

Political Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy: Evidence from Latin America, Lessons from Other Regions

A Conference of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI)
organized and cosponsored by

The International Forum for Democratic Studies

Grupo FARO

The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law

with the financial support of the Ford Foundation and the Taiwan Foundation for
Democracy

Quito, Ecuador
November 5–6, 2010



This conference was supported by grants to the International Forum for Democratic Studies and Grupo FARO from the Ford Foundation and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, which do not take responsibility for any statements or views expressed in this document.



The Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI) is an association of institutions that conduct research on democracy, democratization, and related topics in comparative government and international affairs. The Network includes independent institutions and university-based study centers, as well as research programs and NGOs devoted to the study of democracy and human rights. To fulfill its mission of linking democracy research institutes across the world into a global network, the NDRI holds international conferences and regularly disseminates information to its members.

Political Clientelism, Social Policy and the Quality of Democracy

Quito, November 5–6, 2010

Introduction

On November 5–6, the global Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI) convened a conference in Quito, Ecuador, on “Political Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy: Evidence from Latin America, Lessons from Other Regions.” The meeting was cosponsored by three NDRI member institutes—the Washington-based International Forum for Democratic Studies (IFDS) of the National Endowment for Democracy, Ecuador’s Grupo FARO, and Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)—and made possible by financial support from the Ford Foundation and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. The conference agenda and a list of participants appear in the Appendix. The papers presented at the conference will be compiled into a volume edited by Diego Abente. The brief report that follows summarizes the main issues and key findings discussed at the meeting.

The conference aimed to explore, in a comparative framework, the *modus operandi* of political clientelism in the realm of social policies as well as the strategies that might be employed to combat it. The conference brought together 21 scholars and practitioners from around the world, including several from South America, particularly the Andean region. The international character of the meeting was designed to generate discussions that were not excessively self-referential and to enable participants to learn from a wide range of experiences across cultures, political contexts, and historical legacies. Participants were meant to profit from both regional and international perspectives and from theoretical analysis as well as practical experience. The conference was structured with an eye toward learning from successful experiences and developing a set of best practices as a sort of guide to what might be called a *modus extricandi*. The regions covered included Latin America, India, Africa, the postcommunist countries, and Southeast Asia.

To ensure a rigorous intellectual debate, conference organizers commissioned a series of papers on the following topics: a theoretical overview to help frame the discussion, six separate papers dealing with Latin America, one with India, one with Africa, one with postcommunist Europe and Russia, and one with Southeast Asia.

The Study of Clientelism by Political Scientists

In spite of valuable contributions made in the 1970s and 1980s, including James C. Scott’s seminal 1969 article “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” and the edited volumes *Friends, Followers and Factions* (1977), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (1977), and *Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development* (1981),¹ the study of clientelism for many years failed to grab the attention that it deserved from political scientists. Over the last ten years, however, clientelism has regained its place high on the scholarly agenda.

Accustomed to viewing clientelism as a relic of the past and a problem of the least developed societies or the less developed areas of rapidly modernizing countries, scholars once considered it to be a passing phenomenon, a feature that would quickly disappear like the “pimples of adolescence.” As Javier Auyero brought to our attention a decade ago,² however, in the

1. James C. Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change,” *American Political Science Review* 63 (December 1969): 1142–58; Steffin W. Schmidt, James C. Scott, Carl Lande, and Laura Guasti, eds., *Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (Hanover, N.H.: Center for Mediterranean Studies of the American Universities Field Staff, 1977); and S.N. Eisenstadt and René Lemarchand, eds., *Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981).

2. Javier Auyero, *Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).



Diego Abente-Brun and Orazio Bellettini provide opening remarks

most modern and advanced Latin American countries, the “pimples” were back—with a vengeance. Later works by Steven Levitsky,³ Levitsky and Gretchen Helmke,⁴ Susan C. Stokes,⁵ and Karen Remmer⁶ offered further confirmation of this disturbing trend. Soon it became clear that clientelism was flourishing not only in Argentina but also elsewhere in Latin America as well as in Africa, Asia, and even postcommunist Europe. Furthermore, clientelism was no longer present only in rural areas. Its existence was strongly in evidence in urban settings too. Moreover, as Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson⁷ argued, clientelism proved also to be alive and well in developed societies. Thus the last decade witnessed an explosion of studies on this subject, and these days it is rare to attend a professional conference that does not feature at least a dozen or so panels on the matter.

3. Steven Levitsky, *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

4. Steven Levitsky and Gretchen Helmke, eds., *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

5. Susan C. Stokes, “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina,” *American Political Science Review*, 99 (August 2005): 315–25.

6. Karen Remmer, “The Political Economy of Patronage: Expenditure Patterns in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2003,” *Journal of Politics* 69 (May 2007): 363–77.

7. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson, “Citizen-Politician Linkages: an Introduction,” in *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, eds. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–49.

The already large body of extant literature has often used concepts such as clientelism, patronage, and pork-barrel politics loosely and sometimes interchangeably. Similarly, it has at turns defined clientelism as a dyadic relationship, a network of dyadic relationships, and a one-shot vote-buying operation. As Auyero argued, these networks thrive in a “gray zone” characterized by a “double life” of domination and veiling—and sometimes collective violence—where the needs of political machines, on the one hand, and the daily survival of the dispossessed, on the other, converge. Auyero developed the indispensable definition of the phenomenon and its conceptual refinement as a subject of study, and his work exemplifies the rich contribution of ethnographic studies to the field.

Without purporting to engage in a lengthy conceptual debate, for the purposes of this report we must nonetheless clarify that *political clientelism* refers to:

- **a more or less stable network of asymmetric dyadic relationships;**
- **policy patterns that persist over time;**
- **the exchange of primarily private goods (and occasionally “club goods”⁸) in return for political support and/or loyalty;**
- **benefits intended to influence political preferences and behavior that include but are not limited to voting;**
- **and/or the assurance that even nonexcludable public goods reach their beneficiaries in a relatively expeditious manner.**

Rich as it may be, however, this characterization

8. According to the Office of Development Studies of the UN Development Programme, a “club good” is “an intermediate case between a pure public good and a pure private good. With a club good exclusion is feasible, but the optimal size of the club is generally larger than one person. An example is a film shown in a theater, where it is possible for the good to be priced (exclusion can be practiced) and for a number of people to share the good without diminishing each other’s consumption of it”; see www.undp.org/globalpublicgoods/globalization/glossary.html.

is just a first step—a shared conceptual anchor. From there, conference participants moved to tackle a host of new questions, beginning with causality. Can widespread patterns of clientelism be attributed to poverty, to state capture by ethnic or partisan networks, or to resource scarcity, as Beatriz Magaloni explored in her presentation? Or are they products of an underdeveloped society with low levels of social density and therefore lacking in both incentives and sufficient strength for collective action⁹ and universal demands?

Institutional Factors: The Nature of Parties and Clientelism in Argentina, Chile, and Peru

A second set of questions explored the role of political parties. Parties are, after all, the essential instruments of intermediation between society and the state. Do different kinds of parties handle this function differently? Juan Pablo Luna and Rodrigo Mardones examined how the presence or absence of party machines and the strength of the state affects the likelihood of the clientelistic capture of social policy. In their analysis of clientelism in Chile, a strong counterpoint to Argentina and Mexico, Luna and Mardones showed that in the absence of party machines, social policies are more likely than not to be distributive—either on a mass scale or selectively, depending on the strength of the state, rather than clientelistic side payments.

Ernesto Calvo and Victoria Murillo looked at Argentina and Chile, but shifted the emphasis from supply to demand, examining the patron-client relationship from the point of view of voter expectations. They began by underscoring, as Kitschelt had earlier, that clientelistic parties influence how voters access all benefits, not just excludable goods. In their comparative study, Calvo and Murillo examined how ideological distance from parties and proximity to party activists affected the distributive expectations of voters. As expected, ideological distance had a strong predictive effect in the case of Chile. In Argentina, by contrast, ideological distance had no significant predictive value, while proximity to party networks did.

9. Auyero warns about the risk of assuming collective action and clientelism as dichotomous realities. Albeit an important conceptual caveat; the evidence suggests that collective action and clientelism do not tend to go hand in hand.



Martín Tanaka discusses the "Peruvian anomaly."

Martin Tanaka, meanwhile, addressed the relationship between political parties and clientelism in Peru, explaining what he called the "Peruvian anomaly." According to Tanaka, Peruvian political parties today are not based on programs, clientelism, or identity. As such, they fail to perform an intermediating role. Instead, that task falls to a network of relatively autonomous and competing brokers with allegiance neither to the parties that "hire" them nor to the people whom they purportedly serve. These brokers act as consultants and link local demands with the central bureaucracy, connecting local notables with popular organizations in an ever changing set of alliances of convenience aimed at establishing privileged links with local powers around election time. The result is vertical and horizontal fragmentation.

Institutional Factors: Re-Engineering the Rules in Brazil and Colombia

A third area of analysis dealt with the impact of rules. In Brazil, for example, a very elaborate set of federal rules to select the beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família conditional cash-transfer (CCT) program has had mixed results. In his study of the state of Bahia, Brazil, Simeon Nichter identified the absence of a heavy clientelistic bias in the Bolsa Família program and attributed it to the fact that the selection and targeting criteria are determined at the federal level. The program is not flawless, however; the information that recipients must provide includes their voter-registration and voter-precinct numbers. Yet clientelism continues to be pervasive in the provision of other social services in small municipalities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants. In such places, the dispossessed adopt the strategy of not declaring their

political preferences as a hedge against the misfortune of not picking the winner. Given that the provision of public services, especially health care, is heavily mediated by political networks, voters protect themselves by withholding their preferences entirely.

In their analysis of Colombia's educational sector, Kent Eaton and Chris Chambers-Ju considered the resilience of clientelistic practices and how they reconstituted themselves after successive institutional reforms in the 1980s and 1990s attempted to eliminate or at least to reduce them. Eaton and Chambers-Ju convincingly showed that decentralization in itself could not eliminate clientelism. Indeed, when substantial decentralization measures were introduced in Colombia's constitution, national patrons were replaced by local ones, and clientelistic networks remained intact if not stronger. Likewise, when the electoral system was changed in the opposite direction, mandating the election of senators by a single national constituency rather than by smaller districts, the result was that candidates simply worked through local clientelistic networks as much as necessary. Even the assumption that a strong role for collective actors would do away with clientelism proved to be wrong. In fact, when the locus of power was displaced from politicians to labor leaders, FECODE (the teachers' union) became the platform for labor *caciques* (local political bosses) to develop their own clientelistic networks. Thus traditional "patrons"—that is, politicians—were replaced by labor leaders. Furthermore, in this case the "clients" were middle-class or lower-middle-class teachers, whereas in the typical clientelistic setting, they tend by and large to be members of informal and marginal populations.

Ascriptive Factors: Gender and Caste in Argentina, Mexico, and India

A third family of problems discussed at the conference relates to the effects of ascriptive variables. In many countries, CCT programs have been praised for being less discretionary and more transparent, and because they build human capital and have greater impact than other social programs. The reality in Argentina, however, is that new forms of clientelism, this time connected with gender discrimination, are emerging. Christian Gruenberg



Vicky Murillo, Paul Hutchcroft, Kanchan Chandra, Beatriz Magaloni, and Francis Fukuyama on the panel "Lessons from Other Regions"

showed that complaints about women being victimized by men are six times higher than those of men claiming to be victimized by women. The findings of a comparable study of gender discrimination in Mexico point in the same direction. Gruenberg also examined the Human Development Bond program in Ecuador and reached a similar conclusion. Thus, in addition to the usual "political" conditionalities, Gruenberg revealed an understudied dimension of gender violence—be it psychological, physical, or sexual. In short, in patriarchal societies, we may be witnessing a transformation of traditional clientelistic relations into gender-based relations of domination and violence. The selection process has improved, but the implementation phase remains deeply troubled.

Kanchan Chandra explained that in India the pervasiveness of clientelism has transcended all barriers. The poor population, especially in rural areas, is particularly vulnerable to clientelistic politics due to the difficulty of accessing state services, ranging from security to medicine and hospital beds to electricity and water. Even basic civic needs, such as a certificate of birth, death, or caste, are mediated by the favor of politicians. In addition, given that some 70 percent of formal jobs are in the public sector—95 percent of which are in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy and require little qualification—these positions have also become favors dispensed using clientelistic criteria.

Two distinctive elements, though, set the Indian case apart. First, the basis upon which clientelism operates is identity politics. What appears to be rigidity, however, is countervailed by constant at-

tempts at manufacturing new identities based on tribe, caste, region, language, or religion. Second, the links between politicians and clients are implicit rather than direct. Clients read the clues sent by politicians, vote accordingly, and both receive their rewards. In this sense, the relationship is more akin to a market transaction than to the tight networks of interpersonal relationships observed in most Latin American countries.

Regime Type and Ethnicity: the Case of Africa

The relationship between regime type and clientelism was the fourth issue discussed. Nicolas van de Walle examined several African cases, illustrating the evolution of clientelism under different types of regimes. During much of the postcolonial period in Africa, regimes were predominantly authoritarian. In highly presidential settings, clientelism was dominated by the executive branch and favored the socio-political elite. Leaders did not use clientelism to cross socio-economic divides. Instead it was used to promote cross-ethnic elite accommodation. As democratization processes began in Africa in the late 1980s, the locus of clientelism moved horizontally from the presidency to the parties and legislatures, and vertically from the better-off to the poorer segments of the population. With the introduction of institutional devices such as the Constituency Development Fund in the Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia came a “codification of clientelism” that seems to suggest that clientelistic practices have come to stay. Is it, as van de Walle suggests, that “clientelism should be understood as an inevitable and omnipresent feature of the modern state”—and even more so in very poor countries? Or is it that clientelism will remain expeditious “as long as the instruments of the new kind of politics, political parties, are weak and poorly organized?”

Structural Variables and Clientelism: Eastern and Central Europe and Russia

The fifth area of exploration encompassed a classic set of questions about the relationship between clientelism and socioeconomic settings—those that are more “advanced” versus those that are less

developed or rural. Linda Cook’s analysis of post-communist regimes highlighted the interesting contrast between the two. In postcommunist regimes, classical clientelism is present in less-developed, poorer, rural, and ethnically distinct countries and regions such as Albania, Bulgaria, and rural Russia. In the more developed and urbanized areas, however, the strong bureaucracy and extensive welfare system inherited from communism, higher levels of education overall and the predominance of a well-educated middle class, and the weak roots of the new political parties that emerged after the collapse of communism form a set of conditions inimical to the development of clientelism. In such anticlientelistic settings, however, a particular intraelite “exploitation” game has emerged that consists of the appropriation of resources for political or personal gain. Furthermore, this region also has witnessed the widespread emergence of the “brokers for themselves” phenomenon—especially in the health sector, where both doctors and hospital administrators request informal payments for the performance of certain services. Surveys indicate that through these shadow payments surgeons may multiply their income by between five and ten times; unit heads by three to four times; other doctors and specialists by two to three times; and nurses up to two times. Should this reality be characterized as one of increasing private and atomized clientelism or as outright petty corruption?

State Bureaucracy and Parties: Evidence from Southeast Asia

The issue of state bureaucracies and political parties re-emerges in terms of the particular combinations that they assume in Southeast Asia. Thus Paul Hutchcroft showed how the patterns of clientelism vary in Japan (strong bureaucracy, strong parties), Thailand (strong bureaucracy, weak parties), and the Philippines (weak bureaucracy, weak parties). In Japan, clientelism operates within a highly institutionalized context and side-payments tend to be club goods. In Thailand, clientelism relies on both club-good and excludable side-payments. In the Philippines, large local clientelistic networks deliver essentially excludable side-payments in exchange for political support.

Clientelism, Quality of Democracy, and Democratic Stability

At the outset of this report, we defined clientelism as particularly deleterious to the quality of democracy. This claim stands on firm ground. The evidence highlighted during the conference discussions shows that, by and large, clientelism operates as a mechanism by which political elites hijack the political citizenship of the dispossessed in exchange for low-quality social citizenship. As a comprehensive study by the Inter-American Development Bank has shown, even when clientelism is rooted more in the exchange of club goods than **private goods**, its impact on the overall quality of public policies is negative.¹⁰

And yet there is a flip side to this coin. Kanchan Chandra argued quite strongly that it is precisely the clientelistic nature of the Indian political system that makes it so stable and elicits such legitimacy. She even warned that the rapid modernization and privatization of the last few decades could potentially erode the strong support for democracy that exists in India today. Likewise, Steven Levitsky warned somberly but wisely that in “many middle- and lower-income countries, the disappearance of clientelism would weaken, quite considerably, established political parties and that, at least in the medium term, the result would be greater fragmentation, higher levels of volatility, and a greater likelihood of outsider politics and populism. This could well end up being worse for the quality of democracy.” Francis Fukuyama argued similarly that “patron-client relations or patronage in general is a natural form of human association to which everyone defaults without having to be instructed. In the beginning everything was patrimonial, everything was clientelistic.”

Fortunately, reality is not a coin, and we are not forced to choose heads or tails. Although it is true that clientelistic networks and practices may play a stabilizing role in certain lower- and middle-income countries at the early stages of the political development of democracy, it is also true that in the medium and long run they adversely affect the quality of democracy. Can countries simply “grow out of it?” Can clientelism substitute for citizenship? The available evidence seems to suggest that in the absence of an

effective strategy for combating political clientelism, it becomes a more powerful force. However, to use a game-theoretical analogy, citizens living in areas where clientelism is robust are faced with what could be considered suboptimal outcomes in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Thus patron-client relationships are inherently unstable and perhaps may contain the seeds of their own destruction. After all, have the current Latin American populist regimes—such as those of Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—not emerged in countries with strong pre-existing partisan clientelistic networks?

Policy Implications for Governments, Challenges for Civil Society

Given that social policies should remain at the forefront of the public-policy agenda, how can we best ensure that they are protected from the distortions of clientelism? The conference concluded with some tentative reflections about how best to address that challenge. Referring again to the prisoner’s dilemma analogy, what kind of a “cooperative” game can be triggered to produce a Pareto-optimal outcome—that is, one in which all players obtain the best socially feasible outcome?

Beatriz Magaloni offered a number of suggestions for policy makers. Development, certainly, is in the long run the surest bet. There are, however, other strategies that that will have a more immediate impact. These include portfolio diversification, better-designed political institutions, the strengthening of veto players to check politicians, and the “Ulyssean” resource of tying the hands of political elites until the sirens’ island is left behind.

Yet the solution cannot be left in the hands of the political system alone. Civil society has a role to play, and an important one. Orazio Belletini, in his concluding remarks, explored what civil society can do and how it can do it best. Ensuring the social citizenship of the dispossessed, without reducing them to clients in the process and thereby sacrificing their political citizenship, is a challenge that demands the concerted effort of reformist politicians and effective civil society organizations.

10. Inter-American Development Bank, *The Politics of Policies: Economic and Social Progress in Latin America—2006 Report* (Washington: IADB, 2005).

Participants

Diego Abente-Brun is the deputy director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy. Prior to joining the Forum, Mr. Abente-Brun served as a professor of sociology and politics at Catholic University in Asunción, Paraguay, where he had taught since 1994; as a senior research fellow at the Centro de Análisis y Difusión de la Economía Paraguaya; and as an associate professor of political science at Miami University from 1984 to 1992. Mr. Abente-Brun has published and edited several books, including *Latin America's Struggle for Democracy*, edited with Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner in 2008; *Estado, Economía y Sociedad: Una Mirada Internacional a la Democracia Paraguaya* (2005), edited by Fernando Masi; and *Stronismo, Post Stronismo, and the Prospects for Democratization in Paraguay* (1989). His work has also appeared in numerous academic journals, including the *Journal of Democracy*, *Comparative Politics*, the *Journal of Latin American Studies*, and the *Latin American Research Review*. In addition to his scholarly activities, he served as a senator from 1993 to 2003, Senior Cabinet Advisor to the Minister of Finance (2003–2005), Ambassador of Paraguay to the Organization of American States (1999–2002), and Minister of Justice and Labor (2002).

Javier Auyero is the Lozano Long Professor in Latin American Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin. He was previously a Guggenheim Fellow and served as the editor of *Qualitative Sociology* from 2004 to 2010. He has written four books: *Poor People's Politics* (Duke, 2000), *Contentious Lives* (Duke, 2003), *Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina* (Cambridge, 2007), and *Flammable: Environmental Suffering in an Argentine Shantytown* (with Débora Swistun, Oxford, 2009). In addition, he has published articles in journals including the *American Sociological Review*, *Theory and Society*, *Ethnography*, and the *Latin American Research Review*. His research has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the American Sociological Association. He is currently finishing a new manuscript entitled *Patients of the State*.

Orazio J. Bellettini is a social entrepreneur, public policy expert, and think tank manager. He graduated from the Escuela Agrícola Panamericana in Honduras with an engineering degree in agricultural economy and from the Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador (PUCE) with Master's degrees in political science and business administration. In 2004, he received an M.A. in public administration and public policy from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. Mr. Bellettini has trained graduate students, Ecuadorian mayors, and local government officials in local finances, development policies, and public reforms at PUCE, the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), and the University of Murcia, Spain. Mr. Bellettini has advised international agencies, civil society organizations, and governments in Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Paraguay. Mr. Bellettini is co-founder and executive director of Grupo FARO, a "think-and-do tank" that promotes the participation of citizens in the strengthening of the state and civil society through the design, promotion, and implementation of public policies that encourage equity and growth in Ecuador.

Ernesto F. Calvo is an associate professor of political science at the University of Maryland. His research focuses on the comparative study of electoral and legislative institutions. His work has appeared in numerous publications, including the *American Journal of Political Science*, *World Politics*, the *British Journal of Political Science*, *Desarrollo Económico*, *Política y Gobierno*, and other top journals in the U.S., Europe, and Latin America. He is currently conducting research on clientelistic networks in Latin America and finishing a book manuscript on *Legislator Success in Fragmented Congresses*.

Chris Chambers-Ju is a third-year graduate student in political science at the University of California at Berkeley. In 2009–2010 he served as a visiting scholar at the Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP) in Bogota, Colombia. He holds an M.A. in social science from the University of Chicago and has studied at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, Colombia, through the Fulbright program.

Kanchan Chandra, an associate professor of politics at New York University, is the author of *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed* (Cambridge, 2004), and articles on ethnicity, clientelism, democracy, and party politics in journals such as *Perspectives on Politics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Electoral Studies*, *Politics & Society* and the *Annual Review of Political Science*. She has just completed a collaborative manuscript entitled *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*, which attempts to distill constructivist approaches to ethnic identity into a set of testable propositions and incorporate them into theories of politics. She is currently working on two complementary books: *Measuring Ethnicity*, which establishes basic facts about the political mobilization of ethnic identities using cross-national data collected from a constructivist perspective, and *Ethnic Diversity and Democracy*, which reimagines the relationship between ethnic diversity and democracy from a constructivist perspective. She has recently been a Guggenheim Fellow, a Carnegie Scholar, a fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University, and a Russell Sage Foundation fellow. Her current work is supported by the National Science Foundation and the United States Institute of Peace.

Linda J. Cook is a professor of political science at Brown University, an associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University, and an associate at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Her main research interests are the politics of the Russian Federation and Central and Eastern Europe, comparative welfare states, political regimes, and representation. She is the author of *The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed* (Harvard, 1993), *Left Parties and Social Policy in Postcommunist Europe* (with Mitchell Orenstein and Marilyn Rueschemeyer, Westview Press, 1999), and *Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe* (Cornell, 2007), as well as articles in *Comparative Politics*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, and other publications. She is currently studying the effects of privatization and informalization of welfare in postcommunist states, and linkages between politics and welfare in electoral-authoritarian polities.

Larry Diamond is the director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University, where he is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the founding coeditor of the *Journal of Democracy* and a senior consultant at the International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy. During 2002–2003, he served as a consultant to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and was a contributing author of its report *Foreign Aid in the National Interest*. He has also advised and lectured to the World Bank, the United Nations, the State Department, and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies dealing with governance and development. His latest book, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World* (Times Books, 2008), explores the sources of global democratic progress and stress as well as the prospects for future democratic expansion.

Kent Eaton is a professor and chair of politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. He is the author of *Politicians and Economic Reform in New Democracies: Argentina and the Philippines in the 1990s* (Pennsylvania State, 2002) and *Politics Beyond the Capital: The Design of Subnational Institutions in South America* (Stanford, 2004). His publications on comparative politics in Latin America have appeared in *Comparative Politics*, the *Latin American Research Review*, *Politics & Society*, *Security Studies*, and *World Politics*. Mr. Eaton has also co-authored and coedited several recent monographs on decentralization, including *Making Decentralization Work: Democracy, Development and Security* (Lynne Rienner, 2010), *The Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook* (USAID, 2009), and *The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications for Aid Effectiveness* (World Bank, 2010).

Murilo Cassio Xavier Fahel is a professor and researcher of public policy at the School of Government at the João Pinheiro Foundation, as well as with the department of philosophy and humanities at the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. He also serves on the editorial board of the journal *Revista Três Pontos*. He holds Ph.D.s from the University of Texas and Universidade Federal

de Minas Gerais in public politics and sociology, as well as a Master's degree in health sciences. Mr. Fahel's primary research interests include social policy, public policy, health management, access to health insurance, and epidemiology.

Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University and resident in the Institute's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. He was previously the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, where he was also the director of SAIS's International Development Program. He has previously held positions at the RAND Corporation, George Mason University, and the U.S. Department of State, where he served as deputy director for European political-military affairs. Widely published on issues related to democratization and international political economy, Mr. Fukuyama is the author of the books *Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap between Latin America and the United States* (Oxford, 2008), *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (Yale, 2006), and *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press, 1992). He holds a B.A. from Cornell University in classics and a Ph.D. from Harvard University in political science.

Christian Gruenberg is a feminist lawyer, co-founder of the Coalición por la Diversidad, and member of Lesbians and Feminists for the Decriminalization of Abortion. He has worked to advance the implementation of policies for transparency in public bidding processes, political financing, targeted social programs, and the allocation of public subsidies to the private sector. His current projects address this field from a feminist perspective and seek to denaturalize the androcentric bias and heteropatriarchal violence that crosses the design and implementation of public policies. Mr. Gruenberg studied law at the University of Buenos Aires and public policy at the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Chile and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Paul D. Hutchcroft is the director of the School of International, Political, and Strategic Studies (IPS) at the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University and holds a concurrent appointment as professor of political and social change. He is a scholar of comparative and Southeast Asian politics who has written extensively on the Philippines. His research interests include state formation and territorial politics, the politics of patronage, political reform and democratic quality, state-society relations, structures of governance, political economy, and corruption. He is the author of *Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines* (Cornell, 1998) and is currently completing a manuscript entitled *The Power of Patronage: Capital and Countryside in the Philippines from 1900 to 2010*.

Steven Levitsky is a professor of government at Harvard University. His research interests include political parties, political regimes and regime change, and the causes and consequences of institutional weakness, with a focus on Latin America. He is the author of *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, 2003) and coeditor of *Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness* (Pennsylvania State, 2005) and *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America* (Johns Hopkins, 2006). His most recent book, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (with Lucan Way, Cambridge, 2010), focuses on the rise and diverging fates of competitive authoritarian regimes in contemporary Africa, Asia, Latin America, and postcommunist Eurasia. He is coediting a book with Kenneth Roberts on the rise of the Left in Latin America in the 2000s.

Juan Pablo Luna is an associate professor of political science at the Catholic University of Chile and the coordinator for the Chilean chapter of the Latin American Public Opinion Project/AmericasBarometer survey, run by Vanderbilt University. Previously, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center's Latin American Program and a visiting associate professor at Princeton University. Mr. Luna's research interests include the analysis of political parties and party systems, the nature of political repre-

sensation, and the political effects of social and economic inequality. His work has appeared in *Comparative Political Studies*, *Política y Gobierno*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, the *International Political Science Review*, *Third World Quarterly*, the *Journal of Latin American Studies*, and the *Journal of Democracy*. In 2010, along with Herbert Kitschelt, Kirk Hawkins, Guillermo Rosas, and Elizabeth Zechmeister, he published the book *Latin American Party Systems* (Cambridge).

Beatriz Magaloni is an associate professor of political science at Stanford University. She is also a faculty associate at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, where she coordinates the Program on Poverty, Inequality and Democracy. Before joining Stanford's faculty in 2001, Ms. Magaloni served as a visiting adjunct professor at the University of California, Los Angeles; as a research fellow at Harvard's Government Department; and as a professor and director of political science at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). In 2007, her book, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico* (Cambridge, 2006), won the Leon Epstein Award for the best book published in the previous two years in the area of political parties and organizations. It also won the best book award given by the Comparative Democratization section of the American Political Science Association. Her articles on Mexican politics, clientelism, poverty reduction, rule of law, crime, and authoritarian politics have appeared in numerous books and academic journals. She is currently finishing a book manuscript, *Strategies of Vote-Buying: Poverty, Democracy, and Social Transfers in Mexico* (with Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Federico Estévez), and working on various projects on the effects of governance on public good provision, infant mortality, and women's well-being.

M. Victoria Murillo is an associate professor of political science and international affairs at Columbia University. She is the author of *Political Competition, Partisanship, and Policy-Making in Latin American Public Utilities* (Cambridge, 2009) and *Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and*

Market Reforms in Latin America (Cambridge, 2001); and the coeditor of *Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness* (Pennsylvania State, 2005) and *Discutir Alfonsín* (Siglo XXI, 2010). Ms. Murillo has been published in journals including *World Politics*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Comparative Politics*, and *Comparative Political Studies*. Her current research projects involve the study of electoral behavior and political linkages between voters and parties, regulatory politics in privatized public utilities, public opinion on economic policy, and the causes and consequences of institutional weakness.

Simeon Nichter is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. He also serves as a non-residential postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Global Development. Mr. Nichter holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, an MPA in international development from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and a B.A. in economics from Carleton College. His ongoing research explores the political voice of poor and marginalized populations in emerging democracies, with a particular emphasis on Latin America. He examines how politicians offer material benefits to the poor in exchange for political support, and investigates how individuals' vote choices affect subsequent access to services. He has recently published articles in the *American Political Science Review*, *Comparative Political Studies*, the *Review of Economics and Statistics*, and *World Development*.

Andrea Ordóñez is research director at Grupo FARO, where she manages the articulation of the institutional research agenda. She is currently researching the use of evidence in the policy-making process in Ecuador. Previously, she directed the study of public finance at Grupo FARO, where she focused on developing research on Ecuador's fiscal policy and oil sector. In 2006, she participated in the initiative to prevent clientelism in social programs. She holds a Masters in economic development from the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) in Ecuador.

Marc F. Plattner is the director of the Interna-

tional Forum for Democratic Studies, coeditor of the *Journal of Democracy*, and vice president for research and studies at the National Endowment for Democracy. Prior to joining the Endowment in 1984, Mr. Plattner was a fellow at the National Humanities Center in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, an advisor on economic and social affairs at the United States Mission to the United Nations, and managing editor of *The Public Interest*, a quarterly journal on public policy. He is the author of *Democracy Without Borders? Global Challenges to Liberal Democracy* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) and *Rousseau's State of Nature* (1979), a study of the political thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Over the past two decades, he has coedited almost twenty books on contemporary issues relating to democracy, including, most recently, *How People View Democracy* (2008); *Latin America's Struggle for Democracy* (2008); and *The State of India's Democracy* (2007). His articles on a wide range of international and public policy issues have appeared in numerous books and journals.

Martín Tanaka is an associate professor at Pontificia Universidad Católica of Peru and principal investigator at the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP). He was a visiting postdoctoral fellow at the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame in 2003 and 2009. He is also a weekly columnist for the newspaper *La República* in Lima. Mr. Tanaka's recent publications include the articles "How Does a Democracy with a Weak Party System Work?: The Peruvian Case" and "La Dinámica 'Neodualista' de una Democracia sin Sistema de Partidos: La Situación de la Democracia en el Perú" ("The Neodualist Dynamics of a Democracy without a Party System: The Situation of Democracy in Peru"). He also recently edited a 2010 book entitled *El Estado, Viejo Desconocido. Visiones del Estado en el Perú* (The State, Old and Unknown. Visions of the State in Peru), published by IEP.

Nicolas van de Walle is a professor of government at Cornell University and a non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development. He taught at Michigan State University from 1990–2004. He has published widely on democratization issues

as well as on the politics of economic reform, the effectiveness of foreign aid, and political clientelism, all with a special focus on sub-Saharan Africa. His books include *Overcoming Stagnation in Aid-Dependent Countries* (Center for Global Development, 2005), *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999* (Cambridge, 2001), and *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspectives* (with Michael Bratton, Cambridge 1997). In addition, Mr. van de Walle has worked extensively as a consultant for a variety of international and multilateral organizations, including the World Bank, USAID, and UNDP.

Conference Program

Friday, November 5

10:00–10:30 Opening Remarks

Orazio Bellettini, Grupo FARO

Diego Abente-Brun, International Forum for Democratic Studies

10:30–12:00 SESSION I: Towards a Conceptual Framework

Presenter: Javier Auyero, University of Texas

Commentator: Steven Levitsky, Harvard University

Chair: Marc F. Plattner, International Forum for Democratic Studies

12:15–14:00 Lunch Break

14:00–15:45 SESSION II: Latin America I

Presenter: Victoria Murillo, Columbia University

Presenter: Juan Pablo Luna, Catholic University of Chile

Presenter: Simeon Nichter, Stanford University

Commentator: Murilo Cássio Xavier Fahel, University of Minas Gerais and Fundacao Joao Pinheiro

Chair: Diego Abente, International Forum for Democratic Studies

15:45–16:15 Coffee Break

16:15–18:00 SESSION III: Latin America II

Presenter: Martin Tanaka, IEP

Presenter: Kent Eaton and Chris Chambers-Ju, University of California, Santa Cruz

Presenter: Christian Gruenberg, Coalición por la Diversidad

Commentator: Diego Abente-Brun, International Forum for Democratic Studies

Chair: Orazio Bellettini, Grupo FARO

19:15–21:30 Dinner at El Ventanal de San Juan

Saturday, November 6

09:30–11:15 SESSION IV: Lessons from Other Regions

Presenter: Paul D. Hutchcroft, The Australian National University

Presenter: Kanchan Chandra, New York University

Commentator: Francis Fukuyama, Stanford University

Chair: Beatriz Magaloni, Stanford University

11:30–11:45 Coffee Break

11:45–13:00 SESSION V: Lessons from Other Regions II

Presenter: Nicholas van de Walle, Cornell University

Presenter: Linda Cook, Brown University

Commentator: Marc F. Plattner, International Forum for Democratic Studies

Chair: Steve Levitsky, Harvard University

13:00–15:00 Lunch Break

15:00–17:00 SESSION VI: Inferences, Lessons and Policy Implications: A Comparative Exercise

Chair: Larry Diamond, Stanford University

Andrea Ordóñez, Grupo FARO

Beatriz Magaloni, Stanford University

19:15–21:30 Dinner at Mea Culpa



www.ndri.ned.org