

**The Japanese Network State in U.S.
Comparison: Does Embeddedness Yield
Resources and Influence?**

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Abstract

Scholars describe the East Asian—Japanese and South Korean—state as a network state that guides the private sector by means of embedded relationships (i.e., informal persuasive ties). In theoretical terms, these embedded ties represent informally institutionalized social capital. This study refines the network state thesis by comparing embedded ties with tangible resource exchanges in their effects upon political influence among political (organizational) actors in Japanese and U.S. labor politics. The network state thesis predicts that in Japan embedded ties should channel the flow of tangible resources (e.g., vital information, political support), and that embedded third party brokers should mediate this flow. Embedded ties have generally pervaded the Japanese polity, whereas in the United States, they have remained concentrated within the labor sector. In Japan, the embedded ties form a “bow tie” pattern: the Ministry of Labor (MOL) bridges a structural hole between corporatistic business and labor. The presence of embedded third parties predicts the dyadic exchange of information. Political support, by contrast, forms a distinct, nonembedded network, centered on political parties. Tensions between the embedded network and the instrumental political support network help explain characteristics of Japanese politics, such as the relative slowness of its response to financial crisis.

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Introduction

The end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War gave birth to an era of “competing capitalisms.” Trade frictions heated up among Europe, the United States, Japan, and new entrants. The resulting heat and light cast differences that had once been ignored—particularly those concerning the pros and cons of the state’s role in orchestrating economic growth—into bold relief. Seeking explanations for these differences, social scientists have increasingly begun to compare the advanced, capitalist, industrial, democratic societies with one another (Badie and Birnbaum 1983; Berger 1981; Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol 1985, 355; Knoke, et. al. 1996).

In this regard, the East Asian political economies emerged as central puzzles among the capitalist societies. Early commentators attributed the Japanese economic miracle mainly to private business initiative (Patrick and Rosovsky 1976, 46-48). By the late 1970s and 1980s, however, a group of “revisionists” argued that Japan was simply “different.” Prominent voices held that Japan possessed a “developmental state,” capable of making autonomous policies and persuading economic actors to follow them (Appelbaum and Henderson 1992, 20-21; Cumings 1987, 51; Deyo 1987; Haggard 1990; Johnson 1982; Krasner 1978, 60; Morishima 1982; Prestowitz 1988; Sakakibara 1993; So and Chiu 1995, 171; Vogel 1979; Vogel 1991, 87; Wade 1990, 337). According to this thesis, as in much Western theory, the state *dominated* business through resource and regulatory control (Weber 1978).¹ But this thesis paid little attention to the organization of society as a whole.

By the late 1980s, anomalies appeared in the strong, developmental state picture. From the Western point of view, indicators of state power or capacity include the state’s

degree of autonomy in formulating policy goals, its ability to implement those goals effectively, and its success in extracting resources from society (Badie and Birnbaum 1983, 103; Cumings 1987; Evans, Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol 1985, 351; Kitschelt 1986; Krasner 1978; Migdal 1986; Poulantzas 1973; Skowronek 1980; Wade 1990, 337). By these measures, the Japanese state appeared weak. It had relatively few personnel, a small budget and revenue, feeble legal regulatory capacity, and was riven with bureaucratic factionalism and sectionalism (Campbell 1989, 128; Dore 1987, 14; Haley 1992; Krauss 1989, 50; Sakakibara 1993, 30; Samuels 1987, 262).² Even if it possessed authority, the Japanese state seemed to lack power (Haley 1992). How, then, could it shape its political economy?

Out of this question, a new explanation of the East Asian developmental state emerged—the network state. This view claimed that the East Asian state produced rapid economic growth by gently shepherding its myopic business sheep. The East Asian developmental state operated as a network state ruling through embedded autonomy (Evans 1995; Murakami and Rohlen 1992, 65; Okimoto 1989; Samuels 1987, 262). In this network state model, state bureaucrats had autonomy—they decided their own preferred policies, rather than slavishly following priorities imposed by interest groups in society (Evans 1995, 58; Okimoto 1989, 173). Most notably, the state bureaucrats implemented these policies by *persuading* business groups, not dominating them. Japanese scholars have long characterized this process as “administrative guidance” (Young 1984; Yamanouchi 1979). The Western scholars who promulgated the network state model focused on state–business ties, paying little attention to the social organization of the business sector and society.

The East Asian economic “meltdown” of the 1990s could not be readily explained by the network state model. Why, for example, could not the Ministry of Finance persuade banks to stop making bad loans, or, if necessary, to go bankrupt (*New York Times*, April 4, 1998)? Even in prior, more prosperous times, it became apparent that Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) did not always get its way with business (Broadbent 1998, 61). Such realities fit neither the developmental state nor the network state model, and have prompted considerable rethinking of both scenarios (Aoki 1997; Kim 1997; Woo-Cumings 1999).

In fact, the Japanese state may be less autonomous from and more trapped by its own embedded networks than noted by the preceding models (Eccleston 1989, 115; Sugimoto 1997, 198).³ Some argue that political power in Japan shifts among a number of élites, not just the state, and lacks a coherent center (van Wolferen 1989). External pressures on the web may cause its center to shift within a larger “communitarian élite corporatism” (Broadbent, 1998). The state may attain influence by brokering interactions among these élites (Broadbent and Ishio 1998).

Yet this theory provokes new questions. Do embedded ties really matter? How does the pattern of embedded social networks relate to other forms of social organization? How does it affect the flow of other resources and the generation of power? Do these embedded ties promote the autonomy and power of the state?

In addressing these questions, an empirical comparison with the United States—which contrasts sharply with Japan in these regards—is instructive. Arguments about the nature of the U.S. state and its relation to society have an even longer, more convoluted, and varied history than those concerning Japan. Theorists have described the United States’ state as pluralist (Dahl 1961; Polsby 1995), capitalist class-dominated (Wright 1985), élite-dominated (Mills 1956), or relatively autonomous (Skocpol et. al. 1995).

In many ways, when stacked against its Japanese and European counterparts, the United States is the “unique” case. The U.S. polity displays a relative weakness of the state and a

fluidity to its interest group configurations. The “organizational state” model provides one theoretical basis for this fluidity (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Knoke, et. al. 1996). This view further suggests that the state is increasingly balkanized by disparate constellations of interest groups in specific policy domains. These constellations shift from domain to domain, making the polity very pluralistic. Consistent with this model, recent work has confirmed that the United States, and to some extent Germany, lack a constant core set of organizations at the center of their policy-making (Knoke, et. al. 1996; Heinz, et. al. 1993). Japan, by contrast, does possess such a core (Knoke, et. al. 1996). These findings indicate that the United States and Japan are likely to occupy opposite ends of a continuum, both with respect to the centrality of their state and peak corporatist organizations, and the embeddedness of their polities.

Varieties of Embeddedness

Embeddedness refers to will and action being entangled in “connections”—informal social ties imbued with expectations of long-term reciprocity and mutual aid (Granovetter 1985). Okimoto, for instance, states that:

The Japanese state has no choice but to rely on consensus, habits of compliance, and voluntary cooperation on the part of private actors to get things done. . . . It is these values, the by-products of over a thousand years of social evolution, that give distinctive shape and life to the institutions of Japanese capitalism (1989, 228-37).

Evans observes similarly institutionalized networks in South Korea, though he does not attribute them to culture as much as Okimoto:

Embeddedness, as it is used here, implies a concrete set of connections that link the state intimately and aggressively to particular social groups with whom it shares a joint project of transformation (1995, 59).

These connections can be thought of as *social capital*—social relationships that help an actor to attain goals, and that help a group or community to become more democratic and solve problems more effectively (Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Putnam 1993). Embeddedness—an enduring set of persuasive and mutual-aid connections—is a kind of institutionalized social capital (Granovetter 1985; Evans 1995, 34). Being situated within a network of embedded social relations provides certain resources, but also imposes its own rules of behavior (Sewell 1992; Stryker 1994). The embeddedness of political actors, of course, varies among societies.

The network state model assumes, in effect, that an embedded relationship itself carries the power of persuasion. Such ties enable the state to persuade business actors to follow national plans. This concurs with sociological neo-institutional theory: embedded ties may convey persuasive force even if they do not carry tangible resources (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The network state model implies that the embedded ties would also channel other types of resources between the state and businesses—tangible ones such as vital information and political support, necessary to accomplish joint goals. Some network studies predict similar channeling, reasoning that embedded actors can call on their partners’ resources (Coleman 1988, S104). The network state model further implies that actual political alliances and resulting policy outcomes would be mostly strongly predicted by the

patterns of embedded relationships per se, more than by other types of networks.

Even in a highly embedded society, however, these hypotheses may be questioned. Embeddedness may not encompass all political relationships, generate all power, or channel other sorts of resources. Some resources, such as the flow of vital information, providing work for other organizations, the licit and illicit transfer of funds, public political support, and other sorts of resource transfers—all of great importance to political studies—may follow their own channels. Indeed, these might be very “nonembedded”—that is, conveyed through calculated instrumental exchange to create resource dependency (Knoke 1994, 288). Recent political economic events in Japan, for example, demonstrate that persuasion is not working very well. Even if they once exercised it, embedded networks may be losing their persuasive power. Perhaps they no longer convey the necessary tangible resources.

To address these issues, we need to study how embedded and tangible resource flow networks articulate, and what effect their relationship has on political power. Thus far, both network and developmental state research, and research within the policy network school in network sociology, have been largely silent on the problem of inter-network (or multiplex) articulation. It is an important issue, however. As distinct political-relational patterns, the relationship-embedded and other types of networks may either complement each other or exist in contradictory tension (Clemens 1999; Friedland and Alford 1991). The degree and style of inter-network articulation may affect the distribution of power and the political capacities of the state and society. Network analysis offers new ways to examine these questions empirically.

To what degree, then, does the embeddedness network channel the exchange of more tangible resources, predict the accumulation of influence by central actors, prefigure the actual political alliances that form around specific policy-making events, and affect the outcomes of policy decisions? The comparison of Japanese and U.S. politics in these arenas—two societies predicted to be far apart on their embeddedness—provides an instructive contrast.

Hypotheses for the Japan and U.S. Cases

The initial inspiration for the concept of the network state derives from Japanese social anthropologist Chie Nakane. Nakane argued that a standard, institutionalized social form—vertical personalistic obligation—imbued all Japanese relationships, whether between persons or between organizations. As applied to politics, this vertical obedience gave the state an authority that could be “transmitted without obstruction” down through affiliated organizations in society (Nakane 1970, 102).

Studies of conflict in Japan, however, reveal that Japanese culture is not uniformly suffused with trust of and deference toward élites. Rather, it may boil with submerged resentment. External patterns of relationship, and not internalized values, may be the more important factors constraining the expression of dissent (Broadbent 1998; Krauss, Rohlen, and Steinhoff 1984). Recent social-psychological research supports such a structural hypothesis, indicating that, as individuals, Japanese trust each other *less* than Americans, except in the presence of an overarching “guarantor” to the relationship (Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998; Yamagishi 1988).

Even Nakane argued that Japanese social relationships (whether between persons, groups, or organizations) were profoundly embedded in an “inverted V” (\wedge) or pyramidal pattern, mediated by a third party (Nakane 1970). Without a common superior, the two lower actors had little direct solidarity. Given this scenario, embedded third parties in Japan should tend to mediate the country’s flows of resources and acquire influence.

Based on the foregoing review of existing theory and research, this author hypothesizes that embedded ties will strongly affect the flow of tangible resources such as vital information and public political support. Moreover, this channeling should follow the third party mediator pattern predicted by Nakane and other work. That is, in Japan, tangible exchanges should occur most strongly when two parties both have embedded ties to a common third party, who will act as a broker and guarantor of the exchange. This arrangement will in turn produce a reputation for influence for the third party guarantor, giving the “expected reciprocity” relationship a strong correlation with influence reputation. In Japan, the centrality of this pattern of embedded relationships should predict much more about an organization’s influence and exchange of tangible resources than it will in the United States.

The United States, by contrast, has often been described as a pluralistic society with shifting political alliances. Alliances shift because they depend, like a market, upon the momentary convergence of immediate political interest (Knoke, et. al. 1996). In the United States, then, embedded ties should predict little about the flow of tangible resources and the accumulation of influence.

Data and Methods

The data presented in this paper come from a survey of influence networks in the labor policy domains of 122 organizations in Japan, and 117 in the United States. A policy domain refers to a set of organizations actively attempting to influence a certain type of policy (Knoke, et. al. 1996). The organizations in this study were active and influential in the labor policy domain between 1982 and 1988. Their names were culled from newspaper and specialized journal accounts of labor policy decisions.⁴ In the Japanese case, a panel of experts suggested more.⁵ This process produced two full lists of the most active and important organizations in the labor policy domain in Japan and the United States.

These organizations effectively constituted the entire organizational membership of each national labor domain, not a representative sample of its members. The organizations range from departments/ministries (*sho*) and bureaus (*kyoku*) within the administrative state, to political parties in the national legislature (Congress/Diet), and in the Japan case, advisory councils (*shingikai*) appointed by state officials. A host of organizations in civil society are also represented: business and labor sector federations (*gyokai* and *kumiai*), their peak associations (e.g., National Association of Manufacturers, AFL-CIO, *Nikkeiren*, *Rengo*, *Sohyo*), and public interest groups and social movements of several types (on *gyokai*, see Sone 1993). In Japan, advisory councils contain mainly pro-government academics and business leaders, appointed by a ministry to evaluate new policy initiatives within a specialized domain, i.e., minimum wage. Appendices 1 and 2 contains the lists of all organizations in the Japan and U.S. labor politics domains, respectively, as well as their acronyms and their scores on a number of reciprocity ties and two influence measures.

Usually, the survey respondent was the political expert of the organization, the person most familiar with its ties to other actors in the national political arena. The survey asked respondents, in the lists of 122 or 117, to indicate their partners for labor policy-related pursuits in four types of networks. The four networks were: the sending and receiving of vital information; the receipt of public political support; the provision of aid through performing work for another organization; and finally, confidence that another organization would honor the norm of reciprocity by returning political favors.

Some studies consider the exchange of information or support to indicate, in itself, a social network and a type of embeddedness. This paper distinguishes information and

support from embeddedness, treating them as tangible resources of instrumental utility. Social embeddedness is elicited by the following survey question (and its Japanese equivalent):

Sometimes one organization participates in a labor policy event that has little importance for itself but is a favor to the second organization. The second organization is then obligated to the first one, and the first organization can later expect a favor in return from the second.⁶

The survey also asked about the other networks. It specified the kind of information exchanged as “important policy information.” It defined support as “public political support” for a public stance on a certain policy. Both of these types of resources may be obtained through impersonal, “arms length” means—such as government documents or expedient exchange. Therefore, their association with social embeddedness becomes an empirical question. Do socially embedded ties channel the flows of these other resources?

Measuring the effect of network centrality upon power required an independent measure of each organization’s power. To measure influence, each respondent was asked to check off which of the 117/122 organizations were “especially influential” in the labor policy domain. The respondents were the political officers of their organizations, and so were experts in this area. The sum of these checks provided a reliable “reputational” measure of political influence, or power.

Network analysis views politics as a pattern of actors and influence relations among them (Knoke 1981; Knoke 1990; Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden 1978; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Laumann, Knoke, and Kim 1985; Laumann and Marsden 1979; Laumann, Marsden, and Galaskiewicz 1977; Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1994). Actors occupy positions within a system defined by many relationships. In this view, actors with more ties (greater centrality) should have more influence (Knoke 1994, 290; Wasserman and Faust 1994, 169). In some cases, though, when an actor bridges a structural hole between groups (Fernandez and Gould 1994; Burt 1992)—especially when it is the only bridge—an actor with only a few ties can be powerful. Furthermore, an actor with authority may command many other actors via a few vertical ties. These caveats suggest a more nuanced approach to the relationship between networks and power than centrality alone can provide.⁷

Network images are used extensively in this paper. These images represent the pattern of ties among organizations in a visual way. This in turn should allow the reader intuitively to grasp the political significance of network patterns, which might otherwise remain dry statistics.⁸

Findings

The Macro-Pattern

The patterns of reciprocity networks in the United States and Japan exhibit one similarity, and otherwise striking differences, as Table 1 reveals.

The levels of expected reciprocity patterns within the United States and Japanese labor sectors are very similar. In both countries, the labor peak associations and other labor union associations have very high scores on these ties. As the old union song goes, “solidarity forever” seems to pertain in both U.S. and Japanese labor sectors.

Outside the labor sector, however, the similarities end. In the United States, political organizations do not expect long-term reciprocity from other organizations. In Japan, they do. Almost all other Japanese organizations also expect “solidarity forever.” From business associations and central government ministries and bureaus, to political parties and public interest groups, reciprocity between important organizations is expected and planned for.

Table 1: Mean Levels of Expected Reciprocity by Organizational Type for the United States and Japan


Type of Organization	United States			Japan		
	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.*</i>	<i>N*</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.*</i>	<i>N*</i>
Union Associations	5.26	(4.95)	19	3.47	(2.99)	34
Labor Peak Associations	16	—	1	14.5	(3.54)	2
Business Associations	0	(0)	25	2.06	(2.38)	31
Business Peak Associations	0	(0)	5	5.4	(10.97)	5
Professional Associations	.1	(.32)	10	0	(0)	1
Public Interest Groups	.37	(.65)	35	2.31	(4.19)	13
Central Government	0	(0)	18	3	(5.63)	16
Political Parties	0	(0)	6	5.5	(5.79)	6
Advisory Councils	—	—	—	.4	(.84)	10

*S = standard deviation

*N = 117 U.S. organizations; N = 122 Japanese organizations

At the first glance, then, the Japanese political system, as exemplified by the labor policy domain, appears much more laced with ties of reciprocity than does that of the United States. Visual images of these ties in the United States and Japan reinforce this impression. In the United States, as Figure 1 shows, only 26 out of 117 organizations (22 percent) had mutually-confirmed favor reciprocity ties, a surprisingly small number. Furthermore, the pattern formed by the ties is centered on the AFL-CIO, the U.S. “peak association” for labor. Close to the AFL-CIO, a densely interconnected cluster of labor unions forms another central focus. Other unions surround the core, and at the pattern’s periphery, a few public interest and one professional group attach to some unions. Evidently, labor forms a unique island of reciprocal solidarity within a U.S. polity that enjoys almost no such solidarity.

Figure 1: Expected Reciprocity Network in US



This image confounds theories and studies that stress the relatively socially integrated nature of the U.S. capitalist class, internally and with the state (Domhoff 1979; Useem 1984). Beyond the labor sector, business groups, government agencies, political parties, and other actors have few committed relationships. Judging from this evidence, the integration of the business community/capitalist class that exists through interlocking directorates and other means is simply a “marriage of convenience.” Whatever their transactions, they produce no expectation of extended reciprocity among the business groups involved. This lack of integration would support, rather, a pluralistic, alliance-shifting image of the U.S. polity.

Japan, again, presents a dramatic contrast to this U.S. image. Figure 2 shows the Japanese labor politics sector to be a complex sphere of ties. Figure 3 imposes some dividing lines on that sphere to differentiate basic sectors. Many organizations are densely woven together by bonds of (expected) reciprocal obligations. Fully 75 organizations out of 122 (61 percent) acknowledge and mutually confirm such ties with others. These bonds interweave the labor sector as extensively as in the United States, if not more so. But they also weave together the business sector, and connect the state to both business and labor. Business and labor organizations cluster on opposite sides of the sphere without many mutual ties, indicating strong class polarization in Japanese society. But it’s a small world: by going through just two or three intermediaries, most organizations can connect in spite of the class divide. Most state agencies are located in between the two class sectors and serve this intermediary role most directly.

Figure 2: Expected Reciprocity Network in Japan





Figure 3: Clusters and Ties of Expected Reciprocity in Japan



If we cluster organizations that are densely tied together by favor reciprocity, the image becomes easier to decipher.⁹ Doing so produces 19 clusters, some with many members and some with only one member (Figure 3). The membership of these clusters is listed in Appendix 2. Figure 3 and Appendix 2 clearly show that reciprocity relations, while penetrating the entire organized Japanese political economy, also clump in distinct, tightly knit groups. The clusters fall into three main sectors: the corporatist core, the business sector, and the left labor sector, each possessing individual clusters within, and brokers between them.

The Corporatist Core includes the Labor Politics Bureau (*Roseikyoku*) of the Ministry of Labor, which is really the “spider” at the center of the national reciprocity web (22 ties), bridging the business–labor divide. Other centrist, bridging organizations are also in that Core, including the Democratic Socialist Party, the Private Sector Trade Union Confederation (*Rengo*), and the Social-Economic Council of Citizens (a consensus-building discussion forum), plus a number of associated centrist unions.

The Business Core, in the lower right, centers around the Federation of Employer’s Associations (JFEA or *Nikkeiren*). The Federation of Chambers of Commerce, the Administrative Reform Committee, and the numerous business associations (*gyokai*) within this cluster exchange political favors with the JFEA so exclusively that the cluster resembles the spokes and hub of a wheel. Another nearby cluster of business associations is connected to the Business Core, but also tightly tied to the Labor Politics Bureau.

The labor sector is more fractured. In 1989, when this data was collected, two peak associations contended for the loyalties of labor unions: the older, more leftist General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (*Sohyo*), and the newer, more centrist, Japan Private Sector Trade Union Confederation (*Rengo*). As Figures 2 and 3 reveal, the various union federations making up the labor sector divide their loyalties between these two peak confederations. Furthermore, unlike the business sector, many of the union federations have direct reciprocity ties to government ministries and bureaus. In terms of political power, both of these factors weaken the labor sector by splitting it, and by circumventing the peak labor confederations, thereby reducing their “broker” role.

The Left Labor Core contains the Left peak labor association, the General Council of Trade Unions (*Sohyo*, largely disbanded since the late 1980s), a group of unions, a social movement (against discrimination toward the *Buraku* minority), a small labor-related “think tank,” and a government-sponsored advisory council concerned with minimum wage. Two small union clusters are in the same sector, along with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which acts as a broker. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) cluster hovers nearby. More than half of Japan’s labor organizations have been absorbed within the Corporatist Core, a process that has probably accelerated since.

Brokers mediate between sectors and clusters. If a broker provides the only bridge between two mutually isolated groups of actors—over what network scholars call a structural hole—the broker should gain power (Burt 1992; Fernandez and Gould 1994; Marsden 1981; Marsden 1982; Marsden 1983). Depending on the resources that flow through the broker connections, the broker may gain even more power by regulating their transfer.

In Japan, political parties play broker roles. The JSP obviously acts as a broker within the labor sector. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in a cluster with several ministerial bureaus, mediates between business and *Rengo*.

Ministries also mediate. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has its own cluster with three union federations (energy, oil, and gas workers), one business federation (Petroleum Industry), and the Japan Productivity Center (an organization set up

by MITI to improve industrial productivity). MITI is also strongly tied to organizations in the Corporatist Core. Other ministerial bureaus mediate directly between business and labor, or between the JFEA, *Rengo*, or the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP).

Advisory councils, too, whose purpose is to debate and review government policies, hold representatives from both business and labor, and therefore act as mediators. The Employment Advisory Council and the Minimum Wage Advisory Council mediate political favors between the JFEA and the leftist General Council of Trade Unions. The National Center for Agricultural Cooperatives (*Nokyo*)—which represents farmers—mediates between the Labor Policy Bureau, the DSP, and the JCP. All these brokers and mediating organizations weave together Japan’s potentially divisive labor policy domain into a fabric of expected reciprocity, of give-and-take, thereby reducing potential conflicts across the board.

These findings strongly support the network state claim that state and business are embedded in mutual ties of reciprocity. The complex patterns presented above further demonstrate that the reciprocity ties extend *throughout* organized Japanese society, to labor and other groups. Both the business and labor sectors not only show degrees of corporatistic integration as sectors, and ties to a mediating state, but also balkanization into numerous separate clusters. As discussed earlier, the U.S. polity, by contrast, only has ties of reciprocity within the labor sector.

Relational Patterns and Organizational Influence

Does centrality or brokerage in reciprocity networks give an organization control over the flow of other, more tangible resources, and ultimately, more influence? How does this control affect an organization’s influence?

Measures of Influence

Table 2 compares the organizations with the strongest reputations for influence in Japan and the United States, and indicates the relatively high importance of state agencies in the former, as compared to the latter.

Table 2: The Most Influential Organizations in Japan and the United States
(Top 15 organizations on reputation for influence, number in each category)

	Japan	United States
Government Ministry or Department	8	2
Political Party	2	4
Business Association	2	3
Labor Association	3	4
Public Interest Group	0	2

The specific influence scores, ranging from 112 to zero, are listed in Appendix 2. In Japan, *Rengo* (112), and the JFEA (109) enjoyed the strongest reputations for influence. The next highest group consisted of the Labor Policy Bureau (82), the LDP (74), the Left Labor Peak *Sohyo* (72), and the International Metalworkers' Federation (69). MITI received a score of 38. Overall, this measure indicates a fairly wide dispersal of power across this labor-politics domain. The Ministry of Labor-Labor Politics Bureau (MOL-LPB), with its moderately high level of influence, mediates between powerful class-based business and union organizations. These comparisons again show the relative importance of government agencies in Japan, as the network state models predict. In the United States, by contrast, political parties and public interest groups play much bigger roles in the country's politics, as the pluralist and organizational state models would suggest.

Centrality, Resources, and Influence

Three networks in the United States and Japan were measured for the purposes of this paper: vital information, public political support, and expected reciprocity. Table 3 displays the differences in density and connectivity for these three networks between the two cases. The United States exhibits much denser networks of information flow, while Japan supports much denser networks of expected reciprocity. The density of political support is about equal in both countries.

Tables 4 and 5 show the correlations between an organization's centrality in the different networks and its reputation for influence, in the United States and Japan. Centrality refers to the number of ties that attach to any given organization. If social embeddedness contributed to the production of power in Japan, but not in the United States, it should correlate more strongly with the reputational influence variable in Japan. If its contribution to power served to make it a conduit for other types of resources, then centrality in reciprocity should also correlate strongly with centrality in vital information and political support.

Table 5 shows that, in Japan, a central position in ties of expected reciprocity strongly predicts an organization's reputation for influence (.501), while Table 4 demonstrates how much weaker this relationship is in the United States (.270).

How does embeddedness relate to the flow of resources? Does embeddedness channel the flow of more tangible resources? Does a central position in embedded ties mean that an organization will receive more of such resources, or give more of them away? In Japan, being embedded in reciprocal relationships correlates moderately with sending and receiving vital information (.305), and more strongly with sending and receiving political support (.474/.449). Since the direct correlations between the information and political support variables are weak to nonexistent, reciprocity clearly provides an important conduit for both kinds of tangible resources in Japan. In Japan, for example, the provision of political support reflects not a momentary, issue-based relationship, but a longer-term solidarity. As a resource, information has a weaker correlation because it is cheaper than political support, and can be dispensed more readily beyond an organization's circle of reciprocity.

In the United States, by contrast, reciprocity has only a negligible correlation with the exchange of vital information. It correlates very strongly, however, with receiving political support (.562). Reciprocity exists mainly in the labor sector, so this kind of channeling occurs in that arena, and centers on the AFL-CIO and a few union federations. American organizations share information very widely, which means that information has virtually no relationship with centrality in reciprocity ties. These findings support the typical image of the U.S. labor movement: it enjoys an internal solidarity, while the rest of the U.S. polity has a shifting pluralism.

Table 3: Properties of Information, Support, and Reciprocity Networks

	VITAL INFORMATION		POLITICAL SUPPORT		EXPECTED RECIPROcity	
	United States	Japan	United States	Japan	United States	Japan
WHOLE NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS						
Density (%)	38.8	17.0	4.1	4.9	3.5	8.2
Connectivity (%)	100.0	100.00	43.1	55.3	29.6	69.7
Path Lengths (%)						
1 (direct)	38.8	17.0	4.1	4.9	3.5	8.2
2	61.2	79.5	8.7	17.6	8.9	38.1
3	.04	3.5	10.8	19.9	9.1	20.7
4	-	-	10.2	12.2	5.4	2.7
5	-	-	6.3	.7	2.5	.1
6	-	-	1.9	.01	.2	-
7	-	-	.2	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-
∞ (no connection)	0.0	0.0	57.9	44.7	70.4	30.3
Dyads (N)	13,572	14,762	13,572	14,762	13,572	14,762

Table 4: The U.S. Labor Policy Domain—Network Correlation Matrix

Correlations

	Mutually confirmed expected reciprocity	Mutually confirmed sending of vital information	Mutually confirmed receipt of vital information	Mutually confirmed exchange of vital information	Sending political support	Receiving political support	Reputation for influence
Mutually confirmed expected reciprocity	1.000	.117	.117	.004	.394**	.562**	.270**
Mutually confirmed sending of vital information	.117	1.000	1.000**	.803**	.385**	-.016	.544**
Mutually confirmed receipt of vital information	.117	1.000**	1.000	.803**	.385**	-.016	.544
Mutually confirmed exchange of vital information	.004	.803**	.803**	1.000	.317**	.010	.396**
Sending political support	.562**	-.016	-.016	.010	1.000	1.000	.096
Receiving political support	.394**	.385**	.385**	.317**	1.000	.018	.565**
Reputation for influence	.270**	.544**	.544**	.396**	.565**	.096	1.000

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 5: The Japanese Labor Domain—Network Correlation Matrix

Correlations

	Mutually confirmed expected reciprocity	Mutually confirmed sending of vital information	Mutually confirmed receipt of vital information	Mutually confirmed exchange of vital information	Sending political support	Receiving political support	Reputation for influence
Mutually confirmed expected reciprocity	1.000	.305**	.305**	.218*	.474**	.449**	.501**
Mutually confirmed sending of vital information	.305**	1.000	1.000**	.878**	.317**	.000	.493**
Mutually confirmed receipt of vital information	.305**	1.000**	1.000	.878**	.317**	.000	.493**
Mutually confirmed exchange of vital information	.218*	.878**	.878**	1.000	.218*	.033	.393**
Sending political support	.474**	.317**	.317**	.218*	1.000	.177	.612**
Receiving political support	.449**	.000	.000	.033	.177	1.000	.237**
Reputation for influence	.501**	.493**	.493**	.393**	.612**	.237**	1.000

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

The direct correlations between political support and information are similar in the United States and Japan. Organizations that *send* considerable political support also transfer (send and receive) considerable vital information. But those organizations that *receive* significant political support neither send nor receive vital information. In other words, providers of political support are also brokers of information, but those who need political support are not “in the know.”

Who are the highly central actors in each network? The preceding analysis measured centrality in terms of the number of contacts (direct ties) an organization possessed. Centrality can also be considered in terms of *brokerage*: how many actors must go through actor A in order to reach one another? Both are important means to discover potential power in a network.

Table 6 compares these two scores for the top organizations in the three Japanese networks. In the reciprocity network, the JFEA and the MOL-LPB, held the highest number of ties (25 and 22) and were also the top brokers (531 and 308). However, the two peak labor federations, the Democratic Socialist Party and the Social-Economic Councils of Citizens (the forum for policy discussion between parties and labor and business groups) also played central brokerage roles in this network. The way these organizations knit together the labor polity echoes the well-known closeness between a Japanese company and its in-house union (Kume 1998; McMillan 1985).

In the Japanese information network, some organizations shift their degree of centrality. The MOL-LPB and *Rengo* enjoy an equal number of strong ties, but as a broker of information, transferring it among organizations, the MOL-LPB predominates (1742). Other organizations hardly register, when compared to the centrality of these two organizations for the flow of vital information.

The political support network indicates a total shift of centralities from the preceding case dominated by the MOL-LPB. In this instance, two actors that hardly figure in the prior networks—the LDP and the Federation of Economic Organizations (*Keidanren*)—emerge as predominant. This is very interesting, because it indicates the powerful actors in formal politics. The LDP, of course, dominates the national legislature (the Diet), and the *Keidanren* is the very vocal political voice of Japan’s organized business community. This formal, public network stands in stark contrast to the busy, informal information network and the invisible strands of solidarity that weave through the polity.

The final network, not measured for the United States, is that of providing “work.” The Japanese respondents interpreted work in their own ways. For the government agencies, it meant administrative chores, such as gathering data. For political parties, it meant providing services and patronage. The findings of this paper show that two MOL bureaus, MITI and the JFEA, were the main recipients of such work (total ties in), since other organizations gathered data for them. The main providers of work, however, were two political parties, a Ministry of Health and Welfare bureau, a union, and an industrial association. The LDP and DSP roles in providing patronage to numerous constituencies emerged clearly in this network.

These findings are based on analysis and correlations of organizational level variables. They indicate that relationships of expected reciprocity do indeed weave together the Japanese polity, compared to the U.S. polity, in the way predicted by the network state models. At the same time, a more detailed consideration of the interactions among the three networks shows a complex pattern of cross-national similarities and differences. Both societies have power brokers that provide both political support and vital information. Weaker actors depend upon these brokers for political support without having a lot of information. But in each network, the most

Table 6: Total Ties, Brokerage, and “Betweenness” in Four Networks for Main Organizations

Network Type Organizational Type and Name	Expectation of reciprocity (mutual and confirmed)		Give and receive vital information (confirm)		Give and receive political support		Perform and receive work from other organizations	
	Total ties	Total brokerage/ betweenness	Total ties out/in	Total brokerage/ betweenness	Total ties out/in	Total brokerage/ betweenness	Total ties out/in	Total brokerage/ betweenness
Government Ministries								
Min. of Labor – Labor Policy Bureau (MOL-LPB)	22	308/709	50/44	1742/4190	8/31	59/426	26/37	289/1037
Min. of Labor – Human Resources Bureau	4	4/49	32/7	99/485	6/7	6/92	15/27	146/1255
Min. of H&W – Social Affairs Bureau	0	0/0	22/11	58/517	5/0	0/0	48/10	101/269
Min. of H&W – Social Insurance Bureau	0	0/0	22/11	127/884	8/0	0/0	5/18	22/25
Min. of International Trade & Industry (MITI)	9	20/101	3/3	2/4	11/7	27/378	30/28	303/1136
Political Parties								
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	4	8/18	4/10	14/215	12/63	522/2488	61/11	258/1187
Japan Socialist Party (JSP)	11	66/135	15/23	135/644	25/23	310/1206	23/23	173/532
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)	14	117/210	9/16	47/108	24/12	169/1072	84/19	627/1291
Union Federations								
Rengo – Private Sector Trade Union Confederation	12	95/206	50/37	1253/3097	20/0	0/0	12/30	155/524
Sohyo – General Council of Trade Unions	17	207/492	27/23	382/1530	18/18	163/687	17/17	94/368
Int’l Metalworkers Federation (IMFJC)	9	18/46	4/4	3/25	0/5	0/0	1/11	0/0
Federation of Elec. Mach. Workers’ Unions	9	31/93	7/2	6/53	10/1	2/32	3/9	4/9
Int’l Chem. & Energy Workers’ Union	11	56/128	7/6	11/40	2/56	77/1005	57/9	143/482
Business Federations								
Nikkeiren – Federation of Employers’ Associations (JFEA)	25	531/843	30/9	185/966	24/5	47/166	0/30	0/0
Keidanren–Federation of Economic Organizations	0	0/0	0/1	0/0	25/26	488/2190	1/24	6/6
Federation of Chambers of Commerce & Industry	1	0/0	9/8	20/131	16/0	0/0	15/15	75/223
Japan Shipbuilding Ind. Association	9	34/164	8/7	11/46	5/1	3/22	3/6	5/5
Japan Steel Ind.	10	46/190	8/11	31/252	4/51	103/421	46/4	39/117
Other								
Social–Economic Council of Citizens	14	84/233	13/6	18/120	5/59	136/753	29/28	359/885
Japan Productivity Center	7	12/26	0/1	0/0	4/0	0/0	19/27	177/488
Average, 122 organizations	2.9	/4.1	4.6/4.6	/133		/120.62	10/10	/122.16
Standard Deviation, 122 organizations	4.34	/116	8/6	/500		/356.11	14.5/7.6	/267.96

powerful actors shift. Government agencies lead the reciprocity and information networks in Japan, whereas parties lead the political support networks.

Overall, a more complicated picture than that sketched by the network state models begins to take shape. It portrays the different networks as distinct institutions, each with its own dynamics, and each posing potential tensions with the others. A given political issue's emergence may be determined by a different dynamic relationship between the networks.

Brokerage and Influence

Even when the centrality variables of organizations in different networks are correlated, it is impossible to know if a strong connection between two networks indicates that they overlie or "channel" each other. The same organizations could have many ties on two networks, but the ties could relate to entirely different sets of partners. Therefore, this kind of correlation would not indicate the extent to which embeddedness channels the flow of tangible resources. To study this question, the method of matrix correlation must be used.¹⁰ This method shows the degree to which actors with one type of tie (e.g., expected reciprocity) also maintain other, different kinds of ties (e.g., vital information).

When many actors are involved, a high correlation does not necessarily signify a high density of interaction in the network. It only means that those actors active in one network are also active in the other network. The whole active group can be a small partitioned segment of the entire network. As shown above, this is the case with expected reciprocity relations in the United States, which are largely confined to the labor sector. The relatively high correlations between having common third parties and engaging in direct dyadic exchange within the same network are not discussed in this paper, since they occur in both the Japanese and the U.S. matrices, and are to be expected.

The network analysis program can produce a matrix composed only of ties to common third parties. By seeing the degree to which third party ties on the expected reciprocity network predict exchanges of tangible resources between dyads, one can test the accuracy of this paper's starting hypothesis. Put simply, this "Nakane hypothesis" predicts the importance of those kinds of third party ties for any dyadic cooperation.

Table 7 displays the correlations between the four Japanese dyadic networks as well as their third party versions. Table 8 provides the same information for the United States (except for the missing work network), and provides instructive comparison.

Table 7: QAP Matrix Correlations, Japan Labor Networks

	Expected Reciprocity (Confirmed)	Vital Information Transfer (Confirmed)	Political Support	Work	3rd Party Expected Reciprocity	3rd Party Vital Information	3rd Party Political Support	3rd Party Work
Expected Reciprocity (Confirmed)	—	0.302	0.262	0.217	0.361	0.227	0.180	0.147
Vital Information Transfer (Confirmed)		—	0.203	0.199	0.370	0.360	0.100	0.111
Political Support			—	0.401	0.181	0.178	0.277	0.161
Work				—	0.185	0.155	0.155	0.256
3rd Party Expected Reciprocity					—	0.332	0.284	0.251
3rd Party Vital Information						—	0.186	0.217
3rd Party Political Support							—	0.263
3rd Party Work								—

Table 8: QAP Matrix Correlations, U.S. Labor Networks

	Expected Reciprocity (Mutually Confirmed)	Transfer Vital Information (Mutually Confirmed)	Receive Political Support	Expected Reciprocity with 3rd Party	Transfer Information to or from 3rd Party	Political Support to or from 3rd Party
Expected Reciprocity (Mutually Confirmed)	—	0.132	0.505	0.321	0.095	0.096
Transfer Vital Information (Mutually Confirmed)		—	0.153	0.047	0.197	0.036
Receive Political Support			—	0.182	0.096	0.205
Expected Reciprocity with 3rd Party				—	0.077	0.244
Transfer Information to or from 3rd Party					—	0.048
Political Support to or from 3rd Party						—

The Japan table reveals two distinct main exchange subsystems: expected reciprocity with information, and political support with work. In the first subsystem, the third party expected reciprocity network proves to have relatively strong predictive effect upon the dyadic transfer of vital information (0.370). The correlation for dyadic exchange of information and reciprocity is also relatively high (0.302). These findings support the prediction of the Nakane model, as well as the network state model, since embedded ties (represented by expected reciprocity) are channeling vital information.

In the second subsystem, dyadic actors directly exchange work and political support with considerable intensity (0.401). They do not rely on third party overseers, as shown by the strikingly different, low correlations (0.100, 0.161). In other words, the organizations that give or receive much of the public political support in Japan (political parties) also do much of the work for the same partners—political work at influencing politics.

The dyadic quality of these exchanges indicates a more instrumental, *quid pro quo* style of exchange than is present in the reciprocity and information networks. Public politics, even in Japan, is “hardball,” and typifies “the art of compromise.” The party in power must negotiate with powerful new groups (or at least publicly seem to do so), even if those groups are outside the so-called “old boy network.” The sticky web of mutually expected reciprocity would make this kind of political expediency impossible.

The correlation of expected reciprocity with information and of political support with work represent the two most distinct exchange subsystems in the Japanese labor polity.


However, many other correlations in the matrix are far from negligible, especially when compared to the U.S. matrix. Most network correlations in the United States (Table 8) are very low, indicating a pluralistic type of polity, in which exchanges are widely dispersed among different partners. One very high correlation does exist, that of the dyadic overlay of expected reciprocity and political support (.505). Clearly, as shown above, this occurs within the U.S. labor sector, where the reciprocity often occurs in terms of political support (see Figure 1, Table 5).

Discussion

The findings indicate that embeddedness (expected reciprocity) pervades the Japanese political economy, but not that of the United States. The Japanese state occupies a high degree of centrality within the pattern of embedded ties. Each of these points supports the network state model.

In addition, the findings extend the network state model beyond the state–business relationship, into wider reaches of society. They reveal a corporatistic organization of both business and labor sectors in Japan. These two sectors articulate most strongly with the state through their peak associations, which intermediate between their members and the state. The state largely respects the intermediary role of the business peak association.

Moreover, the Japanese state acts as a “broker” in the pattern of embedded ties, bridging the “structural hole” between the business and labor sectors, which remain relatively isolated from each other. The basic pattern here is that of a bow tie:



According to the network theory of brokerage, actors that provide a unique bridge between two otherwise unconnected actors—but who want to be connected—gain power and autonomy. The network broker model proposes that the capacity of the Japanese state to persuade social actors through network connections depends in part upon being a broker in this structural “bow tie” pattern. If one wing of the bow tie should fall off, the state would lose its broker-augmented power. Accordingly, in Japanese policy domains that do not have large opposing sectors, like labor, the state should be weaker.

A closer look, however, reveals that, unlike the ideal model of corporatism, the state circumvents the labor peak associations to make ties directly to sectoral labor union federations. Presumably, by weakening the power of the peak labor associations, this “disintermediation” augments the state’s persuasive capacity over the labor sector. Japanese corporatism does include labor, contrary to some assessments (Pempel and Tsunekawa 1979). But, contrary to those who attribute growing influence to Japanese labor, its power is weak compared to that of business (Kume 1998; Tsujinaka 1993).

The peripheral role of political parties in the embedded network indicates the corporatist, negotiated nature of the network. Centrality in embedded networks garners much more (reputational) influence in Japan than in the United States. In Japan, when

organizations have more embeddedness ties, they also tend to have more exchanges of vital information. However, they tend less strongly to exchange more public political support.

Existing literature suggested the hypothesis that, in Japan, third parties with embedded ties to two others would broker their exchange of tangible resources (vital information and public political support). Matrix correlation revealed that such embedded brokers did strongly predict a dyad's exchange of vital information. The MOL-LPB was the biggest information broker in the system (Table 5), and also sat at the center of the embeddedness network (Figure 2). However, embeddedness did not strongly predict the dyadic exchange of political support or work. Embeddedness, evidently, greases the flow of information and negotiation about pressing issues. But when issues become public, they turn into more calculated negotiations or instrumental fights between interested actors.

Political parties played the central role in the exchange network of public political support. Clearly, this was different from the embedded network. Embeddedness, in other words, did not constitute or determine the entire political system. Rather, several distinct, informal but institutionalized networks, somewhat in tension with each other, wove through the political system. Of course, these informal networks also interacted with the formal institutions of politics: the legislatures, electoral rules, bureaucratic structures, and courts.

The government ministry-centered embedded system of relationships could work in different ways, or at cross-purposes, with the political support system centering on political parties and deriving its origins from electoral democracy. The dominant political party lay at the intersection of these two systems. It had to adjudicate continually between demands from the state and established interest groups, versus demands from the public.

Business and labor peaks received higher (reputational) influence scores than did ministerial (state) agencies. This finding indicates less state autonomy and persuasive power than predicted by the network state model. Similar results came from the other measure of influence—such as self-assessed goal attainment (SAGA), covered in Appendix 2—except for the ascendancy of the Ministry of Finance as a more generalized power over finances. In other words, the state did not appear to have strong persuasive power over organized interest groups. Rather than devise and impose plans, the state seemed to coordinate the demands of the organized interest groups, persuading them to work together productively. Put simply, the state acted as a broker. This finding implies that, to have influence, the state needs to occupy the position of a broker, bridging a structural hole between two opposed, organized, and mutually isolated sets of societal interests.

If the state did not fill such a structural hole, it would no longer be a broker. In that case, the state might end up being the junior partner of a powerful interest group sector, with little persuasive power at all. Precisely that situation may explain the Japanese state's ineptness in regulating the financial sector. Stockholders are very weak in Japan, leaving the state to contend with the banking sector on its own. One official in the Ministry of Finance explained that, after the bubble broke, the Ministry had sternly told the banks to stop making unsecured loans. But the banks refused to listen, he said, and went ahead, using subordinate banks (Interview, November, 1999). A similar laxness is evident in the government's regulation of the nuclear power industry, which led to the Tokaimura meltdown and release of radiation in October 1999.

These findings diverge from all Western models of the state and its relation to society. They do not present a neutral, arm's-length regulatory state that reflects societal demand expressed through elections (Polsby 1995). They do not show a state subservient to the capitalist class (Marx and Engels 1968). Nor do they indicate a state that is proactive in

pursuit of its own agenda, with relatively autonomy from the capitalist class and other interest groups (Skocpol 1985).

The findings also differ from the neo-institutional view of the state found in political science, which stresses either the formal institutional roles and authorities designated to the state (Cohen, McCubbins, and Rosenbluth 1995), or the state as an “agent” of its principal, the ruling political party (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). Nor do the findings paint a picture of European-style corporatism with tripartite negotiation (Schmitter 1974). Their closest analogue is Mills’ idea of a power élite, but the state was not so central in Mills’ vision (Mills 1956).

Rather, the findings indicate different organizational mixtures arrayed within distinct and semiautonomous patterns of power relations. This scenario recalls the tensions between institutions recently noted in U.S. theory (Clemens 1999). However, the “institutions” covered in this paper are informal relational ones. The Japanese patterns involve different central actors, different types of social relations, and the exchange of different sorts of resources. They are also institutionalized as taken-for-granted role-sets to different degrees. The embedded network is highly institutionalized by definition, while the exchange of vital information and public political support is increasingly instrumental. Within the embedded network, state agencies act as central brokers bridging structural holes between opposing social sectors. But within the political support network, political parties and a different big business federation represent their sets of supporters in more strategic clashes.

These different power patterns generate distinct sets of rules and resources available to different actors within the Japanese polity (Sewell 1992; Stryker 1994). Actors who believe state-mediated harmony to be legitimate dislike the discordant fray of open politics. Yet, the state-mediated embedded network excludes unorganized, weak, and newly emerging social groups, such as ordinary citizens. Democratic electoral institutions, by contrast, encourage the public exchange of political support on issues to build winning coalitions. The shifting pluralism of this system has penetrated the U.S. polity, but is severely resisted by the members of Japan’s embedded system.

No succinct catchphrase readily summarizes this complex and dynamic system. This author prefers to call it the embedded broker state model. By contrast, in the United States, the lack of embeddedness, and the lack of overlay among resource exchange networks, indicates noninstitutionalized patterns of relationships, with pluralistic and shifting alliances. This situation has been well described by the organizational state model (Knoke, et. al. 1996; Laumann and Knoke 1987)

Conclusions

This paper’s findings capture a particular Japanese policy domain at one point in time. The extent to which the image is general remains unclear. However, based on the evidence, certain theoretical generalizations can be ventured.

The findings do not support the idea of a Japanese developmental state that strongly guides the business sector, and instead favor the network state model. These implications emerge especially when contrasted with the U.S. situation. However, the evidence presented above also critiques, refines, and extends the network state model.

The embedded broker model of the state, based on these findings, argues that the network state’s persuasive power is not just inherent in the types of ties it maintains. It depends

in part upon the state's location in a bow tie-shaped network pattern. The MOL-LPB bridges the structural gap between two corporatistic sectors, business and labor. Its autonomy and persuasiveness depend in part upon its relatively central (though not unique) role in filling that hole.

In this situation, the state does not so much persuade—as the network state model proposes—as it “harmonizes” the competing demands of the two opposed sectors. Harmonization builds on the oft-stated Japanese cultural value and goal of *wa* (literally, harmony). But being the harmonizer gives the state the opportunity to add its own spin to the compromises. In that space, its autonomy emerges. However, since the business side is more tightly organized and possesses more tangible resources, the final plans bear the imprint of business more than that of labor. This imbalance constantly threatens to disrupt the *wa*.

In the immediate postwar decades, the state controlled vastly more resources than society, and thus could impose its “developmental” plans (Johnson 1982; Johnson 1995), which contributed to many strikes (Kume 1998). As the economy developed, business and labor both acquired increasing power vis à vis the state (Evans 1995, 232). This power shift forced the state to rely increasingly on its network influence. As a result, by the late 1980s, the broker state role emerged prominently in the labor domain. In domains without opposed sectors, however, the state could not play this role.

In the Japanese labor politics domain of the 1980s, the MOL-LPB was the mandated broker. It tried to solve the “collective goods dilemma” by improving communication and overseeing the fulfillment of agreements. To achieve this goal, though, the state needed to occupy the position of a third party “embedded broker,” which greased the flow of vital information and gave the state space for putting its own spin on compromises. This flow of information remains crucial to forging acceptable compromises between business and labor (Kume 1998).

It is possible that such government brokers exist in all Japanese policy domains, working for *wa* but very often ending up frustrated. In many Japanese policy domains, the lack of a bow tie pattern of opposed organized interest groups has weakened the state's persuasive capacity. This has contributed to state failure or ineptitude in responding to many crises: the Kobe earthquake, the banking and financial crisis, and the Tokaimura nuclear accident, to name a few. For instance, in the finance politics sector, Japan does not have a strong stockholders lobby to balance the interests of business management. In this situation, embeddedness alone loses the capacity to carry effective persuasion. Moreover, the embedded system does not represent the whole of Japanese society and politics. Unorganized and grassroots groups lie outside the embedded loop.

Because of these failures and problems, the ministry-centered, embedded political system has been losing legitimacy in the public eye. The more it does so, the more political discontent will force the public, electoral, party-centered political system to challenge priorities set by the embedded system.

The public political support network, with political parties as its central brokers, exhibits very different dynamics. Deals cut behind the scenes among the corporatistic players in the embedded network, when they become public, may stir up broad or heated opposition. When that happens, to keep its hegemony in the Diet, the ruling party may have to compromise. The need for compromise makes the parties untrustworthy partners in the embedded network, and hence, they end up outside it. Public political support more regularly follows contours of power established by the formal institutions of democracy and elections. This system closely resembles the pluralistic U.S. polity.

The slow decline of the embedded system in Japan has been coupled with an equally gradual rise in power of the electoral system. As a result, in 1993, the long-dominant ruling

political party (the LDP) suffered a fall from legislative control. While having regained that dominance for the time being, its grip is no longer so sure. This uncertainty is forcing the LDP into greater responsiveness to popular demands, including those that challenge priorities set by the embedded system of actors.

This paper raises more questions than it answers. What is the interaction between informal networks and formal institutions? Why do the embedded networks exist as they do in Japan? Why does the state play such a central role? Why do not labor and business make extensive direct connections, as they do within the firm? Do such embedded networks and state brokers exist in other Japanese policy domains, such as construction, finance, environment, and health? Do they relate similarly to tangible networks?

The next step of this author’s research will involve finding out how well clusters of organizations on the embedded and other networks predict actual political coalitions around specific policy events (formal decisions) and how they are decided. Comparisons between Japan and the United States will also be enlarged, and the German case added to the data set.

The author’s long-term plan (and reason for embarking upon the labor project) is to apply the foregoing research methods to the realm of environmental policy decision-making. Both the labor and environmental domains address the comparative participation of civil society (movements, Non-Governmental Organizations, or NGOs) in the political and policy-making process, an area of particular personal interest. Moreover, the author hopes to expand the study of the environmental network domain to include international agencies and NGOs. The central thrust of such a project would be to investigate the “learning channels” by which new global scientific ideas, and international norms relating to environmental problems, penetrate or are blocked in different types of national polities. Such a project will require asking a larger set of actors about new networks, beyond those studied in the present labor policy networks project.

Notes

¹ In this paper, power is the capacity to determine the content of collectively binding policy—in this case, governmental policy. Authority is the formal right to exercise power over policy outcomes. Influence is the informal capacity to affect those outcomes. For a discussion of these terms, see Wrong 1979.

² Nondefense government expenditures are derived as a percentage of gross domestic product from 1987 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) figures presented by Sakakibara (1993, 30):

	Japan	United States	UK	Germany	France
Government final consumption	9.73	18.31	21.13	19.96	16.20
Defense	0.94	6.57	5.12	2.79	3.49
Remaining difference	8.79	11.74	16.01	17.17	12.71

³ The state’s use of persuasion and guidance has become especially prominent since the 1960s, as its formal regulatory powers and resources have waned (Inoguchi 1988, 186).

⁴ The names were compiled with the help of Professor Yutaka Tsujinaka and graduate students at Tsukuba University.

⁵ To represent the full ideological spectrum, five well-known experts in labor politics were selected.

⁶ The Japanese translation runs as follows:

(mochitsu motaretsu) toki ni wa, jibuntachi no soshiki wa sono roudou seisaku ni amari kanshin wa nai keredomo, ta no soshiki no ikou o ukete sono roudou seisaku ni kakawariau (tedasuke o suru) to iu koto ga aru to omoimasu. Kou shita baai (mochitsu motaretsu) to iu koto de betsu no kikai ni okaeshi o kitai dekiru to iu wake desu. Kisoshiki to sono you na kankei ni aru you na dantai o gokyoushi kudasai.

⁷ Measures of centrality do not adequately portray the importance of the overall pattern. For instance, an organization that enjoys the role of unique broker between two clusters might receive few ties, and hence not be “central,” yet still be very powerful as a “bridge-keeper.” The varieties of brokerage roles require at least five measures (Fernandez and Gould 1994). The possible impacts of pattern expand geometrically from there.

⁸ The visual image is built from the n by n matrix (where n means the number of organizations involved), with a number one in each cell where a tie exists between two organizations. If an organization has a direct tie to another, they end up close together in the visual image. If an organization must go through another to reach a third, the first and third organizations end up further away from each other in the image. These are known in network studies as “path distances.” UCINET, a network software program, was used to calculate the path distances between all participating organizations (Borgatti, M. G. Everett, and Linton C. Freeman 1999). Another UCINET program (multidimensional scaling) was used to find a set of coordinates that would place each organization in three dimensional (3D) space. The program selects the 3D arrangement that best represents the path distances between all the organizations: close ones near one another, and distant ones far apart, not unlike the distances between the planets in the solar system at a given instant of time. The image-producing program MAGE was then used to produce a 3D image of these coordinates (Richardson 1999), which can also be rotated in 3D space. The 2D images used in this paper best reveal the relationships and patterns bearing upon the present argument.

⁹ The technique displayed here uses the Tabu clustering technique found in the UCINET program (Borgatti, M. G. Everett, and Linton C. Freeman 1999). It places organizations that are directly tied together, whether exclusively or around an outside broker, into the same cluster. Organizations that only broker between two clusters become their own individual “cluster.”

¹⁰ Performed by the QAP analysis program in the UCINET software package (Borgatti, M. G. Everett, and Linton C. Freeman 1999).

Appendix 1: Organizations in Japan Labor Policy Network Survey

Trade Unions (36 actors)

Peak Associations

- 1 JPTUC–Japan Private Sector Trade Union Confederation (*Zenminroren, Rengo*)
- 2 GCTUJ–General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (*Sohyo*)

Trade Sectoral Federations

- 3 IMFJC–International Metalworkers Federation–Japan Council (IMF–JC)
- 4 JFISWU–Japan Federation of Iron and Steel Workers’ Unions (*Tekko Roren*)
- 5 NMWU–National Metalworkers’ Union (*Zenkoku Kinzoku*)
- 6 NFMTU–National Federation of Metal Trade Unions (*Zenkin Domei*)
- 7 AJFEMWU–All Japan Federation of Electrical Machine Workers’ Unions (*Denki Roren*)
- 8 NFSHMWU–National Federation of Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery Workers’ Unions (*Zosen Juki Roren*)
- 9 GFJAWU–General Federation of Japan Automobile Workers’ Unions (*Jidosha Soren*)
- 10 ICEWFJAF–International Chemical and Energy Workers’ Unions–Japanese Affiliates Federation (*Kagaku Energii Rokyō*)
- 11 GFPPPWU–General Federation of Paper and Pulp Processing Workers’ Unions (*Kamipa Sorengo*)
- 12 FPIWU–Federation of Petroleum Industry Workers’ Unions (*Sekiyu Roren*)
- 13 FNGWU–Federation of National Gas Workers’ Unions (*Zenkoku Gasu*)
- 14 FNEPWU–Federation of National Electric Power Workers’ Unions (*Denryōku Roren*)
- 15 AJFFWU–All Japan Federation of Food Workers’ Unions (*Shokuhin Roren*)
- 16 CMCICWU–Conference of Mass Communication Information and Culture Workers’ Unions (*Nihon Masukomi Bunka Joho Roso Kaigi*)
- 17 JPWU–Japan Postal Workers’ Union (*Zentei*)
- 18 TWUJ–Telecommunication Workers’ Union of Japan (*Zendentsu*)
- 19 GFNCWU–General Federation of National Construction Workers’ Unions (*Zenken Soren*)
- 20 JFCCEU–Japan Conference of Construction Employees’ Unions (*Nikkenkyō*)
- 21 FCBEU–Federation of City Banks Employees’ Unions (*Shiginren*)
- 22 NFLIWU–National Federation of Life Insurance Workers’ Unions (*Seiho Roren*)
- 23 FIIWU–Federation of Indemnity Insurance Workers’ Unions (*Sonpo Roren*)
- 24 FAJRWU–Federation of All Japan Railway Workers’ Unions (*Tetsudo Roren*)
- 25 GFPRWUJ–General Federation of Private Railway Workers’ Unions of Japan (*Shitetsu Soren*)
- 26 FJMTWU–Federation of Japan Metropolitan Transport Workers’ Unions (*Toshiko*)
- 27 FJTWU–Federation of Japan Transport Workers’ Unions (*Kotsu Roren*)
- 28 AJTU–All Japan Transport Union (*Zennitsu*)
- 29 AJSU–All Japan Seamen’s Union (*Zen Nihon Kaiin Kumiai*)
- 30 JTU–Japan Teachers’ Union (*Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai*)
- 31 FJCWU–Federation of Japan Commerce Workers’ Unions (*Shogyō Roren*)
- 32 JFTWU–Japan Federation of Textile Workers’ Unions (*Zensen Domei*)
- 33 JFNPSU–Japan Federation of National Public Servants’ Unions (*Kokko Roren*)
- 34 AJPMWU–All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Unions (*Zen Nihon Jichidantai Rodo Kumiai*)

- 35 CGPCWU–Conference of Government-related Public Corporations Workers’ Unions (*Seirokyo*)
- 36 JMWUF–Japan Medical Workers’ Unions Federation (*Nihon Iroren*)

Business Associations (36 actors)

Peak Associations

- 37 FCCI–Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (*Nihon Shoko Kaigisho*)
- 38 JFEO–Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (*Keizai Dantai Rengokai, Keidanren*)
- 39 JFEA–Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations (*Nihon Keieisha Dantai Renmei*)
- 40 JCED–Japanese Committee for Economic Development (*Keizai Doyukai*)
- 41 NCMSEOJ–National Center for Medium and Small-sized Enterprises Organizations in Japan (*Zenkoku Chusho Kigyo Dantai Chuokai*)
- 42 NCACJ–National Center for Agricultural Cooperatives in Japan (*Zenkoku Nogyo Kyodo Kumia Chuokai*)

Trade Sectoral Associations

- 43 JPPIF–Japan Paper Processing Industry Federation (*Nihon Seishi Rengokai*)
- 44 FJPIO–Federation of Japan Pharmaceutical Industry Organizations (*Nihon Seiyaku Dantai Rengokai*)
- 45 MBEA–Maritime Business Employers’ Association (*Gaiko Romu Kyokai*)
- 46 AIEA–Automobile Industry Employers’ Association (*Jidosha Sangyo Keieisha Renmei*)
- 47 JFTA–Japan Federation of Taxicab Associations (*Zenkoku Joyo Jidosha Rengokai*)
- 48 NCIA–National Construction Industry Association (*Zenkoku Kensetsugyo Kyokai*)
- 49 EIF–Electrical Industry Federation (*Denki Jigyo Rengokai*)
- 50 JCIA–Japan Chemical Industry Association (*Nihon Kagaku Kogyo Kyokai*)
- 51 JCTIA–Japan Chemical Textile Industry Association (*Nihon Kagaku Seni Kyokai*)
- 52 JMIA–Japan Machine Industry Association (*Nihon Kikai Kogyo Rengokai*)
- 53 FJCIO–Federation of Japan Construction Industry Organizations (*Nihon Kensetsugyo Dantai Rengokai*)
- 54 JMA–Japan Mining Association (*Nihon Kogyo Kyokai*)
- 55 JRIA–Japan Rubber Industry Association (*Nihon Gomu Kogyokai*)
- 56 JIMIA–Japan Industrial Machine Industry Association (*Nihon Sangyo Kikai Kogyokai*)
- 57 JSA–Japan Shipowners’ Association (*Nihon Senshu Kyokai*)
- 58 JSBA–Japan Securities Business Association (*Nihon Shokengyo Kyokai*)
- 59 JSIA–Japan Shipbuilding Industry Association (*Nihon Zosen Kogyokai*)
- 60 JSIF–Japan Steel Industry Federation (*Nihon Tekko Renmei*)
- 61 PIF–Petroleum Industry Federation (*Sekiyu Renmei*)
- 62 JEMIA–Japan Electric Machine Industry Association (*Nihon Denki Kogyokai*)
- 63 JSI–Japan Spinning Industry (*Nihon Boseki Kyokai*)
- 64 JPRA–Japan Private Railway Association (*Nihon Minei Tetsudo Kyokai*)
- 65 JCSA–Japan Chain Store Association (*Nihon Chenstoa Kyokai*)
- 66 JD SA–Japan Department Store Association (*Nihon Hyakkaten Kyokai*)
- 67 JTA–Japan Trade Association (*Nihon Boekikai*)
- 68 NFBA–National Federation of Bank Associations (*Zenkoku Ginko Kyokai Rengokai*)
- 69 LICA–Life Insurance Company Association (*Seimei Hoken Kyokai*)

- 70 IICA–Indemnity Insurance Company Associations (*Nihon Songai Hoken Kyokai*)
- 71 RA–Realtor Association (*Fudosan Kyokai*)
- 72 JGIA–Japan Gas Industry Association (*Nihon Gasu Kyokai*)

Professional Association (1 actor)

- 73 JMA–Japan Medical Association (*Nihon Ishikai*)

Public Interest Groups (13 actors)

- 74 ILO–ILO–Tokyo Office, International Labor Organization (*ILO Tokyo Jimukyoku*)
- 75 NSWF–National Social Welfare Conference (*Zenkoku Shakai Fukushi Kyogikai*)
- 76 NGA–National Governors’ Association (*Zenkoku Chijikai*)
- 77 NAMM–National Association of Municipal Mayors (*Zenkoku Shichosoncho Kai*)
- 78 BLL–Buraku Liberation League (*Buraku Kaiho Domei*)

Committees and Forums

- 79 FMCPAR–Five Member Committee for Promotion of Administrative Reform (*Gyokaku Suishin Gonin Inkaï*)
- 80 SECC–Social Economic Council of Citizens (*Shakai Keizai Kokumin Kaigi*)
- 81 JPC–Japan Productivity Center (*Nihon Seisansei Honbu*)
- 82 PECC–Peace Economy Council of Citizens (*Heiwa Keizai Kokumin Kaigi*)
- 83 CPSG–Contemporary Policy Studies Group (*Gendai Sogo Kenkyu Shudan*)
- 84 EPC–Employment Promotion Corporation (*Koyo Sokushin Jigyodan*)
- 85 JIL–Japan Institute of Labor (*Nihon Rodo Kyokai*)
- 86 JIPEH–Japan Institute for Promoting Employment for the Handicapped (*Nihon Shogaisha Koyosoku Shinkyokai*)

Mandatory Insurance Groups (4 actors)

- 87 FHIA–Federation of Health Insurance Associations (*Kenko Hoken Kumiai Rengokai*)
- 88 FWAIF–Federation of Welfare Annuity Insurance Funds (*Kosei Nenkin Kikin Rengokai*)
- 89 FNHIA–Federation of National Health Insurance Associations (*Kokumin Kenko Hoken Chuokai*)
- 90 FNCSBS–Federation of National Civil Servants Benefit Societies (*Kokkakomuin Kyozaikumiai Rengokai*)

Government Ministries (16 actors)

- 91 CS–Cabinet Secretariat (*Naikaku Kanbo*)
- 92 AMCA–Administrative Management and Coordination Agency (*Somucho*)
- 93 EPA–Economic Planning Agency (*Keizai Kikaku Cho*)
- 94 MOLLPB–Ministry of Labor (MOL)–Labor Politics Bureau (*Rodosho Rosei Kyoku*)
- 95 MOLLSB–MOL–Labor Standards Bureau (*Rodosho Rodo Kijun Kyoku*)
- 96 MOLESB–MOL–Human Resources Bureau (*Rodosho Shokugyo Antei Kyoku*)

- 97 MOLWAB–MOL–Women’s Affairs Bureau (*Rodosho Fujin Kyoku*)
- 98 MOLVADB–MOL–Vocational Ability Development Bureau (*Rodosho Shokugyo Noryoku Kaihatsu Kyoku*)
- 99 MHWSAB–Ministry of Health and Welfare Social Affairs Bureau (*Koseisho Shakaikyoku*)
- 100 MHWSIB–MHW–Social Insurance Bureau (*Koseisho Hoken Kyoku*)
- 101 MHWPB–MHW–Pension Bureau (*Koseisho Nenkin Kyoku*)
- 102 MITI–Ministry of International Trade and Industry (*Tsusansho*)
- 103 MOT–Ministry of Transport (*Unyusho*)
- 104 MOC–Ministry of Construction (*Kensetsusho*)
- 105 MOP–Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (*Yuseisho*)
- 106 MOF–Ministry of Finance (*Okurasho*)

Political Parties (6 actors)

- 107 LDP–Policy Research Council Labor Committee (*Jiyu Minshu To Seichokai Rodo Bukai*)
- 108 JSP–Japan Socialist Party Policy Council (*Nihon Shakai To Seisaku Shingikai*)
- 109 DSP–Democratic Socialist Party Policy Council (*Minsha To Seisaku Shingikai*)
- 110 CGP–Clean Government Party Policy Council (*Komei To Seisaku Shingikai*)
- 111 JCP–Japan Communist Party Policy Council (*Nihon Kyosan To Seisaku Shingikai*)
- 112 SDFPC–Social Democratic Federation Policy Council (*Shakai Minshu Rengo Seisaku Shingikai*)

Advisory Councils (9 actors)

- 113 EAC–Economic Advisory Council (*Keizai Shingikai*)
- 114 ISAC–Industrial Structure Advisory Council (*Sangyo Kozo Shingikai*)
- 115 SCPAR–Special Council for Promotion of Administrative Reform (*Rinji Gyosei Kaikaku Suishin Shingikai*)
- 116 CMWAC–Central Minimum Wage Advisory Council (*Chuo Saitei Chingin Shingikai*)
- 117 ACHIAP–Advisory Council for Health Insurance for Aged Persons (*Rojin Hoken Shingikai*)
- 118 SIAC–Social Insurance Advisory Council (*Shakai Hoken Shingikai*)
- 119 EAC–Employment Advisory Council (*Koyo Shingikai*)
- 120 CLSAC–Central Labor Standards Advisory Council (*Chuo Rodo Kijun Shingikai*)
- 121 CESC–Central Employment Stability Council (*Chuo Shokugyo Antei Shingikai*)

Appendix 2: Clusters of Expected Reciprocity (ER)

ER Clusters with Organization Type and Organization Name	Number of ER Ties	RI: Reputation for Influence	SAGA: Self-Assessed Goal Att.	Number of Partic. Events	System Influence (SAGA x E)
MOL Corporatist Core					
Peak Labor Federation					
JPTUC	12	112	3.32	27	89.64
Union Association					
AJFEMWU	9	34	4.00	4	16.00
AJFFWU	1	4	2.50	7	17.50
AJSU	2	11	2.00	2	4.00
FJTWU	2	4	3.00	3	9.00
IMFJC	9	69	3.33	3	9.99
NFLIWU	5	6	—	—	—
NFMTU	8	8	2.25	4	9.00
NFSHMWU	6	15	2.00	1	2.00
NMWU	3	9	2.00	2	4.00
Business Association (<i>Gyokai</i>)					
LICA	1	9	—	—	—
Central Government Ministry					
MOL-LPB	22	82	4.00	8	32.00
Political Party					
DSPPC	14	40	4.33	3	12.99
Third Sector (social group est. by government)					
SECC	14	30	4.00	2	8.00
MITI Cluster					
Union Association					
FNGWU	6	3	—	—	—
FPIWU	5	4	—	—	—
ICEWFJAF	11	15	2.75	4	11.00
Business Association (<i>Gyokai</i>)					
PIF	1	8	1.00	2	2.00
Central Government Ministry					
MITI	9	.38	3.77	13	49.01
Other Government					
JPC	7	36	3.40	5	17.00
Business Peak Cluster					
Union Association					
FJCWU	1	13	3.00	8	24.00
Peak Business Federation					
FCCI	1	47	3.56	25	89.00
JFEA	25	109	3.08	12	36.96
NCMSEOJ	1	23	3.75	13	48.75
Business Association (<i>Gyokai</i>)					
AIEA	1	9	—	—	—
FJCIO	3	7	2.50	4	10.00
JCSA	3	6	3.33	6	19.98
JDSA	3	7	3.44	9	30.96

ER Clusters with Organization Type and Organization Name	Number of ER Ties	RI: Reputation for Influence	SAGA: Self-Assessed Goal Att.	Number of Partic. Events	System Influence (SAGA x E)
Business Peak Cluster (cont.)					
Business Association (cont.)					
JPRA	1	18	4.33	4	17.32
JRIA	2	2	2.00	1	2.00
JSBA	2	6	5.00	2	10.00
NCIA	4	10	4.00	7	28.00
NFBA	1	10	2.50	4	10.00
Other Government					
FWAIF	1	15	4.00	1	4.00
Public Interest Group					
FMCPAR	1	21	3.50	8	28.00
Business Cluster 2					
Business Association (<i>Gyokai</i>)					
JEMIA	3	10	3.14	8	25.12
JIMIA	2	4	3.33	3	9.99
JMIA	4	4	3.83	6	22.98
JSA	2	4	3.25	4	13.00
JSIA	9	7	2.86	7	20.02
JSIF	10	24	3.12	17	53.04
MBEA	1	1	—	—	—
Central Government Ministry					
MOT	3	19	4.50	3	13.50
Left Labor Peak Cluster					
Peak Labor Federation					
GCTUJ	17	72	2.42	24	58.08
Union Association					
AJPMWU	2	30	2.30	10	23.00
JPWU	1	20	3.00	12	36.00
JTU	3	25	2.00	4	8.00
TWUJ	4	36	2.50	4	10.00
Advisory Council					
CMWAC	2	43	5.00	1	5.00
Public Interest Group					
BLL	3	8	2.00	10	20.00
PECC	5	3	—	—	—
Labor Cluster 2					
Union Association					
CGPCWU	4	6	3.60	5	18.00
FJMTWU	7	7	2.00	12	24.00
GFNCWU	6	9	2.43	15	36.45
GFPRWUJ	5	34	2.80	10	28.00
Labor Cluster 3					
Union Association					
FIIWU	2	6	—	—	—
GFJAWU	5	36	3.75	4	15.00
JFCCEU	4	5	—	—	—

ER Clusters with Organization Type and Organization Name	Number of ER Ties	RI: Reputation for Influence	SAGA: Self-Assessed Goal Att.	Number of Partic. Events	System Influence (SAGA x E)
Central Government Ministry					
AMCA	0	22	4.00	14	56.00
Peak Business Federation					
JCED	0	30	3.75	8	30.00
JFEC	0	61	3.20	10	32.00
CS	0	34	5.00	4	20.00
MHWPB	0	40	—	2	—
MHWSAB	0	28	4.14	10	41.40
MHWSIB	0	38	4.00	2	8.00
MOC	0	16	4.33	9	38.97
MOF	0	11	4.29	34	145.86
MOLLSB	0	71	4.70	12	56.40
Other Government					
FHIA	0	25	2.75	4	11.00
FNCSBS	0	7	—	—	—
FNHIA	0	8	4.00	2	8.00
JIL	0	15	—	—	—
NAMM	0	7	2.88	9	25.92
NGA	0	16	3.00	10	30.00
Political Party					
CGPPC	0	31	2.47	17	41.99
SDFPC	0	13	—	—	—
Advisory Council					
ACHIAP	0	29	4.00	1	4.00
CESC	0	8	—	—	—
CLSAC	0	55	5.00	3	15.00
EAC	0	16	3.70	10	37.00
ISAC	0	15	—	—	—
SCPAR	0	41	3.80	5	19.00
SIAC	0	41	—	—	—
SSSAC	0	51	4.00	6	24.00
Professional Association					
JMA	0	23	2.38	10	23.80
NSWF	0	7	3.56	9	32.04
Public Interest Group					
CPSG	0	9	3.00	1	3.00
ILOTO	0	11	—	—	—
Third Sector (social group est. by government)					
EPC	0	16	—	—	—
JIPEH	0	1	5.00	1	5.00

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Jeffrey Broadbent received the B.A. in Religious Studies (Buddhism) from the University of California at Berkeley in 1974 (High Honors). During his undergraduate years, he completed a year of intensive training in Japanese language at International Christian University in Tokyo (1971-72), and participated in Buddhist monastic and meditative practice in Japan, Korea, Thailand, and India. Influenced by sociologist Robert Bellah, he decided to pursue sociological studies. At Harvard University, he received the M.A. degree in Regional Studies (Japan) in 1975, with a thesis on Tokugawa peasant rebellions, and completed the Ph.D. degree in sociology in 1982. His doctoral thesis, *State and Citizen in Japan: Social Structure and Policy-Making for a "New Industrial City," 1960-1980*, was based on two and a half years of field work in Oita Prefecture, Japan, studying the environmental and political aspects of regional industrial growth.

Broadbent spent three years as a junior fellow at the University of Michigan Society of Fellows, with concurrent appointments as assistant professor of sociology and research scientist in the Center for Japanese Studies. In 1986, he moved to the University of Minnesota, where he is now an associate professor with tenure. During 1988–1990, he conducted a second major research project in Japan on labor policy networks. Broadbent has published a number of articles and chapters on Japanese protest movements, politics, and social structure, and is the author of *Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest* (Cambridge 1998) and co-author of *Comparing Policy Networks: Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany and Japan* (Cambridge 1996). He is currently editing *Social Movements in East Asia* (a collection of chapters by twelve East Asian authors).

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