

power since the days of Richard Nixon. This rejection of the rule of law, just like the photos of Abu Graib, will be present in the minds of many with whom we have to deal the world over." He cited the torture and degradation of prisoners in Afghanistan, Guantánamo, and Abu Graib, the extraordinary rendition of captives and grotesque interrogations, the denial of habeas corpus and judicial review, saying the memory of this "will not go away."

"When we sit at tables negotiating and needing to persuade others to do what we would like them to do, we need to have standing," Casper concluded. "And that is our main resource to deal with things in the world, to persuade others that we are right. We can do that again, but we have a long way to go to recreate confidence."

Physician and economist Alan Garber, the Henry J. Kaiser, Jr. Professor, professor of medicine, and director of FSI's Center on Health Policy, addressed the potential for health care reform, innovation, and cost reduction. Total U.S. health care expenditures—16 percent of GDP—exceed the rest of the world, he noted, and the United States spends two times as much per capita on average than other OECD countries. Soaring Medicare spending, he advised, is the single greatest threat to the long-term viability of the federal budget and the U.S. economy.

Although health care—and expanded insurance coverage—was a major issue for candidate Obama, the financial crisis and pressures on Medicare make it unlikely that President Obama will start with comprehensive health reform, he said. More likely will be legislation to expand health care coverage for children. Among a set of useful endeavors to slash health care costs—by as much as \$200 billion a year—Garber cited wider adoption of health care information technology, lower administrative costs, and rationalizing payment for care—"the single most important and difficult thing we could do," he said. Another priority for Garber is "figuring out if what we do actually adds value."

Faced with a global landscape of two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a deteriorating situation in Pakistan, the prospect of a nuclear Iran, and a re-assertive Russia, political scientist Stephen Krasner, the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations and senior fellow at FSI and the Hoover Institution, was asked what U.S. priorities should be and what we might realistically expect to get done.

Great power relations will not change "one whit" under President Obama, Krasner argued. Other countries continue to rely on America's military might—only 6 of NATO's 26 members meet agreed targets for defense spending (2 percent of GDP) and the trend is going *down*, not up. The Europeans are unlikely to step up to the challenge in Afghanistan. "Iran is building a nuclear bomb. Make no mistake about it," Krasner said. U.S. options include internal regime change (unlikely), successful negotiation—also unlikely, as Iran sees a nuclear weapon as consistent with its internal and external interest, living with a nuclear Iran, or attacking Iran's nuclear facilities, which might be successful, but would increase internal support for the regime.

Krasner expects India, China, Japan, and South Korea to continue to engage with the United States and sees no major changes in dealings with the Middle East and Russia. "Bottom line, the United States is going to remain the global hegemon for the foreseeable future," stated Krasner.

Acclaimed historian Timothy Garton Ash gave the keynote address, "Beyond the West? New Administrations in the United States and Europe Face the Challenge of a Multipolar World." In an elegant framework, Garton Ash asked what is the nature of the moment, what is to be done, and with whom? We are experiencing unprecedented transitions to a multipolar world involving powers far beyond the West, he pointed out, especially the renaissance of Asia. China's expected rise to economic parity with the United States and the European Union (EU) by 2020 is translating into real political, cultural, and ideological competition. "This is a story more of the rise of the rest than of the fall of the West," he advised.



LEFT: FSI DIRECTOR COIT D. BLACKER DISCUSSES GLOBAL ISSUES WITH FSI ADVISORY BOARD MEMBER GEORGE SYCIP '78.

RIGHT: FSI TERRORISM EXPERT MARTHA CRENSHAW (CENTER) DISCUSSES THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND THOMAS FINGAR (RIGHT), DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.



LEFT: BONNIE NIXON, HEWLETT PACKARD, RICHARD LOCKE, M.I.T., AND STANFORD UNIVERSITY WORKING CONDITIONS IN "THE WORLD IS NOT FLAT: WORKING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY."

RIGHT: THE FORUM ON CONTEMPORARY EUROPE'S AMIR ESHEL, TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, AND PROSPECTS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE.



LEFT: CDDRL ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR KATHRYN STONER-WEISS (CENTER) MODERATES A DISCUSSION BETWEEN PROFESSORS STEPHEN KRASNER (LEFT) AND MICHAEL MCFAUL (RIGHT) ON POSITIVE POLITICAL CHANGE IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

RIGHT: MR. J. FRED WEINTZ, JR. '48, FSI ADVISORY BOARD MEMBER, AND HIS GRANDSON.



LEFT: SAKO FISHER '83 AND PHILIPPE DE KONING '10 AT THE FSI INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

RIGHT: JOINED BY ALLEN WEINER (LEFT), STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, AND HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR DANIEL SNEIDER, CISAC CONSULTING PROFESSOR MICHAEL MCFAUL (CENTER) DISCUSSES HOW THE U.S. COULD TAKE TO REDUCE NUCLEAR THREATS.



LEFT: DANIEL SNEIDER (CENTER), ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF FSI'S WALTER H. SHORENSTEIN CENTER, DISCUSSES "TOWARD REGIONAL SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA" WITH COLLEAGUES DONALD KEYSER AND MARK SUZMAN.

RIGHT: MARK SUZMAN, THE GATES FOUNDATION, STEPHEN MINK, THE WORLD BANK, AND DANIEL SNEIDER DISCUSS A KEY GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONCERN, "IS AFRICAN SOCIETY READY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY?"

LEADERSHIP FOR THE 21ST CENTURY CONFERENCE 2009

International Conference



ADVISORY BOARD MEMBERS TAREK ABUZAYYAD '91, NINA HACHIGIAN JD '94, AND

MODERATOR OF "RETHINKING THE WAR ON TERROR" WITH COL. JOSEPH FELTER (LEFT) AND CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.



MODERATOR'S JOSHUA COHEN TAKE A HARD-HEADED LOOK AT GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH.

MODERATOR ASH, NORMAN NAIMARK, AND HELEN STACY DEBATE "THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PROSPECTS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS" TO A PACKED AUDIENCE.



MODERATOR ANIMATED DEBATE, "PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: SHOULD WE? CAN WE?" WITH COL. JOSEPH FELTER (LEFT) ON WHETHER AND HOW THE UNITED STATES SHOULD INTERVENE TO EFFECT PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

MODERATOR, JAKE CERF '12, AT THE FSI ADVISORY BOARD MEETING.



CONFERENCE.

MODERATOR AND POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR DAVID HOLLOWAY (RIGHT), FOR A DEBATE ON "PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: SHOULD WE? CAN WE?" WITH PROFESSOR PHILIP TAUBMAN (CENTER) SUGGESTS POSITIVE STEPS THE NEW PRESIDENT SHOULD TAKE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN OTHER COUNTRIES.



MODERATOR AND POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR DAVID HOLLOWAY (RIGHT), FOR A DEBATE ON "PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: SHOULD WE? CAN WE?" WITH PROFESSOR PHILIP TAUBMAN (CENTER) SUGGESTS POSITIVE STEPS THE NEW PRESIDENT SHOULD TAKE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

MODERATOR AND POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR DAVID HOLLOWAY (RIGHT), FOR A DEBATE ON "PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: SHOULD WE? CAN WE?" WITH PROFESSOR PHILIP TAUBMAN (CENTER) SUGGESTS POSITIVE STEPS THE NEW PRESIDENT SHOULD TAKE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

We face transnational challenges of a kind and scale far beyond the power of any single state to address, Garton Ash said, requiring "a new quality of international cooperation different from that we have achieved in the 20th century." He called for concerted action on four projects of "visionary realism" to advance our common interests of global economic order; development, democracy, and the rule of law; energy and the environment, and banishing nuclear weapons.

Asking *how* to get this done, Garton Ash advocated a re-launching of a strategic partnership between the United States and the 27-member EU, not as a partnership *against* other nations, but as an alliance that would reach *beyond* the West to develop new and effective communities of shared purpose—an effort in which Stanford can make a particular contribution, he argued.

The task for American leadership, he said, is to move "from the U.S. to a new us."

The afternoon plenary "Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threat" featured Stephen Stedman, FSI senior fellow and director of the Ford Dorsey Program in International Studies; Bruce Jones, director of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University; and Carlos Pascual, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. The three are directing a major initiative, Managing Global Insecurity, which seeks to mobilize more effective action against transnational threats—such as economic crisis, terrorism, pandemic disease, and climate change—and to build the political will and support networks needed to reform and reenergize major international institutions. Launching their groundbreaking "Plan for Action" at the FSI conference, the group called for efforts along four key tracks:

- Restoring credible American leadership
- Revitalizing international institutions
- Tackling shared threats, and
- Internationalizing crisis response.

Another key recommendation: Expand the current G-8 to a G-16 of established and rising powers by including China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa, and several major Muslim nations, such as Indonesia, Turkey, and Egypt. A G-16 could serve as a pre-negotiating forum to forge agreement on responses to major global challenges and institutional priorities and as a place to build knowledge, trust, and patterns of cooperation among the most powerful states. "The G-16's convening power, the collective weight of its economies and diplomatic and military capacities, and its combined populations," Stedman, Jones, and Pascual argue, "would create an unparalleled platform to catalyze and mobilize effective international action."

As the conference drew to a close, participants could be heard debating key issues as the United States moves forward with new leadership and an ambitious agenda for change in a complex and challenging world. ■

(PHOTOS: STEVE CASTILLO)

"This is a story more of the rise of the rest than of the fall of the West."

TIMOTHY GARTON ASH

Interactive Panel Discussions on Contemporary Issues

Participants engaged in animated debate on leading issues with Stanford faculty, outside experts, and policymakers. Audio recordings of the plenary and panel discussions are available on the FSI website, <http://fsi.stanford.edu>

COMBATING HIV IN LOW-RESOURCE COUNTRIES – WHO'S SURVIVING, WHO'S DYING AND WHY?

Alan M. Garber, Eran Bendavid, and Douglas Owens

RETHINKING THE WAR ON TERROR

Martha Crenshaw, Col. Joseph Felter, and Thomas Fingar

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PROSPECTS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Amir Eshel, Timothy Garton Ash, Norman Naimark, and Helen Stacy

TOWARD REGIONAL SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Daniel Sneider, Donald Keyser, and David Straub

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: SHOULD WE? CAN WE?

Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Stephen Krasner, and Michael McFaul

IS AFRICAN SOCIETY IN TRANSITION?

Rosamond Naylor, Gebisa Ejeta, Stephen Mink, and Mark Suzman

THE WORLD IS NOT FLAT: WORKING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY

Joshua Cohen, Richard Locke, and Bonnie Nixon

OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

David Holloway, Philip Taubman, and Allen Weiner

The Growing Problem of Human Trafficking

BY HELEN STACY



AN INDIAN SEX WORKER HOLDS A BANNER AS OTHERS HIDE THEIR IDENTITY DURING A PROTEST IN NEW DELHI. (REUTERS/DESMOND BOYLAN AH/LA)

HUMAN TRAFFICKING IS THE MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY, the fastest-growing criminal industry after arms sales and drug dealing. It moves an estimated 4 million people—mostly women and children across national borders each year, reaping an estimated \$9.5 billion in profits for traffickers and organized crime syndicates. Traffickers target the poor and the underprivileged, tricking victims with promises of a better life in another country where victims may find themselves forced into prostitution, or working in slave-like conditions in quarries, sweatshops, on farms and in private homes, and even as child soldiers. They are deprived of the most basic of human rights like freedom of movement, shelter, and health care, and they may be beaten, raped, and sometimes killed. Victims rarely dare to leave their “owner” because of fear their traffickers will retaliate. Likewise, victims dare not report their plight to local police in case their undocumented status leads to their arrest. Those brave enough to testify

against traffickers may simply find themselves deported back to their original country where they are likely to be shunned by their families and communities.

No country is immune from human trafficking. The largest number of victims comes from South and Southeast Asia, but cases of human trafficking exist in nearly all the developed nations. As many as 17,500 people are trafficked to the United States each year, mostly from East Asia and the Pacific, and also from Latin America, Europe, and Eurasia.

INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. TRAFFICKING LAWS

A significant milestone in international efforts to stop the trade in people came in 2000 with the United Nations adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women and Children (the “TIP” protocol), which supplements the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. This convention seeks to prevent trafficking, to

protect victims, and promote anti-trafficking cooperation among nations. It says that no one can “consent” to being exploited, thus eliminating the legal grounds for traffickers to defend themselves by claiming they had willing victims. More than 110 countries have signed and ratified the protocol. It entered into force in 2003 and was supplemented the following year with the Protocol Against The Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.

The United States passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (the “TVPA”) in 2000 and reauthorized it in 2003. It provides extensive protections and services for victims of trafficking found in the United States, regardless of nationality, and gives them eligibility for social services such as Medicaid, food stamps, and housing subsidies as they move through a process that certifies their legal immigrant status.

THE FUTURE

Translating these laws into reality is problematic. Very few criminals are convicted and most victims are probably never identified or assisted. Combating trafficking also needs deeper policy responses from governments of countries where victims originate (the “supply” side) and also countries where victims go (the “demand” side).

From the supply side, trafficking won’t stop until the promises offered by traffickers of a better life in another country can be resisted. This means that economic hardship and poverty in supply countries need to be tackled so as to provide alternative employment options for potential victims. Community-led activities to improve gender equity and to educate potential victims about the hazards of trafficking can also make a difference.

From the demand side, national governments of destination countries need to improve their lackluster law enforcement of anti-trafficking laws. As long as traffickers face little risk of criminal prosecution, they will continue their lucrative trade in human suffering. ■

The European Example

BY KATHERINE JOLLUCK

Human trafficking received focused attention from law and policymakers in the late 1990s in the wake of the appearance and explosive growth of the problem in post-communist Europe. The collapse of state socialism, widely viewed triumphantly, left societies with a weak rule of law, widespread corruption, and fast-growing organized crime networks. Less-noted consequences included the feminization of poverty and increased gender discrimination. The lack of employment options has forced many women into migration in search of opportunities, where they become vulnerable to traffickers. Given the increasing demand for cheap, compliant, and young sex workers, 80 percent of the women and girls trafficked from and within the region are forced into the sex industry. Today, Eastern Europe supplies most of the prostitutes to the West European market, with an estimated 120,000 women moved each year through the Balkans alone.

In the early 1990s the flow of trafficked women was from poorer countries to richer ones, from Eastern Europe to the EU. But the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina saw the arrival of international peacekeepers and the creation of a sex industry to serve them. Thousands of women, predominantly from Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania, were brought to Bosnia under false pretenses, where they were traded, exploited, and brutalized. Traffickers acted with impunity, while women suffered

arrest or deportation if they went to the police. The scenario repeated itself in Kosovo in the aftermath of the war with Serbia in 1999.

Today’s pattern of trafficking in Europe is even more troubling than the initial east-to-west pattern. Internal trafficking both within the region and within individual countries is increasing. Additionally, women are trafficked more and more beyond Europe, to Turkey, Israel, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Libya, the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Total numbers of women trafficked from Europe are climbing.

The Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings entered into force in February 2008. Open to non-member states of the Council of Europe, the convention has so far been ratified by 19 countries and signed by 21 others. The treaty contains comprehensive measures to prevent human trafficking and to prosecute traffickers. Most significantly, it brings a human rights perspective to the fight against trafficking by focusing on the protection of victims and obligating states party to the convention to safeguard their human rights. Europe leads the world in striving for regional co-operation between governments for anti-trafficking measures. ■

Liberation Technology

Encina Columns talks to Joshua Cohen, director of the Program on Global Justice, about a new interdisciplinary project.



Q: You've done some interdisciplinary work with practical applications—your 10-week Google.org course on poverty and development last fall and your ongoing Just Supply Chains project, which looks at institutional experiments and innovations in creating fairer workplaces. Your latest is a project you started with Larry Diamond and Terry Winograd from computer science, on “liberation technology.” Can you tell us a little bit more about it?

A: Lots is being said about the innovative uses of new information technologies as ways to improve economic or political performance in developing countries. The aim of this project is to try to assess those ideas and develop some that sound

good. More particularly, we're looking for a research project that combines social scientists and people from computer science or applied information technology. We want to focus on practical applications in areas of economic or political development. And we want to build on people's research, so that it really is a research enterprise and not just a pro-bono, Saturday afternoon sort of thing. We are looking for the sweet spot where there are points of intersection between the research being done by somebody in the applied information technology area and the research being done

by somebody in the social sciences: so that they can each do better by collaborating with a concern about practical applications.

Q: Where did the idea for this come from? Was there a Saturday afternoon?

A: Larry Diamond and I both happened to be thinking along similar lines—that it would be good to be doing something like this—and we had a conversation and realized we were thinking along similar lines. But I think more fundamentally it's just an absolutely natural thing for Stanford. Very few places, if any, have the same great strengths in the social sciences and in computer science and information technology. So it's kind of an idea whose time has come. In addition, there is lots of “hype” about all the problems in the world that can be solved if only everybody was using SMS the right way or if there were one laptop per child. There are all kinds of exaggerated promises to solve problems, but trying to figure out what problems are actually being solved and if they're not being addressed, how you could develop technologies that would better address them is just a total natural for Stanford.

Q: I understand it's still early in the project—do you have any programs or events that might be open to the public or the wider Stanford community?

A: We've had a couple of workshops this fall and we've got a few coming up. There's a liberation technology wiki and people can get in touch with me (jcohen57@stanford.edu) or with Adam Tolnay (atolnay@stanford.edu) to get on that list. At this point it's a very, very good idea, but we're looking for a way to focus it on some kind of project or projects that people could collaborate on.

FOR A TRANSCRIPT OF THE FULL INTERVIEW WITH DR. COHEN, PLEASE GO TO: [HTTP://FSI.STANFORD.EDU/NEWS/1775](http://FSI.STANFORD.EDU/NEWS/1775)

TOP PHOTO: B. J. FOGG OF THE STANFORD PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY LAB PRESENTING RESEARCH ON MASS INTERPERSONAL PERSUASION; BOTTOM PHOTO: LIBERATION TECHNOLOGY WORKING GROUP MEETING ON MASS INTERPERSONAL PERSUASION. (PHOTOS COURTESY KATHLEEN BARCOS)

FCE Series on New U.S. Foreign Policy

BY ROLAND HSU

THE FORUM ON CONTEMPORARY EUROPE (FCE) is sponsoring research on trans-Atlantic and global policy of the Obama administration. During fall 2008, FCE built a list of alarmingly pressing concerns including the following:

- catastrophic violence and sectarianism in two ongoing wars
- new acts of terror in nuclear-armed South Asia
- critical levels of distrust between the United States and traditional allies
- international treaty paralysis on combating climate change
- insecurity of traditional energy supplies
- great flows of refugees, immigration, and human trafficking
- deep and global economic crisis distressing labor and living standards

Some FCE scholars forecast that the U.S. White House, Department of State, and Department of Defense will respond to competing exigencies. Multiple FCE analysts describe President Obama in January 2009 facing two in-boxes on his desk: one marked “important” and the other “urgent.” Most concede that in the administration's first 100 days items in the “important” box will likely be overlooked. Nearly all agree that the following three areas, from the viewpoint of global allies, should be moved up among U.S. priorities from important to urgent.

INTERNATIONAL MULTILATERALISM

The new U.S. administration must lay the groundwork for its international agenda by reviving multilateralism in policy and practice. Josef Joffe (*FSI/Die Zeit*) warns



that without cultivating partners capable of productive consultation, the new administration will cool Europe's fervent endorsement of American leadership. Timothy Garton Ash (Hoover/Oxford) spoke at the forum's panel at the November 2008 FSI international conference, on prospects for learning lessons from European Union human rights campaigns. As Garton Ash frames it, the European Union presents the United States with a paradox: The EU is the institution most self-consciously promoting standards of human rights, but it is also the polity least capable of enforcement. Up to now, the EU has built model international jurisprudence, and leveraged the allure of membership and partnership to entice initial reforms. But the European Commission has not responded coherently to Russian aggression and the African humanitarian and global economic credit crises. Implementing U.S. foreign policy will require a strong U.S. effort to support European moves to consolidate the equivalent of its foreign ministry.


HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

U.S. consultative foreign policy effectively defends human rights when it answers to international jurisprudence. Helen Stacy (*FSI/Law School*) and Norman Naimark

(*FSI/History*) gave examples of Garton Ash's paradox in human rights campaigns in Africa, Latin America, East Asia, and the Caucasus. International security missions can only effectively build local commitment when peacekeepers are accountable to international law. European Union support for an independent Kosovo lacks a sustainable vision of self-determination that must be wrought from consultation with the United States. U.S. interventions in the Greater Middle East and South Asia could more likely secure multi-ethnic stability if premised on international and regional legal cultures as modeled by the European courts of human rights and justice.

ETHICAL GLOBALIZATION

U.S. leadership on economic recovery will cultivate partners if the United States can learn models of robust and ethical response to globalization. Denmark's former Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (pictured here) was invited to cap the fall series by addressing the economics and ethics of globalizing labor markets. Scandinavian monetary and fiscal policies in the past decade demonstrate the efficacy of state investment in promising industries, as well as in social capital. If the new U.S. administration adapts for domestic needs European models of direct investment in corporate voting equities and also job retraining, it will likely position U.S. industry and labor to lead a global recovery. Forum directors plan to continue in 2009 this series of international post-doctoral fellowships, seminars, public lectures, and conferences to further contribute to Stanford University's focus and influence on new public policy. ■



WOMAN RIDES HER BICYCLE PAST COOLING TOWERS AT A COAL-BURNING POWER STATION IN BEIJING; GREENPEACE ACTIVISTS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST CO₂ EMISSIONS IN FRONT OF 'STAUDINGER' COAL POWER PLANT IN GROSSKROTZENBURG; A COAL SHIP WAITS TO BE LOADED AT THE WORLD'S BIGGEST COAL EXPORT TERMINAL IN NEWCASTLE. (PHOTOS: REUTERS)

Coal vs. Climate: Reconsidering the Battle Over Coal's Future

BY RICHARD K. MORSE III

IN THE PRE-DAWN HOURS OF OCTOBER 8, 2007, six Greenpeace activists clad in orange jumpsuits and equipped with climbing gear shut down the coal-fired power station at Kingsnorth, Kent. They scaled the plant's 630-foot smokestack and emblazoned it with the name of the prime minister, calling on British leaders to halt construction of new coal-fired plants because of their contribution to climate change. The "Kingsnorth Six" emerged from their trial not guilty, adding a starkly ethical dimension to the coal debate. A jury endorsed the argument that the damage at Kingsnorth was intended to prevent the far greater harm the world would suffer from climate change—and therefore was not a criminal act. James Hansen, perhaps the world's leading climate scientist, turned the trial into a referendum on coal with global reverberations, testifying that coal "is the one critical element [to be addressed] in the solution of the global warming problem, in preservation of a planet resembling the one in which civilization developed." Indeed, coal combustion accounts for a staggering 42 percent of global GHG emissions, and that number is expected to grow significantly.

As highlighted by the Kingsnorth incident, we are now witnessing the formation of an anti-coal movement in Europe and the United States that strives to alter coal's apparent destiny as the world's fastest-growing source of fossil fuel.

In the United States, those who believe coal presents an existential threat are toiling to halt its expansion in the power sector. The Sierra Club's anti-coal campaign recently scored a major victory with national implications when it forced a permitting review for the Bonanza Generating Station in Vernal, Utah. Lawyers for the Sierra Club argued that the Supreme Court's 2007 decision defining CO₂ as a pollutant subject to regulation by the EPA means that new coal plants should be forced to apply the same Best Available Control Technology (BACT) standard to CO₂ that they apply to other pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act. But no one knows how to apply the standard or what the "best available" control technology for CO₂ is. Regulatory indecision has effectively paralyzed the permitting of new coal plants in the United States until the new EPA carves out a coherent CO₂ policy. For the moment, no one is sure what "clean coal" actually means in the current marketplace. Utilities will continue struggling to meet Americans' insatiable demand for cheap energy within a nearly incoherent regulatory landscape, and the anti-coal movement will argue that the notion of "clean coal" is an oxymoron, a wolf in sheep's clothing that threatens our very way of life.

But the dilemma coal presents is not just about climate concerns in developed countries, and those who stake their argument on these grounds alone risk missing the whole debate. First, the vast majority of coal use in the coming decades will come from countries outside of the OECD. China alone will account for two-thirds of increased coal consumption to 2030 and India another 19 percent. Eighty percent of current Chinese power generation comes from coal, and as the country continues to grow in the foreseeable future, that share is likely to increase despite China's best efforts to install wind turbines, solar panels, and nuclear power.

Second, affordable electricity from coal is viewed by China and other developing nations as essential to achieving the economic growth necessary to lift millions out of poverty. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao explains the issue this way: "China is a

developing country with a per capita GDP just over U.S. \$2,000. Fifteen million of its rural population still live in abject poverty and over 22 million live on basic living allowances. Although China is in the stage of fast industrialization, its per capita greenhouse gas emission is less than one-third that of developed countries and its total historical per capita emission level is even lower." The climate evangelist who goes to Beijing preaching emissions mitigation should therefore understand that he can no longer simply frame the challenge to coal in terms of obligations generated by climate—he must have an answer to the obligations generated by poverty.

PESD's work on coal addresses both the global nature of the coal market and the country-level policymaking priorities that will shape the future of coal and its consumption. The first element of the research, developed in collaboration with our partners at DIW in Berlin, is a quantitative model of the global coal trade. Seaborne flows of the steam coals used to produce electricity have roughly doubled in the last 10 years. This growth has been accompanied by the emergence of new financial instruments for coal that link together markets that were previously distinct. Understanding the increasingly global nature of the coal market is critical to anticipating the effects of localized policy changes. For example, if developed countries sharply curtail coal use in response to environmental pressures, how much will the downward pressure on coal prices in these parts of the world merely lead to increased coal consumption in other countries eager to capitalize on coal's cheap cost of energy?

The second major element of the research, linked closely to the modeling efforts, is a set of case studies of regional markets that explore how policies at the country level drive coal production, trade, and use. As discussed previously, management of the coal sector in China is inseparable from that country's desire for inexpensive electricity to fuel growth. Coal exports will be allowed only to the extent that they are felt not to detract from this objective. The combination of liberalized coal prices with capped electricity prices in China causes market distortions that have a significant effect on coal and electricity availability—these effects need to be understood to predict China's future role in Pacific basin and global markets. Other countries are also confronting major coal-related challenges that will undoubtedly impact global markets. In Indonesia, a major exporter, coal export policy swings wildly in response to the chaotic political discourse. In India, an ineffective state coal production apparatus has forced the country to rely more and more on imports, with recent admissions by state officials that coal shortages have become a significant drag on the economy.

The third main thrust of PESD's coal work considers whether carbon capture and storage (CCS) has the potential to relieve the apparent conflict between coal-driven economic growth on the one hand and urgent climate concerns on the other by capturing and storing CO₂ underground. The technology is broadly feasible, but tests at scale have been few and current costs (especially for capture) are daunting. Our study of CCS looks at how governments could create regulatory and policy frameworks under which enterprises would actually have incentive to implement CCS at a large enough scale to make a difference for climate. The obstacles are significant, but as the climate vise tightens on coal and the developing world understandably refuses to sacrifice aspirations that appear tied up with coal, CCS has the potential to provide a narrow path forward. ■

CISAC Perry Fellowship Selection Begins

BY NORA SWEENY

“The Perry Fellowship program will provide a vital training ground for tomorrow’s leaders, giving them the opportunity to work across disciplines and develop solutions to today’s difficult challenges.” STANFORD PRESIDENT JOHN HENNESSY

MORE THAN 40 OF WILLIAM PERRY’S COLLEAGUES, FRIENDS, AND FORMER STUDENTS honored Perry on his 80th birthday by providing more than \$1 million in private funds to the William J. Perry International Security Fellowship program. Now CISAC Co-Director Siegfried Hecker and acting Co-Director Lynn Eden are leading the committee to select the first Perry Fellow, who will arrive at CISAC in fall 2009. The committee’s task is a daunting one: to conduct a rigorous selection process that will produce a fellow to carry on the tradition of extraordinary scholarship and public service personified by Bill Perry.

Perry’s career is a model for those who will become the next generation of security experts: with bachelor’s and master’s degrees in mathematics from Stanford and a PhD from Penn State, Perry became a leader in the electronics industry and a frequent advisor to the U.S. government on national security technologies. Perry then went on to serve as U.S. undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, returned to industry, served as co-director of CISAC from 1988 until 1993, and was called back to Washington to be secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. When awarding Perry the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1997, President Clinton called him “one of the ablest people who ever served the United States in any position.”

Perry returned to Stanford because he believes that the key to solving the thorniest international security challenges is through the multidisciplinary training of the next generation of leaders. And CISAC’s environment is unusually congenial to the kind of innovative thinking and broad intellectual development that Perry champions: At its

inception 25 years ago, the co-directors of CISAC recognized that solving complex security challenges demands linking scientists and engineers with political and social scientists. The center has drawn on distinguished scholars from a broad range of disciplines and integrates political, regional, and scientific expertise in its research and policy work. It unites along other lines as well, bringing together scholars with concerned members of the community, the legal and medical professions, military leaders, government officials, and business people.

Hecker, Eden, and the other members of the selection committee will choose a fellow who has a substantive record of outstanding work in natural science, engineering, or mathematics; is committed to public service; and desires to make an enduring contribution to international



BILL PERRY (LEFT) AND FRANKLIN P. JOHNSON, WHO GAVE THE LEAD GIFT TO ENDOW THE FIRST PERRY FELLOWSHIP, AT PERRY’S 80TH BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION.

security. Said Stanford President John Hennessy, “The Perry Fellowship program will provide a vital training ground for tomorrow’s leaders, giving them the opportunity to work across disciplines and develop solutions to today’s difficult challenges.”

Once chosen, the Perry Fellows will conduct rigorous scholarship and policy formulation under the mentorship of CISAC’s seasoned security experts, including Perry himself.


They will help ensure that Bill Perry’s remarkable legacy lives on through successive generations. As FSI Director Coit D. “Chip” Blacker observes, “We fully expect that the Perry Fellows will go on to serve at the very highest levels of government, industry, and scholarship worldwide and will play an active role in Stanford’s contributions to a world that is just, prosperous, and secure.” ■

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FSI
STANFORD

Wings of Defeat A film by Risa Morimoto and Linda Hoaglund

BY LINDA HOAGLUND, RISA MORIMOTO, AND GARY MUKAI



INTERNATIONALLY, KAMIKAZE PILOTS REMAIN A POTENT METAPHOR for fanaticism. In Japan, they are largely revered for their selfless sacrifice. Yet few outside Japan know that hundreds of Kamikaze pilots survived the war. By the spring of 1945, when all Japanese planes were reassigned to Kamikaze attacks, Japan could no longer defend its airspace and its naval fleet was demolished. Old airplanes and inadequate training resulted in many failed Kamikaze missions. When Japan surrendered, hundreds of Kamikaze trainees were awaiting sortie orders that never arrived.

Through rare interviews with surviving Kamikaze pilots, we learn that the military demanded pilots to volunteer to give up their lives. Retracing their journeys from teenagers to doomed pilots, a complex history of brutal training and ambivalent sacrifice is revealed. As U.S. firebombs incinerated Japan’s major cities and the country ran out of weapons and fuel, Japan’s military government refused to accept the reality that it could no longer fight. Instead, thousands of pilots were sent off

to targets nearly impossible to reach. Sixty years later, survivors in their 80s tell us about their training, their mindsets, and their experiences in a Kamikaze cockpit, as well as what it means to survive when thousands of their fellow pilots died. Their stories insist that we set aside our preconceptions to relive their all too human experiences with them. Ultimately, they help us consider what responsibilities a government at war has to its soldiers and to its people.

Following the production of *Wings of Defeat*, two American survivors of the USS Drexler, which was sunk by Kamikaze attacks, asked filmmakers Risa Morimoto and Linda Hoaglund if they could meet former Kamikaze. The meeting in Japan of former enemies of World War II is captured in the sequel documentary, *Another Journey*.

SPICE recently developed a teacher’s guide for *Wings of Defeat* and *Another Journey* to encourage their use in world history and U.S. history high school classes. In addition to its work in developing teacher guides


for films and curricular units based on FSI scholarship, SPICE also conducts teacher professional development programs. In March 2008, SPICE invited Risa and Linda, USS Drexler survivor Gene Brick, and two former Kamikaze pilots, Takeo Ueshima and Takehiko Ena, to be on a panel and speak with high school teachers from the Bay Area. Some of the questions addressed were the following:

- How do you define the word “enemy”?
- How do you decide just how far you are willing to go to prove your loyalty?
- What are the responsibilities of a government to its citizens and soldiers in time of war?
- What is reconciliation?

In addition to exploring these questions in the historical context of World War II, the veterans and teachers discussed their continued relevance in today’s world. Following the seminar, the three veterans took a tour of Stanford University. At Stanford Memorial Church, they prayed for peace. ■

CDDRL

Publications



Human Rights for the 21st Century: Sovereignty, Civil Society, Culture
Stanford University Press,
February 2009
By Helen M. Stacy

In recent years, and especially since 9/11, debates in international relations and international law have become ever more polarized as religious, cultural, and ethnic differences are painted as the catalyst for violence or human rights harms. The U.S. exemplifies this debate. Debate has either emphasized the importance of national interests as justification for exempting the U.S. from international human rights standards or alternatively emphasized the saliency of international institutions in leveling national differences. *Human Rights for the 21st Century* suggests a way out of this impasse, demonstrating that both of these positions fail to fully comprehend the role of law in today's global conditions. Stacy argues that legal institutions have an invaluable role in articulating human rights and that regional courts and judges are the new frontier in negotiations between national, cultural, and religious identities on one hand and universal human rights standards on the other.

Crime, War and Global Trafficking: Designing International Cooperation

Cambridge University Press, July 2009
By Christine JojARTH

Globalization creates lucrative opportunities for traffickers of drugs, dirty money, blood diamonds, weapons, and other contraband. Effective countermeasures require international collaboration, but what if some countries suffer while others profit from illicit trade? Only international institutions with strong compliance mechanisms can ensure that profiteers will not dodge their law enforcement responsibilities. However, the effectiveness of these institutions may also depend on their ability to adjust flexibly to fast-changing environments.

Combining international legal theory and transaction cost economics, this book develops a novel, comprehensive framework that reveals the factors that determine the optimal balance between institutional credibility and flexibility. The author tests this rational design paradigm on four recent anti-trafficking efforts: narcotics, money laundering, conflict diamond, and small arms. She sheds light on the reasons why policymakers sometimes adopt suboptimal design solutions and unearths a nascent trend toward innovative forms of international cooperation that transcend the limitations of national sovereignty.

CHP/PCOR

CHP/PCOR Conference Brings Entrepreneurs, Industry Leaders Together to Discuss Innovation in Health Care Reform

On September 16, 2008, the Center for Health Policy (CHP) and the Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research (PCOR) hosted a unique conference at Stanford University, *Better Health, Lower Cost: Can Innovation Save Health Reform?* in honor of their 10th anniversary. The conference provided a West Coast forum to discuss how and whether innovation in health care delivery, payment incentives, and technology could play a pivotal role in improving access to high-quality health care globally. The ties between innovation and health care expenditures were explored as speakers discussed the domestic and developing world contexts. The conference had significant participation from Silicon Valley and Bay Area entrepreneurs, venture capital and investment banking executives, leaders of the biotech and high-tech industries, provider and insurance executives, as well as academics, students, and policymakers.

CISAC

Former CISAC Co-Directors Perry and Drell Lauded for Arms Control Work

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry and physicist Sidney D. Drell, with George Shultz and Sam Nunn, received the Rumford Prize from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on October 12, 2008, in recognition

of their ongoing efforts to reduce the global threat of nuclear weapons. Perry also was awarded West Point's prestigious Thayer Award that was established in honor of Col. Sylvanus Thayer, the "Father of the Military Academy." The award is presented to an outstanding citizen whose service and accomplishments in the national interest exemplify the military academy's motto, "Duty, Honor, Country."

Hecker Awarded 2008 National Materials Advancement Award

CISAC Co-Director Siegfried Hecker was presented the 2008 National Materials Advancement Award by the Federation of Materials Societies and the 2008 Los Alamos Medal, the highest honor bestowed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. Hecker is a former director of the laboratory.

New York Times Editor Appointed Stanford Scholar, Advisor


Philip Taubman, a reporter and editor at the *New York Times* for nearly 30 years and an expert on national security issues, has been appointed a consulting professor at CISAC and named as an advisor to the campus on university issues. Taubman, a Stanford alum and former Stanford trustee, is working on a book project focusing on the "Getting to Zero" nuclear weapons initiative.

Managing Global Insecurity Project Launches "Plan for Action"

In November the Managing Global Insecurity project, a joint effort of Stanford, New York University, and the Brookings Institution, released its "Plan for Action," a set of foreign policy recommendations for the next U.S. president and other world leaders to address the most critical challenges facing the world today. According to CISAC's Steve Stedman, a project co-director, leaders face a choice: They can use this moment to help shape an international, rule-based order that will protect their global interests or resign themselves to an ad hoc international system where they are increasingly powerless to shape the course of world affairs.

SHORENSTEIN APARC

Publications



Greater China's Quest for Innovation
Brookings Institution Press,
November 2008
Edited by Henry S. Rowen,
Marguerite Gong Hancock,
and William F. Miller

Governments in Greater China (Mainland, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) are striving to create higher value-added—and homegrown—products, services, and technologies. No longer satisfied with China's role as the "world's factory," the Chinese government calls its effort "Independent Innovation." Taiwanese firms, likewise, are endeavoring to become global architects of many products, and Hong Kong and Singapore are rising to the distinctive challenges they face.


Greater China's Quest for Innovation addresses topics at the heart of these efforts: What specific actions are Greater China's governments taking to advance their respective competencies? How do foreign firms bring technologies to them? How adequate are the pools of talent in Greater China and how are they changing as demands increase for highly skilled and educated workers? What do patent and publication data tell us about trends in science and technology? Why are China's research institutes being reorganized? What has made a small set of high-tech regions so productive?

The contributors to this volume, leading scholars and business people from Greater China, the United States, and Europe, offer valuable insights into the region's transition from workshop of the world to wellspring of innovation.

Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia

Brookings Institution Press,
November 2008
Edited by Donald K. Emmerson

This is the second in a three-part series of books that Shorenstein APARC is publishing on Asian



regionalism. In Southeast Asia, and particularly for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), security has long trumped democracy as a priority. But the brutal dictatorship in Burma/Myanmar, political pluralism in Indonesia, and the global growth of democratic norms have led some Southeast Asians to question ASEAN's habit of turning a blind eye to domestic abuses by member states. The concept of regional security, meanwhile, is being reoriented from military threats toward new dangers to health and the environment and from state security toward human security.

Will promoting democracy cause local autocrats to hunker down and split ASEAN into hostile camps? Will ignoring demands for democracy allow domestic pressures to rise to dangerous levels? Should Burma/Myanmar be expelled or engaged? How should ASEAN respond to nontraditional threats to security in which member states are themselves implicated? In *Hard Choices*, expert authors—including a foreword by Surin Pitsuwan, the current secretary-general of ASEAN—grapple with these and other key and controversial questions for Southeast Asia today—and tomorrow.

"*Hard Choices* offers a most rewarding perspective on how Southeast Asian states straddle the ongoing tensions among three rarely compatible goals: security, democracy, and regionalism. The individual chapters are empirically rich and topically diverse. In combination, they generate a book that is broad in scope and full of deep analytic insights. It will be appreciated well beyond Southeast Asia."

— T. J. Pempel, University of California, Berkeley

FSI

Publications



International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring Democracy?
Routledge, 2008
By Amichai Magen and
Leonardo Morlino

Do external factors facilitate or hamper domestic democratic development? Do international actors influence the development of greater civil and political freedom, democratic accountability, equality, responsiveness, and the rule of law in domestic systems? How should we conceptualize, identify, and evaluate the extent and nature of international influence? These are some of the complex questions that this volume approaches. Using new theoretical insights and empirical data, the contributors develop a model to analyze the transitional processes of Romania, Turkey, Serbia, and Ukraine.

Offering a different stance from most of the current literature on the subject, *International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law* makes an important contribution to our knowledge of the international dimensions of democratization. This book will be of importance to scholars, students, and policymakers with an interest in the rule of law, international relations theory, and comparative politics.

Nobel Laureate Outlines Strategy to Reduce Nuclear Proliferation Risk

Nobel laureate Burton Richter, director emeritus of SLAC and PESD research fellow, published a piece in *Issues in Science and Technology* in which he discusses how the international political community might address proliferation risk inherent in the expansion of nuclear energy. He proposes that an inclusive internationalization policy of both ends of the nuclear fuel-cycle can provide much needed carbon-free energy while limiting the potential for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He argues that the nuclear proliferation problem can be remedied by a tightly monitored program through international policy and diplomacy where incentives to tame proliferation are increased, inspections are more rigorous, and a sanctions program is agreed upon and adhered to.

Victor on Offsetting the Human Impact on Climate Change Through Geoengineering

In the recent issue of the *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, PESD Director David Victor explores the possibilities of using geoengineering systems to offset the human impact on climate change. He argues that a regulatory framework to govern deployment of this technology system will be required promptly as a mechanism to address the human-induced effects on the planet's climate.

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
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the new policy agenda by advising the new administration and serving in the government.

FSI Deputy Director Michael McFaul, professor of political science and director of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, has been tapped to serve as special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs. FSI Advisory Board member Susan Rice has been named U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

FSI scholars advising the administration include CISAC research scholar Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, law professor Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, and development expert Peter Henry. It was my pleasure to serve on the Obama for America foreign policy team headed by former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake with Susan, Mike, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and two other distinguished FSI Advisory Board members, Ambassador Richard Morningstar and Ambassador Steven Pifer.

Here at FSI, we welcomed policymakers, public intellectuals, and diplomats, including Iranian democracy activist Akbar Ganji, World Trade Organization Director-General Pascal Lamy, diplomats Karl Inderfurth, Teresita Schaffer, and Theodore Eliot, Jr. to review challenges in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, NPR reporter Sarah Chayes now helping to rebuild Afghanistan, and Deputy Director of National Intelligence Thomas Fingar, who will serve as 2009 Payne Distinguished Lecturer. We were riveted by authors James Traub, Derek Chollet, Jim Goldgeier, Mike Chinoy, and George Herring. FSI's fourth international conference, *Transitions 2009*, provided a major forum to address *profound* opportunities for change afforded by the election of a new U.S. president and historic transitions abroad. Long after the formal sessions featuring FSI and outside experts ended, debate reverberated on policy issues, prospects, and priorities.

One month into the Obama administration, global leaders, opinion makers, and publics are galvanized by a new spirit. America has committed to use *all* its power: its military and diplomacy, its intelligence and law enforcement, its economy, and the power of its moral example. FSI faculty and scholars are shaping and leading that charge. Your continued support makes it possible for us at FSI to continue the work that informs and inspires our nation. We extend our heartfelt thanks. Stay tuned.

Sincerely,



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